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In 2010, Was Homeland Security Useful?
Christopher Bellavita
ABSTRACT:
The failure  of public  safety disciplines  to 
prevent the September 11,  2001 attack gave 
“homeland security” its  chance to emerge 
as a competing paradigm for organizing 
the nation’s  security. But the other 
disciplines  that contribute to the homeland 
security enterprise  have not simply waited 
for this  new  discipline to emerge.  They 
responded to the twenty-first century’s 
national security threats  by getting better 
at what they do. They may be eliminating 
the need for homeland security as a distinct 
public safety/national security  paradigm. 
At the end of 2010, we were better 
prepared as a nation to prevent attacks 
and respond to disasters than we were  a 
decade ago. But that progress may have 
more to do with the work of homeland 
security practitioners  than with homeland 
security intellectuals. If homeland security 
is  to become a useful academic  and 
p r o f e s s i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e ,  i t h a s t o 
demonstrate how  looking at enduring 
problems through a homeland security 
framework adds significant value not 
provided by other disciplines. 
What do the concept of homeland 
security  and the intellectual program 
surrounding that  concept actually 
contribute to the nation’s security?  
Since 2004  I have asked each new 
homeland security  class at the Naval 
Postgraduate School what is working in 
homeland security  and what needs to be 
improved. I ask the questions again 
eighteen months later when they  are 
about to graduate. 
Over  the years, the answers to both 
questions – and at  both times – tend to 
constellate around the same issues:
• Collaboration — among people,
agencies,  disciplines, jurisdictions
and increasingly, nations;
• I n f o r m a t i o n s h a r i n g a n d
intelligence;
• Preventing terrorism  – arising from
international and domestic sources;
• Preparedness – in its many  guises,
including most recently “resilience”;
• Transportation security  – aviation,
rail, other public transportation;
• Border control – northern, southern
and coastal;
• Illegal immigration;
• Technology  – its role in homeland
security; what problems it solves and
creates;
• Risk management – to include risk
assessment and risk informed
decision-making;
• Resources – where they  come from,
how they  are allocated, how they  are
used to sustain progress;
• Critical infrastructure protection –
the interface between public and
private sectors;
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• Leadership – at all levels in  the 
homeland security enterprise.
Our master’s degree participants – all 
of whom  work in a homeland security-
related public safety  discipline – believe 
the nation is continuously  improving its 
ability  to prevent attacks, respond to 
disasters, and recover from  a variety  of 
incidents.  They  also believe we have 
much more work to do,  work that will 
never be completed.
As I reviewed what happened in  the 
homeland security  enterprise during 
2010, and compared that  with previous 
“Year in  Review” articles, I saw 
something similar  to what  our master’s 
participants observed. 1  Most of the 
issues that helped to define homeland 
security  have remained fairly  consistent 
over the past five years:  
• The meaning of homeland 
security, 
• The nature of the threat, 
• Surprise (ant ic ipat ing and 
responding to), and 
• The strategic approaches to 
achieving the various homeland 
security missions. 
Those concerns – along with the 
other issues noted above – outline what 
I consider  to be the enduring problems 
in homeland security. The dynamic 
contours of the homeland security 
enterprise are shaped largely  by  the 
shifting attention and neglect these 
issues receive.2
 I have little doubt  we are better 
prepared as a  nation to prevent attacks 
and respond to disasters than we were 
on September 10, 2001. But it seems to 
me most of that progress has more to do 
with  the work of homeland security 
artisans – practitioners skilled in both 
the practice and theory  of what they  do 
– than homeland security intellectuals.3
P u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e s e c t o r 
professionals, exercising the knowledge 
and ski l l s they  earned through 
discipline-specific training, education, 
and experience make the nation safer 
and more secure than it was a decade 
ago.  
It  is less apparent to me what value 
“homeland security” as a distinct – 
albeit st i l l emerging – body  of 
knowledge or discipline has contributed 
to that progress.
If homeland security  is to become a 
useful academic and professional 
discipline, I think it has to demonstrate 
how looking at  enduring problems 
through  a homeland security  framework 
adds significant value not provided by 
other disciplines. If it is unable to 
demonstrate value, homeland security 
may  devolve into a legacy  concept,  like 
the now largely  forgotten idea of civil 
defense.4
Homeland Security as a Discipline
The idea of homeland security  as a 
distinct discipline took root  initially 
because of the federal government’s 
reaction to September 11, 2001. The 
homeland secur i ty  concept was 
premised on the assumption that public 
safety  disciplines operated too much in 
isolation from  each other. That 
separation created vulnerabilities al 
Qaeda exploited.5   Homeland security 
was supposed to prevent something like 
that from ever happening again.6
Shortly  after the government acted, 
some educational institutions explored 
whether  there was – or  could be – 
enough substance in the homeland 
security  idea to construct an academic 
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discipline around its constituent 
concerns.7  By  2010, more than 200 
colleges and universities (as well as a 
few  high schools) offered courses and 
programs in homeland security.8
An academic discipline minimally 
requires:
• A set of problems to work on;
• A body  of knowledge to apply  to 
those problems;
• Scientifically  legitimate research 
about the problems;
• Textbooks that aggregate the core 
knowledge of the discipline;
• Programs to educate students at the 
undergraduate and graduate levels, 
including developing PhD programs 
to advance knowledge in the field.9
I believe people interested in 
homeland security  as a  potential 
academic discipline have made modest 
advances in each of those areas, with the 
possible exception of educating 
homeland security PhDs.
But the other disciplines that 
contribute to the homeland security 
enterprise have not simply  stood around 
waiting for a  new discipline to emerge.10 
They  responded to the twenty-first 
century’s national security  threats by 
getting better  at what they  do. They  may 
be eliminating  the need for homeland 
security  as a distinct public safety/
national security paradigm.
I still believe there is a place for 
homeland security  as a  professional and 
intellectual discipline. But it is a belief 
based increasingly  more on faith  than 
evidence.11
Homeland Security and Paradigms 
As has been argued e lsewhere , 
homeland security  can be seen as a pre-
paradigm discipline.12  In the world of 
practice and in the academy, it must 
compete against the more mature 
perspectives offered by  the other 
disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise.
Thomas Kuhn uses “paradigm” in two 
senses that I will adapt for this essay. 13
A paradigm symbolizes: 1) the entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, [and] 
techniques… shared by members of a 
given community [of practice].
A paradigm  describes the: 2) concrete 
puzzle solutions which, employed as 
models or examples, can replace explicit 
rules  as the basis for the solution of the 
remaining puzzles of normal science.
Translated into a homeland security 
context, a paradigm is a fundamental 
way  of thinking about a discipline’s 
theories and practices. Each traditional 
discipline in the homeland security 
e n t e r p r i s e ( f o r e x a m p l e l a w 
enforcement, emergency  management, 
fire service, public health, and so on) has 
particular knowledge, skills, and 
preferred ways to think about the issues 
its members attend to. Because “each 
group uses its own paradigm  to argue in 
that paradigm’s defense,” 14  paradigms 
provide raw material for constructing 
the d isc ip l inary  s tovepipes one 
continues to find within the homeland 
security enterprise.
The second part of Kuhn’s definition 
refers to a discipline’s “best practices.” 
For  example,  some people believe the 
incident command system  and its 
National Incident Management System 
extension should be the foundational 
model for  all incident response. The 
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National Response Framework holds a 
s imi lar posi t ion as disc ipl inary 
exemplar. Both models provide general 
solutions to a  broad set of problems; 
they do not provide inviolate rules.15
Each of what can be termed the 
part ic ipat ing homeland security 
disciplines brings with it  an “articulated 
body  of problems” and a commitment to 
use particular  values, knowledge, skills 
and practices to (i.e., paradigms) to 
address those problems.16
F o r t h e r o u t i n e p r o b l e m s 
practitioners encounter,  they  can use 
their discipline’s “normal science,” 17 
tested and proven behaviors that reflect 
successful solutions to similar  problems. 
This approach works as long as 
practitioners face “tame problems,” 
situations characterized by  relatively 
well-defined problems, obvious stopping 
points, and solutions that  can be 
objectively  judged as right  or wrong.18 
The strategies are less effective for 
“wicked problems”: ambiguously 
defined situations generated by  nested 
socia l and pol i t ica l complexity , 
disagreements about  what a solution 
looks like, and so on.19   
The most intractable issues in the 
homeland security  enterprise are related 
more closely  to wicked problems than to 
tame ones, constraining the ability  of 
traditional disciplines to apply  normal 
problem solving  methods to enduring 
problems.20
But looked at from  the perspective of 
someone who is not an advocate for 
homeland security  as a discipline, one 
could argue there are very  few public 
safety  activities undertaken after 
September 11, 2001  that  were not done 
in some form  prior  to the attack. 
Information was being shared – maybe 
not  as effectively  as it  could have been, 
but  it was being  shared. Agencies were 
collaborating. Grants were being 
awarded and spent. Plans were being 
written and exercised. Lessons were 
being learned and incorporated into new 
procedures.  Each discipline was 
practicing its version of normal science.
The central difference between then 
and a decade later  is all those practices 
have improved across the board. Yes 
t h e r e i s r o o m  f o r a d d i t i o n a l 
improvement. But critical security 
practices in this nation are better  than 
they  used to be.  That  progress may  be 
enough to obviate the need for a  distinct 
homeland security discipline.
Is There a Need 
for a New Paradigm?
What would justify  bringing a new 
paradigm into an enterprise that may  no 
longer need it? What, asks Kuhn, causes 
a community  to abandon one paradigm 
for another? What must people do “to 
convert  the entire profession… to their 
way of seeing science and the world?” 21
Existing paradigms (represented in 
this discussion by  traditional public 
s a f e t y  d i s c i p l i n e s ) c o n t i n u e 
u n c h a l l e n g e d a s l o n g a s t h e y 
satisfactorily  address the problems they 
face. “Paradigm  testing  occurs only  after 
persistent failure to solve a noteworthy 
puzzle has given rise to a crisis.” 22
 September 11,  2001  was the initial 
crisis that  opened the door  to homeland 
security  as a potential new discipline. 
Hurricane Katrina created a second 
crisis. Pandemic flu  (H1N1) created 
another opportunity  for homeland 
s e c u r i t y  t o s t e p f o r w a r d a n d 
demonstrate how  the framework it 
provides is in any  way  superior to 
traditional security  approaches. That 
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(arguably  unrealized) opportunity  may 
be vanishing.
Paradigm change begins with 
anomalies: when gaps arise between 
expectations about what  should happen 
and the reality  of what actually  does 
happen. Anomalies typically  have to be 
“sufficiently  fundamental”  to invoke the 
unease and dissatisfaction that leads to 
the next step in paradigm change: a 
crisis.23
“Sometimes,”  notes Kuhn, “an 
anomaly  will  clearly  call into question 
explicit  and fundamental generalizations 
of [a  dominant paradigm].24  But an 
anomaly  does not always have to 
challenge fundamentals before it sparks 
a change.  If the normal science practiced 
by  a discipline inhibits important  work, 
the anomaly  is worthy  of “concerted 
scrutiny.”
“When… an anomaly  comes to seem 
more than just another puzzle of normal 
science [that can be solved using 
existing frameworks], the transition to 
crisis… has begun.”25
Said less elegantly, when business as 
usual gets in the way  of doing  what 
needs to be accomplished, it may  be 
time to challenge basic assumptions. 
This is precisely  what homeland security 
as an intellectual framework was 
supposed to do.
Is the Nation Over 
its Security Crisis?
Efforts to address what I called the 
enduring problems of homeland security 
can be seen from  a “glass half-full”  and a 
“glass half-empty” perspective.
Is the nation (as a  whole) generally 
content with the incremental progress 
made in addressing many  of the 
enduring problems outlined at the start 
of this essay  and visible in the hundreds 
of homeland security-related incidents 
and activities that occurred in 2010?26 
Or is there a significant demand for 
more substantial and more rapid 
improvement  in most, if not all those 
areas?
Anomalies morph into crises (“the 
common awareness that  something 
important  has gone wrong”)27 when the 
normal way  of dealing with problems is 
unsatisfactory. The “failure of existing 
rules [to solve problems] is a prelude to 
a search for new ones.” 28 
With the exception of continuing – 
and important  – problems at  the 
southern border and with aviation 
security, I am not aware of significant 
national dissatisfaction during 2010 
with  existing rules for  addressing the 
enduring problems. The traditional 
disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise, relying on their normal (and 
improved) paradigms, may  have passed 
through  last decade’s doubts about the 
appropriateness of their conceptual 
dominance. 
An outcome like that is compatible 
with  Kuhn’s claim about  how  paradigm 
crises end.29
Sometimes existing paradigms 
eventually  solve or ameliorate the 
problems that provoked a crisis. 
As one example, in 2010 – and after 
some controversy  – fusion centers 
improved their ability  to balance 
information sharing and privacy 
protection.30  This kind of gradual 
improvement based largely  on trial, 
error, and correction happens routinely 
throughout homeland security.
Sometimes problems resist almost all 
attempts at solution and the “problem is 
… set aside for a future generation with 
more developed tools.”31  
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One could argue many  important 
homeland security-related issues have 
so far been impervious to solutions: for 
i n s t a n c e ,  t r y i n g t o m e a s u r e 
preparedness in a way  that will satisfy 
congress and accountants; figuring out 
how to formally  incorporate social 
media into prevention and response 
activities; reducing illegal immigration; 
controlling the southern, northern, and 
coastal borders; and reducing the 
number  of congressional committees 
that have a stake in homeland security. 
Perhaps these problems are best left to 
future generations of (homeland 
security?) scholars and practitioners to 
address.
A crisis might also end, writes Kuhn, 
“with the emergence of a  new candidate 
for  paradigm  and with the ensuing 
battle over its acceptance.”32  
Here is how that part of the change 
process works:33 
A new interpretation of some part  of 
the world “emerges first  in the mind of 
one or a few  individuals.”   These are 
men and women who typically  are new 
to an enterprise, and who are attracted 
by a “crisis provoking” problem.34
Applied to homeland security,  this 
might  refer  to undergraduate and 
graduate students who study  homeland 
s e c u r i t y , a n d t o s c h o l a r s a n d 
practitioners who may  be at the 
sociological margins of one of the 
traditional disciplines: people who for a 
variety  of reasons are not satisfied with 
the established way  of addressing 
national security  concerns. Because they 
are either comparatively  new to the field 
or  are dissatisfied with existing 
approaches,  they  are less committed to a 
traditional discipline’s ways of thinking 
about and working on issues.
The failure of existing disciplines – 
and the paradigms they  embody  – to 
prevent the September 11, 2001  attack 
gave “homeland security”  its chance to 
emerge as a competing paradigm  for 
organizing  the nation’s security. 
Homeland security  acted as a  symbolic 
catalyst to trigger reflection and change 
in  traditional disciplines. Maybe the 
homeland security  concept has served 
its social purpose. Maybe it  has 
contributed all it reasonable can to the 
question of how to establish a  more 
secure nation.
Are We Finished 
with Homeland Security?
Thomas Kuhn wrote, “The single most 
prevalent claim  advanced by  the 
proponents of a new paradigm is that 
they  can solve problems that have led 
the old [paradigms] to a crisis.” 35
That assertion creates a fair test for 
advocates of a homeland security 
paradigm:  How does a homeland 
security  perspective (whatever  that may 
mean in practice) help solve any  of the 
enduring problems outlined at the start 
of this essay? How are ideas derived 
from that perspective superior to the 
approaches championed by  other 
disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise?  
Kuhn also wrote, “In the development 
of a scientific field…a number of schools 
[of thought] compete for domination…. 
[In] the wake of some notable scientific 
achievement, the number of schools is 
greatly  reduced…and a more efficient 
mode of…practice begins.”36  
This provides another  test for 
homeland security’s claim to be a 
discipline: What have been its notable 
scientific achievements?
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To the best of my  knowledge, there 
have been no notable scientif ic 
achievements – either  theoretical or 
practical – as a result of looking at 
security-related issues from a homeland 
security  academic or  intellectual 
framework.
But one can ask the same question of 
l a w e n f o r c e m e n t , f i r e s e r v i c e s , 
emergency  management, public health 
and the other allied disciplines – and get 
the same answer.  There have been no 
notable scientific achievements over the 
past decade (that I am  aware of) 
generated by  their traditional paradigms 
that suggest any  of homeland security’s 
enduring problems will soon disappear.
I believe the opportunity  remains for 
a “homeland security  perspective” to 
make distinct  and valuable intellectual 
contributions to national security.  But I 
do not  think it has much time to 
convincingly demonstrate its utility.
Where to From Here?
I get my  persisting belief in the potential 
of homeland security  – and in the 
difficulty  it faces realizing that potential 
– from Thomas Kuhn’s historical 
analysis.
Philosophers of science have repeatedly 
demonstrated that more than  one 
theoretical  construction  can  always be 
placed upon a  given  collection  of data. 
History  of science indicates that, 
particularly  in  the early  developmental 
stages of a  new  paradigm,  it  is not  even 
very  difficult to invent such  alternates. 
But  that  invention  of alternates is just 
what  scientists seldom  undertake 
except during  the pre-paradigm  stage of 
their  science’s development  and at very 
special [crises] occasions during  its 
subsequent  evolution. So long as the 
tools a  paradigm  supplies continue to 
prove capable of solving  problems it 
defines,  science moves fastest and 
penetrates most  deeply  through 
confident employment  of those tools. 
The reason  is clear.  As in  manufacture 
so in  science – retooling  is an 
extravagance to be reserved for  the 
occas ion  that  demands i t .  The 
significance of crises is the indication 
they  provide that an occasion  for 
retooling has arrived.” 37 
I believe a homeland security 
perspective can be the means to retool 
significant parts of public safety  for  the 
twenty-first century.  
Here is a path  I think those who are 
committed to homeland security  as a 
distinct discipline might  productively 
travel. Some of these activities already 
are underway. 
1. Clarify  the set of problems the 
discipline does and should work on: 
what we know about causes, 
consequences, and approaches to 
addressing those issues.
2. Clarify  the foundational knowledge 
to be applied to those problems. 
This work should also incorporate 
categories Kuhn outlines in his 
“disciplinary matrix:”38
• Shared va lues and ethica l 
principles;
• Symbolic generalizations that 
(potentially) unite the discipline 
[ e . g . , R i s k = ƒ ( T h r e a t , 
Vulnerability, Consequence)];
• Shared commitments to certain 
beliefs, analogies, and metaphors;
• Shared examples and cases that 
students encounter  from the start 
of their  homeland security 
education demonstrating how 
homeland security  work is done, 
and highlighting the link between 
problem and solution;
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3. Systematically  gather and feature 
exemplars of quality  homeland 
security research;
4. Write textbooks that feature the 
discipline’s core knowledge;
5. Educate homeland security PhDs.
On December  30, 2010, “Wired 
Science” featured the top scientific 
breakthroughs of 2010. The article 
reminded readers that in 2010 scientists 
made a  reasonable interpretation of the 
color  of a dinosaur, created a synthetic 
self-replicating form of life,  decoded 
another drug resistant  superbug, 
produced a human embryo with genetic 
material from three parents,  created an 
HIV drug that seems to have remarkable 
success, and found millions of tons of 
water on the moon. 39
In future years, perhaps beginning in 
2 0 1 1 , I h o p e w e c a n r e p o r t 
breakthroughs in homeland security 
equally as dramatic.
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26 I think the best, and most easily available, source for watching the changing dynamics of homeland security is the Homeland Security Institute’s weekly 
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With a Disaster, Pain is Inevitable,
but Suffering is Optional
Sharon L. Caudle & Ernest Broussard, Jr.
ABSTRACT:
Hurricane Ike’s winds  and storm surge 
devastated rural coastal communities  of 
Texas  and Louisiana, many still recovering 
from  severe damage caused by past Gulf 
Coast hurricanes, particularly  Hurricane 
Rita in 2005. Rural coastal community 
leaders, still in the midst of repairing 
Hurricane Rita’s damage, faced swiftly 
restoring basic critical infrastructure  and 
residential services as  well as  longer-term 
political, social, and economic recovery and 
redevelopment efforts.  Lack  of progress  at 
any level could hold back  community 
resurgence.  Despite “bare bones” rural-
area government structure and personnel 
capacity, these rural coastal communities 
have factors  that can mediate or mitigate 
the impact of a large storm  or other 
disaster.  This  article  draws on the 
experiences of Cameron Parish,  Louisiana, 
to  illustrate the factors of (1)  a history and 
culture of self-reliance and independence; 
(2) close-knit,  committed individual
communities; (3) the  continued blows of
devastating hurricanes; (4) a leader and
organization point for resiliency efforts; (5)
a robust recovery and redevelopment plan;
(6) restoration of housing; and (7)  visible
recovery, rebuilding, and re-visioning.
INTRODUCTION
I n t h e e a r l y  m o r n i n g h o u r s o f 
September 13, 2008, Hurricane Ike 
made landfall over  Galveston Island, 
Texas.  The National Hurricane Center 
described Hurricane Ike as a very  large 
and dangerous storm. Its winds 
extended outward from  the storm’s 
center up to 115 miles, with  tropical 
storm-force winds out to 275 miles. 
Storm surges ranged from ten to twenty 
feet  above normal tide levels. The 
hurricane-force winds and storm surge 
d e v a s t a t e d l o c a l r u r a l c o a s t a l 
communities in Texas and Louisiana, 
many  still recovering from  severe 
damage caused by  past Gulf Coast 
hurricanes, particularly  Hurricane Rita 
in 2005.
Rural coastal community  leaders, still 
in  the midst  of repairing  Hurricane 
Rita’s damage, confronted a Gordian 
knot of issues and problems after 
Hurricane Ike. Conflicting community 
stakeholder  perspectives and desires, 
government land-use and rebuilding 
expectations, funding limitations and 
delays, and uncertainty  over  the return 
of residents and businesses displaced by 
the storm presented ongoing challenges. 
In practical terms, immediate recovery 
following Hurricane Ike required swiftly 
restoring basic critical infrastructure 
and resident services, as was the case 
after  Hurricane Rita. Sufficient  basic 
services, such as water  and sewage, and 
other necessary  infrastructure such 
retail establishments and close-by 
temporary  housing, were vital if 
displaced residents were to quickly  find 
or keep jobs and rebuild. 
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Longer-term  political,  social,  and 
economic recovery  and redevelopment 
efforts clearly  would be complicated by 
another  set of factors. Competition with 
other devastated communities for  scarce 
resources so soon after  other  major 
storms, intricate insurance claim 
processing and ultimate payment, and 
government disaster and high-risk 
policy  changes and interpretations at all 
levels could hold back community 
resurgence. At  the “point of the spear” 
for disaster  recovery  and redevelopment 
was what even in the best of times was a 
“bare bones” rural-area government 
structure and personnel capacity. Still, 
rural coastal communities have factors 
that can mediate or mitigate the impact 
of a  large storm  or other disaster. 
I n d e e d , t h e c o m m u n i t i e s m a y 
aggressively  take advantage of the 
disaster’s “window of opportunity”  to 
build a new community  future through 
recovery  and redevelopment, not simply 
restore the past. 
The rural coastal region of Cameron 
Parish, Louisiana, is a  good illustration 
of lessons other communities might 
consider.  This article draws on the 
experiences of Ernest Broussard, the 
executive director  of the Cameron Parish 
Planning & Development Office and 
responsible for  parish recovery  and 
resilience consensus building, planning, 
and strategy  implementation. The article 
also reflects graduate student recovery 
research projects headed by  Sharon 
Caudle, a faculty  member of The Bush 
School of Government and Public 
Service, for Cameron Parish and Bolivar 
Peninsula, Texas. The research projects 
were funded by  the Bush-Clinton 
Coastal Recovery Fund.
Hurricanes Rita and Ike devastated 
the parish in two ferocious blows a few 
years apart. The parish operated from a 
position of strength in that  it took 
advantage of Hurricane Rita  experiences 
and planning. After Hurricane Ike, the 
parish  immediately  moved from  short-
term, basic service recovery  activities to 
l o n g e r - t e r m  r e c o v e r y  a n d 
redevelopment strategies. As Mr. 
Broussard said,  the par ish and 
individual communities agreed that an 
overarching principle should be,  “with a 
disaster,  pain is inevitable, but suffering 
is optional.”1 The parish certainly  knew 
Hurricane Ike would cause extensive 
immediate pain to residents and 
businesses,  but there was no need to 
have prolonged suffering. What emerged 
was an entirely  new  vision of Cameron 
Parish’s future and opportunities for a 
better  quality  of life,  starting with a 




R e c o v e r y  a n d r e d e v e l o p m e n t  – 
resiliency  – following a major  disaster 
has received extensive coverage in the 
literature and in government policies 
and guidelines at all levels. Books such 
as those of Brian Walker and David 
Salt,2 and Charlie Edwards,3 join journal 
articles and other  government material, 
including the National Infrastructure 
Advisory  Council’s 2009 report on 
critical infrastructure resilience and the 
Federal Emergency  Management 
Agency’s draft  National Disaster 
Recovery Framework.4  These sources 
and others touch on shock absorption 
and functionality  as central to resiliency 
or, for purposes of this article, recovery 
and redevelopment. Walker  and Salt, 
and Sonia McManus and others,5 talk of 
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a system’s capacity  to absorb sudden 
change or  disturbances and still retain 
its structure and functionality.   Edwards 
defined resilience as “the capacity  of an 
individual, community  or  system  to 
adapt in order to sustain an acceptable 
level of function, structure, and 
identity.” 6  Fran Norris and others 
describe resilience in terms of dynamic 
resources, including robustness in 
w i t h s t a n d i n g s t r e s s w i t h o u t 
degradat ion , redundancy  where 
disruption or  degradation is countered 
with substitutable elements, and 
rapidity  to achieve goals in a timely 
manner. 7  These definitions implicitly 
recognize the need to identify  and 
understand what sudden changes, 
disturbances, or shocks might be 
encountered.
Timothy  Beatley  emphasizes the 
characteristics of adaptation, arguing 
that creative adaptation, learning, 
stronger  social and community  systems, 
and processes and mechanisms support 
effective response and recovery.8  Past 
responses such as “armoring”  a 
community  must give way  to resilience 
and adaptability. Both he and Thomas 
Birkland highl ight  the learning 
opportunity  of focusing events like 
d i s a s t e r a n d p o l i c y  f a i l u r e s i n 
responding to the event. 9  Beatley  also 
emphasizes resilience as the principle 
guiding decisions of development, 
growth, and infrastructure that do not 
return to a  former condition, but instead 
move to a  new, hopefully  improved, and 
decidedly different set of circumstances.
Recovery and Redevelopment 
Characteristics
Specific characteristics of organizations, 
communities, or systems appear to 
provide very  useful guides to better 
understand a community’s recovery  and 
redevelopment goals and strategies, 
such  as those of Cameron Parish. A 
summary  of characteristics is shown in 
Table 1. These characteristics were 
drawn from a variety of sources.10
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Category Characteristics
Vision and Planning • A compelling vision of the future
• Planning ahead for long-term community sustainability and unusual post  disaster 
opportunities; account for interdependencies of key risk factors
• An integrated, multi-hazard approach to disaster risk reduction recognizing 
relevant hazards and when they are imminent
• Redevelopment fundamentals and practices minimizing the community’s risk, 
such as guiding growth and development away from high-risk locations and 
decentralizing infrastructures
• Phases of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction used as windows of 
opportunity to build community resilience to future disaster risks





• Critical infrastructure, ecosystems and ecological infrastructure, and culture 
resources preserved, restored, and protected
• Adequate performance of vital structures, systems, and functions
• Key production and generation resources shifted to viable alternative sources 




• Informed, coordinated, and facilitative leadership in all sectors and throughout 
phases of the recovery process
• Tribal, state, and local governments with primary responsibility for community 
recovery and the lead role in planning and authority
• Effective functioning, interaction, coordination, training, and policy guidance 
unity of effort between levels of government and other sectors
• The community’s crisis situation management  and operational capabilities 
measured, tested, and assessed




Regional Impact and 
Capacities
• Holistic view of a disaster’s impact  on the daily environment, society, economy, 
and social networks and institutions
• Individual self-sufficiency, voluntarism, and participation
• Strong family relationships and neighborhood ties
• Continued operations of religious and social institutions important  to community 
life
• Equal chance of recovery for all, including those with special needs
• Restoration what makes daily life enjoyable in the community: neighborhoods, 




• Effective planning for and communication of critical recovery information and 
assistance inclusive of and accessible to the general public and stakeholders
• Communities and local authorities access and share necessary information, 
technology, lessons learned, expertise, best practices, resources, and authority
• Opportunities, tools, and resources for meaningful participation of all 
stakeholders in planning and recovery process
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Table 1. Recovery and Redevelopment Characteristics
Barriers to Recovery and 
Redevelopment
O f c o u r s e , t h e s e r e c o v e r y  a n d 
redevelopment characteristics are 
presented as positives, from exhibiting a 
compelling vision of the future to the 
m e a n i n g f u l p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a l l 
stakeholders in the planning and 
recovery  process. Numerous barriers 
exist  that can hamper  or  even prevent 
t h e f u l l a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e s e 
characteristics.  Beatley  argues that 
barriers are substantial for coastal 
communities and points out that low 
political importance is given to natural 
disasters and hazards vulnerability.11 
Natural disasters have a lower priority 
t h a n p r o b l e m s o f m a n a g i n g 
development, unemployment, crime, 
housing, and education. Coastal 
communities have a limited ability  or 
willingness to confront big issues 
looming in the future, exacerbated by 
the short electoral cycle facing officials. 
Often, resources are limited and 
priorities compete for  attention and 
funding.  The coastal planning  culture, 
capabilities, and systems may  be limited 
and weak, particularly  if mandates are 
lacking to prepare local comprehensive 
plans.  In  addition, special interests may 
counter  desires to address risks,  such 
t h e p o w e r o f r e a l e s t a t e a n d 
development interests to oppose limits 
on development in high-risk locations. 
P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s a n d 
individualism might counter  rezoning 
and safer and more resilient land use 
patterns and the need for collective or 
community  action. Finally, there are 
concerns over the upfront  costs 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h  r e c o v e r y  a n d 
redevelopment strategies, even though 
they  promise considerable return on 
investment in the long term.
CAMERON PARISH RECOVERY 
AND REDEVELOPMENT
Mr. Broussard said Cameron Parish 
officials and community  representatives 
would see these general characteristics 
as important and germane to their own 
recovery  and redevelopment efforts. 
They  also recognize that there are 
considerable barriers to overcome 
achieving these characteristics in a rural 
coastal community.  However, a number 
of supportive factors smoothed the road 
o n t h e p a r i s h ’ s r e c o v e r y  a n d 
redevelopment journey. The next section 
describes Cameron Parish and the 
factors central to supporting the parish’s 
efforts after Hurricane Ike.
Cameron Parish and Recent 
Hurricanes
Located in the southwest corner  of 
Louisiana, Cameron Parish is one of the 
most sparsely  populated areas in  the 
state. With  large bodies of water and 
marshland, the parish is close to the 
Gulf of Mexico and the mouth of the 
Calcasieu  Ship Channel. Economic 
activity  focuses on fisheries, oil  and gas 
exploration and operations,  chemicals, 
and agriculture (cattle, horses, and rice). 
The Cameron Police Jury  – the formal 
governing body  for the parish  – is 
composed of seven jurors elected every 
four years. The jury  has both legislative 
and administrative responsibilities, 
ranging from  enacting ordinances to 
preparing and executing the budget. The 
police jury  can appoint special districts, 
boards, commissions, and other 
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organizations to provide specific 
services for  a designated area within the 
parish.  Presently  there are six districts 
in the parish. The organizational 
structure for the Cameron Police Jury 
includes a parish administrator,  a 
number of parish  entities (such  as 
ambulance, recreation,  and hospital 
service districts), an Office of Planning 
and Development, and an Office of 
Emergency Preparedness.
Before Hurricane Ike, the parish was 
s l o w l y  r e c o v e r i n g f r o m  2 0 0 5 ’ s 
Hurricane Rita,  where communities in 
the south half of the parish were 
devastated and the northern half 
s u f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e d a m a g e . 
Hurricane Rita’s aftermath created a 
number of major  challenges for the 
parish  because of the destruction of or 
heavy  damage to approximately  90 
percent of the parish’s buildings, 
including homes, businesses,  and other 
facilities such as schools and churches, 
as well as critical infrastructure. Many 
residents from  the southern half of the 
parish  relocated to the northern area. 
The fishing fleet was heavily  damaged. 
Cameron Parish was thus faced with 
rebuilding commercial and industrial 
sector activity; dealing with  major 
changes in government restrictions and 
higher costs impacting rebuilding the 
coastal areas; and confronting the loss of 
essential public services such as fire 
protection and sewer service.  Only  a 
short  few years later, Hurricane Ike 
overwhelmed the recovering parish with 
115 mile per hour  winds,  heavy  rains, 
and high storm  surges overtopping 
dunes or berms and flowing  into low-
lying marshlands.12
Parish Facilitating Factors
Earlier, this article described the 
r e c o v e r y  a n d r e d e v e l o p m e n t 
characterist ics of a community, 
organization, and system. Planning calls 
for a  compelling vision of the future and 
t h e p r e s e n c e o f r e d e v e l o p m e n t 
fundamentals and practices to minimize 
t h e c o m m u n i t y ’ s r i s k . R e l i e f , 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction 
s h o u l d b e u s e d a s w i n d o w s o f 
opportunity  to build community 
resilience anticipating subsequent 
disasters. Individual and recovery 
system-wide learning should occur. 
However,  in the Cameron Parish 
experience, demonstrating these 
characteristics and successful recovery 
and redevelopment after two disasters 
were not a given. Where does the vision 
come from? Who ensures there are 
redevelopment fundamentals and 
practices in place? What decision 
process takes advantage of windows of 
opportunity? What feedback process 
captures learning  and ensures its gets 
back to decision makers?
Our experiences and research 
indicate that  Cameron Par ish ’ s 
demonstration of the characteristics 
were greatly  aided and guided by  a 
number of key  factors. These included 
(1) a history  and culture of self-reliance 
and independence; (2) close-knit, 
committed individual communities; (3) 
the continued blows of devastating 
h u r r i c a n e s ; ( 4 ) a l e a d e r  a n d 
organization point for  resiliency  efforts; 
(5) a robust recovery  and redevelopment 
plan; (6) restoration of housing; and (7) 
visible recovery, rebuilding, and re-
visioning.
“Too Much Ear.”  Mr. Broussard notes 
that one of the well-used phrases in the 
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parish  is “too much ear.”  This refers to 
the long ears of Brahman cattle that are 
one of the cattle types raised in Cameron 
Parish. The folklore is that the 
Brahmans are quite independent and 
very  dif f icult  to manage unless 
crossbred with  Hereford and Angus 
breeds. Like the Brahman cattle, parish 
residents have a  long history  and culture 
of independence and self-reliance, 
including a historical legacy  of what 
some might even  call lawlessness. The 
geography  has aided seclusion and 
limited access. Marshes, cheniers of 
raised land that were once beaches, and 
prairies to the north provided havens for 
those avoiding the law. Ongoing 
disputes regarding the boundary 
between the United States and Mexico 
was not settled until 1819 and before 
then created a disputed area of “no 
man’s land”  and a  hideout  for  criminals. 
During the Civil War, the parish mostly 
supported the Confederacy, a  support 
grounded in  beliefs of the right to 
govern  itself and solve problems 
locally.13  This cultural mind-set 
continues to this day  and is considered a 
facilitating factor in the community’s 
resilience.
“The Great Louisiana Melting Pot.” 
Jambalaya is a  spicy, mixture of meats, 
vegetables, stock, and rice.  Each 
component is individually  critical,  but it 
is the mixture of the components that 
creates a simple, yet  tasty  dish. So it  is in 
Cameron Parish. The parish has several 
distinctive community  areas that  are 
basically  unincorporated settlements: 
Cameron, Little Chenier, Grand Chenier, 
Southeast  Cheniers, Hackberry, Lone 
Pine, Grand Lake/Sweet Lake,  Johnson 
Bayou, and Lowry  and Klondike. Each  of 
these community  areas are close-knit 
and have strong ties to their  individual 
institutions and residents. To illustrate, 
Cameron, the heart of the parish, is one 
the most populated areas and is the focal 
point  for government and business. 
Cameron is close to the Gulf of Mexico 
and the mouth of the Calcasieu Ship 
Channel and supports maritime-related 
economic activities such  as fisheries and 
offshore oil and gas operations. Lone 
Pine is isolated from the rest  of the 
parish by  limited accessibility  and 
minimal infrastructure. Urban land use 
i s n e g l i g i b l e a n d t h e a r e a i s 
characterized as range and pasture land.
Each parish area is very  independent 
of the others, Mr. Broussard said, and 
that creates challenges for  an overall 
Cameron Parish perspective.  However, 
for recovery  and redevelopment, each 
community  took on the “heavy-lifting” 
of individual community  assessment 
and designing its own future. Then, like 
jambalaya, those efforts were combined 
and brought together within the general 
framework of the overall parish plan. 
The planning effort,  initiated after 
Hurricane Rita and then enhanced after 
Hurricane Ike, brought together the 
exhaustive community  and economic 
development assessment – past, 
present, and what were the better 
choices for the future, all done through a 
consensus process with  multiple 
stakeholders. Decisions were made 
about what might be best for the 
individual communities, and for the 
parish  as a whole (such as basic service 
medical facilities and schools) and 
economic development needs (such as 
port development).
“When You Take a Punch, You Must 
Change.”  Fresh with memories of past 
storms, Mr. Broussard said that he and 
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other parish officials believed that the 
“ p u n c h ” f r o m  H u r r i c a n e I k e ’ s 
devastation actually  provided an 
opportunity  to not  only  recover, but to 
recapture economic prosperity  that had 
eluded the area for almost fifty  years. 
Hurricane Audrey  in 1957  caused 
devastation similar  to that of Hurricane 
Rita and Hurricane Ike.  The impact of 
Hurricane Ike, so close to Hurricane 
Rita, had severely  dented the confidence 
of the population and businesses in  a 
full recovery  if past  strategies remained 
in  place. The facilitating factor was that 
it was no longer  acceptable to be 
stubborn and parochial, and simply 
rebuild the existing settlements and 
infrastructure without a vision  of a 
different future. Mr.  Broussard said the 
storms had radically  changed the 
playing field and created pressure for 
the parish’s future to be based on a 
series of strategic areas, including 
housing, road planning, port feasibility, 
and the development of beach areas. 
Old, new, and emerging industries had 
to be courted and supported through the 
port system. Tourism  would encourage 
visitors to explore the parish  and its 
culture, but they  would not come 
without good roads, lodging, and 
restaurants.
“A Champion in Waiting.”  Another key 
factor was a  leader to direct  and 
c h a m p i o n t h e r e c o v e r y  a n d 
r e d e v e l o p m e n t p l a n n i n g a n d 
implementation, housed in a central 
organizational point. Parish business 
interests after Hurricane Rita believed 
that  funding a  dedicated planning 
position would better protect their 
considerable investment in the parish. 
The end result was the hiring of an 
executive director responsible for 
Cameron Parish ’s p lanning and 
development with  strong credentials in 
economic development, urban planning, 
and smart growth. Mr. Broussard, 
selected for the position, also had other 
attributes that strengthened his impact. 
He was the self-described “cowboy  on a 
palomino” who easily  fit  into the culture 
of the parish and was seen as a trusted 
partner of local government officials and 
businesses of all kinds.  Although a 
thirty-year  resident of nearby  Lake 
Charles, Louisiana, Broussard came 
from a sugarcane background and was 
inherently  familiar  with the parish’s 
rural marine lifestyle, from its special 
languages to its industries. He is an avid 
hunter and fisherman but also enjoys 
competitive rodeo and its applications to 
ranch  and farm life. This background 
augmented his educat ional and 
professional suites in planning, land 
d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d e c o n o m i c 
development. He brought these skills 
and knowledge to the parish assessment 
studies, recommendations for action, 
and implementation plans, including 
relentlessly  tracking down and securing 
funding for recovery  and redevelopment 
projects large and small. He understood, 
and constantly  worked with the 
individual parish areas, to present 
concrete, measurable recommendations 
in  the form  of goals and objectives,  to 
secure commitment,  and then, in turn, 
to build a business case for  funding and 
completing planned projects. This work 
also included involvement  with the East 
a n d W e s t C a m e r o n P o r t s a n d 
implications for the liquefied natural 
gas, offshore oil and gas, commercial 
fisheries, and maritime sectors.
The organizational point was the 
parish’s Off ice of Planning and 
Development (OPD). OPD is responsible 
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for physical development and post  storm 
disaster recovery. OPD’s mission 
includes housing,  transportation, 
economic development, land use 
administration, capital improvements, 
and overall community  development, 
supplemented by  other  functions related 
to strategic planning initiatives.  OPD 
provided the visible structure for 
recovery  and redevelopment efforts 
accessible by  the individual community 
areas. Housed in OPD, the executive 
director for planning and development 
could aggressively  pursue any  and all 
funding opportunities available from the 
federal government and non-profit 
sources. For example, OPD secured 
FEMA funding and resources from 
sources such as the Bush-Clinton 
Coastal Recovery Fund.
“The Making of Quality, Livable Coastal 
Communities.”  Mr. Broussard firmly 
states that is not  enough to lead and 
champion. In his view, the difference 
between mediocrity  and zeal in the road 
to recovery  and redevelopment success 
is the clarity  of the roadmap and 
commitments, another facilitating 
factor. The parish’s future success was 
clearly  tied to explicit, measurable 
strategic goals developed from  the 
ground up and actually  implemented in 
line with the expected goals. Setting the 
goals and implementing them  called for 
quality  commitment and simply  being 
smart about the roadmap to the future. 
The recovery  and redevelopment 
agenda-setting document clearly  was the 
2005 Cameron Parish Redevelopment 
P lan.14  The Plan prov ided the 
groundwork for the future of the 
Cameron Parish economy  and lifestyle. 
It  represented a combination of 
information from previous parish 
planning attempts and programs 
designed in part  to accelerate recovery 
efforts following the devastation of 
Hurricane Rita in 2005. It  also drew  on 
other guidance and information, such as 
from FEMA and Louisiana state studies. 
Previous plans for  rebuilding focused on 
the immediate needs of the parish and 
lacked a more regional vision for 
recovery, redevelopment,  and economic 
growth. In contrast, the Plan presented 
a holistic regional vision for  the parish 
based on the appropriateness of land use 
for residential and industrial growth, 
focusing  on economic development and 
considering  new state and federal 
regulations established post-Hurricane 
Rita. 
The Plan development included an 
analysis of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats (SWOT), 
intended to examine the anticipated 
land use characteristics, demographics, 
and industrial base of the parish.  The 
analysis facilitated the identification of 
parish-wide goals and objectives as well 
as a  long-term vision for  the future.  It 
then paired these goals and objectives 
with  feasible reconstruction and new 
development projects. The Plan was 
different from  former  plans in that  it 
focused on the distinctiveness of both 
parish  and community  characteristics 
and took advantage of specific natural 
assets.  It also reduced land use in  high 
risk areas, but  allowed those who could 
afford the risk the opportunity  to 
develop within state and federal 
standards, such as those in the southern 
reaches of the parish. The vision 
constantly  put forth in the Plan’s 
development and in Cameron Police 
Jury  meetings was “to build safer, to 
build smarter,  to build stronger.” 15 The 
Plan emphasized that the parish’s 
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a p p r o a c h w a s n o t r e b u i l d i n g 
communities just  as they  were before 
the storm, but selecting  new, high 
priority  economic development projects 
that would serve as a catalyze to a  new 
Cameron Parish, one that would be 
recognized as a leader along Louisiana’s 
Gulf Coast  and a destination in and of 
itself.
“There Will Be Places to Live.”  Parish 
officials were adamant that there be 
temporary  and permanent places to live 
for residents and those coming to 
rebuild. Priority  housing restoration, a 
facilitating factor, was absolutely  vital as 
without housing, residents could not 
easily  return and rebuilding would be 
very  slow. Cameron Parish traditionally 
was composed of large, single family  lots 
that were held as ancestral homes for 
hundreds of years. There were also long-
term  leases. Compliance with  building 
codes and elevation requirements was 
very  expensive, most  often requiring 
pilings to elevate the house structure. 
The new  parish  would look to elevated, 
modular housing. Insurance could 
replace old structures, but did not cover 
the rebuilding required for  the new 
standards. New insurance also could not 
be secured if the rebuilding  was not to 
the code and elevation specifications. 
Parish officials believed that an 
immediate first step was assessing 
housing services and features such as 
size and affordability,  including a multi-
family  market. Now was also the time to 
consider how  to bring “outsiders”  to the 
parish,  with the attractions of a working 
coast, recreational opportunities, and a 
vibrant life style.  Thus, another 
important  resiliency  document was the 
2009 Cameron Parish Housing Plan.16
The Housing Plan drew on previous 
planning efforts and programs designed 
in  part  to accelerate recovery  efforts 
following Hurricanes Rita and Ike.  The 
Cameron Police Jury  was very  interested 
in  permanent  housing solutions that 
could withstand future storms. Through 
its Office of Planning & Development, 
the jury  established a  Parish Housing 
Program  and the Cameron Parish 
Community  Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) Housing Assistance Office to 
implement the Parish Housing Program. 
This office employed five temporary  full-
time staff members with extensive 
experience in  CDBG, finance, real estate, 
and other necessary  fields. The Housing 
Plan offered an inventory  and analysis 
of historical data  as well as current 
conditions, goals, and visions to replace 
and infill the parish housing stock. For 
example,  the Housing Plan discussed 
ways to mitigate hazards in low-lying 
areas, provide mortgage assistance with 
l i t t le or no interest , and of fer 
transitional housing for  industry 
personnel.
The housing recovery  followed a 
tiered approach.  The first tier  offered 
compensation for  those residents who 
wished to rebuild. A  second tier 
consisted of new rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of housing in line with 
code and elevation requirements. The 
third tier focused on the first time home 
buyer, including transferring state 
property,  mortgage assistance, and 
replacement of older housing.  The 
fourth tier was comprised of rental 
rehabilitation, including assistance with 
apartments. A special problem was the 
loss of a  significant number of the 
parish’s elderly  population. The elderly 
were particularly  impacted by  the costs 
to rebuild and insure. Parish  officials 
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wanted those elderly  residents to return 
and spend their  last days on ancestral 
land. Those with property  want to come 
back.
“We Are a Community Coming Back.” 
Parish  officials and local business 
leaders recognized that that there must 
be a clear message and visible signs that 
the parish  was, as Mr. Broussard said, “a 
community  coming back.” Parish 
officials had to quickly  deal with initial 
recovery  and clean-up, and also energize 
the community  and find ways for 
residents return, centered on housing 
and economic development. Still 
grappling with  Hurricane Rita recovery, 
the new  damage from  Hurricane Ike 
meant  that again  the economic base and 
housing radically  shifted outside the 
parish.  It was clear that the latest blow 
from Hurricane Ike intensified the 
hurricane fatigue and lack of confidence 
in  full recovery  on the part of parish 
residents.  Basic services,  such as fire 
services, schools, and medical services 
had to be restored. Debris, destroyed 
houses and trailers, and wrecks in the 
shipping channel had to be removed 
quickly. Throughout the parish, Mr. 
Broussard emphasized, there had to be 
tangible, visible signs of normalcy.
Part of the facilitating factor  was that 
rebuilding and restoration proceeded at 
the same time as the clean-up efforts. 
Officials were fortunate in  having the 
existing Redevelopment Plan. The 
foundational concepts in the Plan 
included: (1) focus intently  on re-
stabilizing the fishing fleet  and oil and 
gas operations to pre-storm  levels; (2) 
establish the feasibility  of developing a 
port complex to create a permanent base 
and stable link within the deep water 
and shallow  water oil and gas operations 
and cargo transfer industries; (3) initiate 
feasibility  analysis for improved surface 
and air transportation; (4) identify  the 
costs and benefits of implementing  a 
parish  sales tax for  additional funding 
supporting economic growth and 
development; (5) manage growth and 
development utilizing tools such as a 
GIS; and (6) develop parish-wide zoning 
models for land use controls involving 
residential, public sector, and industrial 
g r o w t h d e v e l o p m e n t . O f f i c i a l s 
recognized that work had to go forward 
on the current market plan as well as 
introduce different housing types. The 
community  never  before had to provide 
business incentives,  now a very  real 
possibility. Cameron Square – a project 
in  the lower parish – was a key  feature 
with  a community  center, including a 
courthouse and recreational services, 
and would provide legitimacy, stability, 
and a government presence. Moreover, 
parish  officials believed that if there was 
the right infrastructure, the parish  could 
compete with the rest  of the Gulf Coast 
in doing deep water work. Thus, 
water front pro jects emphas ized 
maritime facilities and higher-quality 
fishing. 
CONCLUSION AND CHALLENGES
Reflecting  on these facilitating factors 
and the barriers to recovery  and 
redevelopment  mentioned earlier, 
Cameron Parish  provides an example of 
a coastal community  coming back and 
becoming stronger. Overall, Cameron 
Parish has given high importance to 
natural disasters given its track record of 
major  storms and minor problems with 
“normal” issues such as crime and 
education. The parish has confronted 
current,  near-term, and longer-term 
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community  viability  issues. While 
resources are constrained, the parish 
has aggressively  pursued funding and 
partnerships, from federal sources to 
nonprofit opportunities.  The parish took 
advantage of Hurricane Katrina’s 
stronger  locality  plans,  but also built 
institutional planning capabilities in its 
Office of Planning and Development. 
Working in an unincorporated area has 
generally  mitigated political opposition 
and the power of real estate and 
development interests. However, 
governance through the Cameron Police 
Jury  might not be as robust as that in a 
more urban, incorporated area. 
Community  outreach is very  active and 
ongoing with business and community 
interests fully  engaged. Private property 
rights are mitigated by  building codes 
and insurance costs; market value 
generally  is not an issue and land use 
restrictions actually  aid in creation of a 
new vision and acceptance of return-on-
redevelopment investment within the 
parish.  The distinct  communities within 
Cameron Parish  retain their  identity  and 
interests, but are working for the 
common good of the parish.
Other rural communities might find 
these observations useful.  Observations 
from the recovery  research  in Bolivar 
Peninsula, Texas, mentioned earlier, 
confirm the importance of these key 
factors in a smoother recovery  and 
redevelopment effort.  For example, 
Bolivar Peninsula experienced a more 
challenging recovery  process because 
there was not  a  central leader and 
organization point for resiliency  efforts. 
Working  through committees, the 
peninsula developed a  recovery  and 
redevelopment plan, but additional 
work was needed to add specific projects 
for action. The restoration of housing 
was not aided by  a housing plan. Visible 
recovery, rebuilding, and re-visioning 
were sluggish; very  important as the 
Bolivar Peninsula relied heavily  on a 
tourist industry.
Cameron Parish is now in the 
implementation phase of its many 
multi-faced recovery  and redevelopment 
goals and objectives.  Considerable 
progress is evident in a range of areas 
from  housing programs to critical 
infrastructure rebuilding. The Cameron 
Square project and related waterfront 
development continues to move 
forward. Economic development 
projects also are making headway.
The parish also faces ongoing 
challenges. External funding has slowed 
or wound down with  time, although the 
parish has sustained an aggressive 
approach to securing available funding. 
The national and state economy  and 
overall financial crisis has exacerbated 
the funding environment. The parish 
and other  unincorporated coastal areas 
have garnered less attention than more 
populated areas such as Galveston and 
New Orleans. Hurricane fat igue 
increases with each  new hurricane 
season, which may  mean many  former 
residents or  part-time residents will 
never  return.  The longer it takes to 
restore housing and jobs, the more 
difficulty  there will be with issues that 
are factors of daily  life such  as 
commuting costs, access to grocery 
stores and gas stations, and the ability  to 
participate in neighborhood, social, and 
religious activities.  In addition, the 
historical resistance to planning and 
structured development remains a 
factor.
A n o t h e r c h a l l e n g e i s s i m p l y 
unanticipated events. The parish is 
currently  dealing with the Deepwater 
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Horizon Gulf of Mexico oil spill  and its 
a f t e r m a t h , f r o m e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
degradation to ongoing federal decisions 
regarding offshore drilling. The parish 
recovery  and redevelopment plans 
a n t i c i p a t e d n e w a n d s u s t a i n e d 
commercial and recreational fishing, 
tourism, and support for the oil and gas 
industry  on the coast and in the Gulf of 
Mexico. The oil spill’s impact on the 
fragile coastal areas and political 
decisions have had immediate and long-
term  impacts on marine life, fishing, the 
oil and gas industry, and the ability  to 
develop a strong tourism industry.
However,  parish officials remain very 
optimistic, said Mr. Broussard. They  are 
used to the cycle of disaster and recovery 
and taking advantage of what is 
available to them  as they  create their 
future.  A simple anecdote from the oil 
spill crisis makes the point. The federal 
response to the immediate oil spill was 
to put workers in the marsh with towels 
to mop up the oil.  This clearly  was a 
highly  inefficient and costly  strategy 
with  minimal benefit. Those who live in 
the parish know  that each year  the 
marshes are burned to be restored and 
promote new  growth. The resiliency 
lesson is practical, yet profound – to set 
meaningful goals , respond with 
measurable and effective strategies, and 
concretely  work toward a robust future 
for the parish. For  the first time in its 
history, Cameron Parish will remain a 
working community, but with a new 
outlook for diversifying its economy  and 
being  more resilient  when the next 
hurricane or disaster comes along.
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Twitter, Facebook 
and Ten Red Balloons:
Social Network Problem Solving and Homeland Security
Christopher M. Ford
ABSTRACT:
The winner of the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (CHDS) Essay 
Contest in 2010,  this  essay looks  at how 
homeland security could benefit from 
crowd-sourced applications accessed 
through social networking tools  such as 
Twitter and Facebook.  Christopher M. Ford 
looks  at the apparent efficacy of two such 
endeavors: the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects  Agency’s  (DARPA) competition to 
find ten 8-foot balloons moored across  the 
continental U.S.  and Wired Magazine 
challenge to “find” author Evan Ratliff. 
Based on these and other crowd-sourced 
applications,  Ford suggests that the U.S. 
government could utilize the internet and 
social networking sites  to potentially solve 
an array of discrete problems  through the 
active participation of interested citizens.
INTRODUCTION
On December 6, 2009, the Defense 
Advanced Research  Projects Agency 
(DARPA) held a competition designed 
to,  in their words, “explore the role the 
Internet  and social networking plays in 
the timely  communication, wide area 
team-building and urgent mobilization 
required to solve broad scope, time-
critical problems.” 1  The competition 
required participating  teams/individuals 
to find “10 8-foot balloons moored at 10 
fixed locations in  the continental United 
States.”2  Just before the competition 
o p e n e d , t h e b a l l o o n s w e r e
surreptitiously  floated at random
locations in nine states,  including:
C a l i f o r n i a , T e n n e s s e e , F l o r i d a ,
Delaware, Texas, Virginia, Arizona,
Oregon, and Georgia.3
The winning team, comprised of five 
students from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology  (MIT), found all 
ten balloons in  less than nine hours. 
Their performance roundly  beat the 
other 4,000 participants in the 
challenge and shocked DARPA, which 
had scheduled the competition for two 
weeks. Incredibly,  the team learned of 
the competition only  four days before it 
started, and in less than two days they 
had a plan, a  website, and more than 
5,000 signed up to help them.4  They 
then  applied that  network to an 
extraordinarily  complex problem 
spanning the United States. The results 
were shockingly  accurate and swift.  The 
significance and potential application  of 
their system is remarkable. In a  period 
of less than one week, five students 
constructed a  productive, precise, 
layered, networked enterprise involving 
thousands of citizens. This essay 
p r o p o s e s t h a t t h e U . S . f e d e r a l 
government apply  the techniques 
developed by  the MIT team into a 
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nation-wide program designed to 
address discrete security issues.  
The “New” Models:  Social 
Network Problem Solving
Naturally, the system  developed for  the 
DARPA challenge does not perfectly 
correlate with all homeland security 
challenges. For example, the system 
would do little to physically  capture a 
wanted individual. The system could, 
however, be used to locate a wanted 
person. It could also be applied to assist 
in securing physical sites, borders, 
cyberspace, and infrastructure. The 
team leader, Dr. Riley  Crane, speculated 
o n a b r o a d r a n g e o f p o s s i b l e 
applications: 
Can we use this  technology we've 
developed to find missing children  or 
something along those lines where there's 
an incentive for people to really 
participate and help out? Often, the police 
will  offer a  reward for finding a  missing 
child. Can we restructure that in  a  way 
that we tap the vast resources of this 
network? . . . Or during an  emergency, 
maybe we need to find 10 people in  a 
region who can operate heavy machinery, 
maybe a building collapsed.5  
This approach to problem  solving is 
potentially  expansive.  Indeed, the tool is 
so broad and powerful, that it  is difficult 
to pigeonhole individual uses. Suffice to 
say, the potential application extends to 
any defined, discrete issue/problem.      
At the core of the system is its 
i n c e n t i v e s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h w a s 
s t r u c t u r e d t o e n c o u r a g e t h e 
development of a large network of 
interested persons. DARPA offered a 
total of $40,000 in prize money. The 
MIT team allocated this evenly  between 
each of the ten balloons, giving each a 
“value” of $4,000. They  gave $2,000 to 
the person who found each balloon.  This 
was hardly  unique; most other 
participating teams offered some sort  of 
reward for finding balloons.  What set 
the MIT team  apart  is that they  then 
gave a $1,000 to the person that 
referred the balloon finder to their 
website (assuming there was a referral – 
if there was no referral, the finder 
received $2,000 and the other $2,000 
went to charity). Then they  gave $500 to 
the person who referred the referrer, 
$250 to the person that referred them, 
and so on. This diffuse incentive 
structure essentially  propagated itself 
over existing  social networks:  people 
were incentivized to get as many  friends 
working for  the MIT team as possible – 
almost like a  pyramid scheme. The 
speed with which  this propagated itself 
is remarkable. Each of the five members 
of the team  sent out an e-mail 
explaining the competition and the 
incentive structure. Within forty-eight 
hours, they  had 5,000 people signed up 
to assist them.   
A n o t h e r  i n t e r e s t i n g  m o d e r n 
illustration is the Vanish  Competition 
presented in an article in  the August, 
2009 edition of Wired Magazine.6  The 
competition accompanied an article by 
Evan Ratliff, which examined instances 
in  which  people had attempted to make 
themselves disappear.  The competition 
had Ratliff go into hiding for  thirty  days. 
During that time, he traveled around the 
United States in disguise, not making 
contact  with family, friends or editors. 
He ditched his cell phone, credit cards, 
and online accounts. He used physical 
disguises and masked his movement and 
communications online using various 
technical tools.7  A $5,000 prize was 
awarded to the first person to identify 
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Ratliff, take his picture, and say  the 
word “fluke”.
Almost instantly, thousands of people 
became actively  involved in the hunt. 
The participants self-organized into 
dozens of teams, pooling  resources to 
find Ratliff. The teams and individual 
participants extensively  used social 
networking tools such as Facebook and 
T w i t t e r t o c o n n e c t  a n d s h a r e 
information. It took twenty-five days for 
a team to track Ratliff down on a street 
in  New  Orleans – more than 2,000 
m i l e s f r o m w h e r e h e s t a r t e d . 
Throughout his time on the run, Ratliff 
continuously  checked up on the social 
networking sites to track the trackers. 
He was eventually  caught by  team 
members who were able to identify  him 
online and hack through  the measures 
he had set up to protect his identity. 
Other team members, physically  located 
in  New Orleans, approached him  and 
ended the contest.8  
The Vanish competition provides 
several lessons which  affirm  the lessons 
learned from the DARPA challenge. 
First, thousands of individuals can be 
incentivized with  a  fairly  small monetary 
incentive. Though the incentive function 
was slightly  different in the two 
competitions, both  rely  on social 
network mechanisms. In  the DARPA 
challenge, the incentive structure was 
se l f -propagat ing. In the Vanish 
challenge,  the monetary  incentive 
sparked the creation of teams and social 
networking groups. Once sparked, the 
teams appear to have developed a strong 
social cohesion – individuals likely 
became interested in participating and 
assisting because they  wanted to help 
the group. For the technically-oriented 
members of the team, professional pride 
may  have been a strong motivating 
factor. One member would come up with 
a c l e v e r  w a y  t o t r a c k R a t l i f f ’ s 
movements through FaceBook, and 
another  would respond by  improving 
the tool. This highlights another 
important  lesson learned: not only  did 
teams form naturally, a  seemingly 
efficient division of labor developed as 
well.  In both challenges, existing social 
networks were used extensively  to share 
information towards the completion of 
the challenge. Finally,  the winning  team 
in  the Vanish challenge was able to find 
Ratliff despite abundant misinformation 
provided by  both other  teams and Ratliff 
himself. The team devised a way  to vet 
information and team members, thereby 
g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e a c c u r a c y  o f 
information received from  team 
members. 
Crowd-Sourcing Applications 
The DARPA and Vanish challenges 
incorporate many  of the mechanisms 
seen in popular crowd-sourced projects. 
The term  “crowd-sourced”  is a  generic 
term  applied to describe projects whose 
d e s i g n a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e 
implemented by  a community  of people 
rather than a single corporation. The 
internet is replete with websites 
dedicated to crowd-sourcing individual 
items or services. The concept has been 
successfully  applied to the design  and 
sale of t-shirts (Threadless),9 cars (Local 
Motors),10 and small consumer products 
(Quirky). 11 It has also been used to write 
computer programs (Linux)12 and make 
loans (Kiva),13  and in a host of other 
applications.  
For  instance,  at Quirky, individuals 
submit inventions that they  would like 
to see developed. The members of the 
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Quirky  community  vote on each project. 
Aspects of the project are then 
completed by  experts in their  respective 
fields (e.g., a  professional graphic artist 
does the graphic design, a mechanical 
engineer designs the item’s mechanics, 
etc.). Inventors receive a percentage of 
all sales, as do members who worked on 
a given  project.  Further,  individual 
members are publically  recognized when 
the product comes to market. The 
Quirky  online store shows a breakdown 
of which members get how  much  of the 
money  spent on the item. The incentive 
structure for  participation – at Quirky 
and other crowd sourcing sites – is both 
monetary and social.  
The “Old” Models
To fully  understand the potential of the 
new social media models, it’s useful to 
look at traditional systems that seek to 
employ  broad public support towards a 
single public goal. Crowd-sourced 
applications have existed for  years. 
P e r h a p s t h e m o s t w e l l - k n o w n 
mechanism  is the FBI’s “Most  Wanted 
List.” The list was created in  1950 as a 
mechanism  for  enlisting the public’s 
help in capturing the most dangerous 
fugitives.14  Over sixty  years, 494 
fugitives have been listed.15  Of those, 
463  have been captured – an impressive 
statistic.16  However, of those captured, 
only  152 (or 32 percent) where captured 
a s t h e r e s u l t  o f d i r e c t p u b l i c 
cooperat ion.17  This is hardly  a 
commendable success rate given the fact 
that the list is perpetually  displayed in 
more than 30,000 post office locations 
throughout the country, online,  and 
integrated in radio and television 
campaigns.  
One of those campaigns has been to 
integrate the “Most Wanted List”  with 
another traditional mechanism  for 
applying public participation to solve a 
public safety  problem:  the television 
show  America’s Most Wanted.18  The 
show  has resulted in the capture of 
approximately  1,100 wanted persons 
over the course of approximately  1,000 
episodes.19 The show (recently  at least) 
averages six  million viewers per  episode; 
given the cost of production and 
advertising, this is not necessarily  the 
most efficient method of capturing 
criminals.20 
Though popular, American’s Most 
Wanted is “old media.”  People watch the 
show, but they  are not vested in the 
show; a certain percentage of the 
viewership is simply  watching for 
entertainment. This type of crowd-
sourced application is different from the 
newer  applications in that people can 
passively  participate (watch and be 
entertained without engaging).  Perhaps 
recognizing that the social network 
structure used in the “new”  models of 
crowd-sourcing are more effective, 
America’s  Most Wanted has made 
efforts to establish itself in the social 
network universe. At the beginning of 
2011, their Facebook group has 
approximately  137,000 members, and 




It could be argued that  the social 
networking model of problem  solving is 
not  as efficient as it  appears.   In both the 
Vanish and DARPA challenges, there 
were hundreds of unsuccessful teams. 
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E a c h u n s u c c e s s f u l t e a m  l o g g e d 
c o u n t l e s s h o u r s a n d e x p e n d e d 
prodigious talent and energy, with no 
apparent  benefit. While it's true that the 
losing teams gained little personal 
benefit – they  didn't win a  prize – the 
system gained significant benefit  from 
their  participation.22  The potential 
strength of the social networking model 
of problem  solving lies in the sheer 
volume of participants. 
The Balloon Challenge and Vanish 
Challenge suggest that  with little 
funding,  de minimis incentive, and a 
s trong  socia l cohesive e lement , 
individuals can create efficient, layered, 
and accurate organizations that are able 
to accomplish complex objectives. 
Applying these systems to homeland 
security is a natural development.  
Critics of the social networking 
approach would argue the system could 
be easily  corrupted. Individuals targeted 
by  the system could manipulate the 
system by  providing false information. 
This critique presumes the targeted 
individuals would be aware that they  (or 
their activities) are being publically 
hunted. As an initial matter, individuals 
may  never  realize they  are being sought. 
They  are simply  not  paying attention, or 
they  don’t realize they  are part  of the 
enterprise being targeted. Or, just as 
likely, sought individuals may  be 
reluctant to corrupt the system because 
they  are concerned about digitally 
revealing  their  location.  Indeed, this is 
precisely  what led to the discovery  of 
author Evan Ratliff.  
The MIT team anticipated the issue of 
system corruption and developed a tool 
to allow them  to quickly  cull through 
tremendous amounts of information and 
a great deal o f mis informat ion 
(intentional and unintentional). During 
the first hours of the competition, many 
of the 4,000 teams engaged in 
misinformation campaigns designed to 
obfuscate and confuse their  opponents. 
The MIT team  employed an undisclosed 
technique which allowed them  to 
identify  fact from fiction. Their success 
evidences the application of an 
extremely  successful tool which  was able 
to manage and verify, or  discredit,  vast 
amounts of information. Such an 
application is critical to the success in 
the use of social networks in homeland 
security applications.      
The DARPA and Vanish challenges 
both illustrate the power of the social 
networks when applied to discrete 
problems. When properly  constructed, 
tools can harness the power of social 
networks towards a singular goal. They 
have the potential to do this with 
alarming efficiency  and speed. Socially 
networked problem  solving is not (for 
the most part) purely  altruistic.  There 
must be some incentive in  place to 
facilitate involvement and action.  The 
incentive may  be monetary  or social 
(e.g., earning respect from cyber  peers), 
or  a combination  of the two. The 
incentives need not be robust; both 
DARPA and Vanish  demonstrate that 
complex  goals can be accomplished with 
only  the smallest  of incentives. The most 
powerful incentives combine social and 
monetary  elements, and are structured 
so that they self-propagate.    
The U.S. government can, and 
should, apply  the principles underlying 
these programs to a  homeland security 
paradigm. Most obviously, these models 
could be used to locate wanted 
individuals – criminals, witnesses, 
persons of interest, individuals with 
particular skills,  etc. This functionality, 
however, barely  scratches the proverbial 
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surface of the myriad of homeland 
security  applications, both physical and 
cyber. For instance,  a challenge could be 
issued to find the security  flaws in a 
g i v e n g o v e r n m e n t w e b s i t e . O r , 
programmers could be issued a 
challenge to build a website for a 
particular function.  
The modern models created for  the 
challenges can be successfully  adapted 
by  the government if adapted properly. 
The models share three commonalities 
which contribute to their success. First, 
they  are simple programs utilizing 
existing technologies (e.g., simple web 
pages, Twitter, Facebook, etc.). Second, 
the models are structured to answer a 
single discrete question (e.g., where are 
the balloons?). Third, the models are 
fueled by  their powerful incentive 
structures. Indeed, a government 
program  would further benefit from 
another  equally  powerful incentive: 
patriotism.  
A simple website, integrated with 
social networking sites, issuing discrete 
challenges, and offering  small cash 
rewards – in short, a  properly  structured 
program has the potential to solve an 
array  of discrete problems using  a  vast 
and powerful enterprise of active, 
engaged, and networked citizens.   
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Dual Status Command
for No-Notice Events:
Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters
Ludwig J. Schumacher
ABSTRACT:
This article  describes  the history of the 
challenges  in developing structures and 
processes  to integrate  military forces 
during domestic disaster response,  and the 
recent progress  made with  regard to 
employing a Dual Status  Command 
construct for no-notice events. Absent this 
recent initiative enabled by the Council of 
Governors, our nation would employ the 
same construct which was  roundly 
criticized as  a major factor and significant 
causal factor for hampering the military 
response  to  Hurricane Katrina – through 
separate  and uncoordinated chains of 
command, state  military forces would be 
employed under the  control of the 
governor,  and any federal military  forces 
would be employed under the  control of the 
president. The new  Dual Status  Command 
construct is a transformative initiative 
which, i f implemented, wil l affect 
meaningful progress, for the benefit of both 
state and nation.
It has now been five years since 
Hurricane Katrina.  In  that time, we have 
seen a flurry  of documents identifying 
domestic response lessons for  our 
nation’s military, catalogued in reports 
by  the House, Senate, White House, 
commissions and think tanks. There 
certainly  is abundant evidence that  we 
have been moving in the right direction 
in many  areas. There have been 
improvements between the National 
Guard and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) in the areas of planning, training, 
joint exercises, and communications. 
This article will address the long 
impasse, and significant recent progress, 
with  regard to the most critical military 
deficiency  identified during Hurricane 
Katrina: the requirement to properly 
configure command and control 
arrangements for  state and federal 
military  forces responding to domestic 
disasters.
Military  command relationships for 
domestic operations need to be sorted 
out in advance of an event. The proper 
integration of military  forces results in 
the most-effective, most-coordinated 
use of limited resources. Integration 
constructs with  the best  potential for 
success are those that recognize state 
and federal authorities inherent in our 
federalist system of government. To 
date, vesting a  military  commander with 
both state and federal authorities (e.g. a 
dual status command) has proven 
successful during several large-scale 
planned events, such as national 
political conventions and the recent 
presidential inauguration. Governors 
and the secretary  of defense are 
currently  close to jointly  endorsing the 
expanded use of dual status command 
beyond planned events, to now include 
no-notice events. This proposal has the 
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potential to enable us to overcome the 
single greatest challenge currently  facing 
our nation’s military  when responding 
to domestic disasters.
Hurricane Katrina: An 
Uncoordinated Military Response
Under our federal system  of governance, 
there is a constitutional basis for distinct 
and separate chains of command for 
state and federal military  forces. During 
disaster  response missions, National 
Guard soldiers and airmen typically 
operate under the control of the state 
governors in a Title 32 or  State Active 
Duty  s tatus . The pres ident has 
historically  directed responding federal 
military  forces operating in a  Title 10 
status under a  separate chain of 
command. The separate chains of 
command employed during Hurricane 
Katrina significantly  degraded the 
integration and synchronization of more 
than 54,000 National Guard and 
20,000 Title 10 military  personnel from 
different  commands.  National Guard 
and federal responses were coordinated 
across several chains of command but 
n o t i n t e g r a t e d , w h i c h  l e d t o 
inefficiencies and duplication of effort. 
Without a means for integrating the 
response, no one had the total picture of 
the forces on the ground, the forces that 
were on the way, the missions that had 
been resourced, and the missions that 
still needed completion.1 
During Hurricane Katrina,  National 
Guard forces from  all states and 
territories were deployed to impacted 
states,  and operated under  the control of 
the respective impacted state’s adjutant 
general and governor. President Bush 
attempted to convince Governor Bush 
(FL), Governor Barber (MS), and 
Governor Blanco (LA) to give a  state 
commission to Lieutenant General 
Russell Honore and place him in 
command of their  respective National 
Guard forces, which would have placed 
the National Guard of the three states 
under  federal command and control. All 
three Governors refused.
Post-Katrina Failures to 
Integrate the Military Response 
Unfortunately, the lesson that  DoD took 
from Hurricane Katrina was that DoD 
needed to have command and control 
over all military  forces,  including 
National Guard forces, during domestic 
emergencies. DoD believed that in major 
multi-state disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, the Department of Homeland 
Security  needed authority  to craft a 
prioritized and flexible response using 
all available resources, to include 
National Guard, federal forces, and non-
National Guard reserve forces.  The DoD 
perspective was that during a  multi-state 
event involving limited resources, 
centralized command and control would 
be needed to direct resources in 
accordance with a priority  of effort 
strategy  determined by  the Lead Federal 
Agency. DoD’s solution was to propose 
legislation to allow  the president to 
federalize the National Guard in 
domestic emergencies without  the prior 
knowledge or consent  of the governors. 
Although fifty-one governors signed a 
letter objecting to the changes when 
proposed, Congress passed the federal 
fiscal year  2007  National Defense 
Authorization Act  (NDAA) which 
included DoD-drafted text  amending the 
federal Insurrection Act  to authorize the 
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president  to federalize the National 
Guard and mobilize all other military 
components to respond to “any  serious 
emergency.”
The changes to the Insurrection Act 
infringed on the primary  and sovereign 
responsibility  of each state to prepare 
f o r a n d r e s p o n d t o d i s a s t e r s /
emergencies within its borders. In the 
spring of 2007, the congressionally-
chartered Commission on the National 
Guard and the Reserves issued an 
interim  report stating Governors should 
be given the authority  to control all 
military  forces engaged in domestic 
operations within their respective states. 
In its final report, the Commission 
stated:
The Department of Defense disagreed 
w i t h  t h e C o m m i s s i o n ’ s M a r c h  1 
recommendation to develop protocols 
that allow governors to direct the efforts 
of federal military  assets responding  to an 
emergency  such  as a  natural  disaster, and 
incorrectly suggested that such an 
approach  is inconsistent with  established 
law. In fact, similar protocols are 
employed routinely overseas  when  U.S. 
forces are placed under  the command of a 
foreign  commander. The process is  fully 
consistent with law and precedent. The 
President, as commander in chief, can 
assign  a  task  force of active duty forces as 
a supporting  command to a  state military 
joint task force while retaining ultimate 
command authority over those federal 
forces. This  decision by the Department to 
reject the Commission’s recommendation, 
while offering no viable substitute, places 
the nation at  risk of a  disjointed federal 
and state mil i tary  response to a 
catastrophe. 2
Concurrently  with the work of the 
Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves, the governors unanimously 
advocated for  the repeal of the changes 
to the Insurrection Act.  The 2008 NDAA 
signed by  the president on January  28, 
2008, repealed all of the 2007  NDAA 
changes to the Insurrection Act to which 
the governors had objected.
Recognizing the ongoing lack of 
communication between DoD and the 
governors in  this area and others, 
Congress took action. The creation of 
the Council of Governors was required 
by  the National Guard Empowerment 
Act  of 2007, passed by  Congress as part 
of the 2008 NDAA. The act directed the 
president  to establish  a bipartisan 
council of ten governors,  in  order to 
provide governors a forum  to exchange 
views on matters related to the National 
Guard and civil support missions with 
specified federal officials, including the 
secretary  of defense, the secretary  of 
homeland security, and the White 
House Homeland Security Council.
In the absence of presidential action 
with  regard to the establishment of the 
Council of Governors, DoD – again 
without consulting with  governors – 
sought statutory  authority  in the 2009 
NDAA to federalize the National Guard 
and activate other reserve components 
for domestic operations. DoD’s efforts 
were unsuccessful with regard to the 
2009 NDAA. In the Joint Explanatory 
Statement submitted by  the chairman 
and the ranking members of the House 
and Senate Committees on Armed 
Services regarding the 2009 NDAA, 
Congress recommended that  DoD 
“engage with the community  of 
governors to work out an understanding 
of unity  of effort during domestic 
t e r r o r i s t  e v e n t s a n d p u b l i c 
emergencies.”3   The Statement noted 
that this issue must be addressed before 
Congress would consider  legislation to 
implement any  DoD proposal to permit 
the call-up of non-National Guard 
reservists to assist in responses to 
disasters.
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In the 2010 NDAA, DoD again 
attempted to increase its own authority 
to amass and employ  significant military 
forces external to the control of the 
governors. In June of 2009, DoD 
requested Congress grant the secretary 
of defense the authority  to order non-
National Guard reserve component 
forces to active duty  to assist  in  the 
response to a  natural disaster  or other 
emergency  outside a  terrorist attack. On 
August 7, 2009, Governor  Manchin 
(WV) and Governor  Jim Douglas (VT) 
sent a letter on behalf of the National 
Governors Association to DoD, stating 
in  part that  without assigning a governor 
the ability  to control all military  forces 
engaged in disaster response, “strong 
potential exists for confusion of mission 
execution and dilution of Governors’ 
control over situations with  which they 
are more familiar  and better capable of 
handling than a federal military 
commander.”4   As a result  of the 
governors’ unified opposition, DoD was 
again unsuccessful in their legislative 
attempt to establish  authorities for 
greater access to the reserves.
The Council of Governors
On January  11, 2010, President Obama 
issued an Executive Order  establishing 
the Council of Governors, designating 
Governor Chris Gregoire (WA) and 
Governor Jim Douglas (VT) as co-chairs. 
The first  plenary  meeting of the Council 
was held on February  23, 2010. The 
Council established five working groups, 
and charged the Unity  of Effort Working 
Group with addressing the proper 
integration of military  forces during 
domestic operations. The Council made 
quick progress on issues through two 
additional plenary  meetings in 2010, 
working group-specific workshops, and 
n u m e r o u s c o n f e r e n c e c a l l s . 
Representing a significant collaborative 
accomplishment,  these efforts resulted 
in  the proposal to employ  dual status 
command for no-notice events, known 
then as the Contingency  Dual Status 
Commander concept. The secretary  of 
defense opened the policy  door with his 
willingness to consider dual status 
command authorities to address the 
Governors’ concerns. This enabled the 
new commander of U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM), Admiral 
Winnefeld,  to identify  key  middle 
ground, and shift  course to a new vision 
on this critical issue. 
The significant  progress made in  a 
very  short period of time was only 
possible through the support and 
partnership of a l l stakeholders, 
including the assistant  secretary  of 
defense for homeland defense and 
America’s security  affairs, National 
Guard Bureau  (NGB), and other offices 
within the Office of the Secretary  of 
Defense and DoD. The continuous 
support of the adjutants general to the 
Council of Governors throughout  this 
process was instrumental. A proof-of-
concept tabletop was held in Florida on 
November  5,  2010, involving over sixty 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m n u m e r o u s 
agencies. The Lessons Learned from this 
event stated “[T]here is consensus 
among the exercise participants (Florida 
Division of Emergency  Management, 
Florida National Guard,  National Guard 
Bureau, US Northern  Command, 
Federal Emergency  Management 
Agency-Region IV and the Region IV 
Defense Coordinating Element) that the 
Dual Status Commander concept will 
improve Unity of Effort.” 5
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Dual Status Command during No-
Notice Events
Employing a  Dual Status Commander 
(DSC) during a no-notice event provides 
a cooperative and innovative approach 
to increase unity  of effort and purpose 
for state military  and federal military 
support to states by  establishing 
s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r 
commanding and integrating state and 
federal military  forces for contingency, 
or no-notice, operations. The end result 
is an agreed upon command and control 
construct which eliminates the time 
consuming task of synchronizing 
organizational structures and processes 
under  crisis conditions. This allows an 
increased focus on military  operations to 
save lives, prevent human suffering, and 
mitigate great property damage.
The concept of using a DSC for no-
notice events capitalizes on established 
procedures which have been successfully 
employed for  pre-planned events since 
dual status command was made 
available in the 2004 NDAA. This 
unique command construct has been 
used eight times, at events such as the 
G8 Summit, the Democratic and 
Republican National Conventions, and 
O p e r a t i o n W i n t e r  F r e e z e ( a 
northeastern-border security  operation). 
Dual status command allows one 
commander to command both federal 
(Title 10) and state forces (National 
Guard in Title 32  and/or State Active 
Duty  status) with  the consent of a 
governor and the authorization of the 
president.  This centralized command 
and control construct provides both the 
federal and state chains of command 
with a  common operating picture 
through  the eyes of the DSC.  It  also 
enables the DSC to maximize his or her 
federal and state capabilities,  as well as 
facilitate unity  of effort from  all assigned 
forces.
When utilizing a  DSC, Title 10 forces 
and Title 32/State Active Duty  forces 
have separate chains of command. 
Command authority  within each of the 
separate chains of command may  be 
exercised by  the appointed DSC only 
through the separate chains of 
command.  While acting pursuant to 
state authority, the DSC cannot issue 
orders to federal military  forces; while 
acting pursuant to federal authority, the 
DSC cannot issue orders to state military 
forces. As such, the establishment of a 
DSC does not give the president 
command of state military  forces, or  the 
governor of a state command of federal 
military  forces. The National Guard 
remains a state entity  under the 
exclusive command and control of the 
governor, unless federalized, and the 
DSC has a  state chain-of-command that 
reaches through the adjutant general, to 
the governor, and directs both Title 32 
and State Active Duty  National Guard 
forces in response to the state mission. 
The president  remains the commander-
in-chief of Title 10 forces, and the DSC 
has a federal chain-of-command that 
reaches through the NORTHCOM 
Commander, to the secretary  of defense, 
to the president, and directs Title 10 
forces in response to federal requests for 
assistance (RFAs).
National Guard officers are currently 
being pre-designated for appointment  as 
DSCs for  no-notice events.  The 
adjutants general,  coordinating through 
their governors, are nominating 
National Guard officers who are 
genuinely  the best qualified. When 
federal military  forces and state military 
forces are employed simultaneously  in 
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support of civil authorities in  the United 
States, appointment of a National Guard 
DSC would be the usual and customary 
command and control arrangement. 
Actual appointment of the DSC 
following a no-notice event will continue 
to require the approval and consent of 
the president and the appropriate 
governor. In order  for pre-designated 
DSCs to be quickly  available to respond 
to a contingency, required proper 
consent and authorization memoranda 
of agreement are being pre-coordinated 
and maintained ready for signature.
Specialized training and certification 
to command U.S. military  forces in 
support of civil authorities will  enable 
the DSC to improve unity  of effort, 
ensuring  a rapid response to save lives, 
prevent human suffering, and protect 
p r o p e r t y  i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 
NORTHCOM, through NGB and with 
the military  departments, worked with 
the adjutants general to develop a 
standardized training and certification 
program for DSC candidates.  In addition 
to training and certification, DSCs are 
expected to participate in regular  joint 
exercises involving state and federal 
civilian and military personnel.
In order to support a DSC during a 
no-notice event involving both National 
Guard and Title 10 forces, NORTHCOM 
is pre-designating Title 10 officers to 
serve as the federal or Title 10 Deputy 
Commander. The Title 10 Deputy 
Commander’s responsibility  is to ensure 
proper execution of the DSC’s orders to 
Title 10 forces and to act as an advisor to 
the DSC on  Title 10 matters. Title 10 
Deputy  Commanders will establish close 
and habitual relationships with the pre-
designated DSCs, engage senior state 
leaders, and develop close working 
relationships within their  assigned 
states and other key partners.
NORTHCOM has also developed a 
scaleable and tailorable Title 10 staff 
element,  called the Joint Support  Force 
(JSF). The JSF util izes trained, 
experienced,  and deployable staff 
elements to work directly  for  the DSC, 
integrate with the state National Guard 
staff, and support  the federal military 
response. The JSF will, when feasible 
and requested by  the states, participate 
in state-level exercises to hone 
integration with the pre-designated DSC 
and state structures. The development of 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p l a n s f o r s t a f f 
integration of Title 10 personnel into 
state Joint Task Force and Joint Force 
Headquarters will address several 
employment considerations, including 
ensuring  effective mission assignment to 
both Title 10 and state military  forces 
given the restriction of Posse Comitatus, 
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a s s o c i a t e d 
supporting Rules on the Use of Force, 
and maintaining procedures for 
reporting federal mission status through 
federal chains of command. For 
example,  leaders must be aware that 
military  forces supporting a federal 
Mission Assignment are limited by  the 
scope of that Mission Assignment. 
Command and control options must  be 
scalable from  small footprints (when 
Title 10 forces are contributed to a 
disaster,  95 percent of the time the Title 
10 force is less than a  battalion, 
requiring a small JSF staff element),  to 
very  large (possible integration of U.S. 
Army  North’s Contingency  Command 
Post as a large JSF).
P r e - e v e n t p l a n n i n g f o r t h e 
employment of a joint force will reap 
significant dividends in terms of 
increasing the effectiveness of the 
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military  response. For example, 
tremendous efficiencies will be realized 
in logist ics, including the joint 
reception, staging, onward movement 
and integration (JRSOI) of forces. 
Inadequate control of this strategic 
movement results in a loss of potential 
capabilities and capacities. The DSC 
construct  is the vehicle which will enable 
the long-sought coordinated and 
synchronized planning effort  by  joint 
Title 10 and Title 32/State Active Duty 
organizations in advance of an incident. 
The DSC construct will also result in 
progress with regard to development of 
addi t ional pre-scr ipted miss ion 
assignments (PSMA). PSMA contain 
pre-agreed language about those federal 
capabilities that are expected to be 
requested in a Stafford Act-declared 
major disaster or emergency. The 
development of additional PMSA, 
beyond the twenty-seven currently 
established with  DoD, will streamline 
the process and reduce the time it takes 
to deploy  military  resources for many 
contingency scenarios.
DSC Employment during 
Multi-State Incidents 
To date, all but one (i.e., Operation 
Winter Freeze, November 2, 2004, to 
January  28, 2005) of the eight instances 
in  which  a DSC was appointed involved 
operations in a single state. It is highly 
likely  that our nation will face a 
catastrophic incident affecting multiple 
states simultaneously. A multiple state 
response gives rise to several challenges, 
including ensuring limited resources are 
appropriately  shared among states 
during a regional event, in  accordance 
with  priorities established by  states and 
a Lead Federal Agency.  Some have 
argued that  establishing a single DSC 
with multi-state authorities and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s c o u l d a s s i s t i n 
centralizing the interstate coordination 
of limited federal resources.  During 
disasters/emergencies affecting multiple 
states simultaneously, the proper 
solution is to employ  a DSC in each 
state.
Any  multi-state DSC construct would 
i m m e d i a t e l y  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e 
responsibilities of governors for the 
welfare of the citizens of their states for 
several reasons. All agree that  limited 
resources must be allocated in an 
expeditious manner to the affected state 
with  the most urgent requirements. Title 
10 forces are requested, sourced, 
deployed, and employed using the 
existing Request  for Assistance/Mission 
Assignment process. When there are not 
enough resources to go around at  the 
local, state,  or  federal levels, allocation 
d e c i s i o n s a r e m a d e b y  c i v i l i a n 
emergency  management personnel at 
those levels in coordination with elected 
officials at those levels.  Arbitration of 
civilian response requirements is not 
properly  a military  decision, either at 
the state military  or  federal military 
levels. Federal military  forces are 
committed in  accordance with the 
priorities of the Joint Field Office 
Unified Coordination Group locally  and 
by  the Lead Federal Agency  nationally. 
If there are not enough federal military 
resources to meet the requirements of 
e v e r y  s t a t e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , 
prioritization should continue to be 
performed using existing structures and 
processes, regardless of the command 
and control relationships used to 
integrate the military  forces assigned to 
each state. For example, if there are 
SCHUMACHER, DUAL-STATUS COMMAND 7
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Joint Field Offices established in several 
states,  these requests can be prioritized 
in a multi-state Area Command.
A multi-state DSC charged with 
prioritizing resources between states 
would be in the immediately  untenable 
position of being in conflict with the 
Lead Federal Agency, the federal 
coordinating official,  and the governors 
of the several states. As a practical 
matter,  the DSC will be from  one of the 
states,  and any  appearance of favoritism 
will immediately  end the effectiveness of 
a multi-state DSC. Further, state Joint 
Force Headquarters are optimized to 
perform their  domestic operations 
planning and operations in support of a 
specific state’s emergency  management 
structures and governor. National Guard 
domestic operations staffs are highly 
evolved for domestic operations within 
their state. A  multi-state integrated 
National Guard/Title 10 staff would 
have the immediate challenge of being 
responsive in different states with 
distinct supported civilian structures, 
missions, authorities,  funding, and other 
issues. Determining which  states are 
assigned limited federal resources 
should be accomplished exactly  as it is 
now, regardless of military  command 
and control structure.
The DSC as a Foundation for 
Future Progress 
Successful implementation of the DSC 
construct  for no-notice events is likely  to 
provide a necessary  prerequisite for 
resolving an important gap in the law 
that limits our ability  to use all our 
nation’s military  capabilities.  Federal 
law currently  limits the ability  of the 
president or the secretary  of defense to 
mobilize non-National Guard reservists 
for natural disasters. During  Council of 
G o v e r n o r  p r o c e e d i n g s , s e v e r a l 
governors have gone on record stating 
that when they  are guaranteed control of 
military  forces operating in their state, 
including non-National Guard reserve 
forces, at that  time they  would be willing 
to support new authorities allowing 
increased availability  of non-National 
Guard reservists for  disaster response. 
Approving the DSC concept  for no-
notice events therefore will resolve the 
impasse of governor support for 
congressional action with regard to 
e n a c t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n t o a l l o w 
mobilization of non-National Guard 
reservists to help in natural disaster 
response. 
CONCLUSION
T h e D S C c o m p r o m i s e b e i n g 
developed through the Council of 
Governors will dramatically  reshape 
how the U.S. military  responds to an 
emergency  involving both state and 
federal forces, whether our  nation has 
prior  notice of the event or  not, enabling 
the most  effective, most coordinated use 
of mi l i tary  forces for  domest ic 
contingencies. Anytime there is a 
response to an emergency  involving 
both state and federal military  forces, a 
National Guard DSC will normally  be 
appointed to simultaneously  direct the 
operations of both National Guard and 
federal forces. During multi-state 
events, a DSC should be appointed in 
each impacted state to enable effective 
and coordinated military  response 
throughout all impacted areas. These 
effects will be achieved while fully 
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adhering to the sovereign status of the 
governors in  managing and directing 
emergencies within their  states and 
territories and the responsibility  of the 
president in ensuring legal, safe, and 
effective employment of federal forces.
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Americus, Georgia:
The Case Study of Disasters Serving the Role of 
Facilitators & Expediters of Progress & Betterment
Marc Hyden & Charley English
ABSTRACT:
It has long been debated whether a 
community is  better off before or after 
being struck by a natural disaster. The aim 
of this  study is  to utilize the instance of 
Americus,  Georgia,  which was devastated 
by a tornado in 2007,  as  a case study to 
provide evidence for one opposing 
argument or the other.  A problem in 
determining whether Americus has 
recovered and/or is in relatively better 
shape now  is  the economic recession. 
Economic data was collected, interviews 
were conducted,  and information was 
gathered regarding trends  prior to  and 
following the disaster from  three similar 
Georgia cities  to identify and compare 
t r e n d s  i n A m e r i c u s .  M o s t o f t h e 
information for Americus, such as  the 
e c o n o m y , r e d e v e l o p m e n t , n e w 
construction, government infrastructure, 
and opinions  of locals, is  positive. This  data 
seems  to illustrate recovery, even though 
the community may not yet be in a more 
favorable position (but it most likely will be 
once the hospital is  rebuilt). These findings 
project the theory that natural disasters  of 
this magnitude have minimal negative to 
potentially positive effects  on the economy, 
technology, and physical makeup of local 
regions in the medium to long term.
INTRODUCTION
There is a  long standing debate – 
between emergency  management 
professionals and among academics – 
on the subject of whether local 
communities are generally  better off 
before or after  being struck by  a  natural 
disaster.  This question has yet to be 
resolved and, while opinions are often 
freely  proffered, they  are generally 
unsubstantiated by  a formal and 
systematic scientific study.  Even though 
this is a common theme of discussion 
within the emergency  management 
community,  there have been minimal to 
nearly  no detailed studies pertaining to 
this subject. The overarching goal of this 
article is to provide a case study  that 
examines whether or not the occurrence 
of a disaster promoted recovery  and 
betterment or led to stagnation and 
worsening within one community: 
Americus, Georgia. 
In order  to declare one viewpoint as 
the victor, it  must be clearly  understood 
what the phrase “better off”  actually 
means within this study. It is an all-
encompassing phrase meant to describe 
the state of the community  as an 
improvement  representing a  successful 
recovery. To determine that the city/
county  has indeed been improved after 
the disaster, the jurisdiction must be in 
relatively  better economic standing (a) 
as compared to their  previous trends or 
(b) similar to or better  than the control 
group which acts as a  gauge to reveal 
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how the region is or should be trending. 
T h e j u r i s d i c t i o n m u s t a l s o s e e 
improvement  of the physical structures 
within the city/county, as well as in the 
government infrastructure and services 
provided to residents. 
There are potential implications in 
the outcome of this analysis. If the case 
study  reveals that the city  is worse than 
it  was before the natural disaster, then 
changes should be made in the current 
handling of natural disasters to rectify 
these problems. Conversely, if the data 
shows the city  as being in roughly  the 
same state as it was prior to the natural 
disaster  or better  off than before the 
disaster,  then it would seem that the 
current national system of response to 
and recovery  from  disasters is adequate 
and is performing  as it should. There 
will always be room for improvement, 
but this outcome would seem  to 
promote the current system  as adept 
and competent. 
For  this article,  the city  of Americus, 
Georgia  was chosen as the subject  of the 
case study. To come to a broad 
conclusion concerning whether  all or 
most disasters promote betterment and 
progress, a multitude of case studies 
must be completed covering a large 
range of disasters and disaster sites. 
This study  on Americus is simply  the 
first  step, and it will  only  provide a 
conc lus ion regarding Americus ’ 
condition three years after being 
ravaged by  a natural disaster (as 
opposed to making a claim  regarding all 
locations which have experienced a 
disaster).
Previous Research
Very  little has been published regarding 
whether  a  local community  is better 
before or after  a  disaster. While some 
literature examines whether  disasters 
have a positive or negative effect on the 
economy  of a  nation or a large region, 
this literature is hotly  debated and often 
contradictory. While many  of the studies 
postulate the effects of a  disaster from 
the aspect of macroeconomics,  it  seems 
reasonable that the theories discussed in 
this literature can be applied to the 
recovery  of a  local community  such as 
Americus. 
A publication from  the Business Civic 
Leadership Center  asserts that there are 
a multitude of factors which affect the 
recovery  within a  community,  including 
t h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e d i s a s t e r , 
intergovernmental coordinat ion, 
accessibility  of funding, and the degree 
of damage to businesses and housing. 
This publication also states that most 
communities attempt to rebuild just  as 
they  were before the storm, but once 
they  realize this is not possible, they  are 
in  a strong position to modernize the 
infrastructure and services of the 
community.1 
According to the Australian Journal 
of Emergency Management, natural 
disasters offer  great opportunities in 
that circumstances allow communities 
to become more sustainable by 
permitting new construction and 
development, replacing outdated 
building projects with  state-of-the-art 
faci l i t ies , and restructuring the 
economy.2 Another study  concluded that 
“[t]he results provide strong evidence 
concerning the fact that natural 
d i s a s t e r s d o s e r v e a s c r e a t i v e 
destruction,  providing an  incentive to 
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replace technology  in disaster prone 
countries.” 3 It  should be understood that 
this conclusion was derived from a study 
based solely  on developing countries. 
The World Bank found that developing 
nations and regions which  experienced 
storms recovered quite well. These 
nations and regions experience a short 
lived negative impact on GDP, but that 
effect is minimal and recovery  does not 
take long. This hypothesis, however,  was 
based on developing countries and not 
rich industrialized nations such as the 
United States.4 According to a  study  by 
Mark Skimore and Hideki Toya 
“climatic disasters are positively 
correlated with economic growth, 
human capital investment, and growth 
in total factor productivity.”5  The 
authors came to this conclusion by 
examining long term  growth in GDP per 
capita within  eighty-nine countries from 
1960 to 1990. 
Yet another  study  focusing  on the 
medium-term  effect  of economic growth 
claimed “disasters do affect economic 
growth – but not always negatively, and 
often only  specific sectors of the 
economy.”6  According to Stefan 
Hochrainer, the “analysis aimed at 
better  defining a sort of ‘middle ground’ 
identifying circumstances under which 
disasters have the potential to cause 
significant medium  term  economic 
impacts.”7 The medium term  discussed 
was a time frame of up to five years, and 
the findings concluded that generally 
natural disasters cause negative effects 
in  the medium term. Using data related 
to the macroeconomic effects of GDP 
per  capita, another study  claimed “we 
find that large disasters have a negative 
effect on output both in the short and 
long run.” 8  The authors further stated 
“smaller disasters tend to not have a 
significant effect on output  neither  in 
the short nor in the long run.” 9 
According to this assertion, the natural 
disaster  in Americus would not be 
considered a large disaster.  Tobias 
Rasmussen asserts that “natural 
disasters are typically  associated with  an 
immediate contraction in economic 
output, a worsening of external and 
fiscal balances, and an increase in 
poverty.”10 
T h e r e i s m u c h d i s a g r e e m e n t 
regarding the effects of natural disasters 
in  the short,  medium, and long term. It 
should be noted that there is a large 
discrepancy  regarding var iables 
influencing these economic numbers, 
and it should further be understood that 
most of these publications are studying 
t h e m a c r o e c o n o m i c e f f e c t s . 
Unfortunately, the effects of disasters on 
a local economy  such as Americus have 
not been sufficiently studied. 
DISASTER STRIKES AMERICUS
At 9:15 PM on March 1, 2007, the town 
of Americus, Georgia was devastated by 
a category  three tornado as classified 
under  the Enhanced Fujita Scale.11  The 
tornado carved a thirty-eight-mile path 
through  Sumter  County, which is where 
Americus is located, and the tornado 
was reported to be a  half mile in  width at 
its maximum. The city  of Americus 
incurred the brunt of the destruction, 
and hundreds of homes and businesses 
were destroyed. Most  notably, Sumter 
Regional Hospital,  which is situated in 
the heart of Americus, was demolished 
by  the tornado. Two deaths were 
attributed to the storm, and many  more 
people were hospitalized.12  President 
Bush claimed it was “tough devastation,” 
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and this became a presidentially 
declared disaster  on March  3, 2007.13 
Georgia  Governor  Sonny  Perdue said “It 
was worse than I had feared. The 
hospital was hit, but the devastation 
within the area of Sumter County  and 
Americus was more than I imagined…. 
It's just a  blessing frankly  that we didn't 
have more fatalities than we did.”14
Disaster Damages and Losses
By  the time the storm  cleared, 993 
houses and 217  businesses were 
damaged or destroyed. Ten churches, 
eight recreational facilities/parks, three 
cemeteries, and two schools were also 
damaged.15  Sumter Regional Hospital, 
which was the third largest employer in 
Americus,  was directly  hit and its 
destruction left Americus without a fully 
operational hospital.16  The public 
assistance claim  for the city  of Americus 
was approximately  77.4 million dollars 
(of which the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency  (FEMA) is 
currently  committed to contribute 
roughly  75 million dollars to aid in the 
reconstruction of the hospital). The 
individual assistance claims for  the 
munic ipal i ty  were s l ight ly  over 
$800,000 and the insured losses within 
the city  of Americus alone reached well 
over 100 million dollars.17  Initial fear for 
life gradually  turned to economic 
concerns fueled by  homelessness, 
joblessness,  and the loss of services. In 
addi t ion to the economic woes 
attributed to the storm, Americus would 
soon have to deal with a global recession 
unmatched by  any  since the Great 
Depression.
Adding  to the already  shrinking 
economy  – due to the storm and 
recession – there were fears in the 
Sumter County  region that, if the 
hospital was not  to be rebuilt,  a 
complete economic collapse would occur 
turning Americus into a virtual ghost 
town.  Sumter  Regional Hospital was a 
major  employer in Americus and 
interconnected with many  of the 
businesses within the city.  It  was also 
feared that, without a hospital,  the 
enrollment  rates of the post-secondary 
educational institutions within  Americus 
would suffer.  This assumption was 
based on the be l ie f that fewer 
prospective college students and 
nonresidents would be willing to 
relocate to an area without a major 
hospital because of the lack of 
emergency  health services and because 
collegiate institutions rely  on the 
hospital for certain technical studies.
Recovery from Disaster
Once the aggregate of the data  presented 
in this study  – examples of new 
infrastructure, the redevelopment, the 
new county-wide alert system, and the 
opinions of locals – is examined and 
scrutinized, it becomes evident that 
nearly  every  piece is in place to 
acknowledge Americus as a city  which 
has recovered from the March disaster 
and become a  better community. From 
t h e e c o n o m i c f i g u r e s t o t h e 
reconstruction of the city, everything 
points to a relatively  healthy  town, with 
the exception of one fundamental 
component: the hospital. While there is 
currently  no permanent  hospital in 
A m e r i c u s , F E M A c o n s t r u c t e d a 
prefabricated hospital which opened 
April 1, 2008 and has a five year  shelf 
life.  A  new hospital is being built,  and it 
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is slated to be fully  operational by 
2011.18  Once the construction of the 
hospital is completed, there should be 
no doubt  that Americus has fully 
recovered from  the tornado and become 
a better city than before the storm.
METHODOLOGY
There are many  economic indicators 
which must  be examined in order to 
understand the scope of destruction the 
tornado inflicted upon the economy  of 
Americus in the short and long term. 
The difficulty  in discovering the true 
extent of the storm-related economic 
damage is masked by  the recession 
which is a major contributor to 
Americus’ current economic state. 
Control Group
To be able to factor  out the recession to 
gain a better  understanding of what the 
tornado actually  caused, a comparison 
must be made between Americus and 
similar cities which did not  experience a 
devastating disaster near the time 
A m e r i c u s d i d . W i t h i n  G e o r g i a , 
comparisons to the cities of Waycross 
(Ware County), Thomasville (Thomas 
County), and Moultrie (Colquitt  County) 
were used to measure how much of 
Americus’ economic distress resulted 
from the recession and how much was a 
consequence of being struck by  the 
tornado. This control group will also be 
used to determine if the town of 
Americus has recovered from  the 
damages inflicted by  the tornado or 
possibly  even become a better, stronger, 
and more dynamic community. A fuller 
description of this control group is 
provided in Appendix A.
Comparison Points
In order to decipher  the impact of the 
tornado on the economy  of Americus, 
several indicators were examined. These 
include population growth or  decline, 
hotel/motel taxes received, and business 
l i c e n s e f e e s r e c e i v e d f o r t h e 
corresponding cities.  Other data 
analyzed within the respective counties 
were special purpose local option sales 
tax (SPLOST) totals, average monthly 
f o o d s t a m p r e c i p i e n t s a n d t h e 
correlating dollar  amounts,  the funds 
distributed through the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy  Families program, 
new home permits, average annual pay, 
and the poverty  rate. Micropolitan 
information provided clues as well,  such 
as unemployment rates. (A micropolitan 
area is a  geographic region defined by 
the United States Office of Management 
and Budget as an area comprised of an 
urban core with a minimum population 
of 10,000 but less than a  population of 
50,000). 19 Lastly,  the enrollment figures 
of the colleges and universities within 
the corresponding cities were also 
evaluated as a guideline for determining 
the health of the economy  and the 
town’s ability to attract non-residents. 
The data collected and examined 
predominantly  represent  the years 2006 
to 2009 to show the economic trends 
prior  to and following  the 2007  disaster. 
The premise of this study  is if the 
percentage of change between the 
economic numbers represent ing 
Americus for  the years 2006  and 2009  is 
alike or better than the cities to which it 
is compared, then the data shows that 
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Americus has either (a) rebounded and 
is now on par with similar cities or  (b) 
has outperformed the comparable 
communities and is now better off 
economically  than before the disaster. 
Conversely, if the changes in Americus’ 
data are worse than the control group, 
Americus has not rebounded or  is in a 
worse position than before the tornado. 
When available,  if the data from the 
years 2006 through 2009 does not offer 
strong support  for  a conclusion, figures 
from 2003 to 2005 will be presented to 
display  previous trends in  order to 
f o r m u l a t e a h y p o t h e s i s . T h e 
corresponding information and data for 
the year 2007  was also collected, but  it 
shouldn’t  generally  be emphasized as 
definitive evidence of the current state 
of the economy  because this period was 
during and shortly  following the time of 
the tornado. It can  be assumed 
Americus experienced extreme highs 
and lows during 2007  and possibly  some 
abnormal fluctuations in 2008 because 
the tornado struck on March 1, 2007. If 
normalcy  has returned to Americus, the 
2009 data sets should be representative 
of that. 
There are multiple variables which 
can influence economic figures,  and it  is 
often difficult  to prove an undeniable 
causal relationship between the state of 
the economy  and certain external 
factors. The economic analysis within 
this study  will attempt to provide the 
most logical and rational explanation for 
the condition of the economy  within 
Americus. Unfortunately, some data 
which would grant additional validity  to 
this study  – such as figures regarding 
G D P p e r c a p i t a , b a n k r u p t c i e s , 
foreclosures, and housing sales – is 
unavailable because these are somewhat 
sparsely  populated areas which have not 
attracted the interest for  previous 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e s t u d i e s o r  d a t a 
collections.
This study  utilizes communities 
which are similar  to Americus but  have 
not  experienced a major natural disaster 
as Americus did within the designated 
time frame. Much of South Georgia did 
experience wildfires during 2007, and 
some of these fires were presidentially-
declared disasters. Of the four  counties 
discussed, only  Ware County  (where 
Waycross is located) experienced a 
mentionable impact due to the wildfires. 
However,  the effect on Waycross was 
very  negligible because not a single 
building was destroyed, there were no 
deaths, and the fires predominantly 
affected only  wild and swamp lands.20 
Given these facts,  this should not affect 
the use of Waycross within this study  as 
a comparison city  which was not 
affected by  a disaster within the 
designated time period.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
To gain a  clear understanding of 
whether  Americus was truly  better  off 
before or  after the disaster, economic 
data must be scrutinized, abstract  clues 
must be considered, opinions of locals 
must be evaluated, and the makeover of 
the city  must be revealed.  Throughout 
this study  an abundance of information 
and data  wil l be discussed and 
hypotheses will be formulated. 
Population Variances
To perform  a broad economic analysis, 
many  different indicators must be 
analyzed,  and the first indicator  studied 
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within this article is population change. 
Population change within any  city  will 
have periodic fluctuations due to 
disasters or economic pressure. 
Unfortunately, the data sets correlating 
with population growth within this 
study  do not include information for  the 
year  2009 due to the date this study  was 
completed. The population of Americus 
is a  little troubling prima facie because 
from 2006 to 2008 there was a negative 
population growth of 0.53 percent; on a 
positive note, during this period the 
population was shrinking at a much 
s l o w e r r a t e a s c o m p a r e d t o 
2003-2005.21 
This population decline is likely 
representative of a minor exodus 
influenced by  the economy  and/or the 
effects of the tornado. During this same 
time Waycross experienced a  miniscule 
loss of 0.03 percent, while Thomasville 
and Moultrie experienced population 
increases of 2.55 and 2.6 percent.22 
Americus was the only  city  within this 
study  to experience a  noticeably 
negative population  growth from the 
years 2006 to 2008, and this could very 
well be illustrative of a poor economy 
motivating citizens to seek work 
elsewhere. 
Population 
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2003 16,877 14,946 18,204 14,552
2004 16,676 14,812 18,212 14,736
2005 16,534 14,745 18,563 14,743
2006 16,612 14,779 18,807 15,019
2007 16,620 14,759 18,993 15,184
2008 16,524 14,774 19,286 15,409
Population Change
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2003-20
05 -2.03% -1.34% 1.97% 1.31%
2006-20
08 -0.53% -0.03% 2.55% 2.60%
It  is important to note that  some 
estimates for Americus hint at a  sizeable 
population growth in 2009, but these 
estimates did not follow  the same 
guidelines as those just presented from 
the United States Census Bureau.23 
Thus, the figures for the year  2009 could 
not be considered sc ient i f ic or 
acceptable for the purposes of this study. 
Without accurate and systematic figures 
for the populations of these cities in 
2009, it would seem that the loss of 
residents in Americus was a local 
problem, possibly  attributable to the 
natural disaster. 
Without the current 2009 population 
figures to provide clarity  on the subject, 
the data  for  the years 2003  to 2005 was 
examined to determine whether  the loss 
of population within Americus was an 
anomaly,  a  result of the disaster, or  due 
to economic conditions. Americus 
experienced negative population growth 
of 2.03 percent  from  2003 to 2005, 
which is considerably  worse than the 
negative growth rate from 2006 to 
2008.24 From 2003  to 2005, Waycross 
exhibited a population loss of 1.34 
p e r c e n t , T h o m a s v i l l e a t t a i n e d 
population growth of 1.97  percent,  and 
Moultrie saw an increase in population 
of 1.31 percent.25 
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The population growth data for 
Americus shows the city  consistently 
underperforming all of the cities within 
this study  from 2003 to 2008. This 
reinforces the theory  of a localized 
problem  causing negative population 
growth in Americus. The effects of the 
natural disaster  may  be a minor 
influence on  the population change, but 
it  is important to note that  Americus’ 
population is shrinking at a slower pace 
than before the tornado struck. This 
singular data  set gives the impression 
that Americus is doing better  than it  was 
before the natural disaster, but there is 
still an underlying and preexisting 
problem which does not implicate the 
tornado as the main source of the 
negative growth in population. Business 
closures and the overall economic 
climate due to the recession are the 
likely causes of the loss of populace. 
Unemployment Rate
The unemployment rate is an important 
tool and indicator  for  determining the 
health of the economy, and this 
indicator presents Americus as a city  on 
the right  track. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics maintains and updates these 
f i g u r e s o n a  m o n t h l y  b a s i s . 
Unfortunately, they  do not provide the 
unemployment rates for  the individual 
cities examined within this study, but 
they  do, however, publish the data for 
the respective micropolitan areas. 
The Americus micropolitan area 
claimed an increase of unemployment 
rate from 2006  to October 2009  of 
105.17  percent.26  There is an obvious 
rise in unemployment after the tornado 
struck Americus in 2007, and there is a 
surge of unemployment in 2009. The 
increase of unemployment in 2009 does 
not  seem  as though it  could be 
attributed solely  to the storm  though 
because (a) it represents such a large 
increase two years after  the disaster and 
(b) the cities in the control group 
experienced similarly  large increases in 
the unemployment rate. 
Unemployment Rates
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2003 5.50% 4.80% 4.30% 5.20%
2004 5.80% 4.90% 4.40% 4.80%
2005 6.70% 5.10% 4.40% 5.00%
2006 6% 4.63% 4.00% 4.20%
2007 7.01% 4.57% 4.10% 4.50%
2008 7.55% 6.10% 5.70% 6.00%
2009 12.31% 9.74% 8.68% 8.52%
Unemployment Rate Change
 Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2003-2005 21.81% 6.25% 2.33% -3.85%
2006-2009 105.17% 110.37% 117.25% 102.86%
The unemployment rates in Americus 
look worse than the other cities at first 
glance because they  are higher  in each 
individual year, but  the rates were 
substantially  higher  – before the 
disaster  – than any  of the other  cities 
studied. When analyzing the change 
from 2006  to 2009, Americus fared 
better  than Waycross and Thomasville. 
While Moultrie exhibited less of a 
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percent of increase than Americus, the 
difference was nearly  negligible. This 
data suggests that Americus was 
suffering from economic woes worse 
than the other cities prior to the 
tornado, but  the percentage increase in 
unemployment is less than two of the 
three towns discussed. This seems to 
imply  that Americus ei ther  has 
recovered from  the disaster or  is well on 
the way to recovery. 
When the same unemployment data 
from  the 2003 to 2005 period is 
analyzed,  the previously  stated theory  is 
emphasized. The Americus micropolitan 
area claimed a growth in unemployment 
rate by  21.81  percent from  2003 to 
2005.27  During this time, Waycross’ 
unemployment rate grew by  6.25 
percent, the Thomasville micropolitan 
a r e a r e p o r t e d a n i n c r e a s e o f 
unemployment rate of only  2.33 percent, 
and the Moultrie micropolitan area 
unemployment rate declined by  3.85 
percent.28 
It  is obvious that the unemployment 
rate in  Americus increased at a much 
faster pace between 2003  and 2005 than 
in any  other  micropol i tan area 
discussed. This, again, seems to allude 
to a prior economic problem  within the 
A m e r i c u s a r e a .  A m e r i c u s ’ 
unemployment percentages increased 
on pace or  at a slower  rate than the 
comparison cities for  the years 2006 to 
2009. This seems to support the theory 
that Americus is in  relatively  better 
shape than it was prior to the storm, 
even though it  is still  suffering from 
major  economic problems which  do not 
implicate the disaster as the root cause.
Poverty Rate
The poverty  rate, reported by  the United 
States Census Bureau, provides a  broad 
view of what percentage of people live in 
poverty  within a calendar  year, but the 
report of the poverty  rate does not 
provide a def in i t ive conc lus ion 
regarding the recovery  of Americus.29 
The Census Bureau uses calculations 
dependent  upon several variables to 
determine what the threshold of the 
minimum  income is in a particular 
community  which al lows for an 
acceptable standard of living for an 
individual or family. If the individual or 
family  earns less than the threshold 
determined by  the federal government, 
they are considered to live in poverty.30 
The poverty  rates posted by  the 
United States Census Bureau do not 
include the cities discussed within  this 
s tudy, but they  do inc lude the 
corresponding counties.  These counties 
are all sparsely  populated, and a large 
percentage of their populations reside 
within the corresponding county  seats of 
Americus, Waycross, Thomasville, and 
Moultrie. (The Census Bureau did not 
have the figures for 2009  at the time this 
study was completed.) 
Residents of Americus (Sumter 
County) endured net change in poverty 
rate between 2006 and 2008, which was 
an increase of 24.78 percent.31 Waycross 
(Ware County) produced negative 0.96 
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percent growth in their poverty  rate in 
that time span; Thomasville (Thomas 
County) attained a decrease of 10 
percent in poverty  rate from  2006, and 
the total change in poverty  rate for 
Moultrie (Colquitt  County) was a 
negative 10.67  percent during this same 
timeframe.32 
Americus (Sumter County) was the 
only  area which produced an increase in 
their poverty  rate,  and it  is important  to 
note that the increase was a substantial 
one. This means that a larger  number of 
citizens in Americus (Sumter County) 
are living in poverty, and the number is 
growing. The other  counties discussed 
improved their  poverty  rates,  which 
seems to allude to a local problem 
causing the increase in Americus 
(Sumter  County) and not only  the global 
recession. 
Poverty Rate 
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2003 21% 19% 17% 19.20%
2004 22.30% 19.50% 17.40% 20.10%
2005 27.60% 21.50% 18.90% 23.40%
2006 23% 20.90% 23% 25.30%
2007 25% 20.40% 17.10% 22.20%
2008 28.70% 20.70% 20.70% 22.60%
Poverty Rate Change
 Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2003-2005 31.43% 13.16% 11.18% 21.88%
2006-2008 24.78% -0.96% -10% -10.67%
Utilizing this poverty  data alone, the 
conclusion would be that  Americus 
(Sumter  County) is suffering from a 
localized issue which  may  imply  it has 
not  recovered from  the tornado and that 
the city’s poverty  rates are gradually 
worsening. It  was expected that the 
2007  figures and potentially  the 2008 
data would be turbulent regarding 
Americus, but without  the 2009 poverty 
rates, it  is hard to formulate a definitive 
position using this data. Even if the data 
representing the 2009  poverty  rates 
happened to be favorable for Americus, 
chances are it would reveal that 
Americus is in worse condition than the 
comparison counties due to large 
differences in poverty rates. 
Without the 2009 figures, it seems 
prudent to review  prior  data  and 
potential trends from 2003 to 2005. 
Americus (Sumter County) produced an 
increase in the poverty  rate of 31.43 
percent from 2003 to 2005.33 Waycross 
(Ware County) endured an increase of 
13.16 percent in the same time span; 
poverty  increased by  11.18 percent 
within Thomasville (Thomas County) 
and by  21.88 percent in Moultrie 
(Colquitt County).34 
The poverty  rate within Americus 
(Sumter  County) rose at  a  higher rate 
than the other three counties during the 
2003 to 2005 time period, and the rate 
increased more between 2003  and 2005 
than any  comparison from  2006  to 
2008. This data  discounts the natural 
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disaster  as a major contributor to the 
rise in  poverty  rate because the rate was 
already  rising  before the tornado hit, 
and the poverty  rate is growing at  a 
much slower pace after the tornado than 
prior  to the disaster. While the poverty 
rate does not offer a very  optimistic view 
of Americus (Sumter County),  the 
tornado does not  seem  to be the main 
cause of the increase in  the poverty  rate, 
and Americus seems to be following a 
trend already  set in motion prior to the 
natural disaster. 
Average Annual Pay
The Bureau of Labor  Statistics tracks, 
among other things, the average annual 
pay  for individuals in counties across the 
United States.35  These statistics display 
a positive representation of recovery 
within Americus. Like some of the 
previous data examined, the figures 
representing the average annual pay  do 




Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2003 $26,140 $24,742 $26,818 $23,321
2004 $26,132 $25,296 $28,419 $23,744
2005 $27,257 $26,099 $29,800 $24,496
2006 $27,539 $27,054 $30,118 $24,581
2007 $28,457 $27,992 $32,826 $26,315
2008 $28,778 $29,351 $33,556 $26,245
Change in Average Annual Pay 
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co.Colquitt Co.
2003-2005 4.27% 5.48% 11.12% 5.04%
2006-2008 4.5% 8.49% 11.42% 6.77%
The citizens of Americus (Sumter 
County) experienced an increase from 
2006 to 2008 of 4.5 percent in average 
annual pay.36 The average annual pay  in 
Americus (Sumter County) generated 
significantly  less growth than the other 
counties which were analyzed. This 
would seem  to provide supporting 
evidence that Americus (Sumter County) 
has not fully  recovered from  the 
disaster.  When one closely  examines the 
numbers for 2005 and 2006, it is 
noticeable that Americus (Sumter 
County) generally  had smaller rates of 
growth in average annual pay  than the 
other counties prior  to the tornado as 
well as after. 
Americus (Sumter County) displayed 
a 1.03  percent increase in average 
annual pay  from 2005 to 2006, while all 
but one county  outperformed this 
modest amount  of growth. With that 
being understood, it  doesn’t seem  logical 
to implicate the disaster  as the singular 
cause of the lack of significant gains in 
the average annual income. Just as the 
unemployment rate seemed to suggest 
that pre-existing economic conditions 
were adversely  affecting  the economy, 
the same can be said of the average 
annual pay. This does not  mean that the 
effects of the tornado do not factor in at 
all, but,  if they  do, the effects make a 
minor contribution.  
The figures for the years 2003  to 
2005 offer some positive evidence 
regarding the state of Americus (Sumter 
County). The average annual pay  in 
Americus (Sumter  County) displayed a 
loss of $8 per person from 2003 to 2004 
and an increase of 4.27  percent from 
2003 to 2005, but, from the years 2006 
to 2008, there was no decrease in 
average annual pay.37  From 2003  to 
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2005, Waycross (Ware County) 
increased annual pay  by  5.48 percent, 
Thomasville (Thomas County) generated 
an increase in average annual pay  of 
11.12  percent  and Moultrie (Colquitt 
County) produced an increase in average 
annual pay of 5.04 percent.38 
Americus (Sumter County) was the 
only  area to experience a decrease in 
average annual pay  from 2003 to 2004, 
but the county  has consistently 
produced increases since then (albeit 
modest  in comparison to the other 
counties). This would seem to indicate 
that Americus is doing better  than it  was 
before the tornado and may  be without 
many  lingering consequences of the 
disaster. Similar to the information 
regarding the poverty  rates, the data 
describing the average annual pay  lacks 
the figures for 2009 which may  have 
offered a more decisive conclusion 
within this section, but it seems logical 
to theorize that the natural disaster  is 
not  the main cause of Americus’ modest 
growth of average annual pay.  
Special Purpose 
Local Option Sales Tax
The special purpose local option sales 
tax, or SPLOST, is an increase of the 
sales tax  within  a county  in order  to 
f u n d c e r t a i n l o c a l p r o j e c t s . 
Unfortunately  these figures do not seem 
to provide an obvious conclusion 
regarding the state of the Americus 
economy  in conjunction with the natural 
disaster.  Not all counties within the 
United States impose a SPLOST, but all 
four of the correlating counties within 
this project do. The change in  SPLOST 
averages can be an invaluable tool to 
a c c u r a t e l y  p o r t r a y  t h e a m o u n t 
consumers are spending within the 
county. Most of the SPLOST numbers 
gathered for  this study  were as of 
October  2009. Since the amounts for 
2006 to 2008 represent complete years 
and the figures for 2009 do not, the 
average monthly  SPLOST numbers are 
used to reveal the state of the economy 
and are presented in  the form  of the 
calendar year. 
SPLOST (Monthly Average)
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2006 $347,680 $562,247 N/A $486,074
2007 $372,059 $571,370 $616,932 $462,940
2008 $368,362 $597,674 $612,465 $468,585
2009 $298,846 $519,862 $577,559 $453,499
Change in SPLOST 
Sumter 
Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2006-2008  5.95% 6.30% -3.06%
2006-2009 -14.05% -7.45% -6.38% -6.70%
Americus (Sumter County) produced 
a negative growth of 14.05 percent of 
SPLOST totals between the years 2006 
and 2009.39   It is interesting to notice 
that in the year of the disaster, the 
SPLOST numbers grew 7  percent over 
the previous year.  This can most likely 
be attributed to spending on storm-
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related repairs and an influx of people 
providing assistance to Americus. 
During the same time period Waycross 
(Ware County) displayed a  decrease of 
7.54  percent  in  SPLOST sums40  and 
Moultrie (Colquitt County) produced a 
decrease in the SPLOST monthly 
average of 6.7  percent.41  The SPLOST 
currently  assessed by  Thomasville 
(Thomas County) did not  exist in 2006 
and, therefore, cannot  be included in 
this analysis.  The difference between 
2007  and 2009  averages in Thomasville 
(Thomas County) was a  loss of 6.38 
percent.42 
The SPLOST numbers for  the other 
counties outperformed Americus 
(Sumter  County) by  a  sizeable margin. 
This could possibly  provide evidence 
that Americus has not recovered from 
the storm, but this seems somewhat 
unlikely  because the change from  2006 
to 2008 in  Americus (Sumter County) 
was a gain of 5.95 percent,  while 
Waycross (Ware County) saw  growth of 
6.3  percent  and Moultrie (Colquitt 
County) experienced a loss of 3.6 
percent. If the net change between 2006 
and 2009 were to reflect any  negative 
remnants of the natural disaster,  then 
the difference between 2006  and 2008 
would exaggerate the signs of a negative 
impact because the latter time frame 
was nearer to the date of the tornado. 
On the contrary, Americus (Sumter 
County) actually  exhibited relatively 
average numbers which were better  than 
Moultrie (Colquitt County) but worse 
than Waycross (Ware County). 
This information leads to the 
hypothesis that the decrease in the 2009 
SPLOST totals were mostly  unaffected 
by  the consequences of the storm  and 
are, instead, a result  of the recession. It 
is quite feasible that there are residual 
ramifications of the storm  influencing 
the local economy, but it seems that they 
are not  the primary  cause of the 2009 
decline in SPLOST sums. 
HOTEL/MOTEL TAX
Each of the cities within this study  levy 
what is generally  known as the hotel/
motel tax, a city-wide tax on individuals 
renting  hotel rooms. This tax can be a 
useful indicator  of a community’s ability 
to attract tourists – which can in turn 
boost the economy  – and this indicator 
illustrates substantial growth within 
Americus.
The hote l/motel tax amounts 
collected in Americus are based on the 
city’s fiscal year, which ends in 
December, but the 2009 figures 
available for this study  end in October. 
The city  of Americus experienced a net 
increase in hotel/motel tax revenues of 
12 percent from  2006 to 2009.43  (The 
actual increase may  be more than 12 
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percent, but  the totals for the months of 
November  and December of the year 
2009 were not available at  the time this 
study  was completed.) It is interesting to 
observe the 2007  tax received total: the 
amount of growth  from  2006 to 2007  is 
over 43 percent.  This is no doubt 
directly  related to the disaster  because 
residents who lost their  homes needed 
temporary housing. 
Hotel/Motel Tax Received
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2006 $250,000 $245,110 $265,135 $96,352
2007 $357,900 $278,197 $263,842 $94,649
2008 $320,900 $279,153 $242,362 $93,138
2009 $280,000 $250,800 $193,472 $89,644
Change in Hotel/Motel Tax Received
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2006-2009 12% 2.32% -20.4% -7.07%
The hotel/motel tax in Waycross is 
based on a fiscal year ending in June, 
which means that city’s figures are 
complete for the full fiscal year. The 
difference between the hotel/motel tax 
received for the years 2006  and 2009 in 
Waycross revealed positive growth of 
2.32  percent.44  The hotel/motel tax in 
Thomasville was tracked for  the 
calendar  year,  with  figures for  2009 
available through October.  Thomasville 
experienced a loss of 20.4 percent in 
these tax revenues between 2006 and 
2009.45 (The loss would likely  not be as 
great if the November and December 
2009 numbers were available for  this 
study.) The hotel/motel tax data for 
Moultrie (which  uses a fiscal year  ending 
on September 30th) is complete and 
reveals a  loss of 7.07  percent  from  2006 
to 2009.46 
Americus outperformed all three 
cities by  a  sizeable margin in the 
percentage increase in the hotel/motel 
tax from  2006 to 2009. This should be a 
viewed as a positive sign for tourism, the 
economy, and recovery within Americus. 
Business Tax
Most cities collect some sort of business 
license fee.  The name of the tax differs 
from place to place, and it may  be 
known as Business Tax, Business 
License Fees, Occupational Tax, etc. 
Whatever derivative it  is known by, it 
generally  serves the same purpose, 
which is requiring businesses to pay  a 
fee to operate. This is another  way  to 
gauge how  many  businesses are in 
operation within  the city, and how many 
are closing or opening. Businesses are 
the lifeline of the economy, which makes 
this tax or fee a viable indicator of a 
city’s economic health.  
The business license fees in  Americus 
are paid for the city’s fiscal year, which 
ends in December; this means that the 
2009 numbers used in this study  are 
incomplete and current as of October 
2009. From  2006 to 2009, business 
license fees collected in Americus 
increased 1.02  percent.47 Although 2009 
data is incomplete, it is a troublesome 
fact that the Business License Fees are 
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down roughly  11  percent from  the 
previous year. Interestingly, during and 
shortly  after the tornado struck, the 
business license fees collected in 
Americus increased by  relatively  large 
amounts.
 
Business License Fees Received
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2006 $268,000 $786,481 $628,189 $512,000
2007 $289,400 $748,210 $683,577 $619,264
2008 $306,250 $725,497 $675,998 $551,447
2009 $270,730 $751,027 $559,733 $545,039
Change Business License Fees Received
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
2006-2009 1.02% -4.51% -2.8% 6.45%
The city  government of Waycross 
uses a fiscal year  which ends in June, 
and all of the city’s figures are complete. 
Business license fees collected in 
Waycross decreased 4.51  percent from 
2006 to 2009.48 Thomasville’s business 
license fees are incomplete for 2009 
(ending in October  for  the calendar 
year) but show that the city  of 
experienced a loss of 2.8 percent in 
business license fees collected from 
2006 to 2009.49 The city  government of 
Moultrie is based on a fiscal year ending 
on September 30th, which means that  all 
of its numbers are complete. Moultrie 
saw an increase of 6.45 percent in 
business license fees received from 2006 
to 2009.50 
The percentage of difference from 
2006 to 2009 within Americus was 
greater  than that of Thomasville and 
Waycross but less than Moultrie. This 
seems to suggest that Americus has 
recovered economically  from the storm 
and the jurisdiction is either  doing 
better  than before or  has returned to 
normalcy. One troublesome statistic was 
the decrease in fees Americus collected 
in  2009; this decrease can be dismissed 
in  this study  as an effect of the economic 
recession (Thomasville claimed a loss 
nearly as great as Americus in 2009).
New Home Permits
Another  set of criterion to consider  in 
assessing the economic status of 
Americus (Sumter County) is the 
number of new homes built. Nearly  all 
counties across the United States 
require building permits for  the 
construction of new homes. The number 
of permits issued provides a measure of 
how much the community  is growing 
and how  many  individuals potentially 
possess the means to purchase a new 
home. This data also seems to hint at 
recovery with Americus.
The data concerning the number of 
new home permits issued for  Americus 
(Sumter  County) does not include 
houses which were rebuilt due to the 
tornado, and the figures presented are 
based on the calendar year with the 
exception of 2009 (for  which the data  is 
current up to October).  Americus 
(Sumter  County) saw a decrease in new 
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home permits of 69.84 percent from 
2006 and 2009.51 
New home permits for Waycross 
(Ware County) are also tracked for the 
calendar  year  and are up to date as of 
October  2009. It must be stated that  the 
2009 number is somewhat inflated due 
to the fact that forty-nine of those homes 
are from a single development.52  The 
change from  2006 to 2009  in Waycross 
is an increase of 12.16  percent when 
including this development; when it is 
not included, the net change is a 
decrease of 53.05 percent.53
New Home Permits Issued
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2006 63 74 279 45
2007 46 53 200 92
2008 25 41 109 132
2009 19 83 (34) 63 111










The data for Thomasville (Thomas 
County), although presented in calendar 
year  form, is up to date as of October 
2009. Thomasville (Thomas County) 
experienced a decrease of 77.42 percent 
in  new home permits issued from 2006 
to 2009.54  The figures for  Moultrie 
(Colquitt County) are current  through 
December 31, 2009 and show a 147 
percent increase in new home permits 
issued from 2006 to 2009.55
The data for  Americus is alarming, 
but  so are the numbers for  Waycross 
and Thomasville. Americus experienced 
a l e s s d r a m a t i c d e c r e a s e t h a n 
T h o m a s v i l l e a n d a r e a s o n a b l y 
comparable rate of reduction as 
compared to Waycross (when not 
including the new development in 
Waycross’ rate of change).  Moultrie was 
the only  area to consistently  improve 
with  the exception of a decrease in 
2009. Given that  Americus experienced 
trends similar to those experienced by 
Waycross and Thomasville,  it seems the 
decrease in the production of new 
homes is mainly  due to the poor 
economy and not the disaster.
Food Stamp Funds
The Department of Family  and Children 
Services (DFCS) maintains records 
which can be directly  linked to the state 
o f t h e e c o n o m y , i n c l u d i n g 
documentation regarding food stamps 
and the Temporary  Assistance for Needy 
Families program  (TANF). Both of these 
indictors offer  great promise of recovery 
and betterment within Americus. While 
neither of these figures necessarily  offers 
concrete evidence concerning the status 
of the economy  as a whole,  they  do 
contribute clues as to what  trend the 
economy  is following. (All records stated 
from the Department of Family  and 
Children Services are based on the state 
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fiscal year which  is July  1, 2005 to June 
30, 2006 for fiscal year 2006, July  1 
2006 to June 30, 2007  for fiscal year 
2007, and July  1,  2007  to June 30, 2008 
for  fiscal year 2008. Information 
regarding  fiscal year 2009 was not 
available at the time this study  was 
completed. )
Annual Food Stamp Funds Distributed
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2006 $8,867,078 $6,098,011 $6,530,385 $7,217,276
2007 $9,432,414 $5,846,579 $6,456,794 $6,971,842
2008 $9,928,383 $6,266,149 $6,736,639 $8,089,296
Change in Annual Food Stamp Funds Distributed
Sumter 




8 12% 2.76% 3.16% 12.08%
Food stamp funds distributed in 
Americus (Sumter County) increased 12 
percent between fiscal years 2006 to 
2008.56  The sum of food stamp funds 
administered in Waycross (Ware 
County), from fiscal years 2006 and 
2008, rose by  2.76 percent,57  while 
T h o m a s v i l l e ( T h o m a s C o u n t y ) 
experienced an increase of 3.16 
percent,58  and Moultrie (Colquitt 
County) saw an increase of 12.08 
percent.59 
Americus (Sumter County) was the 
only  area which increased the amount of 
food stamp funds from  2006  to 2007, 
and this can clearly  be attributed to the 
storm. The total quantity  of food stamp 
funds in Americus (Sumter  County) was 
consistently  higher  than any  of the 
control group cities each year,  but the 
percentage increase from 2006  to 2008 
was actually  less than that  of one of the 
counties Americus (Sumter County) was 
compared to. 
There may  be lingering effects from 
the natural disaster, but Americus 
(Sumter  County) is increasing on pace 
with  one of the similar communities. 
These inflated numbers lead to the 
conclusion that  the Americus region had 
economic woes prior to the tornado; the 
disaster is most likely  not a major 
contributor  to the current increase in 
food stamps funds because of the 
similarities of the rates of increase 
shared between Americus (Sumter 
County) and Moultrie (Colquitt County).
Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families
The Temporary  Assistance for Needy 
Families program (TANF) provides 
funds to less fortunate families with 
dependent children, and it potentially 
illustrates positive growth within 
Americus. TANF funds distributed in 
Americus (Sumter County) show  a 50.13 
percent decrease from  2006  to 2008.60 
During this same period, TANF funds 
dispersed increased 2.25 percent in 
Waycross (Ware County),61 decreased by 
36.3  percent in Thomasville (Thomas 
County),62  and decreased by  31.33 
percent in Moultrie (Colquitt County).63  
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Total TANF Funds Distributed
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2006 $967,490 $469,528 $451,764 $529,323
2007 $595,987 $387,076 $323,928 $373,222
2008 $482,534 $480,076 $287,386 $363,503
Total TANF Funds Distributed
Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
2006-2008 -50.13% 2.25% -36.39% -31.33%
Americus (Sumter County) disbursed 
a larger amount of funds in 2006 than 
any  of the control areas, and this, once 
again, seems to allude to a  previous 
economic problem. However, Americus 
(Sumter  County) experienced a  much 
more impressive decrease from 2006  to 
2008 than any  other county  within this 
study. This would suggest that the 
tornado had little effect  on TANF, and, 
judging by  the figures, Americus is 
progressing more quickly  than its 
counterparts in decreasing the amount 
of TANF funds distributed. 
College Enrollment
College enrollment, from  2006 to 2009, 
was the last major  indicator  examined 
for gauging  the pulse of the economy 
and community.  This set of data 
provides a superlative outlook for  the 
current and future state of Americus. 
The city  of Americus has one university 
and one college: Georgia Southwestern 
State University  (GSSU) and South 
Georgia  Technical College (SGTC-
A m e r i c u s ) . G S S U i n c r e a s e d i t s 
enrollment by  18.15 percent between 
2006 and 2009, and only  lost 2.1 
percent in 2007  (the year  of the 
tornado). 64  The enrollment of SGTC-
Americus surged from  2006  to 2009  by 
24.54  percent, and SGTC-Americus 
experienced an  increase in 2007  as 
well. 65 
Waycross, Georgia has two colleges 
within the city: Waycross College (WC) 
and Okefenokee Technical College 
(OTC). WC displayed a positive net 
change in enrollment from  2006  to 
2009 of 5.8 percent, and OTC actually 
experienced an 11.11  percent decrease in 
enrollment  during the same time span.66 
Thomasville has one university  and one 
college as well: Thomas University  (TU) 
and Southwest Georgia Technical 
College (SGTC-Thomasville). The 
enrollment of TU soared from 2006  to 
2009 by  37.25 percent and SGTC-
Thomasville displayed a slight  decline in 
enrollment  of 0.94 percent within the 
same time frame.67  Moultrie has only 
one college: Moultrie Technical College 
(MTC), which displayed positive growth 
of 3.85 percent between 2006  and 
2009.68 
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College Enrollment
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
GSSU SGTC WC OTC TU SGTC MTC
2006 2,457 2,857 1,018 1,314 690 1,175 3,688
2007 2,405 3,013 989 1,118 753 1,071 3,587
2008 2,717 3,222 936 1,150 899 1,028 3,646
2009 2,903 3,558 1,077 1,168 947 1,164 3,830
Change in College Enrollment
Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
GSSU SGTC WC OTC TU SGTC MTC
2006-20
09 18.15% 24.54% 5.8% -11.11% 37.25% -0.94% 3.85%
The negative growth of GSSU in 
Americus in 2007  should not be viewed 
as an effect  of the tornado because four 
other schools within this study  also 
claimed a negative growth rate in 2007. 
Both  the college and university  in 
Americus grew at  a faster rate than any 
other institution within this study, with 
the exception of TU in Thomasville. This 
increase in enrollment should discredit 
the claim that  students will not attend a 
college in a  community  without a 
permanent  and fully  operational 
hospital (as was the case in Americus 
from 2007  to early  2008). However, 
SGTC-Americus President Sparky 
Reeves disagrees claiming, that not 
having a  permanent hospital “would 
have a long term  negative impact.”69 He 
based his conclusion on the school’s 
reliance on the hospital for certain 
clinics and the need for the hospital in 
maintaining the college’s nursing 
program. 
The increase of enrollment from 
2006 to 2009 presents strong evidence 
that Americus is attracting  people to the 
community.  The more students there 
are at a college, the more spending there 
will be in the community. The more 
students there are at a  college, the more 
jobs will need to be filled at a college or a 
university.  This is indirect evidence 
which is positive for the economy  and 
recovery of the community. 
Negative Economic Influences
Some of the factors influencing the 
economic status of the city  of Americus 
may  seem  to place more blame on the 
d i s a s t e r t h a n w h a t i s a c t u a l l y 
appropriate and exaggerate the apparent 
economic condition of Americus. These 
factors – which seem  to skew  the 
economic figures negatively  – need to be 
described in detail. 
As if an omen of worse things to 
come, Collins & Aikman Corp., one of 
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the largest employers within the 
Americus region, went out of business 
and closed permanently  the morning 
before the tornado.70 A  sudden increase 
i n t h e n u m b e r o f u n e m p l o y e d 
individuals may  have inflated certain 
economic figures to a certain extent, 
adding to the rise in unemployment, 
possibly  causing lesser amounts to be 
contributed to the SPLOST fund, 
increasing the poverty  rate, and 
potentially  increasing the number of 
food stamp recipients. 
Many  credit  the tornado for  the loss 
of employment at Sumter Regional 
Hospital, the third largest employer in 
Americus at that time, but the tornado 
may  not be completely  to blame for this 
loss.71  At  the time of the tornado, the 
hospital was overstaffed, and layoffs 
were a necessity. 72  The hospital 
employed roughly  600 people in 2006; 
currently  it employs approximately  375 
with  no plans to add more employees in 
the near future.73 (Once the new  hospital 
opens there is a potential need for up to 
50 more employees.)74  Given an 
overstaffed hospital that may  have been 
planning lay-offs,  it is difficult  to 
implicate the tornado alone as the cause 
of the reduction in  Sumter Regional 
Hospital’s workforce. The inevitable 
layoffs did come to fruition and were 
hastened due to tornado damage. This 
may  have distorted some of the figures 
from  2007, and possibly  2008 and 
2009, as did the closing of Collins & 
Aikman Corp. 
Immediate Economic 
Benefits of the Tornado
The year of 2007, when the tornado 
struck, did not see only  negative results 
in  every  niche within the community  of 
Americus. There were some constructive 
outcomes which benefited the local 
society. The SPLOST fund grew at an 
unprecedented rate. From 2006 to 
2007, SPLOST funds received by 
Americus increased by  7.01  percent, 
which is the highest growth rate of any 
city  during any  year within this study. 
The most plausible explanation for this 
surge is an unfortunate one. The rise in 
SPLOST funds was likely  the result  of 
higher sales due to reconstruction and 
increased transactions from of an influx 
of nonresidents of fer ing a id to 
Americus. 
The hotel/motel tax  collected in 
Americus is another indicator offering 
optimistic 2007  figures: from 2006  to 
2007  monies received from  this tax grew 
by  47.16  percent.  This is the largest 
boost of any  city  during any  year within 
this study.   It is tragic that one reason 
for the sudden rise in  hotel/motel taxes 
received was the increase of residents 
made homeless by  the disaster. The rise 
in  both the SPLOST and hotel/motel tax 
was directly  related to the natural 
disaster and can be viewed as a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a s u f f e r i n g 
community,  but  the swift injection of tax 
dollars to aid an ailing city  is a positive 
consequence with a horrific origin. 
While this increase in tax revenue was 
not  enough to allow Americus an 
immediate or expeditious recovery, it 
still provided vital support  for  a 
debilitated region.
ECONOMIC CONCLUSION
It  is difficult to assign singular 
importance to any  one set of economic 
clues; it  seems logical to perceive 
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individual indicators as roughly  equal, 
with  each offering a different  aspect for 
assessing the economic impact  of the 
tornado. The data regarding the SPLOST 
funds is not positive for  Americus, which 
has experienced a  decrease in funds 
worse than any  of the other cities 
described. It  should be noted, however, 
that this decrease seems to be solely 
related to the recession – the rate of 
change from 2006  to 2007,  and 2006 to 
2008, revealed an average to excellent 
rate of change in Americas as compared 
to the other  three cities.  The 2009 
f i g u r e s a r e w h a t i n f l u e n c e t h e 
substantial negative net change and do 
not implicate the tornado as the cause. 
The rate of change in population, 
poverty  rate, and average annual pay  in 
Americus offers a  bleak view because 
these rates were outperformed by  all 
three of the comparable cities.  However, 
the negative changes in these numbers 
should not be attributed to the tornado 
because Americus’ population, poverty 
rate, and average annual pay  are 
trending similarly  or  better than before 
the disaster. While these rates of change 
are worse than in the other cities, the 
rates of change do offer  a relatively 
p o s i t i v e o u t l o o k b e c a u s e t h e s e 
indicators are generally  worsening at  a 
similar or slower  pace than before the 
tornado. The poor  production alludes to 
a prior  localized economic problem 
within the Americus region. 
New home permits issued and food 
stamp funds administered within 
Americus trended similarly  or better 
than one of the cities to which Americus 
was compared. Outperforming only  one 
of the three cities should not necessarily 
be viewed as a negative indicator; if 
Americus had not recovered from  the 
storm  it would be performing worse 
than all of the comparison cities in these 
areas (those cities have only  had to 
contend with a recession and Americus 
had to contend with a recession and a 
natural disaster). Again, the increase in 
food stamp funds implies a preexisting 
problem within Americus. 
Business license fees collected and 
the unemployment rate progressed or 
regressed more favorably  in Americus 
than in two of the three cities; this 
should be viewed positively  with regards 
to recovery. However,  like many  of the 
other indicators, the unemployment rate 
hinted at  a sizeable localized issue which 
predated the tornado.
Americus outperformed all three of 
the comparable cities in TANF funds 
distributed, hotel/motel tax received, 
a n d c o l l e g e e n r o l l m e n t . T h i s 
performance indicates Americus is 
recovering and,  perhaps, becoming 
better than before the disaster. 
Most of the indicators which were 
analyzed seem  to support the concept 
that Americus is either on the path to 
full recovery  or has already  recovered. 
While most indicators offered positive 
views, a minority  of the figures 
examined – more cryptic and enigmatic 
– do not  seem to suggest  much of 
anything regarding the recovery  of 
Americus. The overall view of the 
economy  in Americus is suggestive of a 
productive and positive economy  which 
is well on its way  to recovery  or has 
already  recovered, but it  should be 
recognized that some of the indicators 
suggest an economic problem already 
existing prior to the natural disaster.
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OTHER 
MEASURES OF RECOVERY
Not all indicators of Americus’ recovery 
are based on economic data. There are 
multiple variables and instances which 
should be expanded upon to better 
understand how Americus is recovering 
and whether or  not it is in relatively 




It  is hard to attribute any  good 
consequence to a tornado that claimed 
two innocent lives, destroyed scores of 
homes, f lattened a  multitude of 
businesses,  and wrought  havoc on a 
community,  but many  of the outcomes 
have, in fact, been positive. Whole strips 
of deteriorated and outdated buildings 
were destroyed by  the tornado.75  Prior 
to the storm, there was not enough 
money  or motivation to redevelop this 
land. Redevelopment became a viable 
option when many  of these buildings 
were destroyed by  the tornado. Modern 
construction, which can better  serve the 
community, has replaced old and 
decaying buildings.76 
Sumter Regional Hospital, the only 
hospital in Americus, had been added 
onto piecemeal since 1908.  It was not 
known for  being technologically 
advanced, nor  was the money  available 
for modernizat ion. The tornado 
completely  destroyed the hospital, and, 
due to the efforts of and grants by 
F E M A , t h e G e o r g i a E m e r g e n c y 
M a n a g e m e n t A g e n c y  ( G E M A ) , 
insurance proceeds, and a large 
investment by  the Phoebe Putney  Health 
System  (which  now owns Sumter 
Regional Hospital), the new hospital will 
be the most technologically  advanced 
hospital in the Southwest Georgia 
region. It is being built specifically  to 
meet the current and future needs of the 
community.77
The devastation caused by  the 
tornado provided the opportunity  for 
numerous improvements, and it seems 
to have prompted individuals in 
leadership roles to perform already 
identified and necessary  actions, such as 
reducing the number of employees at 
Sumter Regional Hospital and selling 
the hospital in order to allow it  to 
become more viable. There are many 
more instances of Americus benefiting 
from the combination of insurance 
proceeds and FEMA and GEMA grants 
which allowed for the updating and 
modernizing of public and private 
facilities within Americus.
Large businesses with an abundance 
of patrons will be interconnected within 
the local economy. The obvious form  of 
interconnectedness is the employment 
of a myriad of personnel,  and many  of 
the employees are residents of the 
community  where the businesses are 
located. Beyond these mundane and 
apparent  connections, other  companies 
seek to improve their sales by  opening in 
a location which  already  attracts large 
numbers of people. Thus was the case 
with  Sumter  Regional Hospital.  Many 
independently  operated businesses are 
partially  or fully  dependent upon the 
hospital; some examples of these are 
florists and pharmacies.78  Businesses 
like these located near  the hospital to 
take advantage of the sheer volume of 
customers and employees the hospital 
cared for and employed.  When the 
hospital was destroyed, many  of these 
companies were placed in peril due to 
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the lack of sales. Some of these 
b u s i n e s s e s m a n a g e d t o r e m a i n 
operating but were forced to perform 
layoffs.79 
Once the new hospital, owned and 
operated by  Phoebe, is constructed and 
opens, the direct opposite should occur. 
The businesses which were forced to 
close or lay  employees off will once 
again return in full force and thrive.  This 
will create new  jobs,  new opportunities, 
and new businesses. There is no logical 
reason to believe that the kinds of 
companies that were once interwoven 
with  the fate of the former  hospital will 
not  return and flourish as much, if not 
more, as before. The opening of the new 
medical center  is a highly  anticipated 
moment within the community  of 
Americus because it  will undoubtedly 
improve the city  and create jobs, but it is 
also a tangible symbol of normalcy  built 
of brick and mortar. 
In addition to a  new hospital, 
Americus (Sumter  County) acquired a 
new  community  center  due to the 
natural disaster. FEMA constructed a 
disaster  recovery  center in Sumter 
County  in response to the tornado, and 
the facility  was designed to cater  to the 
needs of the locals to apply  for 
assistance and low-interest loans, meet 
with  FEMA representatives, and obtain 
information regarding recovery  and aid. 
The disaster  recovery  center  was a 
36,000 square foot facility  which was 
eventually  sold to the Sumter County 
government. The structure was refitted 
and redesigned, and it became the 
Columns at Boone Park Community 
Center, which  will continue to serve the 
community  with its basketball courts, 
swimming pool, playground, picnic 
shelter, and softball field, among many 
other amenities.80  The Sumter County 
Parks and Recreation Department 
operates several other  community 
centers, but this was a modern and 
sizeable addition to the city’s repertoire 
of facilities that  would not exist if the 
city  had not  been struck by  a devastating 
tornado.
Expansion of Services
T h e t o r n a d o e x p o s e d s e v e r a l 
shortcomings and weaknesses regarding 
government-owned infrastructure 
within Americus. After the disaster, 
county  and city  officials became aware 
of the fact  that  they  did not possess a 
sufficient number of firefighters and fire 
stations. It was blatantly  clear  during 
and following the tornado that more 
emergency  workers were needed to 
cover  the large geographic area  with 
enough assets to respond to any 
plausible incident, and off icials 
responded to this need. A new fire 
station  was built and more firefighters 
were employed, and this decision was 
directly  prompted by  the natural 
disaster.81 Unlike the situation prior  to 
the storm, there are fewer to no gaps 
currently  in fire fighting and emergency 
service coverage within Sumter County. 
Another  deficiency  which was revealed 
by  the natural disaster was the small 
collection of outdated road equipment, 
such  as dump trucks, owned by  the 
Sumter County  government. The large 
post-disaster reconstruction effort was 
hindered by  the antiquated equipment. 
This motivated county  officials to invest 
in  modern road equipment which  will 
serve the community  well into the 
future.82 
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Hazard Mitigation Projects
In addition to the economic data, 
redevelopment,  and the expansion of 
services,  different hazard mitigation 
projects also highl ight  how the 
community  is better and safer.  Prior  to 
the tornado, Sumter  County  had only 
one antiquated warning  siren to serve 
the entire county, and it had been 
constructed within the heart of 
Americus.83 This siren was not activated 
to warn residents of the impending 
tornado; it was thought there was no 
time to warn citizens and the alarm 
might not  have even been heard outside 
of the immediate reach of the siren. 84 
Regardless of whether the siren 
should have been activated, it became 
obvious that Sumter County  needed a 
technologically  advanced county-wide 
system of warning sirens.  Purchased 
through state and federal hazard 
mitigation grants, eighteen outdoor 
warning  sirens (which should become 
operational in  2011) will be constructed 
throughout Sumter County, and each 
will have range of up to two-miles. In 
addition to the sirens, two safe rooms, 
which provide shelter for locals during a 
tornado, will be constructed. These safe 
rooms, which will  be finalized in 2012, 
are being built  near local government 
buildings, and they  can withstand wind 
speeds up to 200 miles per  hour. Hazard 
mitigation grants also allowed for  the 
purchase and distribution of 450 




It  is well known in Americus what 
immediate damage the tornado caused. 
It  is also widely  understood in Americus 
that the effects of the tornado were the 
cause of much of the community’s 
apprehension  and trepidation.  What is 
unclear  within this region is how much, 
if any, of the effects of the natural 
disaster  still negatively  influence 
Americus and whether the aftermath of 
the tornado is the primary  cause, or 
even a contributor, of the depressed 
economic state of Americus. 
Some quotes from citizens offer 
insight as to what exactly  happened, 
how  residents responded, where the 
community  is heading, and how much 
the tornado is to credit or  to blame. 
Michael Sudduth  of the Sumter County 
Code Enforcement is well aware of the 
physical damage the storm  inflicted 
upon the community; his office handles 
the county-wide administration of 
building permits. He made a positive 
claim regarding the rebuilding of 
Americus when he said, “When people 
build back, they  build back bigger.” 86 
His claim  promotes the concept that 
residents were bettering their living 
situations, and when homes are 
destroyed or  damaged people generally 
rebuild, and the reconstruction is larger 
than before. Despite the negative impact 
of the natural disaster, it  seems that the 
reconstruction process allowed citizens 
to rebuild in a  manner  which was bigger 
and better than before. 
Angela  Westra, President  of the 
Americus-Sumter County  Chamber of 
Commerce, is fully  cognizant of the 
broad impact  of the disaster on the 
community,  but is not certain of what 
can be rightfully  attributed to the 
tornado. As she states,  “People like to 
blame the tornado for a lot of things,”87 
implying many  people in  Americus fault 
the storm  for the current woes when 
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there are many  other forces and 
variables which have influenced the 
state of Americus. She was adamant that 
the community  is resilient, and it has 
and will persevere. 
When speaking with  Captain Phillip 
Daniel of the Sumter County  Sheriff’s 
Department, he was asked when 
Americus will recover and become a 
better  community  than it  was before the 
tornado. He responded,  “When the 
hospital is built.” 88  Sumter County 
Commissioner Randy  Howard agreed 
with this statement, but he also 
expanded on it to say  that in  the 
medium  to long term, the tornado has 
provided the community  of Americus 
with  great opportunities which it would 
not  have had otherwise. He believes that 
the consequences of the natural disaster 
h a v e m a d e A m e r i c u s a b e t t e r 
c o m m u n i t y  i n m a n y  w a y s .  H e 
u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t i m m e d i a t e 
devastation it  caused and would never 
wish  this upon any  area,  but the good 
t h e t o r n a d o p r o d u c e d a n d t h e 
opportunities provided to Americus are 
undeniable and prevalent.89  When 
discussing the hospital alone, Marcus 
Johnson, Director of Marketing for 
Sumter Regional Hospital, was under 
the impression that Americus is gaining 
a better  hospital, which will be a more 
technologically-advanced facility, greatly 
benefiting the community.90 
In aggregate,  these interviews yielded 
some surpris ing ins ights .  Some 
individuals seemed to believe that the 
natural disaster has become a scapegoat 
for social and economic problems within 
their community. Others even believe 
that the tornado was a  blessing in 
disguise which allowed for  growth  and 
cleared the path  to a  brighter future for 
Americus. Throughout the interviews, 
which ranged from government officials 
to individuals passing  on the street, 
there were conflicting  opinions on 
mundane issues, but nearly  all of the 
interviewees agreed on a few points: 
Americus is a  proud and tightly  knit 
community  with an optimistic citizenry 
determined to move forward and 
progress. 
CONCLUSION
It has long been disputed among 
emergency  management professionals 
whether a community  is better off 
structurally  and economically  before or 
after  a  natural disaster. The intention of 
this in-depth analysis of Americus, 
Georgia  was to formulate a case study  to 
provide credible justification for one 
view-point or the other. As stated 
earlier, it is difficult to obtain a 
d i s c e r n a b l e , u n a m b i g u o u s , a n d 
undeniable yes or  no answer. Thus was 
the case in studying Americus, but there 
is enough evidence to provide a claim 
supported by  data. What cannot be 
quantified or  compared within this 
impact study  is the loss of human life or 
the pain and suffering endured, but 
what can be weighed is what Americus 
structurally  had prior to and following 
the disaster and its economic status 
before the storm and after it. 
It  is true that Americus withstood 
hardships on a dual front from  the 
tornado and the recession. While the 
city  may  not have recovered completely 
unscathed, Americus does seem to be on 
the right track. The majority  of the 
emphasis should not be placed solely  on 
economic data because the economy  is 
merely  one component used to measure 
r e c o v e r y  a n d b e t t e r m e n t . N e w 
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infrastructure, redevelopment, the 
economy, and opinions from  locals 
should be equally  considered in 
determining the state of Americus, 
because each indicator provides a 
different aspect on the condition and 
health of Americus. 
Most of the opinions of the locals 
promote the belief that, while Americus 
may  not be better off yet, they  are nearly 
fully  recovered and the city  will be better 
off once the hospital is completed.  The 
information regarding the new  hospital 
is supportive of this as well because the 
new facility  will be an improvement 
upon the previous hospital, and, once it 
opens, more jobs will be created. 
Americus gained a large structure from 
FEMA, and the quality  and use of this 
structure, which is now serving the 
community, is unprecedented in 
Americus. Americus is also acquiring a 
county-wide warning siren system  which 
will be unparalleled by  any  system the 
city/county  had previously  owned. The 
tornado also prompted leadership to 
perform  much needed actions such as 
adding another fire station and updating 
antiquated road equipment. The natural 
disaster  was the unfortunate cause of 
the demolition of many  buildings, but 
this allowed for  the redevelopment and 
updating of a vast number of businesses 
and homes which were in dire need of 
reconstruction and modernization. The 
economy  as a whole also seems to be 
progress ing or regress ing more 
favorably  than the economies of the 
comparison cities used in this study  – 
with  a few exceptions – and Americus 
seemed, many  times, to be progressing 
or regressing more favorably  than it was 
trending prior to the tornado. 
The aggregate of all the data, 
information, quotes, and opinions 
promotes the notion that Americus is 
well on  the way  to recovery  or  may  have 
already  recovered. Once the hospital is 
completed, Americus will be in an 
undeniably  more advantageous position 
than it was prior to the tornado. With 
the exception of the completion of the 
hospital, warning sirens, and safe 
rooms, everything else seems to 
promote the concept of full recovery  and 
Americus becoming a  better  and more 
resilient community  than before the 
disaster. The construction of the 
hospital and hazard mitigation projects 
is just the final piece which will 
complete the recovery  of Americus and 
will propel the community  into the 
future as a  city  greatly  improved since 
2007. 
Next Steps
In order to obtain a general consensus 
on whether or not communities are 
better  off before or after a disaster, more 
case studies must be conducted. Future 
studies regarding this genre should 
examine the effects of a  broad spectrum 
of disasters with varying scopes of 
intensity. The study  of communities 
should focus on a  large range of 
populations, different geographical 
locations, and diverse economies. In 
addition to these variables,  future 
studies should analyze instances of 
disasters in  a  multitude of communities 
which received a wide-range of state and 
federal grants. Once a broad spectrum of 
case studies is conducted, analyzed, and 
compared, a consensus may  be formed 
w h i c h c o u l d p r o v i d e a n a l l 
encompassing answer to the question at 
hand regarding all communities and all 
disasters.
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Appendix A: CONTROL GROUP
The communities of Waycross, Thomasville,  and Moultrie, were selected as comparison 
communities due to the large number of similarities they  share with  Americus (Sumter 
County). First, the three cities, like Americus, all have at least  one major hospital and at 
least one college or  university  within the city, and all of these cities are located in the 
southern half of Georgia. These municipalities all have similar populations ranging from 
roughly  15,000 to 19,000.91 They  all had comparable poverty  rates, average annual pay, 
and unemployment rates prior to the natural disaster.92 All of these towns are somewhat 
isolated as they  are all at least thirty  miles away  from a city  with a population of at least 
50,000, and the economies are considerably  solitary  because between 77.1  percent and 
86.2 percent of the working populace living within the corresponding counties are 
employed within the boundaries of the county.93
These economies also offer similarities due to comparable workforce percentages, 
and even the education levels within these communities are alike. Within the respective 
counties,  between 31.3 and 34.3  percent  of the residents obtained a high school diploma 
or a GED, and between 5.3  and 7.9  percent of the citizens attained a  bachelor’s degree or 
higher.94 The general demographics of these counties are also similar. Between 71.6  and 
73.7  percent  of the population was age eighteen or older, and from 13.7  to 19.5 percent 
of the residents were sixty-five years of age or older.95 Between 44.3  to 49.1  percent  of 
the counties’ citizenry  were composed of males and 50.9  to 55.7  percent were female.96 
Obviously, no two cities are carbon copies of each other because each community  and 
each economy  is unique. Of course there are variables, dynamics, and diversities which 
may  reveal subtle differences between these cities, but  for  the purposes of this study, 
these are the most similar cities to Americus within the state of Georgia.
Population by Occupation by Percent as of the year 2000 
                                                                                 Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
Management, Business & Financial Workers                    8 7.5 10.7 9.1
Science, Engineering & Computer Professionals              1.7 0.9 1.1 0.8
Healthcare Practitioner Professionals                                   3.3 2.5 4.1 1.8
Other Professional Workers                                                  11.7 10.2 9.7 8.4
Technicians                                                                           2.4 1.8 3.8 1.9
Sales Workers                                                                     8.9 11.7 10.2 10
Administrative Support Workers                                          14.2 14.2 14.3 12.9
Construction & Extractive Craft Workers                           4.9 5.7 4.2 6.5
Installation/Maintenance/Repair Craft Workers            4.5 6.7 5.1 6.6
Production Operative Workers                                             11.5 9.5 10.2 14.1
Transportation/Material Moving Operative Workers      5.9 5.6 4.9 5.3
Laborers and Helpers                                                          6.2 6.5 5.8 10.7
Protective Service Workers                                                   2.6 2.9 2.1 1.4
Service Workers, except Protective                                      12.7 13.1 12.6 9.6
No Civilian Work Experience Since 1995                                      1.5 1.4 1.3 0.9
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Education and Commuting Patterns
                                                                                Sumter Co. Ware Co. Thomas Co. Colquitt Co.
Percent of working residents working within the county      83.4 81.3 86.2 77.1
Percent with a high school diploma or GED 31.3 33.9 33 34.3
Percent with a 4 year college degree 7.9 5.3 7.3 7.2
City Demographics as of the year 2000 Census
                                                     Americus Waycross Thomasville Moultrie
Percent 18 years old or older                             72 73.7 73.1 71.6
Percent 65 years old or older                             13.7 19.5 16.2 16
Percent Male                                                  44.3 45.6 49.1 46.6
Percent Female                                              55.7 54.4 50.9 53.4
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“No  ruling class has  ever voluntarily and peacefully abdicated.  In questions  of life and death, 
arguments based on reason have never replaced the arguments of force.” 
 Leon Trotsky 1
ABSTRACT
Successful terrorist groups can evolve to 
gain national power. This  article consists  of 
three case studies: the overthrow  of the 
Russian Czar, the overthrow  of the Shah of 
Iran and Hezbollah’s rise to  power in 
Lebanon.  The three are compared in order 
to  identify common stages  in terrorist 
evolution.  These  stages  are  identified as 
Ideological Development, Small Group 
Terror, Mass  Civil Unrest and Revolution, 
Revolutionary Victory and Consolidation of 
Power and finally,  Tyranny.  Both the 
Russian and Iranian Revolutions followed 
the six stages  to  Tyranny while  Hezbollah 
has not (yet) completed the fifth stage to 
power.
INTRODUCTION
In a  July  2010 lecture, former  FBI 
Deputy  Director  for  the National 
Security  Branch Philip Mudd spoke 
about counterterrorism  strategy  and al 
Qaeda Ideology.2 He addressed al Qaeda 
Prime, the core group of modern Islamic 
terrorists, and how  it has influenced 
affiliates and likeminded groups.  Their 
goal is the revolutionary  overthrow of 
the Western-dominated world order  and 
terrorism  is their tactic. We are dealing 
with  a revolution rather  than simply  a 
terror group. This article describes not 
terrorist organizations but revolutionary 
movements and their use of terror.
Revolutionary  movements are a 
product of social protest movements. 
Social protest  movements are usually 
organized and act outside of the political 
system to either  promote or prevent 
change in the existing social order.3  A 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  m o v e m e n t “ u s e s 
confidential, violent terroristic activity” 
in  order to achieve its ends.4  The 
objective of the revolutionary  movement 
is the destruction of the existing social 
or political order  so that it can be 
replaced with one conforming to its own 
ideology.  For the purpose of this article, 
terrorism  is defined as the calculated 
u s e o f v i o l e n c e , o u t s i d e o f 
internationally  accepted bounds of civil 
law and conventional military  conduct, 
in  the pursuit of political or  social 
objectives.5  Internationally  accepted 
bounds are those laid out in  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
a n d t h e G e n e v a a n d H a g u e 
Conventions. 6 
Acts of terror alone do not overthrow 
g o v e r n m e n t s a n d w h e n u s e d 
indiscriminately  terror  alienates the 
society  it wishes to coerce. Without 
popular  support, the ire of the state may 
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be brought to bear on the isolated terror 
group; it is forced to flee or  be 
destroyed. Those who use terror must 
first  justify  its use. Without justification 
the group remains an illegitimate 
criminal organization in the eyes of the 
p o p u l a t i o n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community; the population sides with 
the state, perceived as the legitimate 
upholders of society. The terror-using 
group endeavors to turn the support of 
the populace away  from the state and 
towards itself by  undermining the 
legitimacy of the state. 
Repressive measures intended to 
control terrorism  can alienate the 
public, shifting their support towards 
the revolutionary  movement. The more 
popular  support of the revolutionary 
movement grows, the more the 
legitimacy  the state is brought into 
question.7 Terror  groups may  evolve in 
capability  – from  terrorists to insurgents 
to revolutionaries – as they  meet with 
success, ultimately  replacing the existing 
power structure. 
T h i s a r t i c l e e x a m i n e s t h r e e 
revolutionary  movements that used 
terror as a means to achieve their 
objectives: the overthrow of the Czar by 
the Russian Socialist  Revolution, the 
overthrow of the Shah by  Iranian 
Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah’s rise 
to power  in Lebanon. The three are 
compared in order  to analyze whether 
t h e s e a r e s e p a r a t e a n d u n i q u e 
occurrences or whether  these might be 
indicative of the successful application 
of terrorism. 
The Russian Revolution is perhaps 
the quintessential revolutionary 
movement and one that  has had a 
particularly  large impact on the United 
States. In studying the Russian 
R e v o l u t i o n , I i d e n t i f i e d s i x 
developmental stages, which  can be 
organized as a Revolutionary  Terrorism 
Value Chain (RTVC).8  The six stages of 
the RTVC are: Ideological Development, 
Small Group Terror, Mass Civil Unrest 
and Revolution, Revolutionary  Victory 
and Consolidation of Power, Tyranny, 
and Export of Terror  and Expansion.  A 
successful terrorist group can evolve 
through  these stages to gain national 
power.
  Next, I researched the Iranian 
Islamic revolution, which likewise has 
had great impact on the U.S. Its parallels 
to the Russian Revolution helped refine 
and validate the RTVC. Finally,  I applied 
the RTVC to Hezbollah because of its 
contemporary  interest and because of its 
links to the Iranian Revolution. At this 
writing Hezbollah is in the fourth  stage, 
providing the opportunity  to observe 
whether  it continues to evolve or if its 
development may  be arrested or 
diverted. 
The RTVC illustrates how  social 
revolutionary  movements uti l ize 
v i o l e n c e t h r o u g h  s i x s t a g e s o f 
development.  I refer to this use of 
violence as “revolutionary  terror” in 
general through all six stages. Because 
different applications of violence are 
necessary  in  each stage, there are 
distinct types of terror within the 
general category  of revolutionary  terror. 
In all stages however, the violence is 
illegitimate and therefore characterized 
as terror. Identifying and analyzing the 
stages of a revolutionary  movement may 
determine how terror will be used. This 
analysis enables the identification of 
collection requirements and indicators 
of terrorist  operations and conversely 
allows tracking of the progression of a 
revolutionary  movement. Because there 
are basic stages necessary  to conducting 
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a successful revolution, a common value 
c h a i n c a n b e a p p l i e d t o m o s t 
revolutionary social movements. 
THE REVOLUTIONARY 
TERRORISM VALUE CHAIN
The Revolutionary  Terrorism  Value 




A revolutionary  social movement  begins 
as an idea. The idea must present the 
case against the existing social or 
political order and the need for 
fundamental change. Once the existing 
order is deemed illegitimate the ideology 
justifies the use of violence as a means of 
achieving change. It is when the 
ideology  rationalizes unlawful violence – 
that is to say  terror – that the 
revolutionary  terrorism value chain 
begins.  
Stage Two: Small Group Terror
A core group acts upon the ideas 
developed in  Stage One. Ideological 
propaganda in this stage appeals mainly 
to fringe elements easily  branded as 
extremists. The existing power structure 
reacts with violent  repression.  Terror in 
this stage is used to manipulate an 
audience, either to gain sympathy  for  its 
cause or to create dissatisfaction with 
the existing social or political order. The 
existing social/political entity  reacts 
with  repressive measures intended to 
crush the terrorist. Overly  repressive 
m e a s u r e s , h o w e v e r , p r o v e 
counterproductive,  creating  widespread 
dissatisfaction leading to the next stage. 
Stage Three: 
Mass Civil Unrest and Revolution  
The ideology  gains mass appeal enabling 
the core group to create a political 
organization that eventually  gains 
legitimacy. Ideological propaganda 
becomes more sophisticated and more 
widely  accepted.  Small group terror 
continues, however; the core group 
maintains a separation between the 
action cells,  responsible for acts of 
s a b o t a g e ,  a s s a s s i n a t i o n a n d 
kidnappings, and the larger political 
party  formed out of the disaffected 
population. Legitimate means of civil 
protest – including protest marches, 
general strikes and sit-ins – are 
employed by  the overt political party. A 
second type of terror tactic emerges in 
the form of riots and lynching of 
opposition figures. These acts are made 
to appear spontaneous but are in fact 
centrally  coordinated culminating in a 
popular armed revolution. 
Stage Four: Revolutionary Victory 
and Consolidation of Power 
The revolution overthrows the former 
government and the core group 
consolidates power. Consolidation of 
power is defined as the ability  of the 
core group to impose its will over the 
entire country  and exercise effective 
control of instruments of national 
power. In this stage terror becomes a 
mechanism  to eliminate political rivals. 
Successful revolutions are often the 
result of the united effort  of several 
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parties that may  have dif fering 
objectives.  Some of these parties will not 
use illegitimate violence and fall  victim 
to those who do. The most ruthless of 
these parties will apply  terror  in  the 
forms of intimidation, assassination, 
and – when it has gained enough power 
– through the arrest and imprisonment 
or execution of its rivals. 
Stage Five: Tyranny 
Tyranny  is defined as centralized rule 
over a nation, benefiting the ruler rather 
than the ruled, and uses violence in a 
manner  considered unlawful by  modern 
international norms of behavior. With 
rival parties eliminated, a  power 
struggle within the core group ensues. 
The most  ruthless faction wins and 
imposes autocratic rule. Terror becomes 
an integral function of the regime 
applied through a state security 
apparatus. These secret police are used 
to repress opposition and indoctrinate 
the population. National power  is 
s t r e n g t h e n e d t h r o u g h f o r c e d 
conscription  and the diversion of 
economic assets to the defense industry. 
Stage Six: 
Export of Terror and Expansion 
The regime seeks to expand its sphere of 
influence. Terror or the threat of terror 
is used as a tool in  foreign policy  to 
threaten hostile states. Foreign small-
group terrorists are provided training, 
financial support, and weapons with the 
twin objectives of spreading the 
revolutionary  ideology  and intimidating 
foreign enemies.
There is a danger  of forcing events to fit 
into this framework.  It is important to 
remember that these stages are meant to 
be broad and general.  Overlap and 
concurrence particularly  in the latter 
stages do not  invalidate the overall idea 
that terror campaigns evolve and, if 
successful, can become national 
governments. The first example in the 
twentieth century  of the successful 
appl icat ion of terror ism  in the 
achievement  of political and social 
change is the Socialist Revolution in 
Russia.
CASE 1: TERROR AND SOCIAL 
REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 
Ideological Development
The Russian revolution really  began in 
the late nineteenth  century. Although 
Czar Alexander II (who ruled from 1855 
to 1881) was attempting  modernization 
using the Western model,  much of the 
country  remained in a  state of feudal 
peasantry.9  The Russian intelligentsia 
was also taking ideas from the West. 
In Russia, Mikhail Bakunin  and 
Sergey  Nechayev  were two early  Russian 
proponents of terror  as a political 
weapon used to incite rebellion.10  Both 
went into exile in Western Europe and 
met other  revolutionary  ideologues such 
as Karl Marx, developing ideas similar  to 
the Italian thinker Carlo Pisacane who 
wrote,  “Ideas result from  deeds.”11 
Pisacane thought violence was necessary 
to grab attention and ral ly  the 
population behind a revolution.
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Small Group Terror
The Narodnaya  Volya, or  People’s Will, 
founded in  the late 1870s, put the ideas 
of the intellectuals into practice. In an 
attempt to win over the peasants, 
Narodnaya  Volya committed acts of 
terror to attract  attention to the cause.12 
T h e N a r o d n a y a V o l y a t a r g e t e d 
government officials and members of 
the ruling class for their symbolic value 
as members of the czarist regime.13  The 
Narodnaya  Volya hoped terror  would 
undermine the people’s confidence in 
the government  and win support for 
regime change.
 Narodnaya Volya succeeded in 
assassinating the czar  himself, but it 
turned out to be a pyrrhic victory. 14 One 
of the assassins was captured and 
provided the information needed to 
track down the terror organization. By 
1883 Narodnaya Volya ceased to exist.15 
Remnants of the group helped form the 
Party  of Socialist  Revolutionaries in the 
early twentieth century. 16 
Civil Unrest 1905   
The Socialist Revolutionaries continued 
the terror campaign. Russian terrorism 
w a s e v o l v i n g . T h e S o c i a l i s t 
Revolutionaries advocated “terrorism, 
not  in place of work among the masses, 
but  precisely  for  and simultaneously 
with that  work”.17  The political 
revolutionary  organization replaced the 
terror group as the prime vehicle for  the 
revolution. Vladimir Lenin, an exiled 
l e a d e r o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , 
differentiated between “individual” 
terror – which he saw as a substitute for 
popular  active support of the masses – 
and the kind of terrorism by  the masses 
associated with the uprising of 1905. 18 
The revolutionaries did not renounce 
terror; the tactics of bombings and 
assassinations continued to be used. 
N o w , h o w e v e r ,  t h e “ c o m b a t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n " ( r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
“individual”  terrorism) operated 
separately  from the party  so as not  to 
jeopardize its political actions. 19   If the 
state took down a terrorist cell,  the 
political arm  of the revolution could 
disavow  them  and continue their 
activities.
When a group of unemployed 
workers began demonstrations in St. 
Petersburg, Georgi Gapon, an Orthodox 
priest,  decided to make a  personal 
appeal to Nicholas II on  their behalf.  He 
drew  up a petition outlining the workers' 
demands and on January  22, 1905, led a 
large procession of workers to the 
Winter Palace in order to present  the 
petition.  Police and Cossacks attacked 
the procession and more than 100 
workers were killed.   The incident, 
known as Bloody  Sunday,  signaled the 
start of the 1905 Revolution.  The Czar 
v i o l e n t l y  c r u s h e d t h e m a s s i v e 
demonstrations and strikes that spread 
throughout the empire. 20  The ruthless 
manner  in which the revolt was put 
down destroyed public trust in  the 
government, further legitimizing violent 
opposition to the state.21
Revolutionary Victory 
February 1917
In 1917 Russia was at war and losing to 
the Germans. In February, a general 
strike in St. Petersburg exploded into a 
second revolution. Unlike 1905,  the 
Russian Army  joined the workers, 
forcing Nicholas II to abdicate his 
throne, and a new  Russian government 
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was formed. A group known as the 
Mensheviks led the new Provisional 
Government.
Unable to solve many  of the problems 
faced by  the Czar, including the 
continued war  with Germany, the 
provisional government  faced its own 
difficulties with social unrest.   The 
flames of unrest were fanned by  radicals 
released from  the Czar’s prisons and 
others returning from exile. One of the 
key  people returning from exile was 
Vladimir Lenin.  His Bolsheviks had 
organized workers, peasants, and 
soldiers into a powerful political force. 
The Bolsheviks felt that Russia  should 
make peace with  Germany, ending the 
war  immediately.22  Continuing the 
mistakes of the Czarist regime, the 
Mensheviks began arresting radicals, 
which alienated the working class. When 
the situation became desperate, the 
leader of the provisional government 
sought the help of the Bolsheviks, who 
played a key  role in defending the 
provisional government, enabling them 
to gain  even deeper support from the 
Russian people. When elections took 
place,  the Bolsheviks won a majority  of 
the seats in the soviets in Petrograd, 
Moscow, and other cities.23
Consolidation of Power 
October 1917
On October 24-25, 1917, pro-Bolshevik 
soldiers, sailors, and Red Guards 
stormed the Winter Palace and arrested 
members of the provisional government. 
This "bloodless coup" put the Bolsheviks 
in  power.24  Russia soon found itself in  a 
civil war  between the "Whites" (White 
Guard Volunteer Army) led by  General 
Kornilov, and the “Reds” led by  the 
Bolsheviks.25  The Bolsheviks, who 
became known as the Communists, were 
besieged by  not only  the Whites, but also 
the Allies (Great Britain, France,  and the 
United States), who feared international 
communism  would spread to their own 
countries.26 Eventually  the Allied Forces 
withdrew and the Whites were defeated.
Once in power  the Communist use of 
terrorism  transformed into a means of 
controlling internal enemies and coping 
with international strife. Political 
opponents were rounded up and 
executed or  imprisoned. Meanwhile, 
threatening  the export of terrorism held 
off hostile nations, primarily  Western 
Europe and the United States. 27
Stalin and Tyranny
With the death of Lenin a brief power 
struggle ensued within  the Communist 
Party. Stalin’s ruthless application of 
terrorism  removed his rivals and cowed 
his doubters as he took power. His use 
of violence to eliminate real and 
perceived opponents did not conform to 
international norms of acceptable use of 
national power. His archrival Leon 
Trotsky, himself a practitioner  of 
terrorism, fled to exile in  Mexico where 
he was eventually  assassinated by 
Stalin’s henchmen. 
Stalin institutionalized terrorism  in 
the Soviet Union.  The Communist  Party 
and the state’s police, military, and 
s e c u r i t y  a p p a r a t u s e s b e c a m e 
instruments of his personal will.  A 
biographer described Stalin’s political 
purges and imprisonments,  and forcible 
impressments and deportations, as a 
“conspiracy  to seize total power by 
terrorist action,” resulting  in the death 
of millions.28
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After Stalin,  the USSR continued to 
rule through fear. In the West, Siberia 
has become synonymous with political 
exile. Terrorism  continued to be 
exported through support  given to 
international terrorist organizations 
such as the German Bader-Mienhof 
group and the Italian Red Army  Brigade. 
For  many, communism and terrorism 
were and remain inextricably linked.
SUMMARY CASE 1
I have identified six  stages of terror in 
the Russian Revolution. The first stage is 
the development of an ideology; in 
Russia this began as early  as the 1850s. 
Mikhail Bakunin and Sergey  Nechayev 
were two early  Russian proponents of 
terror as a political weapon used to 
incite rebellion.29  It is important to note 
that terror  is not  the ideology; rather, 
the ideology  legitimizes the use of terror 
as a means to an end. In Russia the 
ideology  eventually  developed into 
communism. The early  ideologues spent 
much time in exile, expounding their 
radical views, and little time actually 
committing terror in Russia.  
Stage two is the application of small 
group terror. If stage one is that of word, 
stage two is that of deed. Bakunin and 
Nechayev’s words inspired others to act 
upon their ideology. Small groups or 
cells of violent radicals with little mass 
a p p e a l c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s s t a g e ; 
Narodnaya  Volya was such  a group. 
These terrorists came largely  from  the 
intellectual class and hoped to incite 
rebellion among the lower classes 
through  their  violent acts. When they 
failed to gain support through their 
deeds,  they  hoped to cause increased 
repression by  the state, which they 
hoped would finally  turn the people 
against  the government. With little 
popular support, the terrorists were 
crushed by the government crackdown.  
This led to the third stage: mass civil 
unrest used by  the terrorist/intellectuals 
to form a revolutionary  movement. The 
increased repression of the czarist 
government was one of several causes of 
social upheaval. The successors to the 
N a r o d n a y a V o l y a , t h e S o c i a l i s t 
Revolutionaries, formed the now 
discontented people into political 
organizations and paramilitary  fighting 
groups. The Socialist  Revolutionaries 
orchestrated strikes, demonstrations, 
riots and other forms of mob violence as 
a sort of mass terror campaign against 
the state. Small group terror  continued 
but now in a supporting role.
Stage four: the victory  of the 
revolution and consolidation of power. 
The revolutionary  movement was not 
homogenous in Russia. Competing 
ideological groups cooperated towards 
the common goal of transforming 
Russian society.  With the fall of the 
Czar, the victorious coalition fought with 
each  other for supremacy . The 
Bolsheviks used political terror  to 
eliminate their competitors while at 
same time using propaganda and 
providing bread and services to ensure 
the support of the people.  
Stage five: tyranny. Lenin and the 
Communists successfully  consolidated 
power through a reign of terror and by 
winning the civil war. Resistance was 
not tolerated,  a police state was 
instituted, and the population was 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  i n d o c t r i n a t e d i n 
communist ideology. The revolutionary 
intellectuals now held total power as the 
new ruling class, dictating what  was 
“best” for the lower class. 
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The sixth and final stage: the export 
of terrorism.  In  the weakness of its early 
years ,  the Russian Soviet  s tate 
threatened hostile nations with  the 
export of terrorism  as a defensive 
s t r a t e g y . T h i s b e c a m e a n 
institutionalized part of Soviet foreign 
policy  throughout the life of the USSR, 
as ev idenced by  i t s support  o f 
international terrorist organizations.  
The next section tests the validity  of 
the six stages of the Revolutionary 
Terrorist Value Chain by  applying them 
to the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
CASE 2: TERROR AND 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN
The Islamic revolution in Iran provides 
striking parallels with the Russian 
revolution. In each case there was a 
monarch  attempting to modernize the 
country. In both countries there was a 
large poor  agrarian lower  class. A feared 
secret police apparatus ruthlessly 
repressed dissent. A revolutionary 
leader in exile in Western Europe 
returned after  civil unrest toppled the 
monarchy. A totalitarian regime 
replaced the monarchy  and engaged in  a 
war with a fascist dictator  on their 
western border. And both successful 
revolutions used terror to gain maintain 
and extend their power.
Ideological Development 
In 1941  Muhammad Reza  Shah Pahlevi 
succeeded his father  to become the shah 
of Iran.  In the post war  years the shah 
sided with the western powers, but in 
1951  Muhammad Mossadegh, a  militant 
nationalist, became prime minister. 
Mossadegh attempted to nationalize the 
oil industry, which was controlled by 
western companies. The United States 
feared he would allow the Soviet Union 
to gain control of Iranian oil resources. 
Bowing to U.S. pressure, the shah 
dismissed the prime minister  in  1953. 
Mossadegh, however,  had popular 
support and instead induced the shah to 
flee to Rome. Riots ensued and the shah 
won back control, returning to Iran and 
sending Mossadegh to prison. The shah 
pursued agricultural and economic 
modernization but,  despite growing 
prosperity,  opposition to the Shah grew 
as well. Chief among the opposition 
were Shiite Muslim clerics who called 
for the recognition of Islamic law. 
Ayatollah  Ruhollah Khomeini,  in exile 
first  in Iraq and later in France,  became 
the acknowledged leader of the clerics.
The shah hoped liberal reforms would 
gain popular support. When Khomeini 
issued a fatwa against his reforms,  the 
government responded with ridicule in 
an attempt to undermine the cleric’s 
influence. This tactic backfired,  winning 
new support for Khomeini from the 
religious community.
Small Group Terror
The shah came to be seen as a puppet of 
the United States and the CIA was 
commonly  thought  to have orchestrated 
Mossadegh’s removal. An underground 
group of pious Muslims formed a terror 
organization known as the Fedaiyan-e 
Islam. This organization attempted to 
assassinate some of the shah's officials. 
The government responded with a crack 
down on the Fedaiyan-e Is lam, 
capturing and executing its members.30
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Mass Civil Unrest and Revolution
The shah’s secret police,  the SAVAK, 
and the army  cracked down on dissent. 
As government repression grew 
disturbances spread across the country. 
From  Iraq,  Khomeini ordered strikes 
and demonstrations. Religious students 
led protests, turning into riots, against 
the shah’s reforms.31  By  1978, Iran was 
in  chaos and the regime declared martial 
law.  
When protest  broke out  in the capital 
of Tehran, the army  used deadly  force 
(instigating what became known as 
Black Friday) and hundreds – perhaps 
thousands – were killed.   The killing 
became too much for  the soldiers, many 
of whom refused to fire on their 
countrymen and changed sides. Like the 
Russian czar, the shah  could not  retain 
power without the army; he accepted the 
formation of a new government and 
went into exile.32
Revolutionary Victory and 
Consolidation of Power
Shahpour Bakhtiar, the head of one of 
the largest opposition groups,  the 
N a t i o n a l F r o n t , l e d t h e n e w 
government.33 Attempts at  reform were 
opposed by  Khomeini, who declared 
Baktiar’s appointment  as prime minister 
by  the shah  as illegitimate.  Khomeini 
renewed his calls for dissent, this time 
against the new  government.  Bakhtiar 
represented secular intellectuals and 
Islamic moderates, who felt they  could 
control Khomeini, and so he was 
allowed to return from exile. Khomeini, 
however, was not content to allow  a 
secular  democratic government to 
remain in power.
Khomeini returned to Iran to popular 
acclaim. His followers continued to 
demonstrate and Khomeini demanded 
Bakhtiar’s resignation. The ayatollah’s 
supporters seized government buildings 
and forcibly  took power  in a second 
revolution reminiscent of Russia’s 
October  Revolution in which Lenin’s 
Bolsheviks seized power from the 
provisional Russian government. State 
terror followed the ayatollah’s power 
grab. Those who had supported the shah 
were executed or  went into exile. 
Political opponents were imprisoned or 
executed and buried in mass graves.
When the United States allowed the 
shah admittance for  medical care, 
massive protests erupted in Tehran, 
culminating in the storming and seizure 
of the U.S. embassy. The embassy  staff 
were held hostage, which led President 
Jimmy  Carter  to authorize a  military 
rescue operation. The operation ended 
in  disaster when several aircraft were 
accidentally  destroyed in the Iranian 
desert. The hostage crisis has commonly 
been cited as a major  contributing factor 
in  Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan in the 
1980 U.S. presidential elections. 
In an attempt to capitalize on the 
chaos, neighboring Iraq seized disputed 
territory  from Iran. The resulting war 
lasted eight years and resulted in more 
than two million dead and wounded. It 
was during this war  that  Iran developed 
the suicide bomber  tactic to counter 
Iraq’s technical superiority.
Tyranny
Banks and industry  were nationalized, 
political opposition banned, and wealth 
confiscated from  the rich. Former allies 
began to turn against Khomeini, but 
soon found themselves imprisoned, 
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exiled, or  dead. Khomeini instituted 
sharia law and exercised complete 
control over Iranian society.  Moral 
infractions became punishable by 
stoning.  Foreign films were banned or 
heavily  censored and religious police 
patrolled the streets enforcing modest 
dress and behavior. 
Export of Terror and Expansion
Just as the success of the communists in 
Russia inspired socialists in Western 
Europe, the Islamic revolution  in Iran 
inspired Muslims throughout the Middle 
East. Khomeini and his followers found 
they  could extend their influence beyond 
their borders. The Shia clerics found 
they  even gained admirers among Sunni 
Arabs
Yasser  Arafat, the chairman of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), was among the first to express 
admiration. This was the beginning of a 
long symbiotic relationship between 
Iran and Palestinian terrorists. The PLO 
had a stronghold in southern Lebanon. 
Iran found fertile ground in the Shia 
community  in  Lebanon.  The Iranian 
Revolutionary  Guard was dispatched to 
train the Shia  militia  engaged in the 
Lebanese civil war  and to form  the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. Through the 
Hezbollah, Iran has been able to conduct 
a proxy  war against Israel and to aid 
Palestinian terrorists.
SUMMARY CASE 2
The Iranian Is lamic Revolut ion 
conforms quite closely  to the six  stages 
of terror  identified in the Russian 
Revolution. The first stage is the 
development of an ideology: in Iran this 
revolved mainly  around the Shia clerics, 
although there were westernized secular 
intellectuals and Marxists involved as 
well.  In  Iran the ideology  eventually 
developed into Islamic fundamentalism, 
as it is known in the West. 
Stage two is the application of small 
group terror.  The Fedaiyan-e Islam was 
the Narodnaya Volya  of Iran. These 
terrorists were religiously  motivated to 
conduct acts of terror against the 
government. Like the Narodnaya  Volya, 
the Fedaiyan were crushed by  a 
government crackdown.  
This led to the third stage, mass civil 
unrest, used by  the Islamists and 
intellectuals to form a revolutionary 
movement. The increased repression by 
the shah was one of several causes of 
s o c i a l u p h e a v a l . S t r i k e s , 
demonstrations,  riots,  and other forms 
of mob violence erupted in a mass terror 
campaign against the state. 
Stage four: the victory  of the 
revolution and consolidation of power. 
Competing ideological groups had 
cooperated in pursuing the common 
goal of transforming Iranian society. 
With the fall of the shah,  the victorious 
coalition fought with each other for 
supremacy. The Islamists used political 
terror to eliminate their competitors, 
while at same time using propaganda 
and providing bread and services to 
ensure the support of the people.  
Stage five: tyranny.  Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the Islamists successfully 
consolidated power through  a reign of 
terror. Resistance was not tolerated, a 
police state was instituted and the 
p o p u l a t i o n w a s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
indoctrinated into Islamic ideology.
The sixth and final stage: the export 
of terrorism. In the weakness of its early 
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 10
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
years the Iranian Is lamic s tate 
threatened hostile nations with  the 
export of terrorism  as a defensive 
s t r a t e g y .  T h i s b e c a m e a n 
institutionalized part of Iranian foreign 
policy  best  exemplified by  the Iranian 
proxy  in Lebanon – the subject of Case 
Three, the Hezbollah.
CASE 3: THE HEZBOLLAH  
Hezbollah, the “Party  of God”, has some 
100,000 supporters (about half of whom 
are party  members) and an annual 
budget in  excess of $100 million, much 
of which  comes from Iran, Hezbollah's 
major  patron. Hezbollah regards Iran's 
supreme leader, the Ayatollah  Ali 
Khomeini, as its ultimate leader and 
maintains close ties to Iran's leadership, 
especially  to the hard-line clerics who 
helped organize the party  in the early 
1980s.  
Like the Russian revolutionaries, 
Hezbollah claims to fight the oppressors 
of the downtrodden.  In  its 1985 
manifesto Hezbollah listed three main 
goals: “putting  an end to any  colonialist 
entity” in  Lebanon; bringing the 
Phalangists to justice for “the crimes 
they  [had] perpetrated,” and the 
establishment of an Islamic regime in 
Lebanon.34  Hezbollah’s Shia Muslim 
followers are strongly  anti-West and 
anti-Israeli.35 In 2000, Hezbollah forced 
Israel to withdrawal from  Lebanon. This 
victory  raised the movement to greater 
prominence in Lebanon and the greater 
Muslim world.36
Ideological Development
Like the communists of Russia, 
Hezbollah was born of social strife and 
intellectuals inspired its creation. In the 
1970s Lebanon was a nation of warring 
factions. Christians, Sunnis and Shiite 
fought for control.37 Like the peasants of 
Russia,  the Lebanese Shiites were 
largely  poor farmers and laborers with 
little political power.38  Religiously 
motivated intellectuals of the Shia sect – 
such as Imam Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah  in Lebanon, who was usually 
described as the spiritual leader  of 
Hezbollah, and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini in Iran – developed the ideas 
that inspired future generations of 
Muslim  activists. In 1975, Fadlallah 
wrote his book, Islam and the Logic of 
Force, which explains that  military  force 
must serve the aims of Islam  in its war 
against infidels and imperialists.39  Like 
the early  Russian intellectuals, the 
Muslim ideologues were more men of 
words than of deed.
The Shiite militia, Amal, that 
preceded Hezbollah was formed in  1975 
by  Imam Musa  Sadr.  Sadr had been 
raised in Iran and trained at  the same 
religious schools attended by  Iran’s 
Ayatollah  Khomeini. As Amal,  the 
largest Shia militia in Lebanon, 
struggled to settle sectarian differences 
peacefully,  the more radicalized Shiites 
aimed for the establishment  of an 
Iranian-style Islamic state.  At  the 
conclusion of the Israeli siege, the newly 
installed Khomeini regime in  Iran  sent 
Revolutionary  Guards to southern 
Lebanon. The Revolutionary  Guards 
provided military  training for  the 
existing Shiite militia and helped form 
Hezbollah, a new, more radical Islamic 
faction.  The words of the intellectuals 
had formed the ideology  to motivate 
terrorists.
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Small Group Terror
The PLO was the Narodnaya  Volya  of 
Lebanon and Israel played the part  of 
the czarist regime. The PLO, basing 
itself in South Lebanon, waged a terror 
campaign against  Israel and the West. 
In June 1982, the Israelis responded by 
invading Lebanon, routing the PLO, and 
occupying the southern  portion of the 
country.
In late August  1982, a multinational 
peacekeeping force arrived in Beirut to 
evacuate the PLO. This ended the small 
group terror waged by  the PLO. A month 
later, Christian Phalangists swept into 
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and 
slaughtered hundreds of Palestinian 
civilians. A  multinational peacekeeping 
force of mostly  U.S., French, and Italian 
troops occupied barracks at the Beirut 
airport.
Civil Unrest 
The massacre in the refugee camps, like 
Bloody  Sunday  in Russia and Black 
Friday  in Iran,  served as a  catalyst for 
the Shiites. A series of suicide truck 
bombs struck targets associated with the 
multinational force and the Western 
powers. The terrorist organization, 
Islamic Jihad,  claimed responsibility. 
Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad shared the 
same leaders.40  Like the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, it  seemed Hezbollah 
wanted the fighting organization to 
appear as a separate entity.  
Where the PLO was a  foreign entity 
with  little backing from the population, 
the Shiite terrorists enjoyed the support 
of a large population base.  The 
multinational force was pulled out, but 
the attacks did not stop. Hezbollah/
Islamic Jihad was behind not only  the 
bombing of the U.S.  Marine barracks 
but  also the 1985 hijacking of a  TWA 
flight in Beirut. They  also claimed 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  m a n y  o f t h e 
kidnappings and assassinations in 
Lebanon, including that of Terry 
Anderson and CIA Station Chief William 
Buckley.41 
Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Sheikh 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, insisted 
that Hezbollah stood for  moderation 
and restraint: "It  is a mass movement 
that concentrates on facing political 
problems.”42 As the Russian communists 
had done with the working class and 
peasants, Hezbollah developed support 
from among the poor Shia peasants and 
young people in West Beirut’s poor Shia 
suburbs.  Hezbollah  spread propaganda 
through  films, ideological seminars, and 
radio broadcasts to indoctrinate 
f o l l o w e r s a n d r e c r u i t f i g h t e r s . 
Additionally, Hezbollah provided public 
services such as education and health 
care. By  late 1984, Hezbollah had 
become not only  a militant organization 
but also a powerful political entity. 
Based in the Bekka Valley  and Southern 
Lebanon, they  conducted their own 
terror campaign against Israel.43 
Once again Israel responded with 
military  force to drive Hezbollah from 
the southern border  of Lebanon. During 
the onslaught, Israeli forces assassinated 
Hezbol lah leader Sheikh Abbas 
Mussawi. Mussawi's successor, Sheikh 
Hassan Nasrallah, vowed revenge. 
Rather than directly  attacking the 
powerful Israeli Army, Hezbollah struck 
soft  targets.  In  Buenos Aires,  Argentina, 
a suicide bomber exploded at the Israeli 
embassy  and Islamic Jihad claimed 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . O t h e r a c t s o f 
international terrorism followed; a 
Jewish  cultural center in Buenos Aires 
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 12
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
was bombed as were Jewish targets in 
London.
Political Victory
The Lebanese government had been 
struggling since the end of the civil  war 
in  1991.  When Israel invaded in 1992 
the government was unable to respond 
effectively.  It was Hezbollah that faced 
the invasion and won,  gaining immense 
national prestige in  the process. Much as 
the Bolshevik defense of the provisional 
government in 1917  set  them up to seize 
power in Russia, the repulsion of the 
Israelis did the same for  Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.
In 1993  Iranian sources estimated the 
number of Hezbollah fighters at 5,000 
strong.44  Hezbollah’s military  branch 
included not only  members recruited 
from the unemployed,  but also doctors, 
engineers, and other professionals; the 
party’s political cadres and workers were 
estimated to be 3,000. Within the larger 
guerrilla  organization, Hezbollah has 
retained small terrorist  cells organized 
on an informal basis.  
When Lebanon’s various militias 
were disbanded, Hezbollah was allowed 
to keep its fighting capacity  intact and it 
became, in effect, a second national 
a r m y . T h e s m a l l t e r r o r  g r o u p 
transitioned into a supporting role. 
Hezbollah’s political wing became a 
legitimate political force in the Lebanese 
Parliament.45
Consolidation of Power
H e z b o l l a h i s c u r r e n t l y  i n t h e 
consolidation of power  stage. There has 
been some struggle for  leadership of 
Hezbollah over the years. In the early 
years of the movement the most 
significant Shiite leader was Imam Musa 
Sadr.  Sadr wanted the Lebanese Shia 
community  to remain independent of 
Iran and keep its distance from the 
Palestinian resistance movement. 
S h e i k h M u h a m m u d H u s s e i n 
Fadlallah, a  disciple of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, arrived in Lebanon in 1966. 
Fadallah did not become prominent in 
the Lebanese Shia community  until Sadr 
d i s a p p e a r e d u n d e r  s u s p i c i o u s 
circumstances while on an official visit 
to Libya. Fadlallah became Hezbollah’s 
spiritual leader and encouraged support 
for the Palestinian resistance to Israel. 
Fadlallah  passed away  on July  4, 2010. 
Hezbollah’s Secretary  General Nasrallah 
now  appears to be in complete control of 
the organization. 
If control of the party  is resolved, 
control of Lebanon is not. The 2003 
assassination of the popular politician 
Rafik Hariri may  have been an attempt 
to eliminate Hezbollah’s competition for 
power. If this is true, it backfired when 
much of the population demonstrated 
against the attack. Blame was placed on 
the Syrian Government, which resulted 
in  the withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon.46  
However,  Hariri had close ties to 
Saudi Arabia’s ruling family  – Iran’s 
Sunni rival – making him  a rival of 
Hezbollah as well.47  Whether  or  not 
Hezbollah was involved, Hariri’s death 
has left it the dominant  political force in 
Lebanon. This stage will culminate 
when, or if,  Hezbollah gains total control 
of the Lebanese government. That will 
open the way for the final stage, tyranny.
As did the Soviets, Hezbollah  already 
uses the threat of terrorism as a foreign 
policy  tool and seeks to expand its 
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 13
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
sphere of influence, particularly  through 
its relationship with  Hamas in Gaza. 
Hezbollah threatens terrorism  out of 
weakness; this continues to be true in its 
dealings with the West.  Its conventional 
military,  however, continues to gain 
strength. The private intelligence 
organization, Stratfor  (citing Reuters) 
reported Sheikh Naim Qasim, deputy 
leader of Hezbollah,  as saying military 
action against Iran by  Israel or  the 
United States could result in  violence 
across the Middle East.48  Although 
Qasim  did not say  what actions 
Hezbollah might  take,  he asserted that 
any  country  involved in an attack on 
Iran would face reprisals and that 
Hezbollah is ready  for another war  with 
Israel.49 
SUMMARY CASE 3
It  may  be useful to refer to Hezbollah 
not  as a  terrorist  organization but rather 
as a social revolutionary  organization 
that uses terrorism  to achieve political 
goals. Hezbollah has evolved through 
the first four stages of terrorism. 
Building on an ideology  developed by 
Imams and Ayatollahs, Hezbollah 
experienced, almost from the start, 
parallel development of the fighting 
organization and the overt political 
organization. Through small group 
terrorism  and mass appeal, Hezbollah 
has successfully  transformed itself into a 
powerful political and social force. 
Having won legitimization it  now seeks 
to consolidate its power  and gain 
complete control of Lebanon. Should 
Hezbollah’s success continue, it  is 
possible Lebanon will be transformed 
into an autocratic regime using terror to 
cow internal opposition and continuing 
to export  terror  as it seeks to expand its 
sphere of influence.
Hezbollah’s legitimate political 
standing creates the opportunity  to turn 
them  away  from violence.  Hezbollah is 
already  responsible for  a  large portion of 
the Lebanese population and will act to 
retain their support. The U.S. can 
leverage public opinion in Lebanon 
through its dealing with Hezbollah, 
either treating  them as criminals or as a 
legitimate political entity.  Hezbollah has 
brought some stability  to the country; 
should it be destroyed, Lebanon will 
likely  return to the chaos of the 1970s. It 
may  be that Hezbollah has grown too big 
to fail. 
OVERALL SUMMARY 
The use of terror is a rational strategy 
for  combating an enemy  possessing 
overwhelmingly  greater resources. The 
terrorist is under  no illusion that he can 
inflict enough damage to defeat his 
enemy  solely  through acts of terror. He 
knows he must win mass support. When 
the population believes the grievances of 
terrorists are legitimate, the tide can 
turn in favor of the terrorists.50  The 
population may  then be induced to 
revolt.
Although the parallels between the 
above cases are not exact, the grand 
pattern seems to hold.  Terror begins in 
support of an idea. A core group acts 
upon the idea. The core group gains 
mass appeal. The support  of the masses 
enables the creation of a political 
organization that eventually  gains 
legit imacy. Once legitimate, the 
organization consolidates power, 
tyranny  is imposed, and the movement 
seeks to expand its sphere of influence.  
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Once an ideology  rationalizes the 
illegitimate use of violence, terrorism 
becomes a  tactic used throughout the 
evolution of the movement. Because of 
this ideological rationalization  in  the 
respective movements, terrorism has 
b e c o m e , t o m a n y  i n t h e W e s t , 
synonymous with first Communism, 
then Islam.  Although terror was and is a 
hallmark of these movements, terror 
alone could not accomplish the desired 
social change.  
A coup d’état can replace the existing 
regime but is possible only  if the 
conspirators are already  part  of the state 
power structure. For those who are not 
in  power to effect radical change, the 
support of the population is necessary. 
When overly  relied upon,  terror can 
alienate the public from  whom support 
is sought. Without the support  of the 
people, terror groups are easily  isolated, 
tracked down, and eliminated. 
When the ire of the state is brought to 
bear  on the isolated terror group, 
members of that group are forced to flee 
or be destroyed. Acts of terror, however, 
can be applied in such a way  as to 
compel the state to repress the people as 
a whole, which  in turn pushes the 
population into, rather than away  from, 
the camp of the terrorists. Once this 
happens, the terrorist can transform 
into a revolutionary  movement where 
there is strength in numbers. Acts of 
terror evolve into mob violence, such as 
riots, which further enflames the wrath 
of the state.  Reactionary  state violence 
pushes the mob to organize armed 
resistance; the revolutionary  movement 
c a n t h e n b e d e s c r i b e d a s a n 
insurrection.  
Successful insurrection puts the 
leaders of the revolutionary  movement 
into power.   In the minds of the leaders, 
the success of their movement validates 
the use of violence. There is no incentive 
to abandon a successful tactic.
PREDICTING AND PREVENTING 
TERRORISM
Predicting terrorism is not the goal of 
c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m  i n t e l l i g e n c e . 
Preventing terrorism  is the goal. If the 
intelligence community  (IC) predicts a 
terror group will blow  up a  particular 
building and that act comes to pass, 
then the IC has done a great job of 
predicting terrorism, but the terrorists 
have scored a victory. Preventing 
terrorism  involves predicting aspects of 
terrorism.  
The Terrorist Value Chain breaks 
down terror operations into the steps 
necessary  to produce an attack, from 
planning, to gathering resources, to 
carrying out the operation.  Value Chain 
Analysis is a  good tool for identifying 
where and how to task information 
collection and also to identify  indicators 
of impending terror operations.
Predicting terrorism  is most effective 
in  tasking collection efforts and 
determining indicators rather than in 
identifying a particular  attack.  The goal 
is to get “inside” the terrorists’ 
operational cycle in order to disrupt the 
operation. Stopping terrorists at the site 
of the attack is the last chance and least 
desirable moment to disrupt the 
operation. Interdicting reconnaissance 
of targets, denying or confiscating 
resources and capturing leaders can stop 
a terror  operation before it  can be 
implemented. In order to prevent terror 
operations at  these earlier stages, a 
comprehensive understanding of 
terrorist motivation,  organization, 
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targeting preferences and tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) is 
necessary.  
The six stages of the Revolutionary 
T e r r o r i s t V a l u e C h a i n e n a b l e 
intelligence analysts to determine how 
best to counter terrorism. Different 
stages of terrorism  call for  different 
methods of collection and counter 
actions.
Stage One: Ideological Development. 
A n i d e o l o g y  i s d e v e l o p e d t h a t 
rationalizes the illegitimate use of 
violence.  At this stage the struggle is one 
of words and ideas. The government can 
censor the terrorist ideologues but this 
often proves counterproductive. The 
revolutionaries will challenge such 
censorship as an attack on human 
rights. It  is better to expose the 
revolutionaries’ terror-supported 
philosophy  in order to educate the 
public and turn them away  from  an 
ideology  that  supports the use of 
violence.
Stage Two: Small Group Terror. A 
core group acts upon the ideas 
developed in stage one.  The government 
must take care not to react with  such 
repressive violence as to alienate the 
populace. The terror  groups must be 
delegitimized in  the eyes of the people. 
Terrorists are criminals and must be 
treated as such. The government must 
assure its citizens that the rule of law 
will not be forsaken.
Stage Three: Mass Civil Unrest and 
Revolution. The ideology  gains mass 
appeal, enabling the core group to create 
a political organization that eventually 
gains legitimacy. Non-violent means to 
effect acceptable change must be made 
available to the citizen. Revolutions 
generally  don’t  happen in democracies 
because the citizen is a  part of the 
governing process and feels empowered 
to correct  the perceived problems of 
society.
Stage Four: Revolutionary  Victory 
and Consolidation of Power. The 
revolution overthrows the former 
government and the core group 
consolidates power. Terror becomes a 
mechanism  to eliminate rival political 
groups (political rivals). In this stage the 
indigenous government no longer exists 
or is in exile.  Foreign governments may 
try  exerting international pressure to 
moderate extremist behavior.
Stage Five: Tyranny.  A power struggle 
within the core group ensues. The most 
ruthless win and impose an autocratic 
regime. Terror becomes a standard tool 
of the state, used to repress opposition 
and indoctrinate the population. 
International pressure can be brought 
against such a regime; sanctions can be 
put in  place to induce the terror regime 
to behave in an acceptable manner 
towards its citizens. Opposition groups 
can be given foreign aid and intelligence 
operations can be used to expose the 
abuses of the regime.
Stage Six: Export of Terror and 
Expansion. The regime seeks to expand 
its sphere of influence. Terror  or the 
threat of terror is exported as a tool of 
foreign policy  to threaten hostile states. 
Intelligence must  collect information to 
prove the links between the terror 
regime and the terrorists it  supports 
outside its borders. Such proof allows 
international pressure to be brought to 
bear.
CONCLUSION
Combating terror is first and foremost 
an ideological struggle. Those seeking 
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change through violence are inherently 
antagonistic towards democracy  and 
those who disagree are the enemy. 
Terrorists dehumanize their targets – 
for Marxists there were the capitalist 
pigs and for the Jihadist there are the 
infidel dogs. Terrorists view every 
member of society  as complicit in the 
sins of the government; those not with 
them are against them. 
Religion is often cited as the cause of 
violence. This is rarely  the case – 
religion is used to recruit and incite.   It 
is used to motivate followers in the 
pursuit of a political or military 
objective. If this is true, then the current 
wave of Islamic terrorism is not 
necessarily  a natural outgrowth of Islam. 
The objectives of Jihadist leaders are the 
s a m e a s t h a t o f t h e S o c i a l 
Revolutionaries at  the beginning of the 
last  century. The objective is to replace 
the existing power structure with  one of 
their own, with themselves in complete 
and total control in  order to implement 
their ideology. 
What, then, can we expect  to see in 
the development  of international Islamic 
revolutionary  terrorism? Although it 
remains a threat, the core group of al 
Qaeda has been heavily  damaged by  the 
U.S. reaction to the 9/11  attacks. Using 
the Revolutionary  Value Chain,  this 
places us in the third stage: Mass Civil 
Unrest and Revolution. Of greater 
concern than individual terror  attacks is 
the wider movement inspired and 
motivated by  j ihadist ideology.51 
Counterterrorism  does not take place in 
a vacuum but must  be linked to a larger 
strategy  with geopolitical objectives. 52 
T h e p r i m a r y  o b j e c t i v e o f 
counterterrorism  strategy  must be the 
neutralization of the enemy  ideology 
without which he cannot  progress 
through the RTVC.
In order  to win the ideological 
struggle,  the ideology  of the terrorist 
must be shown to be illegitimate. 
Counterterrorism  often requires the 
application of military  force. If, however, 
terrorists are treated as lawful 
combatants they  gain legitimacy  in the 
eyes of the public. In general, terrorists 
should be treated as criminals in order 
to deny  them  legitimacy; military  action 
should be reserved for  cases of 
immediate public endangerment.53  
Terrorists are politically  motivated 
criminals. Law enforcement must be 
effective enough to track down and kill 
or  capture terrorists and the legal 
system must be robust enough to try  and 
convict  terrorists. In fighting these 
criminals, the legal system must be 
protected from  abuse or  the state risks 
losing the support of the people. 
Terrorist claims of injustice from the 
legal system reinforce their  ideology  and 
potentially  gain them popular support.54 
The United States must publicly  display 
respect for international law  and human 
rights, which simultaneously  increases 
the legitimacy  of our cause while 
undermining the terrorist cause.55
The intent of terrorists is to compel 
some form  of policy  change,  to influence 
t h e p o p u l a t i o n o r t o p u n i s h a 
government for failing to address the 
terrorist’s demands. 56  Giving in to those 
demands proves to the terrorist that his 
tactics work and he is more likely  to 
employ  them again. The government 
must never be seen to acquiesce to the 
demands of a terrorist organization. 
Still,  it is necessary  to address the 
factors that contribute to the growth of 
an ideology  and provide an alternative 
t o v i o l e n c e f o r a  d i s s a t i s f i e d 
population.57
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Terrorists use illegitimate means to 
come to power and then, when in power, 
usually  continue to use illegitimate 
means to govern, resulting in crimes 
against humanity  such as were 
perpetrated by  Stalin and Khomeini 
against  their own countrymen. The 
motivation and intent  of terrorists must 
be understood in order to counter  them 
– if western governments understand 
their grievances, we may  be able to 
a d d r e s s t h e r o o t p r o b l e m . 
Understanding, however, is not  to be 
confused with empathy.  
  Empathy  may  cause the terrorists to 
be viewed as a legitimate opposition 
group, which gives them  an advantage in 
the intellectual fight.  Just as the 
revolutionary  movement is trying to 
gain mass support, the state must vie for 
t h e “ h e a r t s a n d m i n d s ” o f t h e 
population.  Regardless of the nature of 
the complaint made against  the existing 
social order it is unlawful action which 
renders the terrorist a criminal. That 
point must  be clearly  communicated to 
the public so they  understand the 
illegitimate nature of the terrorist.  
If there are legitimate injustices 
against which the terrorist acts, then 
remove the injustice and eliminate a 
motivational factor.  It  may  then be 
possible to guide or  influence the 
revolutionary  terrorist to abandon 
unlawful violence in favor of democracy. 
Win the ideological battle and victory  in 
the operational battle will follow.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Master Sergeant Thomas Myers currently 
serves as an Army ROTC instructor at 
Florida A&M University. He has  served 
with the 10th Special Forces Group as  an 
intelligence sergeant and operations 
sergeant. Myers  has deployed to  the 
Balkans and the Middle  East. He recently 
earned a master’s degree in intelligence 
studies  with American Military University. 
M S G M y e r s  c a n b e r e a c h e d a t 
thomas.ripley.myers@us.army.mil.
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 18
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 Pete Dickenson, “What About Russia? Does The Fall Of The USSR Prove That Socialism Will 
InevitablyFail?” The Socialist online (June 2002), http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/russia/index.html.
2 Philip Mudd, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy,” lecture at the George Washington University/ Homeland 
Security Policy Institute, June 21, 2010, http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/294157-1.
3 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, from Revolution to Institutionalization (New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009), 1.
4 Ibid., x.
5 Mark Burgess, “Terrorism: The Problems of Definition” (Center for Defense Information, August 1, 
2003), http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1564&from_page=../index.cfm.  
6 International Conferences (The Hague), Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374cae64.html; United Nations “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,  http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/
pages/introduction.aspx.
7 Azani, Hezbollah 3.
8 The Revolutionary Terrorism Value Chain (RTVC) is derived from David Rubin, Maya Vidich, David 
Kletter, and Sharon Russ. “Transforming Intelligence Using Industry Best Practices - The Terrorism Value 
Chain,” https://analysis.mitre.org/proceedings/Final_Papers_Files/59_Camera_Ready_Paper.pdf.
9 Richard Brereton, “Czar Alexander II of Russia the Liberator,” Suite 101.com, Russian/Ukrainian/
Belarus History, June 20, 2010, http://russian-ukrainian-belarus-history.suite101.com/article.cfm/czar-
alexander-ii-of-russia-the-liberator#ixzz0sAQS6EDN.
10 John Simkin, “Mikhail Bakunin; Biography” (Spartacus Educational, n.d.), http://
www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAbakunin.htm.
11 Mark Burgess, “A Brief History of Terrorism” (Center for Defense Information, July 2, 
2003), http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1502. 
12 Z. P. Solovyeva, “Narodnaya Volya,” (The Encyclopedia of Saint Petersburg), http://www.encspb.ru/en/
article.php?kod=2804022444. 
13 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 18; Leon Trotsky, “In 
Defense of October” (Socialist Party, UK), http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/russia/index.html.  
14 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism; Solovyeva, “Narodnaya Volya.” 
15 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 19.
16 Solovyeva, “Narodnaya Volya.” 
17 Gareth Jenkins, “Marxism and Terrorism,” International Socialism Online Journal of Socialist Theory 
110 (April 2006), http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=182&issue=110
18 Strategy for Revolution in 21st Century, “Terrorism, Its Relation to a Culture of Peace for the 21st 
Century,” http://sfr-21.org/terrorism.html; Jenkins, “Marxism and Terrorism.” 
19 Leon Trotsky, “In Defense of October,” (Socialist Party, UK), http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/russia/
index.html.
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 20
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
20 “George Gapon; Biography” (Spartacus Educational), http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/








27 Pete Dickenson, “What About Russia?” 
28 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 25.
29 John Simkin, “Mikhail Bakunin; Biography.” 
30 Frank Eugene Smitha, “The Iranian Revolution: King Pahlavi (the Shah) Against Dissent,” Macro 




34 Middle East Conflict: Israel, Palestine, conflict & peace online, “Hezbollah History,” Mid East 
Conflict.NET (n.d.), http://middleeastconflict.net/hezbollah-history/. 
35 Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes A Terrorist And 
Why?” (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999).
36 David Lewis, “Bullets to Ballot Box: a History of Hezbollah”, From “LEBANON, Party 




39 Eli Avidar, “Death of the Iranian ‘fig leaf’ in Lebanon,” The Jerusalem Post, July 7, 2010,
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=181943.
40  Adam Shatz, “In Search  of Hezbollah,” Review of  multiple books and articles, by various authors, The 
New York Review of Books 51, no. 7 (April 29, 2004), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17060.
41 Ibid.; David Lewis, “Bullets to Ballot Box.”
42 Lewis, “Bullets to Ballot Box.”
43 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism”; Lewis, “Bullets to Ballot Box.”
44 Lewis, “Bullets to Ballot Box.”
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 21
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 6 (FEBRUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
45 David Lewis, “Bullets to Ballot Box.”
46 Jay Solomon, “U.N. Brings Hezbollah to Hariri Questioning,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2010, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303338304575156231183106538.html.
47 Ibid.




50 Jenkins, “Marxism and Terrorism.” 
51 Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force,” January 25, 
2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-future-terrorism-010107.pdf
52 Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Strategies and Grand Strategies,” in Aurdrey Cronin 
and James Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), 90.
53 Benjamin J. Priester, “Who Is A 'Terrorist'? Drawing the Line between Criminal Defendants and 
Military Enemies,” FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 264 (August 24, 2007),  http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1009845.
54 James Renwick and Gregory F. Treverton, “The Challenges of Trying Terrorists as Criminals: 
Proceedings of a RAND/SAIS Colloquium” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), http://
www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF249. 
55 Prime Minister and Secretary of State for the Home Department, “Countering International Terrorism: 
The United Kingdom’s Strategy” (The United Kingdom, July 2006).
56 Benjiman Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic And International 
Terrorists, 2nd ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001).
57 Crenshaw, “Terrorism, Strategies and Grand Strategies,” 91; Prime Minister, “Countering International 
Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy”; Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism, “Combating 
Terrorism in a Globalized World” (The National War College, May 2002).
Baton Rouge Post-Katrina:
The Role of Critical Infrastructure Modeling 
in Promoting Resilience
Laura J. Steinberg, Nicholas Santella, Corrine B. Zoli
ABSTRACT
The events of Hurricane Katrina have 
become a textbook example of system 
failures  at multiple and intersecting levels. 
One  unexplored dimension of this  tragedy 
is the role of infrastructure performance 
data and modeling studies in aiding 
stakeholders  in understanding this  and 
future crises  in order to promote resilience. 
This  article  presents  results  from  a 
comparative validation study of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
s p o n s o r e d C r i t i c a l I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
Protection Decision Support System 
(CIPDSS) to  offer an interdisciplinary  and 
systems-level understanding of resilience. 
Our analysis  of Baton Rouge critical 
infrastructures response to one of the 
largest population displacements  recorded 
in U.S. history highlights  the importance of 
integrating engineering systems and policy 
approaches  with critical infrastructure 
protection,  planning, and capacity 
b u i l d i n g .  B y u s i n g i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
performance data we were able to  address 
which systems in Baton Rouge proved 
r e s i l i e n t a n d w h y a n d d e t e r m i n e 
recommendations for effective planning to 
increase critical infrastructure resilience.
INTRODUCTION: CIPDSS 
Validation Study as an Occasion 
for Monitoring Resilience 
A common definition  of resilience is “the 
capability  of a system to maintain its 
functions and structure in the face of 
internal and external change and to 
degrade gracefully  when it must.”1 This 
deceptively  simple definition, however, 
belies longstanding difficulties in 
defining, measuring, and fostering 
resilience in general,  particularly  in the 
p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t o f c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure systems.2  In this article, 
the authors illustrate an approach  to the 
chal lenges of achiev ing cr i t ica l 
infrastructure resilience using modeling 
informed by  infrastructure performance 
data. Observations are reported from a 
val idat ion study  of the Crit ical 
Infrastructure Protection  Decision 
Support System model (CIPDSS), a 
simulation tool developed for  the 
Science and Technology  Directorate of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security  (DHS). This validation study 
considered the effects of a seminal 
disaster  for the homeland security 
community  – Hurricane Katrina – on 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
The unprecedented increase in the 
population of Baton Rouge resulting 
from Katrina severely  stressed critical 
infrastructures providing an ideal 
opportunity  to exercise infrastructure 
modeling tools and observe factors that 
contribute to resilience. The results of 
the study  are used to illustrate both the 
potential benefits and myriad challenges 
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of modeling critical infrastructure 
resilience.  The article first discusses the 
potential role of critical infrastructure 
modeling in promoting resilience, as 
revealed by  the response to Hurricane 
K a t r i n a . S e c o n d , w e d e t a i l t h e 
methodology  used in  the validation 
study  and summarize the factors 
measured to determine the level of 
infrastructure resilience in Baton Rouge. 
Third, drawing on our own collected 
data, we illustrate the importance of 
these factors by  descr ibing the 
performance of key  infrastructure 
systems considered in  the CIPDSS 
Validation Study. Last, we outline the 
results of our validation study  and 
e x p l o r e r e s u l t i n g i n s i g h t s i n t o 
infrastructure resilience – namely,  how 
critical infrastructure resilience can be 
promoted using simulation-based 
analyses.  
As is now well known,  Hurricane 
Katrina caused massive destruction, loss 
of life,3  and widespread systems-level 
failures in critical infrastructure, policy 
and political channels of communication 
and decis ion-making,  homeland 
security, and disaster planning.4  The 
contribution of critical infrastructure 
failures to the disastrous conditions 
following Katrina has been the subject of 
significant study, particularly  with 
regard to hospital,5  public health,6 and 
telecommunications systems.7  Because 
of these failures, Katrina has become a 
classic example of the dire consequences 
that accompany  loss of infrastructure 
systems and, hence, the need for 
resilient infrastructure.8  In  fact, the 
importance of resilience for critical 
infrastructure (much of it privately 
owned) has achieved greater recognition 
and analytical interest in  large part 
because of recent major disruptions, 
especially Katrina.9  
To a certain degree these matters are 
now  federal policy.10  Government 
investigations of the response to 
Hurricane Katrina, such as The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned,  for instance, explicitly 
recognized the role that loss of critical 
infrastructure played in the disaster  and, 
in turn,  the ameliorative role that 
greater  use of simulation-based analysis 
may  play  in improving disaster 
response.11  The document recognized 
“critical infrastructure and impact 
assessment” as one of seventeen critical 
challenges for  improved federal 
r e s p o n s e ,  f o l l o w e d b y  t h e 
recommendation to enhance capacities 
to “rapidly  assess the impact of a 
disaster  on critical infrastructure.” The 
report recommended that DHS revise 
the National Response Plan to provide a 
“stronger”  role for the Infrastructure 
Support Branch in the National 
Operations Center, which would suggest 
remedial actions,  based on the input of 
the National Infrastructure Simulation 
and Analysis Center (NISAC) and other 
entities. Also recommended was 
e n l a r g i n g N I S A C ’ s c a p a c i t y  f o r 
modeling-based analysis of critical 
infrastructure, including greater sharing 
of modeling tools, analysis, and data 
among federal agencies. Elsewhere, the 
importance of infrastructure resilience 
has been demonstrated across federal 
agencies with  President Obama most 
r e c e n t l y  i s s u i n g a  P r e s i d e n t i a l 
Proclamation declaring December  2010 
“Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Month,” a time to focus on “delivering 
the necessary  information, tools, and 
resources to areas where critical 
infrastructure exists in order to 
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 2
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VII, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
maintain and enhance its security  and 
resilience.” 12 
G i v e n  t h e c o m p l e x i t y  a n d 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y  o f c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure systems, NISAC and 
other ’s ef forts at modeling and 
simulation offer  important contributions 
to increasing infrastructure resilience.13 
While varied and important work has 
been undertaken, the limited availability 
of data on infrastructure performance 
during disaster  conditions has been a 
significant challenge to modeling efforts 
and, thus, to analysis of resilience. This 
challenge has been described in recent 
efforts to develop data collection 
methodologies for natural hazards and 
other  events.14  Moreover, while 
modeling and simulation are critically 
important  in aiding decision makers’ 
investments in  disaster  preparedness,  to 
be most  useful these tools must 
comprise a  multidisciplinary  approach 
that integrates technological and social 
systems, thereby  adding to their 
complexity.15 For  example, as this study 
will show, the physical capacity  of 
infrastructure may  be increased during 
times of stress by  strategic changes in 
the practices of the service personnel 
responsible for the infrastructure’s 
functionality.   As a result, efforts to 
d e v e l o p p r a c t i c a l a n d u s e f u l 
infrastructure models for  homeland 
security  applications have attracted 
considerable research and government 
interest. 16  
CIPDSS is one of the modeling and 
analysis tools developed for NISAC by 
Los Alamos, Sandia, and Argonne 
National Laboratories.17  The CIPDSS 
model differs from other modeling tools 
in  that  it represents a large number 
(fourteen) of critical infrastructures and 
key  asset sectors (e.g. public health, 
emergency  services, telecom, energy, 
transportation).18  CIPDISS is also 
intended for  analysis of high-level 
behavior of metropolitan or regional 
infrastructure, taking into account the 
way  disruptions in one sector may 
propagate to other infrastructure 
systems. Modeling is performed using a 
system dynamics methodology  where an 
infrastructure system  is broken down 
into simple items and processes 
(feedback loops, stocks,  and flows), 
which interact  to produce complex 
behaviors.  A simplified example of these 
components taken from the CIPDSS 
model of road traffic is illustrated in 
Figure 1  (below).  In this sub-segment of 
the model, traffic volume (Tro: Traffic) 
is a  stock controlled by  flows determined 
by  the entry  and exit rate of vehicles to 
the roadway, which are themselves 
dependent on other  variables not 
pictured. A feedback loop exists such 
that the entry  rate decreases under 
heavy  traffic conditions. The number of 
people successfully  completing trips 
(Tro: Trips Completed) is calculated 
from the exit rate.
Within the CIPDSS model,  each 
infrastructure sector is divided into 
subsectors (e.g., road transportation, 
metropolitan rail transportation) 
re p re s e nt e d by  p ag e s o f v i s u a l 
programming code (i.e., “views”) 
describing infrastructure behavior at an 
aggregate level. For  example, as 
illustrated above,  all  roads are treated as 
a single system  that behaves in a  fashion 
similar to an individual road.  The total 
CIPDSS model consists of over 100 
views, and these views are connected 
through variables describing  major 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s ( e . g . r o a d 
transportation is less efficient without 
electricity  for  traffic control). Given its 
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abi l i ty  to map the behavior  o f 
interdependent  systems, CIPDSS has 
been applied to complex scenarios such 
as influenza outbreak or the impacts of 
blackouts on telecommunications and 
emergency  services.19  CIPDSS was 
intended to meet  an initial operating 
goal of order  of magnitude prediction 
accuracy, though improvements are 
ongoing.
In September 2005, several weeks 
after  Hurricane Katrina, CIPDSS 
developers conducted a series of 
s i m u l a t i o n s , d e s c r i b e d i n  a n 
accompanying report: CIPDSS Baton 
Rouge Report,  Analysis of the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on Baton Rouge.20 
Hurricane Katrina caused one of the 
largest  population displacements 
recorded in U.S. history  with  estimates 
of over 800,000 displaced people.21 
Although direct hurricane impacts on 
Baton  Rouge itself were moderate, up to 
250,000 people were displaced to Baton 
Rouge from  New  Orleans and other 
coastal areas, increasing the city’s 
overall population by  50 percent and 
causing significant strains on local 
critical infrastructure. The CIPDSS 
analysis of the situation was intended to 
both exercise the model, which was at 
the t ime about hal fway  though 
development, and provide insight into 
necessary  resources and adaptations 
needed in Baton Rouge over a six-month 
planning horizon.  The CIPDISS analysis 
focused on five critical infrastructure 
areas and their  interdependencies: 
r o a d s ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  s u p p l y , 
telecommunications,  public health  and 
hospitals, and emergency  services (EMS 
and police). Since the timeframe for 
reconstruction of New Orleans was 
unknown at  the time, the largest 
uncertainty  was to what  extent  and for 
how long displaced persons would 
remain in Baton Rouge.
The authors produced a third-party 
review of the CIPDSS Baton Rouge 
Report in which its predictions were 
val idated against infrastructure 
performance data  collected by  the 
authors in Baton Rouge. 22 The goal of 
the validation process was to determine 
the degree to which the simulation was 
an accurate representation of real world 
conditions in Baton Rouge. Both the 
predictive accuracy  of the CIPDSS tool 
and,  equally  important,  the specific 
causes for any  deviations from  the actual 
course of events were determined.23 
More important than the actual 
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 4
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VII, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG





validation exercise, however, our 
research produced a body  of rich data on 
critical infrastructure performance in 
Baton  Rouge, which we turn to next, 
with  implications for  infrastructure 
resilience.  
One brief word about resilience. The 
type of infrastructure resilience we treat 
here falls outside of the traditional 
context of physical resilience (e.g., the 
ability  to withstand pressure waves 
generated by  a detonation); instead we 
investigate resilience in  its dimension of 
response to capacity  overload or other 
stresses. More specifically, we look at 
the ability  of infrastructure to adapt to 
external change created by  sudden, 
unanticipated, and often dramatic 
events; in  this particular  case, an 
i n c r e a s e i n d e m a n d f o r  t h e 
infrastructure function.24 
In coming from  this perspective, we 
are indebted to several dynamic areas of 
inquiry.  This includes recent  work that 
has emphasized resilience as a broad but 
practical policy  and management goal 
useful for directing government 
priorities and investments, given the 
otherwise impossible task of defending 
against all the man-made or natural 
threats facing critical infrastructure.25 It 
also includes research focused on 
characterizing resilience by  defining the 
core or necessary  performance traits of a 
resilient community  or  system: i.e., its 
robustness, the degree in which it 
contains redundancies, the rapidity  with 
which it can return to function, and its 
resourcefulness in responding to 
problems; increases in one or  more of 
these characteristics of a  system  results, 
it  is hypothesized, in an overall increase 
in  resilience.26  But given our  focus on 
critical infrastructure and modeling,  we 
chose a necessarily  multivariate notion 
of resilience,  one that  is at once 
practical, policy-oriented, interested in 
the observable characteristics that 
indicate resilience in infrastructure 
systems, but  also attentive to the 
complexities of interdependent systems.
  Our approach is equally  informed by 
recent work, some of it focused on 
seismic resilience, that  has highlighted 
the need to develop integrated measures 
of performance, both  technological and 
social, to indicate the level of resilience 
present in a system, often through 
analysis or  computer  simulation, and so 
enable more effective enhancements of 
resilience.2 And our notion of resilience 
takes seriously  a core insight from 
systems engineering – namely, the 
importance of redundancy  in achieving 
resilience in  crisis situations – yet,  we 
have expanded redundancy  to include 
the myriad ways in which  elements or 
aspects o f a g iven system  may 
compensate for  setbacks by  related 
mitigating factors and interventions.27 
For  instance, as we will show  below, 
human capital factors – drastically 
increasing professional emergency 
service personnel and staff and their 
hours of work at  all levels (i.e.,  police, 
fire services,  ambulance) – helped 
mitigate and blunt  any  decline in 
emergency  services in Baton  Rouge in 
the months after Katrina.
METHODOLOGY: 
CIPDSS Baton Rouge Validation 
Study Data Collection
As part of the CIPDSS Validation Study, 
we collected descriptive and quantitative 
data in person and in phone interviews 
w i t h i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s y s t e m 
representatives and stakeholders 
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throughout the months of September 
and December 2007. The focus of the 
data collected was on  the state of critical 
infrastructure systems in East  Baton 
Rouge Parish (EBRP) during the six-
month period post-Hurricane Katrina: 
Sept 2005–Feb 2006. The purpose of 
these interviews was twofold: to collect 
qualitative inputs on conditions in Baton 
Rouge from persons directly  familiar 
with a given critical infrastructure 
sector; and to identify  institutional and 
managerial resources for collecting 
quantitative data. 
Participants for interviews were 
selected on the basis of their direct 
expertise and/or  experience in oversight 
a n d m a n a g e m e n t o f c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure sectors considered in the 
CIPDSS analysis. Targeted persons 
included representatives from  the 
following local,  state, federal, private, 
a n d c o n t r a c t o r a g e n c i e s a n d 
organizations: LA Department of 
Transportation and Development 
(LADOTD); Baton Rouge Area  Chamber 
(of commerce); Alliance Transportation 
Group, Inc (providing travel demand 
modeling services to Baton Rouge); 
Baton Rouge Police Department 
(BRPD); East Baton Rouge Parish 
Sheriff’s Office (EBRPSO), LA State 
Police Troop A,  LA State University 
Police Department; Baton Rouge 
Emergency  Medical Service (EMS); 
Baton Rouge Fire Department; LA 
Health  Association; LA Hospital 
Association; LA Department of Health 
and Human Services (LDHHS); major 
area hospitals including Lane Regional 
Medical Center and Baton Rouge 
General Medical Center; Federal 
Emergency  Management Agency 
(FEMA); Baton Rouge Emergency 
Operations Center; the LA Governors 
Office of Emergency  Management; local 
telecom carriers including AT&T, 
Verizon, and Bell South; and local 
electrical utility Entergy. 
Interviews were semi-structured and 
open-ended, eliciting dialogue and 
f e e d b a c k i n t h e c o u r s e o f 
conversations.28  Individual interview 
time ran from approximately  thirty 
minutes to two hours, depending on 
c ircumstances and respondents . 
Questions included some of the 
following: “How  was your organization 
affected by  Katrina?”; “What  changes 
were made in the six month period after 
the hurricane?”; “What reports or  data 
sets are you aware of describing 
conditions in Baton Rouge during that 
t ime?”  Where possible,  publicly 
available information was used to elicit 
more detai led information with 
questions such  as: “News reports 
describe these specific conditions,  can 
you comment on this and explain how 
your organization responded?” Notes 
were taken manually  during the course 
of interviews and were transcribed and 
coded with annotations. When relevant 
quantitative data sets or  reports could 
be identified, these were likewise 
retrieved in hard copy  or electronic 
formats in follow-up communications. 
Various levels of success were 
achieved in collecting data for  each 
sector, largely  in accord with the 
challenges others have identified in 
collecting infrastructure performance 
data.29 In general, public services, such 
as emergency  services and LADOTD, 
were cooperative in that  they  were 
willing to share any  data they  had 
collected and often provided a wealth of 
data. Others, such as hospital systems, 
were cooperative but decentralized, so 
only  limited data was available for 
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describing the regional hospital system 
as a whole . Telecommunicat ion 
companies were the least cooperative, in 
that they  were unable to share any  of the 
large quantity  of operational data they 
collect. This resulted from strict policies 
discouraging data sharing  based on the 
perceived economic risk of releasing 
data that might be valuable to 
competitors.  The local electrical utility 
was very  cooperative,  perhaps because it 
o p e r a t e s i n a l e s s c o m p e t i t i v e 
environment than telecommunication 
providers.  In  addition much useful data 
may  have been lost because it  was 
collected only  for  immediate operational 
purposes and not archived by  the 
organization that collected it. For 
example,  a weekly  census of patients at 
all Louisiana hospitals was collected by 
LDHHS in the months after Hurricane 
Katrina but  these records were not 
retained after use.
Analysis Schema for CIPDSS 
Baton Rouge Validation Study
The authors approached the process of 
validating the CIPDSS simulation by 
focusing  on ten model variables that 
summarized the simulation results in 
the 2005 CIPDSS Baton Rouge Report 
as well as a  number of contributing 
v a r i a b l e s a n d c o n s t a n t s . T h e s e 
additional variables were chosen by 
their  importance in determining the 
values of the output  variables and the 
availability  of data  from  Baton Rouge for 
their validation. Although the CIPDSS 
model consists of fourteen  sectors and 
over  100 views, the CIPDSS Baton 
Rouge Report only  exercised those parts 
of the model most salient to conditions 
in  Baton Rouge: five sectors and a dozen 
model views. Thus, many  important 
CIPDSS model capabilities, such  as 
modeling of disease transmission, 
agricultural systems,  or food supplies, 
were not exercised by  the Baton Rouge 
scenario and so could not be validated 
by our study.  
The ten output variables, hereafter, 
referred to as “key  outputs,”  are listed 
below (Table 1) and their  significance 
within the model is described.
Prediction errors for the simulation 
were determined by  direct comparison 
of the values for a salient feature 
identified in both key  outputs and actual 
data from Baton Rouge: for example, 
monthly  maximum electrical load or 
monthly  total number of EMS calls 
serviced.  In cases where real-world data 
could not be collected for direct 
comparison with  key  outputs, important 
model inputs and calculations were 
identified and compared to data  from 
Baton Rouge: for example, total number 
of police officers or patients treated. 
With these comparisons as a  starting 
point, additional model constants, 
calculations,  and interdependencies 
were evaluated by  comparison of 
constants to literature values,  when 
available, or sensitivity  analysis for 
constants for which authoritative values 
did not exist.  Source code was evaluated 
by  tracing calculations backward from 
key  outputs to identify  sources of error. 
Finally  when calculations were well 
understood and sources of error were 
identif ied, recommendations for 
improvements were made.
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Data collected in Baton Rouge described 
the behavior of a number of critical 
infrastructures under stress after 
Hurricane Katrina. In addition to 
allowing for  a validation of the CIPDSS 
simulation, this data and its analysis 
provided an indication of the degree of 
resilience demonstrated by  each 
infrastructure system  under  moderate 
disruption due to the hurricane and the 
impact of the rapid increase in demand 
for services. Drawing on prior  work on 
resilience and our analysis of critical 
infrastructure performance during the 
validation study, we defined several 
factors that help to determine resilience 
of critical infrastructure services in 
Baton  Rouge.30  These factors are not 
intended to provide a  comprehensive 
theory  or complete framework from 
which to define or measure resilience 
enhancing properties.   In fact, quite the 
c o n t r a r y ,  t h e y  a r e i n d u c t i v e 
determinations formed from  a practice-
based account  of specific conditions in 
post-hurricane Baton Rouge that, we 
believe, reveal relevant  factors that may 
be generalized and applied to other 
event scenarios and that  may  help in 
understanding the processes for 
increasing infrastructure resilience 
under a variety of stresses.  
The purpose of this exercise is, thus, 
t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a n e v o l v i n g 
interdisciplinary  conversation that is 
shifting discussions of infrastructure 
resilience from a theoretical basis 
toward specific system properties and 
approaches that can be understood and 
usefully  manipulated through policy  and 
investment. This conversation has,  in 
fact,  gained additional national traction 
given the September 2010 U.S. 
Government Accountability  Office 
r e p o r t , C r i t i c a l I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
Protection: DHS Efforts To Assess And 
Promote Resiliency Are Evolving But 
Program Management Could Be 
Strengthened, which “recommends that 
DHS develop resiliency  performance 
measures.” 31  At the very  least these 
factors define questions that may  be 
helpful to ask in the process of 
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Table 1: Summary of Key Output Variables for CIPDSS Baton Rouge Simulation
Sector Variable Definition
Roads Trip Duration Multiplier Ratio of the current time required to complete a trip by road, as compared to the time taken at the free flow rate
Health Care
Bed Utilization Fraction of hospital beds currently occupied
Treated Number of patients being treated within the hospital system at a given time
Hospital Staff Available Number of hospital staff present
Emergency 
Services
EMS Response Number of calls for service which EMS responds to in calls/hour
EMS Calls The number of calls for service which EMS receives in calls/hour
Officer Availability Ratio Ratio of the rate at which calls for police are answered to the rate at which they are received
Power Demand Ratio Ratio of current demand for electricity to the maximum supply rate of the distribution system
Telecommuni
cations
Wire-line Availability Fraction of call attempts which connect successfully on the first try for wire-line calls
Wireless Availability Fraction of call attempts which connect successfully on the first try for wireless calls
quantitatively  assessing and modeling 
critical infrastructure response during 
crises.
Important factors, identified in the 
Baton  Rouge scenario, are described 
below  with  associated descriptive 
questions.
Redundancy: Were other equal or 
adequate services available to users? In 
addition to the commonly  considered 
issue of redundant physical system 
components (e.g. lines, switches, roads), 
a less obvious component to redundancy 
is the degree to which alternate services 
can provide similar functionality  to end 
users, for  example, the substitution of 
back roads or  public transportation for 
highways, or wire-less for wire-line 
telecommunication services. 
Responsiveness: Was it possible for new 
or temporary  systems and services to be 
made available so that functionality 
could be maintained by  users? This 
question encompasses the obvious 
technological and manpower constrains 
but  also includes the quality  of system 
management. Resilient management 
might be characterized by  appropriate 
contingency  planning and training at all 
levels of operation and organizational 
capacity  for rapid and decentralized 
decision making.  
Elastic capacity or plasticity of 
systems: Were existing  systems and 
services elastic or  plastic enough  to 
extend their capacity  under stress 
without major impairment of system 
function? Or was a system  enabled to 
“degrade gracefully” so that it  would 
function long enough for other systems 
to meet the demand? Could throughput 
of systems be increased without major 
changes, and did these systems utilize 
technologies that were easily  expanded 
or which required time and high capital 
investment for expansion? 
Social mitigation: Were existing social 
networks and communities useful in 
providing resources or in creating 
economies of scale that could mitigate 
the demands or  stress on a given system 
or service, or in contrast were there 
social factors that hindered adaptation? 
Human capital: Were professional 
persons (law enforcement,  EMS, fire 
fighters,  medical personnel, etc.) and 
volunteers able to effectively  deploy 
themselves or be tasked in emergency 
and mitigation efforts? Was additional 
manpower  available from outside the 
system, and was redeployment or 
addition of personnel able to ameliorate 
deficiencies in critical infrastructure 
services? 
In the following sections, the 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f e a c h o f t h e 
infrastructure systems considered is 
described, with attention to illustrating 
how these five factors played out in 
Baton Rouge.  The results of the 
v a l i d a t i o n e x e r c i s e a r e t h e n 
summarized, and the implications for 
promoting critical infrastructure 
resilience through modeling and 
analysis are discussed. 
Population: 
Primary Infrastructure Stress
Though the physical damage caused by 
Hurricane Katrina  in Baton Rouge was 
limited, the influx of population was a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  s t r e s s o n l o c a l 
infrastructure.32 The population in East 
Baton  Rouge Parish (EBRP) increased 
over the course of a few days from pre-
Katrina levels of 396,735 to levels of 
around 650,000, according to news 
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reports.33  In the weeks following 
Hurricane Katrina, as people returned to 
New Orleans or  dispersed to other 
parishes or states, the population began 
to decrease: by  the end of the six-month 
period simulated using CIPDSS, the 
population in EBRP had fallen to 
approximately  435,000, according to 
U.S. Census estimates (or 8 percent 
above the pre-Katrina population). 
Figure 2, below,  shows the population 
changes in EBRP over time.   This 
population change drives and frames the 
responses observed within various 
critical infrastructures in Baton Rouge.  
Transit Sector: 
Increased Congestion for Roads
Many  who came to Baton Rouge as a 
result  of Hurricane Katrina self-
evacuated via automobile. Baton Rouge 
was also a center  of response activities 
for the State of Louisiana with large 
numbers of personnel and supplies 
passing through. 34 As a result,  soon after 
the hurricane, traffic conditions were 
extremely  congested in  Baton Rouge, 
and this congestion persisted for  some 
t ime. Figure 3  i l lustrates these 
conditions through  daily  traffic counts 
from three locations in EBRP, spanning 
the period pre- and post-Katrina. The 
average daily  total traffic volume from 
traffic count sites increased from 8 
percent  to 47  percent (18 percent 
average across a total of eight  sites) in 
September 2005, as compared to August 
2005. By  February  2006 traffic was still 
up by  3  percent to 22  percent (10 
percent average for all sites). Greater 
increases in traffic counts were observed 
in  the larger  capacity  roads such as I-10 
and I-12. 
 Contributing to traffic congestion 
was the fact that prior  to Hurricane 
Katr ina h ighways in Louis iana, 
including those in  Baton Rouge, were in 
poor  condition, and I-10 and arterial 
streets in  Baton Rouge were reported to 
be near capacity.  As a result, travel times 
increased: rush-hour travel times to 
Ascension parish to the South East of 
Baton Rouge,  for  instance, were 
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Figure 2:  Population of East Baton Rouge Parish with Time
reported to have increased by  a factor of 
two.35
Another  contributing factor  was the 
limited role that public transportation 
played in Baton Rouge. Community 
Survey  Data from the U.S. Census 
indicates that in 2005, 83  percent  of the 
184,000 working residents in EBRP 
traveled to work alone by  automobile, 
and only  2 percent  reported taking 
public transport.36  Due, in  part, to a 
FEMA-funded expansion of public 
transportation systems in 2006, there 
were large increases in the number of 
buses in service: from sixty  to ninety-
one buses, as part of the Capitol-area 
transit system  (CATS) in Baton Rouge.37 
However,  there was a much smaller 
increase in  trips taken by  bus: passenger 
miles increased from 16 to 17  million  or 
about 5 percent  in 2006.  LASwift bus 
service between Baton Rouge and New 
Orleans also began in October  2005, but 
ridership, which grew to 800-900 
passengers per day, was small compared 
to the number of trip taken by 
automobile in Baton Rouge per day.
 As a result  of these converging 
problems – larger  number  of vehicles, 
roads which were at  capacity  and poorly 
maintained, and limited availability  and 
use of public transportation – relatively 
little could be done to improve traffic 
flow within Baton Rouge in the short 
term. LADOTD commissioned a number 
of special traffic flow studies on arterial 
roads and highways in the weeks after 
Katrina which resulted in some traffic 
light re-timing. However, traffic 
congestion on major highways began to 
improve only  as temporary  residents 
became more familiar  with alternate 
routes.38  Monitoring of traffic flow on 
I-10 in Baton Rouge was provided by  the 
LADOTD Intelligent  Transportation 
S y s t e m ( I T S ) , w h i c h p r o v i d e s 
measurements of traffic speed and 
counts, along with  video monitoring. 
The system was disabled immediately 
after  Hurricane Katrina,  but was rapidly 
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Figure 3: Daily Total Traffic Counts at Three Sites in EBRP
brought back online to aid in traffic 
management and was fully  operational 
by the second week of September 2005. 
Using ITS data, the increase in travel 
t imes that resulted from traffic 
congestion was quantified for the five-
mile stretch of I-10 passing through 
downtown Baton Rouge.  LADOTD 
special studies were also used to 
quantify  the post-Katrina travel times on 
other select roads in Baton Rouge.39 
Traffic speeds at fifteen-minute intervals 
were available for fifty-four  individual 
ITS links on I-10, and speed for all links 
were averaged, thereby,  providing a 
single value for each fifteen-minute 
interval. The relative trip duration  was 
calculated by  taking the ratio of 
observed ITS speed to a  free flow rate, 
assumed equivalent to the 65 mph speed 
limit. For  LADOTD special studies, 
travel times were recorded by  test cars 
driving a number  of routes during AM 
and PM peak travel times. In these cases 
traffic speeds were calculated from 
travel times and route distance, and the 
ratio of actual speed to the posted speed 
limit was taken as the Trip Duration 
Multiplier.
A summary  of the Trip Duration 
Multiplier from ITS and special studies 
are shown in Figure 4. ITS data 
represents quarter-hourly  averages from 
two-week periods prior  to, immediately 
after, and six months after Hurricane 
Katrina (April 2005, September  2005, 
and February  2006). Values for  special 
studies are averages of ten pairs of 
morning and evening measurements. 
Travel times on I-10 more than doubled 
in  early  September 2005, compared to 
pre-Katrina levels, and the high 
congestion  “rush hour” period was 
observed to have increased significantly 
in  length. By  February  2006 travel times 
and “rush hour”  length had dropped 
significantly,  but not quite back to 
original levels. Travel times on smaller 
highways and arterial streets were 
greater  than on I-10, but this was also 
likely  the case prior  to Hurricane 
Katrina.
Summary  travel data, including 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT), vehicle 
hours of travel (VHT), and vehicle hours 
of delay  were also obtained from  the 
Capital Regional Planning Commission 
Travel Demand Model (CRPCTDM). 
Data consisted of a  summary  of weekday 
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Figure 4: Trip Multiplier with Time of Day
daily  travel from the model under 
population conditions for  the years 
2004 and a  projected 2009 population 
13  percent larger than the 2004 
population. This population level was 
reached for a brief period in December 
2005, so 2009  travel parameters from 
the CRPCTDM may  approximate the 
situation in EBRP at that time. 
Approximately  3.3 trips per person per 
day  are assumed in  both years.  The 
model shows a 27  percent increase in 
hours of delay  (VHD) in 2009, 
compared to 2004. 
Overall, increased traffic volume 
observed in Baton Rouge rose directly  in 
parallel to the increased population, 
and, as no effective means was available 
to deal with increased demand, the 
quality  of service provided by  the road 
infrastructure decreased as population 
increased. This finding demonstrates 
both a relative lack of redundancy 
within the system  – no alternative 
routes or transport mechanisms were 
easily  available – and an inability  for 
services to respond rapidly  to such 
changing circumstances,  mainly  because 
of physical limitations of existing 
systems. 
It  also raises another issue. Road 
systems are particularly  inelastic: 
expanding their capacity  requires not 
only  capital investment, planning, but 
also building and construction projects 
of a scale and time frame incompatible 
with  a disaster setting. But there is a 
subtler social component to the problem 
as well. Even when bus systems were 
expanded through  outside funding, and 
despite continuing traffic congestion, 
bus ridership only  increased slightly. 
This suggests that lack of social 
acceptance of public transportation 
alternatives may  have also been a 
limiting factor. It  is interesting to 
speculate if the situation might have 
been more effectively  mitigated by 
interventions into social factors which 
encouraged (through advertising 
campaigns or community  efforts) 
greater  use of car-pooling or  other forms 
of collective transportation to bypass the 
p h y s i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e 
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Figure 5: Number of Customers without Electrical Power in EVRP
transportation system. It is this mode of 
questioning and style of reasoning in 
approaching  resilience infrastructure 




One local utility, Entergy, provides 90 
percent of the service in EBRP. 
Approximately  40-60 percent of 
electrical demand is residential use, 
20-30 percent is commercial demand, 
and 10-40 percent is industrial demand. 
The electrical power grid in Baton Rouge 
received only  moderate damage during 
Hurricane Katrina. Although over 40 
percent of customers were without 
service immediately  after the storm, 
service was almost entirely  restored 
within one week,  as illustrated in Figure 
5. 
Entergy  provided information on the 
maximum  hourly  electrical usage in a 
given month (monthly  maximum  load) 
before and after  Hurricane Katrina. In 
general, monthly  maximum  load was 
strongly  seasonal, with high demand 
occurring in  summer months due to air 
conditioning use. As a result, a strong 
correlation is observed between 
maximum  load and maximum air 
temperature (See Figure 6). Maximum 
loads in 2005 were similar to those in 
prior  and subsequent years, with  the 
exception of unusually  high electricity 
demand in September of 2005. 
M a x i m u m  a i r t e m p e r a t u r e s i n 
September and August of 2005 were the 
same (98 degrees), but maximum 
demand in  September  was 110 MW (or 
11  percent) higher  than in August. This 
additional demand is hypothesized to be 
the result of the increased population in 
EBRP.
Using a  series of assumptions it is 
possible to estimate the electrical usage 
of temporary  residents in Baton  Rouge. 
Population during September  2005 was 
elevated by  between 250,000 and 
70,000 persons. As the exact  population 
at the time of peak demand was not 
known, a mid-range value of 200,000 
additional persons was assumed. 
D e m a n d f r o m c o m m e r c i a l a n d 
industrial sources,  typically  about half of 
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Figure 6: Maximum Electrical Load and Air Temperature in EBRP
the total, was assumed to have remained 
c o n s t a n t b e t w e e n A u g u s t a n d 
September. Under these assumptions 
temporary  residents in September  used 
approximately  50 percent of the energy 
per capita of a permanent resident. This 
finding is explained by  the fact  that 
temporary  residents largely  stayed with 
friends, relatives, or  volunteers in 
private homes or  publicly  or privately 
organized shelters, thus leading to 
greater efficiency in electricity usage. 
Our general findings with respect  to 
post-Katrina energy  usage,  then,  were 
twofold: first, the reconnection of 
established customers was accomplished 
rapidly; and second, the electrical 
system had adequate capacity  to meet 
the relatively  small increase in demand, 
caused be the increased population. In 
short, the electrical supply  system 
proved to be fairly  resilient under these 
specific stresses. The social dimension to 
this systemic resilience should not  be 
neglected.  The scale of the evacuation 
after  Katrina  forced a  blurring between 
what  would typically  be considered 
emergency  or  temporary  shelter and 
longer-term temporary  housing.40  As a 
result,  hurricane evacuees in Baton 
Rouge made do for an  extended period 
in  established residences and various 
public and private shelters. This social 
response to limited housing stock helped 
to mitigate what could have been be an 





Although less severe than in areas closer 
to the coast,  power  loss and wind 
damage initially  disrupted both wire and 
w i r e l e s s s e r v i c e s w i t h i n E B R P . 
Quantitative data for  describing the 
state of telecommunication in Baton 
Rouge after  Hurricane Katrina, however, 
could not be obtained; such information 
(e.g.  call volumes, fraction of calls lost) 
w a s p e rc e i ve d t o b e p r i v i l e g e d 
commercial information and, thus, a 
matter of competitive advantage 
amongst carriers.  
One wireless carrier,  however, did 
report that  intense overloads occurred 
only  in  the first few days after  Hurricane 
Katrina and the network was fully 
meeting demands within one month 
post-event. Moreover, the same provider 
cited a need for  additional cell sites in 
Baton  Rouge over  the course of the 
following year in order to improve 
coverage and quality  of service in 
response to the changing spatial 
distributions of population. Similar 
increases and growth in coverage was 
also required in EBRP by  Bell South, a 
major  regional wire line provider, to 
meet increased demand post-Katrina.41
Wireless carriers may  have been able 
to recover more quickly  than wire 
carriers through their  use of portable 
cellular  base stations, several of which 
were deployed in EBRP. Qualitative 
information from  a number  of sources 
suggested that displaced people relied 
heavily  on cellular  services, and 
increases in cellular  usage have been 
reported in Katrina-impacted areas, 
including  Baton Rouge.  In  addition, 
some wireless carriers provided special 
outreach services to displaced people 
and to some households (for example, 
free phones and service).42
Overall the telecommunication sector 
in Baton Rouge proved relatively 
resilient, largely, because of its ability  to 
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rapidly  repair  and/or  deploy  auxiliary 
equipment. Comparing the response of 
transportation with telecom systems 
illustrates the importance of flexibility  in 
infrastructure systems, as well as how 
that flexibility  may  correlate with the 
actual technologies used in each system. 
The ability  to quickly  extend or  expand 
capacities had a significant impact on 
system resilience.   
Emergency Services: Adjustments 
by Law Enforcement, Ems, Fire 
Service to Meet Increased Demand
Immediately  after Hurricane Katrina, 
demand for  emergency  services 
increased dramatically, due to both the 
increase in population and disruptions 
associated with the hurricane. The 
Baton  Rouge Police Department (BRPD) 
handles calls to police within the city  of 
B a t o n  R o u g e : t h e s e n u m b e r e d 
15,000-25,000 per  month in the period 
post-Hurricane Katrina. The East Baton 
Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office (EBRPSO) 
handled calls for  police within the EBRP 
but outside the city  limits; these 
numbered 2,000-3,000 per  month in 
the post-Hurricane Katrina period. State 
police respond primarily  to incidents on 
state highways, which numbered 
approximately  300-400 per month in 
the same period.
Detailed information about each call 
serviced during our study’s period was 
obtained from the BRPD Computer 
Assisted Dispatch (CAD) system, while 
the EBRPSO and state police provides 
only  monthly  total call volumes. Not 
considered in this analysis were the 
thousands of calls for assistance 
originating in New  Orleans, which were 
then routed to state police in Baton 
Rouge, as well as to other law-
enforcement jurisdictions, in the 
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Figure 7: Daily Baton Rouge Police Call Rates
immediate aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina.43 
The daily  volume of BRPD calls 
before, during, and after Hurricane 
Katrina are illustrated in  Figure 7  and 
divided into four classes of law 
enforcement issues: criminal,  alarms, 
traffic related, and other. In general, the 
highest  traffic-call volumes occurred on 
Fridays,  whereas the lowest call volumes 
occurred on Sundays with a similar, if 
less dramatic, pattern also visible for 
criminal calls.  Hurricane Katrina is 
identified in the time series by  a  sudden 
spike in alarm  calls that resulted from 
alarm systems being disrupted by  the 
storm. This spike was followed by  an 
increase over the next two days of both 
criminal and traffic related police calls. 
Figure 7  also shows a similar,  but 
smaller, effect  on alarm  and criminal 
call volumes (but not traffic calls) 
observed in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Rita on September 25, 2005. 
Monthly  totals of calls serviced by  the 
sheriff’s office increased in  a  similar 
fashion to EBRPD calls. Calls to state 
p o l i c e i n S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 a l s o 
increased, but the number of calls, 
particularly  for incidents on I-10 and 
U.S. 61  (a  major  road running north-
south through  Baton Rouge), continued 
to increase in October and November 
2005 not  dropping back to near baseline 
levels until February of 2006.
The demand for EMS and fire service 
also increased. Figure 8 illustrates 
monthly  total calls for all three 
emergency  services in the city  of Baton 
Rouge. In September 2005,  BRPD calls 
increased 24 percent,  EMS Calls 
increased 49 percent,  and fire calls 
increased 39 percent, while population 
was up by  about 40 percent (on average) 
during the same month. Complicating 
this picture, a  majority  of calls directed 
to the fire department, both before and 
after  Katrina, were for  EMS assistance. 
Non-emergency  ambulance service 
p r o v i d e d b y  p r i v a t e c o m p a n i e s 
experienced an increase in  demand 
within Baton Rouge, as well as being 
contracted by  FEMA for evacuation 
response in New Orleans. By  the 
MYERS, TERRORIST TO TYRANT 17
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VII, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Figure 8: Monthly Emergency Service Calls in the City of Baton Rouge
beginning of 2006, demand for  all 
emergency  services had dropped to 
about 6  percent above pre-Katrina 
levels,  in proportion to the remaindering 
evacuee population. 
Meeting this increase in demand for 
emergency  services required a massive 
redeployment  of personnel.  During  the 
first  week after Hurricane Katrina, all 
600 BRPD officers operated under  an 
emergency  schedule with  staff officers 
reassigned to patrol duty, twelve-hour 
shi f ts , seven days a week, and 
cancellation of scheduled leave. These 
twelve-hour shifts continued for 
approximately  two months. Similarly, 
sheriff’s officers were redeployed so that 
there were approximately  200 officers 
assigned to patrol duty  in the weeks 
following Katrina, as compared to 130 
officers pre-Katrina. No information 
could be obtained on state police staff 
levels.
The number  of BRPD officers on duty 
at any  given time was calculated based 
on the number  of individual officers 
responding to calls each  day, according 
to CAD records during the periods when 
eight- and twelve-hour shifts were in 
effect (Figure 9). Immediately  after 
Hurricane Katrina, the number of 
responding officers almost doubled, but 
during the subsequent  two month 
period of twelve-hour shifts, the number 
of officers on duty  returned to this peak 
value only  on Fridays, the day  of the 
week with peak demand. Even during 
full emergency  deployment, it was only 
possible to field one-quarter to one-third 
of the total number  of BRPD officers at 
any  given time. These numbers reflect 
the fact that officers were needed to staff 
police stations and perform other duties 
in  addition to respond to calls. As shift 
schedule was not known, the number of 
sheriff's officers on patrol prior  to and 
post-Katrina were estimated from the 
reported number of officers on duty, 
with  error bars representing  high  and 
low estimates corresponding to eight- 
and twelve-hour shift lengths (Figure 9). 
Although their total number  was not 
determined, law  enforcement personnel 
from  other jurisdictions, university 
police, and National Guard troops 
provided additional security  services in 
Baton  Rouge. For example Louisiana 
State University  Police (LSUP) assisted 
in  the security  effort  at the field hospital 
set up at the LSU Pete Maravich 
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Figure 9: Law Enforcement Officers on Duty
Assembly  Center (PMAC), as well as 
responded to calls on campus. Over 200 
National Guard also accompanied police 
on routine patrols and assisted with aid 
distribution in the hurricane’s first 
weeks.44 
The EMS and fire department in 
Baton Rouge also needed to adjust 
staffing to meet the increased demand 
for services. At the time of Hurricane 
Katrina, EMS personnel totaled about 
117. Hurricane Katrina saw the initiation 
of twelve-hour shifts (with no time off), 
and qualified office staff was redeployed 
to answer  calls. Ambulances were also in 
limited supply, with the entire available 
fleet, approximately  thirty  vehicles, 
brought immediately  into service.  Fire 
department staff were also redeployed: 
BRFD had a total staff of 575 fire 
fighters prior to Hurricane Katrina and a 
minimum of 107  fire fighters were on 
shift  at any  time; immediately  after  the 
event, that number increased to a range 
from 175 to 180 on shift. 
Shortages of staff and conditions such 
as loss of power,  telephone service, and 
road congestion may  have decreased the 
ability  of emergency  services to receive 
and process requests for aid. Although 
such  effects may  be difficult  to measure 
individually, performance data can 
indicate if emergency  services had 
become less effective. 
A common measure of emergency 
service performance is response time. 
Daily  averages of response times for 
EBRP calls are shown in Figure 10. 
Response times for  high priority  calls 
(Code 3), which  make up 3  percent of 
the total,  and Code 2  calls, which make 
up 30 percent of the total,  stayed 
reasonably  steady  after Hurricane 
Katrina – although occasional high-daily 
averages may  have become more 
frequent. Response time of low priority 
calls (Code 1), which are 67  percent of 
the total, gradually  increased by  two to 
three minutes (10-14 percent) in the 
months after  Hurricane Katrina. This 
increase was due to longer hold times 
(time from  operators receiving a call, 
until an officer is dispatched), while the 
travel time (from dispatch to arrival on 
the scene) stayed fairly constant. 
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Figure 10: BRPD Response Time Averaged by Day
This finding suggests that, although a 
backlog  of low-priority  calls developed 
during periods of high demand, the 
ability  of EBRPD to respond to calls was 
not noticeably  compromised by  the 
conditions in Baton Rouge. Similarly, in 
September of 2005, total EMS call time 
actually  went down to a low of thirty-
four minutes (as compared to a usual 
range prior to Hurricane Katrina of 
t h i r t y - s i x  t o f o r t y  m i n u t e s ) – 
presumably  as a  result of a  larger 
number  of staff and ambulances in 
service.  Overall, emergency  services 
personnel were able to redistribute 
personnel and resources, prioritize 
response to more serious incidents,  and 
compensate for conditions that might 
have impacted their  effectiveness (such 
as traffic congestion) so that the quality 
of service remained fairly  constant after 
Katrina – even  as the burden of 
response increased markedly.
In this respect, emergency  service 
systems at all levels – police, fire 
services, and ambulance – showed a 
remarkable ability  to cope with and 
adapt to the changing situation in EBRP. 
There is little doubt that, in these 
systems, human capital was a main 
source for resilience; this included the 
ability  of leadership to make timely 
decisions in increasing personnel and 
redeploying office personnel to field 
duty  and the personal flexibility 
d e m o n s t r a t e d b y  s e c u r i t y  a n d 
emergency response professionals. 
Public Health Sector: Supplements 
to Overwhelmed Hospital System
The hospital system  in Baton Rouge was 
particularly  strained after Hurricane 
Katrina. In addition to an increase in 
population and the resulting  increase in 
those in need of medical services, many 
evacuees from New Orleans had greater-
than-average medical needs. 
To meet this demand there were 
approximately  1,770 hospital beds in five 
acute care hospitals within EBRP. 
Several smaller hospitals in the parish 
brought this count of staffed hospital 
beds up to approximately  2,000. Before 
Hurricane Katrina, hospital occupancy 
in Baton Rouge was close to the 
Louisiana average of 60 percent, 
providing approximately  800 free 
beds.45  An additional 800 beds for 
evacuees were provided for  a two-week 
period at  the LSU PMAC. In the first two 
months after  Katrina, reports to the 
parish Emergency  Operations Center 
(EOC) indicate that occupancy  at EBRP 
hospitals was up to 96  percent.46  By 
February  2006 the occupancy  of acute 
care hospitals was down to 63 percent, 
according to the Louisiana Hospital 
Association, only  slightly  above the pre-
Katrina rates. 
During the first week after Katrina, 
5,700 patients were treated at  the PMAC 
field hospital, and 2,500 evacuees were 
treated by  one acute care hospital with 
about 430 beds. Estimates of the total 
number of displaced people treated in 
EBRP hospitals were not  available, but 
the value of 2,500 treated in one 
hospital,  when scaled proportionately  to 
the total number of hospital beds in 
EBRP, gives a  value of approximately 
12,500 persons – who may  have been 
treated at hospitals during the first  week 
after  Katrina. This number gives a total 
of approximately  18,000 displaced 
people treated within the parish in that 
period. 
Although a  large number, this 18,000 
represents less than 10 percent of the 
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total population of evacuees. For 
comparison,  approximately  30 percent 
of a population of 3,700 evacuated 
( s o m e f r o m t h e N e w O r l e a n s 
superdome) after Katrina to Fort Worth, 
TX required medical care within the first 
week, though only  1  percent required 
inpatient care; similarly  a  sampling  of 
those evacuated to Louisiana shelters 
indicates that over 34  percent required 
immediate medical care.47 
Once the acute medical needs of 
evacuees had been addressed and the 
population began to disperse, demand 
for  medical services decreased in 
proportion to population. For  instance 
one hospital reported a 9 percent 
increase in emergency  room visits as of 
February  2006, when the population 
was also about 9 percent elevated.
In extreme cases,  a crude measure of 
medical care quality  is the level of 
mortality  in the population served. 
Limited information was available on 
mortality  in post-Katrina Baton Rouge. 
The number of monthly  deaths observed 
within EBRP was reported as part of a 
special study  released by  the Louisiana 
division of health  and hospitals.48  The 
report presents deaths tabulated by  the 
parish  of permanent residence, so values 
for EBRP may  not, particularly  in the 
first months after Katrina,  reflect 
mortality  among evacuee populations 
residing temporarily  in EBRP. However, 
the reported mortality  rate in EBRP 
remained close to constant pre- and 
post-Hurricane Katrina. This result 
suggests that supplementary  aid in the 
form of field hospitals,  as well as the 
efforts of hospitals to increase the 
quantity  of care provided, were 
sufficient to prevent any  serious changes 
in the quality  of medical services 
available to the local population post-
Katrina.
SOME CHALLENGES FOR 
ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE
Investigation of the performance of 
critical infrastructure systems in Baton 
Rouge after Hurricane Katrina provides 
insights into the nature of resilient 
infrastructure, the challenges faced in 
applying simulation to promoting 
resilience,  and the need for  adequate 
infrastructure performance data  in any 
such  attempt.  In this last section, we 
discuss the CIPDSS validation results in 
terms of promoting critical resilience 
infrastructure, the applicable policy 
lessons learned from this process, and 
questions for further research.  
Identification of Systems-Level 
Needs from CIPDSS Validation
As previously  observed, the movement 
of evacuees out  of Baton Rouge was not 
known when the CIPDSS simulation was 
performed, thereby, creating a high 
degree of uncertainty  about the levels of 
stress placed on critical infrastructures 
over  time. In addition, the CIPDSS 
model methodology  was not, at  the time, 
designed for  scenarios involving 
dynamic population within a  single 
model run. The Baton Rouge simulation, 
instead, assumed that peak population, 
taken as 1 .5 t imes the original 
population, remained in Baton Rouge 
permanently.  Such static assumptions 
have the value of providing an estimate 
of the maximum  impact possible in 
Baton  Rouge, although the now-known 
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decrease in  population over  time makes 
it  clear that this is an overestimate of 
actual effects. Given past experiences 
w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t p o p u l a t i o n 
displacements in the U.S. (e .g . 
Hurricane Andrew) and their  likelihood 
in  the future,  the ability  to simulate 
population movement and resulting 
impacts across all infrastructures may 
be critical in understanding regional 
resilience.  While the basic ability  to 
simulate effects of changing population 
has reportedly  been enhanced in model 
updates, much remains unexplored 
about the behavior driving population 
movement. Indeed the ability  to 
understand and model this and other 
behavioral and social factors (for 
example,  institutional trust) is a major 
area for improvement in the analysis of 
infrastructure resilience. 
 The CIPDSS simulation of the Baton 
Rouge road system  highlighted the need 
for appropriate model inputs for the 
characterization of infrastructure 
performance. The quality  of road 
function in the simulation was described 
by  the value of the Trip Duration 
Multiplier. Comparison of the Trip 
Duration Multiplier observed in Baton 
Rouge to CIPDSS predictions indicated 
that evening rush hour  travel times were 
reasonably  predicted, but  trip duration 
was severely  overestimated during 
morning  rush hour periods. This 
overestimation resulted, in large part, 
from default input parameters that 
prescribed a  higher  number of trips 
initiated during the morning compared 
to evening rush hours,  opposite to what 
was observed in Baton Rouge. In 
addition,  comparison with  the Baton 
Rouge Travel Demand Model indicates 
that the total number of trips in each 
d a y  w a s o v e r e s t i m a t e d . S u c h 
shortcomings could be easily  remedied 
given sufficient data at the time of 
analys is , but as many  of these 
parameters are unique to individual 
metropolitan areas, collecting data  in 
the timeframe required for a rapid 
simulation is challenging.
The CIPDSS simulation of electrical 
power usage in Baton Rouge neglected 
to take into account seasonality  in 
electricity  demand, which in Baton 
Rouge is a significant issue. The model 
input also prescribed a gradual 20 
percent increase in load over  six 
months, whereas in reality  an 11  percent 
increase occurred in the first  month  and 
disappeared as population dispersed. In 
addition, the dependence of the 
electrical supply  system on the 
availability  of fuels (coal, oil, and gas) 
and on transportation systems for their 
delivery  was not  reflected in the CIPDSS 
model at the time. Although loss of fuel 
supply  did not impact electricity 
generation in Baton Rouge, the 
importance of this dependency  is 
highlighted by  the disruptions and price 
increases resulting from the breakdown 
in transportat ion of fuels af ter 
Hurricane Katrina. These shortfalls in 
the simulation process all  highlight one 
of the fundamental difficulties of both 
broad efforts at infrastructure modeling 
in  general and analysis of resilience in 
specific: defining the boundaries of the 
systems considered. The analysis must 
be limited to a scope which is feasible 
with  available resources but also must 
include all  major  interactions, which will 
vary  with the scenario considered and 
may  include aspects of both the natural 
environment and other  infrastructure 
systems.
Telecommunications is one of the 
more complex views in the CIPDSS 
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model but because of the scarcity  of data 
for comparison many  of the abilities and 
computational methods of this sector 
could not  be validated.  Much of the 
telecom simulation was dependent on 
constant values that dictated the length 
and severity  of phone service overload. 
A ninety-day  period was prescribed in 
CIPDSS for Wire-line and Wireless 
Availability to return to pre Katrina 
levels.  Limited data from Baton Rouge 
indicates that phone service returned to 
pre-Katrina levels more quickly  than 
e x p e c t e d . I n t h i s c a s e l i m i t e d 
information, due in large part to the 
private ownership of this critical 
infrastructure, prevented a meaningful 
analysis of infrastructure performance. 
This is not an incidental problem in 
critical infrastructure modeling  for 
resilience.
In contrast, the models of the 
emergency  services sectors in CIPDSS 
were relatively  simple, and much data 
was available for validation, particularly 
f r o m l a w e n f o r c e m e n t . O f f i c e r 
Availability Ratio could not be directly 
validated. Instead an input to that 
variable, the Law Enforcement Service 
R a t e , w a s e v a l u a t e d . C I P D S S 
significantly  underestimated the rate at 
which police calls were answered in 
Baton Rouge.  The model also 
underestimated EMS Response during 
the first five weeks of the scenario.  In 
both cases, underestimation was largely 
due to calculations that  too heavily 
weighted the influence of telephone 
service and traffic congestion on the 
ability  of emergency  services to receive 
and respond to calls. This reflects the 
noted underestimation of the level of 
service within the road and telecom 
systems describing the impact of these 
conditions on emergency  service 
effectiveness,  which may  have been too 
pessimistic. But it  also reflects an 
analytical gap: the diff iculty  in 
imagining and, thus, accounting for 
responsiveness in a system, as well as 
social mitigation and human capital 
interventions at various levels.  That is, 
in addition to shortcomings in the 
calculation of emergency  service rates 
( w h i c h  w a s k n o w n t o C I P D S S 
developers but not able yet to be 
remedied at the time of analysis),  the 
model did not allow for  the possibility  of 
extra personnel to compensate for lost 
effectiveness due to traffic, telecom, or 
other conditions.  As a result  CIPDISS 
p r e d i c t e d l o n g w a i t  t i m e s a n d 
unanswered calls for all emergency 
services, which were not observed in 
Baton  Rouge. This suggests that a more 
sophisticated emergency  services model 
might be required which takes into 
consideration the factors (among others) 
that we have outlined here. But  it also 
demonstrates the extreme difficulty  of 
predicting results from even relatively 
s i m p l e i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n 
infrastructure sectors (e.g. delays to 
police response due to traffic, loss of 
EMS calls due to limited telephone 
service) in the absence of empirical data 
and the virtues of marrying empirical 
with qualitative analysis,  as Sandia 
National Laboratories’ Energy  and 
Systems Analysis Infrastructure,  A 
Framework for Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience Analysis has suggested.49
Hospital occupancy  rate or Bed 
Utilization was underestimated at the 
initiation of the CIPDSS simulation,  due 
to the assumption of 85 percent 
occupancy  (more typical of a city  larger 
than Baton Rouge), but it was correctly 
predicted that hospitals would reach and 
stay  at maximum occupancy  for several 
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months. However,  because the model 
did not include patients representing 
sick or injured evacuees, the number of 
those Treated in  the hospital system 
w i t h i n t h e f i r s t w e e k w a s 
underestimated by  as much as a factor 
of 8.  This represents a failure to 
consider that  evacuees were potentially 
at greater  risk of illness, injury, and 
infectious disease through demographic 
factors (e.g. the elderly) as well as 
exposure to flood water and the stress of 
evacuating. Subsequently, Treated was 
overestimated as actual population 
decreased sharply  in Baton Rouge,  but 
not  in the simulation. The model did 
correctly  predict  the need for an 
i n c r e a s e i n b e d c a p a c i t y  o f 
approximately  1,000 beds, but  did not 
d i f ferent iate between the rapid 
deployment of emergency  medical 
facilities and the permanent expansion 
of the hospital system.  Additionally, 
mortality  rates calculated by  CIPDSS are 
higher than those observed in  Baton 
Rouge, due to the projected effects of 
longer wait  times for ER treatment and 
lower staff to patient ratios. ER 
treatment rates within  CIPDSS is 
estimated based on a measure of 
effectiveness in a similar fashion as for 
emergency  services, and likewise 
effectiveness appears to have been 
underest imated resul t ing in an 
overestimate of mortality. At issue here 
again are two challenges already 
identified: the need to integrate human 
and social factors with analysis of the 
infrastructure system and the difficulty 
of est imating the magnitude of 
interactions between infrastructure 
components which  may  not have been 
previously observed or quantified.  
Challenges in Simulation 
Modeling from CIPDSS Validation
Despite the extreme stress experienced 
by  infrastructures due to the sudden 
increase in population in  Baton Rouge, 
no serious loss of services occurred.  This 
result was the product  of two factors: the 
limited direct  impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina on Baton Rouge and, conversely, 
the unanticipated and reasonable level 
of resilience demonstrated by  its 
infrastructure through a variety  of 
adaptive processes. 
Given adequate resources and 
manpower,  the hospital and emergency 
service systems were able to respond 
readily, provided that they  were 
supplemented by  temporary  aids and 
expedients (such as the PEMAC field 
h o s p i t a l ) a n d l o n g e r s h i f t s f o r 
emergency  service workers, enabling 
them  to meet a  surge in demand beyond 
their usual capacity. Similarly,  wireless 
telephone service providers were also 
responsive,  able to deploy  portable 
wireless equipment to meet increased 
demand, which resulted in relatively 
short  service interruptions given the 
magnitude of the changes in system 
load. In fact, this rapid response 
appeared to accelerate preexisting 
trends towards increased use of wireless 
service. 
The power  grid, often  considered a 
tightly  coupled and relatively  brittle 
infrastructure system, exhibited excess 
capacity  in Baton Rouge to meet the 
unusual but relatively  small increase in 
demand from higher  populations. The 
stress on the road system  proved to be 
the least manageable challenge, given a 
fixed supply  of service available, a 
system close to capacity  prior to Katrina, 
and a  limited infrastructure and social 
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acceptance of mass transit  alternatives. 
As a result,  despite the best efforts of 
infrastructure managers, there was little 
to be done to address increased 
congestion and longer  travel times post-
Katrina, conditions which only  abated as 
extra population dispersed. Even though 
many  infrastructure sectors were 
successful in managing the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in Baton Rouge, 
almost  all described challenges and 
lessons learned, and, under more 
extreme or different stresses, more 
damaging outcomes were certainly 
possible. Conversely,  efforts to increase 
resilience might expand upon and 
enhance existing coping ability  and 
focus on enabling systems to function 
acceptably  under a broad range of 
conditions. 
Although tools like CIPDSS can in 
principle contribute to a  more orderly 
and efficient  deployment of services and 
provide insight into effective adaptation 
strategies to increase resilience, 
val idation of the model against 
observations in Baton Rouge reveals 
some challenges facing such efforts. 
These challenges are particularly 
daunting when trying to develop 
modeling systems that can provide a 
broad view  for the management of many 
interdependent infrastructure systems. 
The most immediate challenge is 
choosing the appropriate goals and 
methodology  for a modeling tool – a 
problem evident  in the fact that the 
degree of complexity  of model sectors 
within  CIPDSS varies widely,  is 
influenced by  the priorities of the model 
developers, and is not  always in accord 
with  the importance of the sector during 
a given simulation. For example, the 
electricity  subsector  in CIPDSS is fairly 
simple with a limited number  of 
interdependencies,  but interdependence 
with  this sector is of critical importance, 
as demonstrated by  the impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on energy  supply 
chains.50
Approximately  half of the instances of 
prediction error  observed within the 
simulation of Baton Rouge were due to a 
less than ideal choice of model input, 
with  the rest explained by  omissions or 
l imitat ions in assumptions and 
calculation methods.  The significant 
amount of error caused by  model inputs 
highlights the fact  that large amounts of 
scenario or location-specific information 
is required to deploy  CIPDSS or  any 
model of infrastructure resilience with 
accuracy. This is particularly  a challenge 
for rapid deployment of modeling tools. 
To address this, data on metropolitan 
regions of interest can be pre-compiled 
or more model behaviors can be 
parameterized, although both measures 
involve a trade-off with the specificity  of 
the model scenario. One potential 
approach to addressing this need for 
reliable and validated inputs for various 
infrastructure sectors might be to obtain 
information from  the wealth of existing 
location-specific infrastructure models, 
for example the Baton Rouge travel 
demand model.
A shortfall observed throughout the 
CIPDSS sectors involved in the Baton 
Rouge simulation was particularly 
noticeable in the telephone subsector. 
Many  of the computations of the 
telecom model had little impact  on end 
results because scenario-specific 
constant values largely  determined the 
model’s behavior. These inputs were 
used to produce reasonable results 
during the process of rapid deployment 
in  large part  because the model was not 
originally  designed with population 
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fluctuation in mind as a  driving force for 
a scenario.  Use of population as a 
driving force would,  however, require 
the ability  to predict the population 
dynamics of a given scenario from 
limited data, and such modeling of 
human behavior possesses its own basic 
and technical challenges. This reliance 
on choice of constants to produce 
reasonable results also reflects the 
extreme difficulty  of predicting the 
needs of users of a simulation model 
intended to be applied to a variety  of 
very different scenarios. 
Another  difficulty  was the estimation 
of interdependencies where, in many 
cases,  the strength of the interactions 
being modeled where overestimated. 
This demonstrated a particular need for 
calibration and validation of the 
functions and calculations that describe 
interdependencies in CIPDSS. A 
shortfall exists in basic knowledge about 
t h e b e h a v i o r  o f i n t e r a c t i n g 
infrastructures that can only  be 
overcome through the collection of 
sufficient performance data from a 
variety  of stressful and crisis conditions 
across a  representative selection of 
metropolitan areas.  
Lastly,  maintaining consistency  of 
assumptions between model sectors, 
often programmed and set up for 
analysis by  different operators,  can  also 
be a challenge. For example,  the Baton 
Rouge simulation assumed that growth 
takes place in road capacity  over a six-
month period, but the number of police 
officers over the same period is static. 
These and other  challenges in 
p r o m o t i n g r e s i l i e n c e t h r o u g h 
s i m u l a t i o n - b a s e d a n a l y s i s a r e 
summarized in  Table 2.  Both technical 
and conceptual difficulties are presented 
along with new directions in which 
solutions may  be found in the arenas of 
research, implementation, and policy. It 
is important to recall that  the Baton 
Rouge scenario did not exercise many 
important  capabilities of the CIPDSS 
model and, thus, that all model 
components may  display  a similar  mix 
of soft spots and promising successes, as 
those examined in this study. Hence, 
comparison of modeling efforts with real 
world data is a necessary  step in 
bringing CIPDSS or any  similar  model to 
maturity, but must  also be an ongoing 
process. Improvements to the model 
identified by  this analysis have largely 
been implemented in subsequent 
revisions.  However, shortfalls are still 
expected in applying the updated model 
to new scenarios. Development of 
comprehensive and multi-component 
modeling systems in a fashion so as to 
provide accurate predictions to guide 
resilience planning is inevitably  a 
continuous process of refinement. 
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Table 2: Summary of Challenges in Use of Modeling to Promote Resilience
ISSUE POTENTIAL SOLUTION
Research 
Goals and methodology of modeling tools vary 
with scenario and concerns of the user. 
Broad interdisciplinary input needed from all infrastructure 
sectors and stakeholders to define analysis needs and develop 
capabilities.
Population dynamics and other social factors are 
important to critical infrastructure resilience; tools 
for understanding such issues may not exist.
R&D is needed to produce social and behavioral models 
addressing infrastructure resilience and to integrate them 
with engineering models.
Resilience of critical infrastructures varies widely 
depending on factors such as ability to bring in 
supplemental resources and excess capacity.
Measures of infrastructure resilience must take into account 
the mechanisms by which systems attempt to maintain 
output and the circumstances under which coping is not 
possible.
The nature and magnitude of interdependence 
between critical infrastructures is largely 
unknown.
Empirical data on infrastructure interdependency is needed 
across many infrastructures and stressors. As threats may be 
rare or unprecedented, in some cases broad input from 
experts is the only means to understand interdependencies. 
Implementation 
Difficult to maintain consistency of assumptions 
across large and complex models.
Modeling and analysis efforts must be well coordinated to 
keep consistency across model components. 
Large quantities of geographic or situation-specific 
information are necessary for simulations, this is 
particularity challenging for rapid analysis. 
Data may be pre-compiled or harvested from existing 
infrastructure models. Attention must be given to geographic 
variation in infrastructure characteristics. 
 Importance of a given interdependency varies 
with   scenario.
Must account for all major interdependencies, considering 
perspective of all stakeholders, including interactions with the 
natural environment. 
Policy 
Infrastructure performance data may not be 
available because it is not collected or it is 
proprietary.
Protocols for routine collection of data and additional 
mechanisms for access to proprietary data are needed. 
Alternatively, incentives should encourage private 
infrastructures to analyze and report on their proprietary 
data from a resilience perspective. 
Extensive prior planning and coordination is 
needed for resilience; particularly when a crisis 
cuts across multiple infrastructures and 
stakeholders.
 Community-based assessments of resilience should be 
promoted, possibly with additional funding to address 
identified challenges 
Sophisticated analysis is needed for development 
of local, as well as national, policies and plans. 
However, sophisticated analysis tools (i.e., CIPDSS) 
and experts required for their use have limited 
availability.   
A route for analytical support must be developed so that 
critical infrastructure modeling expertise is available at a local 
level. One possible route: building on pre- existing 
relationships of local infrastructure representatives and 
emergency response and planning authorities through 
regional intelligence fusion centers. 
Inelastic systems, which are least resilient, must 
have greater redundancy and more advanced 
planning and management to optimize use of 
existing resources. 
Otherwise unneeded redundancy may justify public support 
(e.g. tax incentives) if it increases resilience. Everyday services 
that provide redundancy in a crisis should be encouraged 
(e.g. public transportation, pedestrian walkways). 
Sophisticated tools should be utilized to manage systems 
with limited capacity, (e.g. enhanced ITS systems to provide 
alternative routing.
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CONCLUSION: 
Future Directions in Resilience 
Modeling and Data Collection
Resilience is a  fundamental goal for 
critical infrastructure systems. Fostering 
r e s i l i e n c e i s b y  n e c e s s i t y  a n 
interdisciplinary  effort  involving 
expertise from  subject-matter  experts 
across infrastructure sectors, as well as 
knowledge from far  outside these fields. 
While the resilience of individual 
infrastructures is a focus of significant 
attention  by  system  managers, a 
resilient  interdependent “system  of 
systems” which comprises modern 
societies’ critical infrastructure is less 
often considered, and generally  only  by 
a small number of academics or 
government analysts. 
The collection of performance-
monitoring data is vital in the analysis 
and promotion of infrastructure 
resilience. It  allows for operational 
adjustments during crises, and helps 
validate and direct research and 
m o d e l i n g s t u d i e s s u p p o r t i n g 
preparation  and planning for future 
crises. It  enables accurate after-action 
analysis of natural disasters and other 
hazards and aids in estimating the level 
o f r e s i l i e n c e d e m o n s t r a t e d b y 
infrastructures and the success of steps 
taken to promote resilience. This data  is 
also useful in understanding the nature 
and strength of interdependence 
between various infrastructures,  which, 
while identifiable with  knowledge of a 
system, may  only  be apparent in their 
true magnitude when systems are 
stressed. 
The choice of appropriate measures 
of infrastructure performance to 
indicate resilience is also important. 
Existing measures of performance are a 
starting point and can be considered in a 
resilience framework (i.e., in Baton 
Rouge, these included such items as 
response times, relative travel time, 
mortality, number of customers without 
phone or electrical service, etc.). These 
types of information are currently 
collected, largely  for short term 
o p e r a t i o n a l a d j u s t m e n t s ( e . g . 
redeployment  of personnel) as well as 
longer term performance monitoring. 
This data is, however, not  generally 
analyzed from the perspective of 
promoting resilience, and such efforts 
may  require new methods of analysis 
outside the realm of infrastructure 
manager  expertise. Such  efforts may 
i n c l u d e , f o r i n s t a n c e , c o m p l e x 
consideration of threatening events, 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s w i t h  o t h e r 
infrastructures, and impact of human 
behavior on systems performance. In 
this paper,  we identified five dimensions 
that infrastructure planners and 
emergency  managers might consider  in 
their  efforts to ensure infrastructure 
resilience in  their  community. These 
include redundancy  of services, 
responsiveness to stressors, elasticity  for 
expansion, socially-mediated mitigation, 
and adaptive behavior of human capital. 
In the area of infrastructure 
performance and resilience, simulation-
based analysis, as exemplified in this 
work by  CIPDSS, is needed.  Such 
a n a l y s i s m a y  e n c o m p a s s b r o a d 
perspect ives , inc luding detai led 
information on each infrastructure and 
its behavior, as well as interactions 
between infrastructures, and the 
economic, public health, or social effects 
of changes and disruptions. As has been 
d e m o n s t r a t e d b y  t h i s w o r k , 
infrastructure performance data  is 
critical to accurate and successful 
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modeling of infrastructures and in 
particularly  of interdependences. 
C o n t i n u e d w o r k o n b o t h 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y  m o d e l i n g a n d 
infrastructure performance data 
collection is expected to greatly  enhance 
the knowledge base required to increase 
infrastructure resilience. 
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Letter to the Editor
Security for Artisans: A Reflective Practitioner’s View of Today’s Security Professional 
and the Protection Business
January 7, 2011
Security  is receptive to scientific advance, but is no field for scientists to dominate. The 
exigencies of protection are too fluid and the stakes too high for  submitting one's 
livelihood, assets,  or life to rigid metrics and laboratory-grade theories that  fall apart on 
first  contact with mortal hazard. On the other hand, security  is no long-term home for 
artists, either. Not that the protective world need be inhospitable to creativity  or 
innovation – particularly  if these produce desired protection on time and within 
ambient resource constraints. However, the artist's highest  aspiration to be and do 
something unique will find a better home elsewhere. In the protection business, it is not 
only  useful but necessary  to be able to replicate and commoditize one's highest 
achievement, to spread it widely  and often without taking credit for it. In  this context, 
die-hard artists will surely  look to greener  pastures more befitting  their  egos and 
temperaments. Where does that leave us, then,  if security  is neither art  nor  science and 
if security welcomes visitors from both camps but offers a home to neither?
Security at its best is  a home for artisans.  It  is one of those hybrid disciplines whose 
highest  expressions derive from synthesis,  from blending theory  and innovation 
together and then applying the mixture with gusto and finesse to situations where 
success may  occasionally  surface but where failure is unmistakable and fatal to people, 
institutions, or careers. Security  is no place for  the faint of heart, for  the indecisive, for 
the chronically  risk averse. It can be a natural fit,  however,  for defenders, pragmatic 
idealists, and masters of the calculated risk.  
A first-rate security  practitioner takes the pains of a fine craftsman – without giving 
the pains of a technical expert or temperamental artist – and applies skills that  require 
not  only  knowledge but some level of apprenticeship. This practitioner takes enough 
pride in mastery  of the discipline to keep honing skills that improve the way  he or she 
practices the craft. Security  professionals at the top of their game do for colleagues and 
neophytes what others did for them:  teach, share, question, explain, and improve. They 
resist  the temptation to hoard knowledge or  mask ignorance. Some are blunt. Others are 
tactful. Some are didactic and prolix. Others are laconic, only  answering questions 
rather than volunteering information. All the pros have successes under their belt, as 
well as misfires it pains them to remember. The good ones will tell you  about both. The 
great ones will have one or  more whoppers in the failure column. When they  talk about 
those,  they  remember  what they  learned from their mistakes, how  they  did better next 
time.  
Security  professionals are as frustrated or stymied as anyone else. They  learn to make 
peace with  an imperfect world and navigate the uncertain waters that raise them  high 
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2one day, only  to submerge them the next day. Over  time, security  professionals learn to 
take vicissitudes in graceful stride. They  learn to anticipate adverse consequences, and 
this knowledge carries over into organizational life.  They  see it  coming.  Ideally, they 
dodge the blow. When dodging is no option, at least they brace for the punch.  
Security  professionals put some distance between themselves and others. It keeps 
them  objective and creates more room for maneuver,  more reaction time. Most of the 
time, Security  (as a function or department) is no one's best friend. Often, though, 
Security  is their only  friend. Security  people know  they  get paid to try  where others run 
or hide.  Part of their job is not just  what  they  do under  routine conditions, but what they 
are prepared to do when things go bad. 
Security  people may  have ambitions,  but they  must learn to keep them in check. 
Crime pays better. So do the kinds of jobs that  require more ethical flexibility. 
Organizational dynamics often put security  practitioners at odds with some employee 
populations more than others. Fortunately, the world keeps serving up just enough 
danger to remind most organizations why they have, and keep, security on the payroll.  
Security  at  its best  keeps spectacular losses from happening. This makes its work 
unspectacular and its consummate practitioners relatively  unheralded. Only  the 
professionals know  among their ranks or just between themselves. And when they  craft 
a worthy  defense or foil an otherwise devastating attack,  they  know. They  look up. They 
smile. And maybe that's enough.
Nick Catrantzos
www.NoDarkCorners.com
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Preparedness Exercises 2.0:
Alternative Approaches to Exercise Design That Could Make 
Them More Useful for Evaluating – and Strengthening – 
Preparedness
Brian A. Jackson and Shawn McKay
ABSTRACT
Preparedness  exercises  play central roles  in 
both the building and assessment of 
organizational readiness  for future 
incidents.  Though processes  for designing 
a n d e v a l u a t i n g e x e r c i s e s  a r e  w e l l 
established,  there are opportunities  to 
improve the  value of exercises  for 
strengthening preparedness and as tools for 
gathering assessment data. This article 
describe the application of systems 
a n a l y t i c a l a p p r o a c h a d a p t e d f r o m 
engineering that examines response 
operations as systems with potential failure 
modes that could hurt performance at future 
incidents.  This  methodology,  which has been 
applied previously to preparedness 
measurement,  is  explored here as  a tool for 
exercise design to focus it more tightly on 
key potential problem areas and to make it 
easier to use exercise data to  explore 
preparedness for incidents that could differ 
considerably from the specific exercised 
scenario.
INTRODUCTION
Preparedness exercises play  a  significant role 
in  the national  preparedness system.  In  the 
Federal  Emergency  Management  Agency’s 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide-101, 
exercises are identified as a  central element 
of an  area’s effort to refine and execute a 
preparedness plan  as well as contributing  to 
red-teaming  efforts to test plans against 
different sets of assumptions. 1  For  medical 
institutions,  periodic exercising  is part of the 
accreditation  requirements imposed by  the 
Joint  Commission  on  Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations.  For rare types of 
incidents or  large-scale  events, use of 
simulated incidents is viewed as particularly 
important, since emergency  response and 
management  personnel are unlikely  to 
encounter  many  of the challenges associated 
with  such  incidents during  their  day-to-day 
activities.  
The general term  preparedness  exercise 
includes activities that fall over  a  wide range 
of scale,  scope, and complexity. Described in 
detail in  the first  volume of guidebooks 
produced by  the Homeland Security  Exercise 
and Evaluation  Program  (HSEEP),  exercise 
can  range from  the most  basic  of seminar-
type interactions up to full-scale response 
simulations where units, equipment  and 
personnel operate as they  would at a  real 
incident  and volunteers serve in  the role of 
victims requiring  treatment  (Figure 1 
illustrates the range of exercise types, in 
order of increasing complexity).  
Figure 1: Varieties of Discussion-based and 
Operations-based Exercises2
As one component of a  preparedness 
program, exercises of these varied types are 
seen  as a  versatile tool that  can  help 
contribute to achieving a  variety  of different 
goals. Though  taxonomies of exercise 
objectives vary  in  the literature,  most include 
the following:3
• Planning  – Exercises provide a  structure 
to advance planning for  a particular 
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incident  scenario,  identifying  problems and 
explore their solutions in focused way.
• Interagency Coordination  – Exercises 
can  act  as a venue for  members of different 
agencies to meet  and interact,  to build 
relationships that are important  to effective 
coordination  in a  real event,  to identify 
issues potentially  falling in gaps of 
authority,  jurisdiction, etc., to test 
m e c h a n i s m s a n d t e c h n o l o g i e s f o r 
interagency  information  sharing  that might 
seldom  be used in  routine events,  and to 
identify  if there are agencies “missing”  from 
plans that  would be needed at a  large scale 
disaster, accident, or terrorist attack.
• Public Education  – Exercises can  act  as 
an  “event”  that, by  being  covered by  the 
media  and discussed publically, makes it 
possible to teach  the public  about  the 
capabilities of response systems, creates the 
opportunity  to educate them  about 
preparedness actions they  could take, and 
informs them  about  preparedness efforts of 
their local, state, or the federal government.  
• Training  – Exercises can  make it possible 
to expose response staff to rare incidents 
and their  unique demands – rather  than 
their  encountering  them  for  the first  time at 
a  real  emergency.  Such  simulations make it 
possible to teach  responders or  volunteers 
specific tasks, practice  equipment  use,  and 
to learn or  refresh  other  knowledge specific 
to an unusual incident.  
• Evaluation  – Exercises have been used to 
evaluate emergency  preparedness activities 
in  a variety  of ways.   Such  evaluations range 
from  very  broad,  qualitative assessments 
(e.g.,  ensuring all significant  issues were 
considered in  planning) to very  detailed, 
quantitat ive studies (e .g . ,  direct ly 
measuring  the patient throughput of a 
medical  facility).  More elaborate and 
realistic evaluative  exercises have the 
potential to assess not just  that a 
preparedness plan  can  be executed,  but 
how  well it  can  be put  into practice under 
the simulated conditions of the exercise 
scenario.
Given  the effort and expense involved in 
designing  them, a single exercise is 
sometimes expected to pursue some or  all  of 
these goals simultaneously.4  This can  be a 
challenge,  since the different goals suggest 
different  priorities and requirements for 
exercise design  that  can  conflict  with  one 
another.  For  example,  the requirement for 
certain  types of realism  could differ 
considerably  between a  training  exercise and 
a focused evaluation drill.  
The published l i terature contains 
examples of exercises focused on  one or more 
of these goals and demonstrations, to varying 
extents,  of how  exercises can  achieve them.5 
Exercises focused on planning  and training 
can  demonstrate issues that were not 
addressed in  existing  plans and, for  training 
efforts, pre-and post-tests of participants can 
show  changes in their  knowledge.6   In 
contrast, using  exercises as tools for 
evaluating  preparedness has been an area  of 
active research  focus,7 and though  it  is clear 
that  the completion  of an  exercise does 
demonstrate something  about  preparedness, 
it  is not always clear  how  much  – or  exactly 
what – has been demonstrated.8
Some of these challenges follow  from 
existing shortfalls in  the ability  to evaluate 
the preparedness of an  organization  or 
jurisdiction. Though  significant  work has 
been  done to develop methods and tools for 
assessing  preparedness for  specific incident 
types or  to deliver  response capabilities of 
interest,  the ability  to effectively  assess 
whether a  particular response system  will 
perform  well  at  a  future incident  is still 
lacking. 9  Measurement  shortfalls create 
challenges for  designing exercises,  since clear 
– and ideally  measurable – preparedness 
outcomes are as important an  input for 
designing training  exercises as they  are for 
framing  exercises whose purpose is 
evaluation.  
In  a  body  of recent  work,10  we have 
explored an  alternative approach  to 
preparedness assessment  based on  applying 
system  reliability  concepts adapted from 
engineering  to response systems. The 
approach  is based on taking  what those 
systems plan  to be able to do and then 
examining  what could go wrong that  might 
prevent them  from  successfully  delivering the 
planned response capacity  at  a  future 
incident.  We define response reliability  as the 
probability  that a response system  will be 
able to deliver  a  specific level of capability  at 
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a  future incident (e.g.,  the ability  to deliver 
mass care to a  population  of 2,000 people for 
a  period of time). A  highly  reliable system 
would have a  high percentage chance of 
successfully  delivering  a  capability  level, 
while a  low  reliability  one might  be very 
unlikely  to do so. Though  the reliability  of 
response systems is a  characteristic that 
appears to be critical for  understanding 
preparedness from  the national to the local 
level – it  answers the fundamental  question 
the public has about  response systems,  “how 
likely  is it that the system  be able to respond 
successfully  to a  future incident” – it is not a 
factor that is currently assessed.11
Examining preparedness exercises, we see 
the concepts that  come out  of thinking 
through  factors that affect  the reliability  of a 
response system  as having  two potential 
applications:
• First,  the logic underlying the analysis 
of a  response system’s reliability  can 
be applied in  exercise design, 
providing a  systematic design 
approach  that can  increase the insight 
that  can  be gained from  exercises 
across the different  types listed in 
Figure 1.
• Second, if appropriately  designed, 
exercises could be very  effective  tools 
for  measuring  the reliability  of a 
response system  – thereby  improving 
the ability to assess preparedness. 12
We see both  these paths as potential 
opportunities to improve the payoff from  the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t m e n t m a d e b y 
organizations and agencies inside and outside 
government  in  preparedness exercises every 
year. 13 Extending  our  analogy  to engineering 
techniques and methods,  these two 
applications are  similar  to the use of these 
approaches at  both  the design  stage of the 
construction  of a  technical system  – to 
identify  and correct  potential  problems 
before they  occur – and in  testing  and 
evaluation of complete technical systems.
In this paper  we explore these two topics, 
rooted in  our  concept of reliable  response 
systems as one of the key  goals for 
preparedness efforts and a  preferred target 
f o r  p r e p a r e d n e s s e v a l u a t i o n . A f t e r 
introducing response reliability  analysis in 
more detail, we examine the application  of 
both  its methods and results in  exercise 
design, and examine how  the logic of 
reliability  assessment  could contributing  to 
better  exercise design across the range of 
exercise goals.  We will then  turn  to how 
exercises can be used as a  primary  evaluation 
tool  to gather  data  to assess a  response 
system’s reliability.  
OVERVIEW OF RESPONSE 
SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The fundamental  approach  of reliability 
analysis is to evaluate a  response system  and 
plans by  systematically  and, if possible, 
quantitatively  analyzing the events and faults 
that  could prevent  it  from  performing as 
planned.  To evaluate response system 
reliability,  we adapted analytical techniques 
developed in  engineering, specifically  fault 
tree analysis and failure mode, effects,  and 
criticality  analysis (FMECA).14  The basic 
steps of a FMECA analysis are:
• Defining and mapping the response 
system, to identify  the different  parts of 
the response operation  and articulate what 
it  means for  them  to function  well.  For 
example,  incident command at  a  response 
could be mapped as made up of several 
parts,  including  building  situational 
awareness about  the incident, making 
decisions about resource allocation  among 
response functions, and dispatching 
response resources.  The system  diagrams 
used for  reliability  analysis are similar  to 
process maps applied in  other  preparedness 
evaluation efforts. 15  To illustrate the types 
of diagrams involved and provide an anchor 
for  later  discussion of their  application  in 
exercise design,  Figure 2  includes an 
example of a  system  model  for  the incident 
command elements of a  generic  response 
based on  recent  analyses we have 
performed.  Complete  examples are 
available in works previously cited.
• Identifying failure modes  that could 
hurt system performance.  Failure 
modes are defined as “the observable 
manners in  which  a component fails,” 16 
which, for  a  response system, would be the 
ways performance in  different  parts of the 
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response system  would break that  would 
h u r t o v e r a l l s y s t e m  p e r f o r m a n c e . 
Identifying fai lure modes involves 
systematically  inventorying  what  might go 
wrong  in  each  part of the system. In  our 
past  work,  we used “classes”  of failures that 
might  produce the same end result  to 
organize the analysis. For  each  part  of the 
system  we looked for  potential failures in 
four  main  classes: (a)  planning  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  ( b ) e q u i p m e n t a n d 
technology, (c) personnel shortfalls and 
h u m a n e r r o r , a n d ( d )  e x t e r n a l 
environmental  causes. Some events or 
b r e a k d o w n s c o u l d h u r t r e s p o n s e 
performance directly, while others might 
only  do so in  combination with other 
failures. Failure modes can  be presented in 
fault  trees that  show  the range of 
breakdowns that could a f fec t  the 
functioning of an  individual part  of a 
response system.  Figure 3  provides an 
example failure tree for  communications 
between on-scene response units and 
incident  command based our  recent  work, 
which  illustrates the different  classes of 
failure modes. The example is included to 
provide a foundation  for  later  discussion  of 
how  such  trees could be used in  designing 
or evaluating exercises.
• Estimate the  probability of different 
failure modes.  Because there are many 
events that  could hurt  the functioning  of a 
response system, one way  to differentiate 
among  potential failure modes is their 
probability  of occurrence.  All other  things 
equal, failure modes that are more common 
will  be of greater  concern  than  less 
common breakdowns.  There are a variety  of 
ways that failure mode likelihoods can be 
estimated,  ranging from  use of real world 
data  to the systematic elicitation  of expert 
opinion.
• Assess  the effects  and severity of 
different failure modes. The other 
characteristic  that differentiates among 
failure modes is their  severity.  For  FMECA, 
severity  is assessed by  asking  what  the 
effect  of the failure is on  overall system 
functioning  – which  for  a  response system 
would be the ability  of to deliver  the 
response capability  it  is designed to provide 
at  an  incident.  Failure modes can  have a 
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Figure 2: Example Portion of Response System Model, Incident Command Components
variety  of effects, ranging from  complete 
failure of the system  (i.e., termination  of a 
response operation) to minor  reductions in 
capability  or  effectiveness.  For  example, 
destruction of an  emergency  operation 
center  in  the course of an  incident  might 
have very  significant  or  even  response 
terminating effect,  while loss of a  few 
response vehicles to breakdowns would cut 
into response capacity to a smaller extent.
Because the focus of this discussion  is not 
the details of the analysis process but  on  the 
relationship with  exercise design  and 
evaluation,  we will not describe the details of 
each  of the steps. 17  Instead, we will walk 
through  the broader  outcomes of reliability 
analysis that relate most  closely  to the later 
sections discussing exercise design.
As illustrated in  Figure 3,  a  realistic 
response system  will  have a  variety  of failure 
m o d e s t h a t  m i g h t o c c u r  – e . g . , 
communications problems, staff shortages, 
traffic  delays that  limit  dispatching of 
resources – whose effects on  response 
operations and on the effectiveness of the 
activities those operations are tasked with 
carrying  out will vary  in magnitude.  For 
example,  for  delivering food aid to victims 
evacuated from  a  disaster, an  area’s plans 
and preparedness efforts will have some 
theoretical maximum  capacity  to provide 
care. For  ease of discussion,  assume a 
maximum  capacity  to feed 1000  people for 
one week. But  that same system  has a  set  of 
failure modes that  could reduce its 
performance when  its response is activated. 
Coordination  problems between  aid 
organizations and response agencies might 
reduce efficiency,  cutting the maximum  by  10 
percent. Damage to key  infrastructures 
during  the incident  (e.g.,  an  aid storage or 
staging area) might  cause more significant 
reductions.  As a  result, at  an  incident  where 
coordination  broke down  but  everything else 
went  as planned,  the system  would be able to 
feed 900 people for  the required week. At 
another  incident,  where multiple failures 
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Figure 3: Example Failure Tree for Communications Between On-Scene Units & Incident Command
occurred,  its performance would be lower  – 
e.g.,  600  people fed – while at  incidents 
where everything went  perfectly  it  could hit  is 
designed capacity of 1,000.
This type of “what-if”  or  “what might  go 
wrong”  analysis is consistent  with  guidance 
i n  d o c u m e n t s s u c h a s F E M A ’ s 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide that 
plans be evaluated for  adequacy, feasibility, 
and acceptability.18 In  particular,  systematic 
assessment of potential  failure modes, their 
likelihood,  and consequences captures the 
CPG direction  that planners “assess whether 
their  organization  can  accomplish  the 
assigned mission  and critical  tasks by  using 
avai lable resources within  the t ime 
contemplated by the plan” as well as that 
Planners  use both  acceptability  and 
feasibility tests to ensure that the 
mission can  be accomplished with 
available resources, without incurring 
excessive risk regarding personnel, 
equipment, materiel, or  time. They  also 
verify  that risk management procedures 
have identified, assessed, and applied 
control  measures to mitigate operational 
risk  (i.e., the risk associated with 
achieving operational objectives).19 
This later  guidance captures not only  the 
importance of assessing  the probability  and 
consequences of different  failure modes,  but 
approaches to deal with them if they occur.
For  a  real system  with  many  failure modes 
(e.g.,  the failure tree include in  Figure 3  was 
one of more than  twenty  crafted to describe a 
realistic  response system), estimates of the 
probability  and consequences of each  failure 
can  provide the basis for simulations of 
response performance.  Rather than  walking 
through  single cases and examining  how  the 
effects of one failure mode or  another  might 
cut into theoretical response performance, 
Monte Carlo simulations of many  cases can 
be done to better  reflect  how  possible failure 
modes affect  the distribution  of its 
performance. The results can be used to 
calculate the probability  that  the system  will 
perform  at  or  above particular  capacity  levels 
or,  put  in our  terms,  its reliability  for 
responding to incidents of different sizes. 
Illustrative reliability  curves that  show 
those probabilities of success for several 
response systems at  increasingly  demanding 
incidents are shown  in  Figure 4.  The dotted 
line shows a  perfectly  reliable system  – since 
nothing  would ever  go wrong  with  the 
system’s functioning, it will  perform  with  100 
percent  reliability  for any  incident  up to its 
maximum  capacity. The light  line shows a 
relatively  unreliable system, which, although 
designed  to deliver  the same level of capacity, 
in  fact would routinely  perform  much  worse. 
The heavy  line shows a  more robust  system, 
which, though  its reliability  drops off as 
incident  size approaches its maximum 
capacity,  is likely  to perform  well  over  a wide 
range of incidents.  All three systems are of 
comparable reliability  at very  small  incidents, 
where each  has so much  slack capacity  that 
even  the system  with  the most  problems is 
still  likely  to hit  the low  required level  of 
performance.
The number  of failure modes a  system  has, 
the probability  of failure, and the scale of 
failure’s effect on  response performance 
determine the shape of these curves. 
Different types of failures (e.g.,  those with  the 
potential to halt  all response operations 
versus capacity  reducing failures) have 
different effects on  the shape of the curves, 
with  their probability  of occurring affecting 
the scale of their  effect. In  previous work, we 
have demonstrated how  these types of curves 
– including their  shape and the area  under 
them  – can provide a  composite measure of 
preparedness (since they  reflect likely 
performance at the full  range of incidents a 
system  might  be called on  to address)  and as 
yardsticks for  comparing different  potential 
preparedness improvements. Since the area 
under these curves provide a  measure of 
aggregate  performance across different  scale 
incidents,  the amount that different 
preparedness interventions are predicted to 
change that area  can  be used to anchor  cost 
effectiveness comparisons among them.20
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Figure 4: Illustrative Reliability Curves for Response Systems with Different Performance Characteristics
USING THE LOGIC UNDERLYING 
RESPONSE RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT TO DESIGN BETTER 
EXERCISES
In  programmatic guidance from  sources such 
as HSEEP, structured approaches for 
developing exercises and designing  multi-
year,  multi-exercise  programs are laid  out  to 
help frame how  goals should be chosen, 
scenarios designed, and the actual tasks of 
exercise development and execution carried 
out.   For  example,  in  HSEEP,  sequential 
steps and conferences are defined that 
identify  and later  flesh  out the “type,  scope, 
objectives and purpose of the exercise,” 21 and 
the write and assemble the materials required 
for  the exercise itself and evaluating  its 
outcomes. 
Key  steps in  this process – which  shape 
the potential  value that  will  be gained from 
actually  planning and running  the exercise – 
include selection  of the portions of the 
r e s p o n s e s y s t e m  a n d t h e r e s p o n s e 
capabilities that  will  be exercised, the nature 
of the scenario that  will provide the 
foundation  for exercising  those capabilities, 
and how  different  injects or  challenges 
throughout the course of the exercise will 
either  test specific  response functions or 
shape the educational or training experience 
of the participants.  Though  exercise design 
doctrine (e.g.,  the HSEEP documents 
referenced previously)  provide processes for 
carrying  out these design  tasks,  good choices 
of such  key  exercise parameters often  depend 
on  the expertise and experience of the 
planners involved. Furthermore,  particularly 
if multiple organizations are involved whose 
priorities for the exercise differ, there may  be 
significant  divergence among participants 
about  the correct  balances to strike in the 
design process.
In  considering  the exercise design process 
– whether  the central  purpose of the exercise 
is training,  planning, or  one of the others 
identified previously  – the logical elements of 
response reliability  analysis could help to 
inform  the choices made during  that process 
and could help to provide a more common 
baseline to design  scenarios and exercise 
events to meet  the needs of all  involved 
organizations.  
• A  system model for  the response 
operation  of interest  (e.g.,  Figure 2) – by 
mapping  out  the “moving  parts”  in  the 
response and capturing  the full range of 
agencies or  other  organizations which 
w o u l d b e i n v o l v e d i n  r e s p o n d i n g 
successfully  – can  help make sure that  key 
response elements (or  the agencies 
responsible) are not left  out  of an  exercise. 
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B y  p r o v i d i n g  a  “ m a p ”  o n  w h i c h 
participating  organizations can  locate their 
functions within  the response,  such  a  model 
can  help provide a  common basis for 
developing a  scenario that  meets the needs 
of all participants.   
• Clear  failure trees  that identify  what 
might  go wrong with  specific  parts of the 
response (e.g., Figure 3) – whether  because 
a  particular  response activity  inherently  has 
many  failure modes or  because it depends 
on  many  other  parts of the response system 
(and is therefore subject to problems that 
might  arise elsewhere)  – can  help guide 
choices of what  functions to exercise.22 
Having  failure trees available to exercise 
designers can  also help to ensure that key 
failure modes aren’t  left  out  when  exercise 
scenarios are designed,  the injects written 
for  scripted exercises,  or  exercise 
evaluation guides prepared to help record 
the key  informational outcomes from  the 
exercise.  In  combination  with  a  response 
system  model,  failure trees for  a  response 
can  also assist in  accurately  interpreting 
exercise results.  Failure modes can also 
provide a common  language and structure 
for  planners and organizations to negotiate 
about  the specifics of exercise injects or 
events to ensure the organizational 
“pressure points”  of interest to all 
participants are covered.
• Data  on  specific failure modes  observed 
in  the jurisdiction’s past  responses can 
similarly  help identify  key  functions that 
might  benefit  from  focused exercising. 
Though  using past experience to guide such 
choices is already  prominent in  exercise 
design  doctrine,  looking  at what failure 
modes occurred (rather  than  focusing  on 
response functions that  encountered 
problems in  past  incidents)  can help 
designers look  across incident  types and 
build more valuable future exercises.  For 
example,  if in  a  past  chemical weapons 
response exercise serious problems were 
observed in  hazmat response, a  planner 
might  conclude that  another  hazardous 
materials exercise was needed.  But, if the 
root  failure mode that caused those 
problems was in  communications or 
incident  command,  it  might  be possible to 
cover  the necessary  material in  a  very 
different  exercise type, creating the 
opportunity  to explore a very  different 
incident  and advance training  goals more 
broadly.
None of the elements from  response 
reliability  analysis would replace steps in 
existing exercise design  processes. However, 
the structure they  provide for  systematically 
thinking  through  what is involved in  a 
response operation and what could disrupt  it 
can  help to make earlier  steps in the exercise 
design  process more straightforward.  At the 
same time, by  laying  out a  “menu”  of the 
choices faced by  exercise designers – from 
what  to test  to the specific  challenges exercise 
participants could be presented with  as a 
scenario evolved – these tools could help to 
ensure that potentially  valuable details are 
not missed in the course of exercise design.
U S I N G E X E R C I S E S T O E V A L U A T E A 
RESPONSE SYSTEM’S RELIABILITY
Though  the logic of reliability  analysis could 
contribute to exercise design,  using exercises 
as evaluation tools to assess the probability 
and consequences of individual  failure modes 
could contribute to actually  measuring  a 
response system’s reliability  – and,  therefore, 
m a k e e x e r c i s e s m o r e e f f e c t i v e a s 
preparedness evaluation tools.
Actually  assessing  the reliability  of a  real 
response system  requires identifying  what 
failure modes could affect  its performance 
and estimating their  probability  and 
consequences for  response performance.  A 
variety  of strategies might be used to do so, 
ranging  from  practitioner  estimation to 
analysis of performance in  past response 
operations. 23 However, for  assessing  levels of 
preparedness, approaches that do not  rely 
either  on  simple estimates or require waiting 
for  a  disaster  to occur  and a  response 
breakdown  to happen  are more attractive.  As 
a  result, preparedness exercises represent  a 
potentially  attractive opportunity  to gather 
information  on response systems’ reliability 
characteristics.  However,  the ability  of 
exercises to support  this type of assessment 
depends on whether  they  are designed to 
measure the information needed.
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The Design of an Exercise Shapes the 
Information It Can Provide
In  thinking  about exercise design, an  analogy 
to the kinds of testing  and assessment  used in 
engineering  – the field where this type of 
analysis was developed – is useful. Just  as we 
would like exercises to discover  or  assess 
problems that  might affect future responses, 
engineers want to discover  problems in  the 
technologies they  design  and build  so steps 
can  be taken to correct  them  before it 
becomes too costly  to do so. As a result, 
different types of testing  and experiments are 
performed on components of such  systems or 
on  models or  prototypes to identify  failure 
modes,  assess their  probability, determine 
their  consequences – and,  in some cases, 
determine how  to maintain  or  service the 
system  to prevent  known  failure modes from 
affecting  performance once it is put  into 
operation.
For  some tests,  systems are evaluated 
under conditions that are very  similar  to what 
they  will be expected to face when  they  are 
actually  used. Put in  a  language more 
relevant  to exercise design, the scenarios the 
systems are subjected to are very  realistic. In 
others tests, conditions are unrealistic by 
design.  Tests subject technologies to very 
high  stress to try  to cause failures more 
quickly  (to limit  the amount of time and 
money  that  must  be spent  testing).  In  other 
tests, specific failures are caused directly  – 
and the focus of the  test  is on assessing  the 
consequences.  
It is intuitive that  exactly  how  a  test is 
designed drives what information  it  can 
provide. Tests that  cause failures directly  can 
tell you  nothing  about  the probability  that  a 
failure will  occur, but may  provide very  good 
information  on  what happens when it  does. 
To get information about the probability  of a 
breakdown  from  a  test  that uses highly 
stressful  conditions (e.g.,  testing  something 
at  a  very  high  temperature to make it fail 
more quickly),  the tester  needs to know  how 
to relate those conditions to what  might  exist 
under realistic  circumstances.  Tests that  are 
done under  entirely  realistic  conditions might 
provide both  probability  and consequence 
information, but might be very  expensive to 
carry  out  (e.g.,  requiring  testing  a  prototype 
computer  for  months of continuous use until 
it begins to break.)
Exactly  the same logic  applies to exercises 
and the sorts of tradeoffs that  exist  between 
design  choices and the information  content of 
their  results.  For  example, there might  be 
design  choices that  are advantageous from 
some perspectives (e.g., reduce the cost  of the 
exercise),  but might  also reduce the 
information  the exercise produces.  Just  as 
different diagnostic  tests are performed on 
technical  systems to get different  types of 
information, there could be very  good 
reasons to run exercises that  might  not 
provide a  complete picture of a  response 
system  – but, in  that case, that  understanding 
must  be carried through  to evaluating  the 
outcomes the exercise does produce. To help 
illustrate these tradeoffs, we will use exercise 
realism  as a  way  of working through  some 
key  design choices and exploring how  they 
affect  the information  content  of the “test 
results” provided by the exercise.
The “Realistic Exercise” as the Gold 
Standard
In policy  discussion about  preparedness 
exercises,  “realistic” exercises are frequently 
put  forward as the standard that  exercise 
designers should target.  For  example, in 
testimony  and analyses by  the Government 
Accountability  Office (GAO) in  the years 
since 2001,24 the need for  realistic exercises 
has been  emphasized, a  finding echoed in 
outside analyses of national preparedness 
efforts.25  The requirement  for  realism  has 
even  been  embedded in  legislation,  with 
PKEMRA stating  that  exercises “as realistic 
as practicable.” 26 Unsurprisingly, this call  for 
realism  is embedded in  exercise design 
doctrine. 27 
From  the perspective of response 
reliability  analysis, realistic  exercises are 
attractive.  Most importantly, the more 
realistic  an  exercise’s scenario the more likely 
it  will  reflect the full range of possible failure 
m o d e s t h a t c o u l d a f f e c t  r e s p o n s e 
performance (see Figure 3).  The concern  that 
unrealistic exercises omit  important  elements 
that  could affect  performance has been raised 
as a general issue in  previous policy 
analyses,28 and in  the specific  examination  of 
individual exercises and their  results.29 
Furthermore,  analogous to testing a  piece of 
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technology  under its real-life “operating 
conditions,”  the occurrence of failures during 
a  realistic exercise is easy  to relate to their 
potential to occur  at  an  actual incident and 
their  consequences should similarly  provide 
direct insight  into how  they  would reduce 
performance at a future response.
Roles for Less-Than-Realistic Exercises
Even  as policy  and doctrinal sources advocate 
for  realistic exercises,  they  acknowledge the 
potential utility  of exercises that  are less 
realistic  as well.  For  example, both  GAO and 
Congress (in  published analyses and 
testimony)  suggest  scenarios should be 
intense enough, in  the words of the GAO,  to 
stress response systems “to the breaking 
point  if possible.” 30 Returning  to the exercise 
goals discussed in the introduction,  there 
may  also be good reasons why  a training 
exercise would intentionally  be unrealistic  in 
some ways to better  focus training efforts on 
the key  points participants are expected to 
take away  from  the experience.  Variations in 
realism  are unavoidable if an exercise 
program  includes activities ranging  from 
seminars to full-scale exercises (Figure 1) and 
often  realism  is relaxed for  valid cost and 
other concerns. To oversimplify  somewhat, 
more realism  usually  corresponds to a  more 
expensive exercise.  
Though  both  exercise design  doctrine and 
the literature include discussion  of exercises 
of varying levels of realism, we could not  find 
a  systematic examination  of the different 
ways the realism  of an  exercise is “relaxed” 
and how  the different options affect  the 
potential value of the information  coming  out 
of an  exercise. Particularly  if one goal  of an 
exercise is assessing  preparedness, a  clear 
understanding  of what  types of evaluation 
information  can  be obtained from  exercises 
designed for different levels of realism.
Examining both  the literature on  exercises 
and drawing on our  earlier  discussion of test 
design  in engineering, we will look  at  four 
different ways that realism  is relaxed in 
exercises and explore what evaluation 
information  – specifically  data  for  reliability 
assessment – can be obtained in each case.  
• Different Exercise Types. Exercises 
conducted around a  conference table or in 
a  seminar  room  (Figure 1)31  are, by 
definition,  less realistic  than  full-scale 
o p e r a t i o n a l e x e r c i s e s .  F r o m  t h e 
perspective of viewing  exercises as 
preparedness assessment tools, the 
concern  is how  different  designs may  – 
intentionally  or  unintentionally  – 
foreclose the possibility  of failure  modes 
occurring  that  could significantly  affect 
performance at a real incident.  
A  very  tangible example of this 
possibility  is that exercises that do not 
involve physically  deploying  people or 
response resources may  not  cover  failure 
modes like vehicles breaking  down  or 
identify  differences between  assumed 
deployment  rates and what  is actually 
realistically  achievable.  Another,  subtler, 
example of this issue is addressed in 
HSEEP guidance: “The level of detail 
provided in  a  scenario should reflect  real-
w o r l d u n c e r t a i n t y . I n c l u s i o n  o f 
superfluous information, or  ‘white noise,’ 
is a  variable that  should be discussed and 
agreed upon  by  the exercise planning 
team.” 32 It  would presumably  be easy  for 
an  exercise planner  who was focused on 
building  a  clear  and high  quality  tabletop 
exercise scenario to leave out  the fact  that 
real-world information  flows are often 
confusing. If omitted, then the possibility 
of incorrect information  affecting 
command decision-making would not  be 
addressed – and the exercise would be 
blind to an  important command-level 
failure mode.
This is not  to say, however,  that 
exercises that  only  capture a  subset  of 
failure modes cannot provide some data 
to support  assessment  of a  response 
system’s reliabil ity.  Though  such 
scenarios might omit  some ways 
performance could break down, as long  as 
their  omission  is unlikely  to distort  the 
occurrence of other  failure  modes (or 
those effects can  be understood and taken 
into account),  such exercises can  provide 
useful data  on the failure modes that are 
included. Failure modes that are 
particularly  high  probability  (e.g., major 
planning  shortfalls) may  be quite likely  to 
be identified in  such  exercises.  When 
interpreting the results of such  an 
exercise,  it  is important  not  to fall  into the 
trap of drawing conclusions about failure 
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modes that were not included in  the 
scenario (or  the overall performance of 
the response system) – since the fact  that 
they  were not  observed when  the exercise 
was run  was a  result of its design, and had 
little to do with  the characteristics of the 
response system being evaluated.
With  respect  to assessing  the potential 
consequences of individual  failure modes, 
less realistic exercises can provide more 
limited information.  For  example,  a  table 
top exercise might  be used as a  venue to 
explore the consequences of identified 
failure modes – though doing  so would 
require additional analysis or  assessment 
since they  could not  simply  be observed 
directly  (as might be the case  in  a  full 
scale operational exercise). 33
• High Stress  Exercises.  In both  the 
GAO report and legislation  cited above, 
exercises that  stressed response systems, 
potentially  to their  breaking  point, were 
highlighted. Such  exercises – similar  to a 
“high  temperature”  test of a  technological 
system  – increase the chance that  failure 
modes will  be detected because of the 
demanding and hostile testing  conditions. 
From  the perspective of observing failure 
modes, such  demanding exercises are 
very  attractive. If an  exercise was run 
under entirely  realistic  conditions, it is 
entirely  possible that no failure modes (or 
at  least none of much  consequence) 
would be observed.  Though  that 
observation  would still provide useful 
data about the response system’s 
performance, it  would be less useful from 
the perspective of considering  future 
strategies to strengthen preparedness.  
Highly  stressful exercise scenarios 
increase the chance that breakdowns will 
be observed in the course of the exercise 
either because the demands of the 
scenario make failure modes more likely 
or  because the consequences of their 
occurring  are more obvious.  Identifying 
what  breaks (and when) under  stressful 
conditions can help  to identify  “weaker 
links”  in the response system  (Figure 2). 
This can  be advantageous for  identifying 
failures that might not have been 
anticipated before the exercise was run 
(e .g . ,  p lanners bel ieved incident 
command activities would function well, 
but during a stressful scenario situational 
awareness broke down).  
Relating the results of a  high  stress 
exercise back  to an  understanding  of 
system  performance under  more normal 
conditions requires breaking  out the 
nature of the stress and how  it  likely 
affects the occurrence of system  failure 
modes.  If the scale of the exercise 
scenario is within the system’s expected 
capabilities – i.e.,  looking  at  Figure 4,  it  is 
an  incident whose requirements fall to 
the right of the  graph, but do not  exceed 
the maximum  planned capacity  of the 
system  – then no further  analysis is 
needed.34  
However,  if the exercise scenario was 
intentionally  selected to fall  above (or  far 
above) the maximum  planned capacity  of 
the system,35  then it  is likely  that  the 
overwhelming  nature of the event  could 
change the probability  and consequences 
of failure modes occurring – and so 
relating  the observations back  to the 
system’s expected performance at smaller 
scale incidents would have to be done 
with  care.   It may  be the case that  the fact 
that  particular  failures were observed in 
these scenarios indicates they  would be 
problems for smaller  incidents as well, 
but before drawing that  conclusion a 
critical examination  must be done to 
determine if the stress level  of the 
exercise makes doing so impossible. 
• Exercise Scenarios  Which Force 
Failures to Occur. In the design  of 
exercises,  scripted series of events are 
frequently  used to ensure that  the 
participating  response organizations test 
the response capabilities or  explore the 
policy  issues the exercise was planned to 
address.  The “injects”  that are included as 
part of an  exercise  scenario could include 
potential failure modes occurring in  a 
scripted way  – e.g.,  an  exercise inject 
stating  that the communications system 
has broken down,  certain  supplies are 
running  out, etc.  In  such  situations, part 
of what the exercise is testing  is the ability 
of the participants to adapt or  improvise 
and prevent the potential failure from 
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becoming  an  actual failure  with  an 
impact on response performance.  
There are real limits to conclusions 
that  can  be drawn  about  the probabilities 
of different  failures based on  the outcome 
of such  an  exercise.  Since a  failure was 
“forced”  in  the scenario,  its occurrence 
has no information  content.36   However, 
the extent  to which  the response system 
was able to adapt  to the failure and 
mit igate i t s impact  on  response 
performance is informative. The ability  of 
a  response system  to prevent  a  potential 
failure from  affecting  performance does 
provide some evidence that  the system’s 
performance is less likely  to be affected by 
that  failure mode at an  actual incident. 37 
Furthermore,  even if the response system 
cannot adapt  to a  forced failure,  such  an 
approach  could be very  useful for 
assessing  the consequences of individual 
failure  modes since evaluation  could 
focus on  gathering  data  of interest 
immediately  after  the scripted (and 
therefore anticipated by  the evaluation 
team) failure occurred (discussed below)
• Exercises Testing Parts  of Response 
Systems in Isolation. Finally,  some 
exercises – notably  drills of specific 
response functions –are designed to test 
p i e c e s o f t h e r e s p o n s e s y s t e m 
individually.  Though  such focus can  allow 
more detailed examination of parts of the 
response,38  understanding how  what  is 
observed in  a  drill  relates to response 
per formance overa l l depends on 
understanding  the effects of isolating  it. 
For  example, such  isolation  will leave out 
failure modes caused by  linkages to other 
pieces of the response system  (Figure 3, 
arrows entering  the tree at the top).  If the 
effects of these failures are understood 
and potentially  simulated as part of the 
focused exercise,  then  it  might  be possible 
to make inferences about system 
performance from  problems observed in 
the drill.  For  assessing  the consequences 
of individual failure modes,  the “linkages 
out”  – how  performance in  the function 
being exercised relates to the rest  of the 
system  – must  be taken into account.   All 
other things being equal,  a  breakdown 
that  has the potential to affect  many  other 
parts of the response system  will  be more 
consequential than one that does not.   
Though  potentially  not  as comprehensive 
as realistic  response exercises, those in  which 
reality  has been  relaxed in  various ways can 
still  provide insights useful for assessing a 
response system’s reliability  characteristics. 
Furthermore,  the systematic thought process 
about  what an  individual exercise is testing, 
which  reliability  analysis provides,  helps to 
interpret exercise results more generally  and 
draw  conclusions about what  specific 
exercises can  reveal about  preparedness. 
Particular  exercise designs – e.g.,  those that 
look at  “forced failures”  or  individual  parts of 
the response systems – may  be very  attractive 
for  some exercise goals.  But by  helping  to 
identify  what types of evaluation data  can  still 
be extracted from  the results of such 
exercises,  this approach  can  help to increase 
the potential  value of individual  exercises and 
their  ability  to pursue multiple exercise goals 
simultaneously.
GENERALIZING FROM EXERCISE 
RESULTS TO DESCRIBE 
RESPONSE RELIABILITY
Exercises of various designs can  clearly 
provide an  approach to collecting  data  on  a 
response system’s reliability  characteristics. 
Either  in  a  realistic or  an appropriately 
crafted less-than-realistic  exercise, the 
observation  of a  failure mode with  non-trivial 
consequences for response performance 
provides one data  point for  reliability 
a n a l y s i s .  C o m p a r i s o n o f a b s o l u t e 
performance in  an  exercise (e.g., the number 
of people evacuated in  a  given  time)  with 
planning  assumptions for  that capability  can 
both  help characterize the consequences of 
observed failures and suggest  the presence of 
failure modes that may  have occurred but not 
been  recorded in  exercise evaluation. Both 
these approaches can contribute to 
identifying  failure modes that  affect a  system, 
observe the occurrence of some of those 
modes during  a  particular  scenario,  and 
explore their consequences.  
In  considering  the overall reliability  of a 
response system, there is still a ways between 
the results of one exercise and the type of 
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reliability  curves shown  at  the beginning of 
this article.  Just as we drew  a contrast 
between  a  single observation of a  response 
system  and simulation of many  cases – which 
made it  possible to draw  the type of reliability 
curves shown in  Figure 4  – one exercise 
represents essentially  one observation  of a 
system.  Because the occurrence of failure 
modes is a probabilistic  process – a  system 
failure of modest  probability  will occur  in 
some responses but  not  others – drawing 
more general conclusions about  system 
reliability requires more than one data point.
As a  result,  an  exercise driven  assessment 
of a  response system’s reliability  is best 
considered a  target  of an  entire exercise 
program, where the results of multiple 
exercises – and the experience in  actual 
incidents as well – are combined to identify 
failure modes that occur  more frequently 
than  others or ones whose consequences 
appear  more consistently  serious.  To build 
that  composite picture, individual failure 
modes provide a  common  framework to link 
the occurrence of – for  example,  command 
and control  problems – from  tabletop 
exercises on unconventional weapons 
scenarios to an  operational exercise on 
responding to a  hurricane. Such  an  analytical 
model would fit  readily  into existing  guidance 
on corrective action programs that are 
designed to capture the improvements 
identified in  past  exercises and assist  in 
prioritizing among those improvements and 
allocating  time and resources to those that 
are more common,  more consequential, or  a 
combination of both.
CONCLUSIONS
In  efforts both  to assess and improve national 
preparedness, exercises occupy  a  prominent 
place in  both  policy  and practitioner  thinking. 
When an  exercise is successfully  completed, 
the results are cited as a  demonstration  of 
preparedness. When  a  response operation 
does not go as expected,  more – or  different  – 
exercise regimens are often  cited as part  of 
the solution  to improve preparedness.  In 
some cases, past exercise experiences are 
cited as evidence that lessons that “should 
have been learned”  were not  absorbed, and 
changes in exercising  and preparedness 
efforts demanded as a result.
The weight  given  to exercises,  and the 
frequency  with  which  they  are run, make 
understanding  how  to get  the most  value out 
of these activities an important  topic that 
merits analytic attention. Numerous 
programs require exercising  as part of 
preparedness efforts for  a  range of hazards, 
and the amount  of money  devoted to meeting 
those requirements is considerable. 
Improvements to exercise design  that 
strengthen  their  effectiveness for  evaluation 
or  other  goals – particularly  improvements 
that  can  be made that  do not  increase the 
costs of individual exercises – will  increase 
the return on that substantial investment.
In  this article,  we have discussed how 
response reliability  analysis – systematically 
looking  at  response operations at systems 
and assessing what might  go wrong  that 
would hurt  their  performance – can  be 
applied to exercise design.  Because of the 
need to improve efforts to measure 
emergency  preparedness, we focused 
primarily  on  how  exercises can  be used to 
collect  the information  needed to assess the 
probability  and consequences of different 
failure modes that could prevent  a  response 
system  from  responding  effectively  to a 
future incident. Though highly  realistic 
exercises are potentially  very  useful for  that 
assessment, exercises that  relax  realism  in  a 
d i f f e r e n t  w a y s c a n  p r o d u c e u s e f u l 
information  as well.   Just as tests of 
technological systems are done under  both 
realistic and intentionally  unrealistic 
circumstances,  exercise tests of response 
systems can  – and should – be conducted in 
this manner as well. However,  when exercises 
are run  where realism  has been relaxed in 
different ways,  the limits on  the information 
obtained must be recognized – and the 
framework provided by  response reliability 
analysis can help to ensure that  the 
conclusions drawn  from  results neither  over- 
nor understate what  the  exercise revealed 
about  the preparedness of the response 
system being tested.
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Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint
Dallas Boyd
ABSTRACT
An abundance of information that could be 
useful to terrorists  is  available  in the open 
literature. This  information,  unclassified but 
nonetheless  sensit ive,  includes r isk 
assessments that identify infrastructure 
vulnerabilities, analyses that hypothesize 
creative  attacks, and otherwise  dangerous 
knowledge that is  released under the rubric 
of scientific openness  or the public’s  “right to 
know.” Attempts  to manage this  information 
more responsibly have been resisted in part 
due to the misconception that such efforts 
would require  formal, draconian restrictions 
on speech. However,  greater discipline in the 
dissemination of sensitive information can 
be introduced without compromising the 
nation’s  values. In particularly sensitive 
areas,  scientists, journalists,  and members of 
the general public should embrace voluntary 
self-restraint as  a civic  duty. Further, both 
government entities  and journalists  should 
avoid call ing attention to  sensitive 
information in ways that compound rather 
than reduce the potential harm it represents.
INTRODUCTION
Less than  a  year  after  the Cold War ended, 
one of its best-kept  secrets came to light 
when  the hidden purpose of West  Virginia’s 
Greenbrier  Hotel  was revealed in  the 
Washington Post.1  Beneath  the hotel  was a 
massive bunker  built to house the U.S. 
Congress after  a  nuclear  war, part  of the 
nation’s “continuity  of government”  program. 
Though  congressional leaders had urged the 
newspaper  not  to expose the secret, the Post’s 
executive editor  justified the publication  as a 
“historically  significant and interesting  story 
that  posed no grave danger  to national 
security  or  human  life.” 2  Ted Gup,  the 
journalist  who uncovered the Greenbrier’s 
macabre function, went  further,  arguing that 
the facility  had been  potentially  destabilizing 
even when  its existence was a  secret. 
Evacuating  Congress during  a  crisis might 
have telegraphed that  the United States was 
bracing  for  nuclear  war, precipitating  a  Soviet 
first-strike. Far  from  an act  of irresponsible 
journalism,  Gup cited the story  as a  case 
study  in the value of an  inquisitive press 
corps.3
Though  lawmakers quickly  acknowledged 
the Greenbrier’s obsolescence, the revelation 
remains controversial.4  Despite a  plea for 
discretion,  a  small number  of journalists had 
substituted their  own  judgment on  national 
security  for  that  of the U.S.  defense 
establishment. The tension  that  the story 
illuminated – between the value gained by 
revealing  sensitive information  and the 
potential harm  invited by  doing  so – has only 
grown  more pronounced since terrorism 
emerged as the dominant security  threat. 
This tension  usually  concerns information 
that,  like the bunker  location,  has been 
formally  designated as secret.  Most  recently, 
WikiLeaks’ release of more than  a  half-
million  classified documents has revived 
debate over  the legitimacy  of leaking  as a 
form  of civil disobedience. 5 However,  a  more 
complex question concerns the advisability  of 
making  public, or  drawing  attention to, a 
variety  of mostly  unclassified information 
that is nonetheless useful to terrorists.6 
Examples of this information  include media 
descriptions of target  vulnerabilities, 
hypothetical attack  scenarios,  and sensitive 
counterterrorism  measures. The central 
question  explored in  this article  is whether 
the availability  of this unclassified knowledge 
benefits our adversaries more than  it 
advantages society.  
The motives behind disclosures of 
sensitive information  vary,  but  a common 
refrain  is that they  spur  remedial action  that 
would otherwise be avoided. Critics argue, 
however, that  these revelations recklessly 
endanger  the public.  Whatever  their  effect,  a 
soft consensus seems to have formed that 
airing  this information  does not  subtract 
from  national security  to such  an  extent as to 
justify  the extraordinary  powers that  would 
be required to suppress it. This attitude 
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represents a  stark departure from  previous 
wartime policy,  when  speech  was frequently 
restricted on  security  grounds.7 During World 
War II,  censorship succeeded largely  because 
communications technology  had not yet 
made the practice impractical. Since then, the 
information  revolution  has greatly  expanded 
the number  of people with  access to sensitive 
information  as well as the means to 
disseminate it.  Attempts to manage this 
information  have been  less than  vigorous, 
and in many  cases the government itself has 
made questionable revelations in  the name of 
greater transparency.  
The existence of sensitive information  in 
the public  domain is a  security  concern  only 
insofar  as there are adversaries poised to 
exploit it.  Yet on this score there can  be little 
doubt. Gathering information  from  open 
sources is an  established intelligence 
methodology  that  both  states and non-state 
actors utilize.  For  example, Chinese 
physicists relied heavily  on  Western  scientific 
literature in  their  development  of strategic 
weapons.8  Modern-day  terrorists appear  to 
behave similarly.  A  captured al-Qaeda 
training manual released by  the Justice 
Department after  9/11  advises that  by  using 
public sources “openly  and without  resorting 
to illegal means,  it is possible to gather  at 
least  80% of information  about the enemy.” 
Among  the sources it  recommends are 
“newspapers,  magazines, books,  periodicals, 
official publications, and enemy  broadcasts.” 9 
The diversity  of malevolent  actors who might 
exploit this information  has also grown 
dramatically  over  the previous decades. In 
the age of terrorism, the incoherence of the 
nation’s response to this phenomenon 
represents a significant failure.  
This article examines three common forms 
of “sensitive information,”  defined for the 
purpose of this analysis as knowledge that 
might  be useful to terrorists and would be 
considerably  more difficult  – if not 
impossible  – for  them  to assemble 
independently. This information includes: 
media  reports and risk assessments,  both 
private and government-sponsored,  that 
identify  critical vulnerabilities to terrorism; 
open-source analyses that  hypothesize 
creative terrorist  attacks; and publications 
that  reveal potentially  dangerous knowledge 
under the rubric  of scientific openness or,  in 
the case of classified information,  the public’s 
“right to know.” The purpose of the analysis 
is to challenge the assumption  that  these 
revelations are largely  innocuous. A  further 
aim  is to dispute the notion  that curtailing 
t h e m  r e q u i r e s m e a s u r e s t h a t a r e 
incompatible with  our  national values. This 
misconception  encourages the belief that  any 
effort  to discourage discussion  of sensitive 
information compromises civil liberties.
An alternative to draconian  restrictions on 
speech  entails fostering  a culture of voluntary 
restraint, in  which  citizens refrain from 
inappropriate revelations out of a  sense of 
civic  duty.  Its enforcement  would depend not 
on  government  coercion  but on individuals 
and institutions supplying disapproval of 
irresponsible discussion. Admittedly, any 
effort  to discourage discussion of unclassified 
knowledge, no matter  how  sensitive, faces an 
obvious hurdle: persuading  the public  to 
accept new  categor ies o f protected 
information  just as the government struggles 
to keep secret  the materials it has already 
classified.   But  the challenge of safeguarding 
the two types of information  is different. One 
requires more diligent  enforcement  of 
existing security  protocols.  The other  is a 
societal responsibility  that  presents no 
additional burden  to the government beyond 
promoting  its merits. While the debate over 
the discussion of unclassified information is 
not likely  to resume until another  attack 
occurs,  policymakers should revisit  the 
matter  before that inevitable event.  In its 
aftermath, impulsive calls to curtail American 
rights may  obscure the more measured 
option that is available today.
ADVERTISING VULNERABILITIES
The emergence of terrorism  has occasioned 
the reevaluation  of what  had been a  steady 
increase in  transparency  across many  sectors 
of society.  The shift in  attitude concerning 
knowledge of natural gas line locations is 
instructive.   For  decades errant  digging  had 
occasionally  punctured pipes containing 
explosive gas, with  lethal results.  Industry 
and government responded by  advertising 
their  location  as widely  as possible.  After 
9/11,  however,  a  series of reports highlighting 
the possibility  of natural gas attacks led some 
to question  the wisdom  of this effort.  A  2004 
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New  York  Times  headline captures the 
dilemma: “Mapping  Natural Gas Lines: 
Advise the Public, Tip Off the Terrorists.”  In 
response to these concerns, pipeline maps 
began  to be  removed from  many  gas 
company  web sites.10  Similar  fears have 
arisen in  other  countries.  In  2008,  flood risk 
experts in  Britain’s Environment  Agency 
incurred the wrath  of security  officials when 
they  published maps depicting  regions under 
severe threat  in  the event  of dam  failures.11 As 
in  the United States,  however,  such 
objections have been  inconsistent, leaving 
unresolved the question of whether  society  is 
better served by openness or discretion.  
Reactions to the identification  of 
vulnerabilities can  generally  be divided into 
two schools of thought. The first  contends 
that vulnerability  assessments are often 
indistinguishable from  terrorists’ target 
research  and should therefore be closely 
guarded.  In keeping  with  this view,  Dennis 
Pluchinsky,  a  former  State Department 
intelligence analyst, facetiously  accused the 
American  media  of “treason”  for  its post-9/11 
security  coverage, which  he suggested had 
“clearly  identified for  terrorist groups the 
country’s vulnerabilities.”12  The opposing 
view  is that identifying  security  gaps has a 
mostly  salutary  effect. As Georgetown  Law 
Professor Laura  Donohue argues,  “Citizens 
are entitled to know  when  their milk,  their 
water,  their  bridges,  their  hospitals lack 
security  precautions.  If discussion  of these 
issues is censored,  the state and private 
industry  come under  less pressure to alter 
behavior…”13 Of course,  these outcomes are 
not mutually  exclusive – publicizing 
vulnerabilities may  simultaneously  alert 
terrorists to promising  targets and prompt 
policymakers to protect  them. In  these cases, 
the crucial  question  is whether  the benefit of 
identifying a  vulnerability  outweighs the 
possibility  that the likelihood of its being 
exploited will increase. Since 9/11, many 
commentators have taken  this wager, as a 
brief review of the literature illustrates.
In  2005, Slate writer  Andy  Bowers 
published instructions on  how  to exploit  a 
loophole in  the No-Fly  List  using online 
check-in. This convenience allows travelers to 
print  boarding passes at  home and proceed 
directly  to airport security,  where they 
p r e s e n t  s o m e f o r m  o f g o v e r n m e n t 
identification. While the names on the pass 
and ID must  match,  the Transportation 
Security  Administration (TSA) does not  scan 
the barcode or  compare the name against  the 
No-Fly  List.  Only  at  the gate is the boarding 
pass scanned,  but  no matching  identification 
is required.  Bowers suggests that  terrorists 
could travel with  two boarding passes – one 
legitimate,  purchased with a  stolen  credit 
card, and the other a  counterfeit created 
using  widely  available software.  At  the first 
checkpoint, the passenger will pass through 
as long as the fake pass corresponds with  the 
ID.  The scan of the genuine pass at  the gate 
will not  register  alarm  because it contains an 
innocent  name. Bowers justified this 
revelation  with  a  familiar  defense – if he 
could discern  the loophole, “any  terrorist 
worth  his AK-47  realized it  a  long time ago.”14 
In  another  piece,  journalist  Jeffrey  Goldberg 
provided a  recipe for  fabricating  a  homemade 
knife in  flight  with  steel epoxy  glue: “It  comes 
in  two tubes, one with  steel  dust and then  a 
hardener.  You  make the mold by  folding  a 
piece of cardboard in  two, and then  you  mix 
the two tubes together…. It  hardens in  15 
minutes.” 15 Goldberg  also described passing 
through  security  wearing  under  his shirt  a 
polyurethane bladder  designed to sneak 80 
ounces of alcohol into sporting  events, 
presumably  sufficient to hold enough  liquid 
explosives to destroy an aircraft in flight. 16
A  frequent target of journalistic exposés is 
the security  surrounding  the nation’s critical 
infrastructure, particularly  facilities that 
manufacture or  store dangerous materials. In 
one “60  Minutes”  investigation  in  2004, 
camera  crews infiltrated several  chemical 
plants to demonstrate their  susceptibility  to 
terrorism. 17  Though  these investigations 
often  contain  sensationalist  or  self-
congratulatory  undertones,  such  reporting 
can  still  be  done responsibly. In  2005,  for 
example,  ABC News investigated the security 
at  nuclear  research  reactors on  25  university 
campuses using  undercover  graduate 
students to penetrate  the sites.18 The laxity  of 
the security  would later be featured in  a 
televised special on vulnerable nuclear  sites. 
However,  six  weeks before the broadcast, the 
investigative team  disclosed its findings to 
university  of f ic ials and government 
personnel, allowing time to heighten  security 
at  the facilities. In  doing  so, a  program  that 
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might  have instantly  increased a  security 
threat  was limited to a  mere embarrassment 
for the universities.
Government as the Source of Sensitive 
Information
Despite the practice of “overclassification,”  in 
which  the government makes secret  an 
a b u n d a n c e o f i n n o c u o u s m a t e r i a l , 
government  reports are ironically  the source 
of much  sensitive information.19 The Smyth 
Report,  the unclassified history  of the 
Manhattan Project,  provides a  useful 
lesson.20 Released in  August  1945,  the report 
had several purposes: to educate  the public 
about  the atomic bomb,  showcase openness 
in  government, and signal  what  could and 
could not  be said about  the new  weapon. A 
debate raged over  whether  the report 
revealed too much  –physicist  Leó Szilárd 
claimed it  “clearly  indicates the road along 
which  any  other  nations will have to travel”  – 
but officials ultimately  judged that  nothing 
vital was revealed.21  However,  historian 
Michael  Gordin  argues that  the Smyth  Report 
was in  fact  “crucial  for  the Soviet  [bomb] 
project—perhaps the most  important single 
source of American information....”  Thirty 
thousand translations were  distributed to 
Soviet  research  institutes.  According to 
Gordin, had the report not existed, “the 
Soviets would have had to write a  guidebook 
of their  own. Smyth  saved them  the 
trouble....” 22  Dr.  Khidhir  Hamza,  an  Iraqi 
weapon scientist  who defected in 1994, 
recalled using  the same materials in  Saddam 
Hussein’s nuclear  program. He later wrote,  “I 
was sure that  if U.S.  officials knew  how 
valuable its Manhattan Project  reports would 
be to us years later, they  would have kicked 
themselves.” 23 
The practice of revealing sensitive 
information  for  the sake of openness in 
g o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u e s t o d a y . T h e 
Government Accountability  Office (GAO), for 
example,  regularly  scandalizes Congress and 
the media  with  revelations of slipshod 
security  practices. A  typical  report  in  2007 
described the ease with  which  undercover 
agents passed through  airport  security  with 
concealed bomb components. 24  Beyond 
confirming the practicality  of this attack 
mode, the report provided clues on  the 
simulated bomb design that an  astute 
terrorist  might  have perceived.  A  later  report 
catalogued deficiencies in the security 
surrounding  the nation’s biosafety  level 4 
laboratories, which  house pathogens such  as 
Ebola and smallpox.25  Another provided 
details of the behavioral  profiling  techniques 
that  TSA  uses to screen for  suspicious airline 
passengers.26 These reports are made public 
despite evidence that  terrorists are aware of 
them. Indeed,  in 2010,  an  al Qaeda affiliate 
released an  English-language document 
detailing  its attempt  to detonate explosives 
on two U.S.-bound cargo aircraft; the 
document referenced a  GAO assessment of 
cargo inspection  methods,  demonstrating  the 
network’s awareness of this source of 
information.27
These revelations would be  beneficial  if 
they  consistently  prompted corrective  action, 
but in  many  cases they  do not,  as an  earlier 
series of reports illustrates.  In  2003,  GAO 
provided a  virtual  guide to collecting  material 
for  a  radiological  dispersal  device (RDD), 
which  could easily  be obtained due to 
weaknesses in  the Nuclear  Regulatory 
C o m m i s s i o n ’ s ( N R C ) l i c e n s i n g 
process. 28 Four  years later, an investigation 
revealed that these weaknesses had not  been 
addressed. After  establishing  a  sham  business 
with  only  a  post  office box,  investigators 
acquired a  license to receive radioactive 
materials and then  doctored it to permit 
unlimited acquisition  of sources.  The 
investigators then  contracted with  two U.S. 
suppliers to purchase moisture density 
gauges containing  enough  americium-241 
and cesium-137  to construct an  RDD.29 While 
this investigation  finally  forced the NRC to 
suspend i ts l i censing program,  the 
government  has identified other  security  gaps 
where the potential  for  timely  remediation  is 
severely limited.  
Numerous reports have advertised 
shortcomings in  the architecture  to detect 
smuggled nuclear  weapons, particularly  the 
inability  of radiation  portal  monitors at  U.S. 
seaports to detect  “shielded”  nuclear 
material. 30  Others have documented the 
virtual absence of scanning  for  railcars and 
small watercraft entering  the country.31  This 
information  greatly  reduces terrorists’ 
uncertainty  about  the obstacles they  face in 
conducting  an  attack. Micah  D.  Lowenthal 
draws on  scholarship concerning criminal 
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behavior  to demonstrate  how  this knowledge 
hinders our  ability  to deter nuclear  terrorism. 
Specifically,  he cites a  study  on  the 
effectiveness of the Lojack car  retrieval 
system, an  unobservable transmitter  that 
allows police to track stolen  vehicles.  While 
visible theft-deterrent devices such  as 
steering wheel locks simply  shift  thieves’ 
energies to neighboring  cars, Lojack 
produced broad reductions in  overall theft.32 
The explanation  is simple: criminals are 
aware that  the device is used but  are unable 
to identify  which  cars have it.   Lowenthal 
argues that  a  similar  phenomenon  may  occur 
with  nuclear  terrorism,  in  which  “the 
existence of some radiation  monitoring  at 
seaports and land border  crossings may 
deflect  adversaries, causing them  to focus on 
other  gaps…that are identified as easier 
targets.” 33  Disclosing  information on  the 
detection  architecture therefore guarantees 
that  it will have little effect on  the overall risk. 
By  contrast,  deliberate ambiguity  about  U.S. 
defenses might  deter terrorists from 
attempting  a  nuclear  attack in  the first  place. 
At the least, such  a  policy  would avoid 
steering them  toward the least defended 
entry points.
The preceding  anecdotes concern  attack 
vectors that are, in  all likelihood,  already 
familiar  to terrorists.  While this information 
may  make an  attack easier  to plan or  more 
likely  to succeed, a  determined adversary 
may  be able to perform  the necessary 
research  without assistance. An altogether 
different category  of sensitive information 
consists of novel ideas for  attacks that  may 
not have occurred to the most  imaginative 
adversaries. Managing  discussion  of these 
scenarios presents a  special challenge, as the 
creativity  of the 9/11  attacks ensured that 
exercises in  innovative thinking  would find a 
receptive audience in  both the government 
and the popular culture.
POSITING CREATIVE SCENARIOS
After  9/11,  conceiving  novel  means of 
wreaking havoc became something  of a 
fiendish  hobby  for  many  analysts. 34  One 
group of authors,  noting the proliferation  of 
hypothetical scenarios in the public  domain, 
suggested that  their  source must be a 
basement where “thousands of monkeys who 
have yet  to type out  exact  copies of the works 
of Shakespeare are nonetheless producing 
dozens of new  ideas for  attacks on 
America...” 35 Many  of these scenarios follow  a 
familiar  template.  “At  3  a.m. on a  moonless 
night,” begins one fictitious plot  in  IEEE 
Spectrum,  “a  pair  of armored vans race down 
an  access road leading up to the sprawling 
Hovensa  oil  refinery.…” 36 Another  scenario 
by  Thomas Homer-Dixon  (which  begins at 4 
a.m. on  a  “sweltering”  night rather than a 
“moonless”  one) involves an  assault  on  the 
electricity grid during a heat wave:
In  different parts  of [California], half a 
dozen small  groups of  men  and women 
gather. Each  travels in a  rented minivan  to 
its prearranged destination – for some, a 
location  outside one of the hundreds of 
electrical  substations dotting  the state; for 
others, a  spot upwind from key, high-
voltage transmission  lines…. Those 
outside the substations put together 
simple mortars made from materials 
bought at local  hardware stores, while 
those near the transmission lines use 
helium to inflate weather  balloons with 
long, si lvery tails. At a precisely 
coordinated moment, the homemade 
mortars are fired, sending showers of 
aluminum chaff over the substations. The 
balloons are released and drift into the 
transmission  lines. Simultaneously, other 
groups are doing the same thing  along the 
Eastern Seaboard and in  the South and 
Southwest. A national electrical  system 
already  under  immense strain is massively 
short-circuited, causing a  cascade of 
power failures across the country. Traffic 
lights shut off.  Water and sewage systems 
are disabled.  Communications systems 
break down. The financial  system  and 
national  economy come screeching  to a 
halt.37
Innumerable scenarios of this ilk  have 
been  described in  the public domain,  ranging 
from  infecting livestock with  contagious 
diseases to setting  serial forest  fires. 38 
Security  expert Bruce Schneier  holds a 
perennial “Movie-Plot Threat Contest,” 
inviting participants to propose attack 
scenarios that are “horrific and completely 
ridiculous, but  plausible.”  The plots are 
reliably  dramatic: irradiating Wall Street with 
radiological bombs,  crashing  explosives-filled 
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airplanes into the Grand Coulee Dam,  and so 
on.39 The government  evidently  sees value in 
such  exercises, in  part because the 9/11 
Commission  identified the  failure of 
“imagination”  as first  among  the deficiencies 
that  contributed to the tragedy.40  Shortly 
after  the attacks, then-National Security 
Advisor  Condoleezza  Rice famously  asserted, 
“I don’t think anybody  could have predicted 
that these people…would try  to use an 
airplane as a missile.” 41 Rice’s statement  was 
soon  discovered to be incorrect – more than  a 
dozen references to hijacked planes-cum-
guided missiles were identified after  the 
attacks. One 1999  report  speculated that  al 
Qaeda’s suicide bombers “could crash-land 
an  aircraft  packed with  high  explosives…into 
the Pentagon, the headquarters of the [CIA], 
or the White House.” 42 
T h e g o v e r n m e n t  s u b s e q u e n t l y 
commissioned a series of exercises to capture 
some of the creativity  that  had so disastrously 
eluded its analysts. In one program, the 
Army-funded Inst i tute for  Creat ive 
Technology  enlisted Hollywood screenwriters 
and directors to conjure up frightening attack 
scenarios. 43 Yet  the products of these sessions 
remained off-limits to public  scrutiny. As one 
official explained, “Our  worst  nightmare was 
that  we would suggest scenarios to 
terrorists.” 44 Marvin  Cetron, a  “futurist”  who 
credits himself with  having foreseen the 9/11 
attacks, claims that the State Department 
removed his prediction from  a  1994 
government  report for fear that  it  might “give 
terrorists a  valuable idea  they  might  not 
conceive on their own.” 45  
Cetron  has found a  more receptive market 
for  his powers of discernment  after  9/11  – he 
has since published several l ists of 
“unthinkable”  terrorist  plots ranging  from 
destroying  Tennessee Valley  Authority  dams 
to bombing  a  liquefied natural gas tanker 
near a  major  city.46 While such  scenarios are 
often farcical, they  occasionally  produce 
useful insights. In  one analysis,  James Acton 
et al. suggest several innovative means of 
disseminating  radiological materal  beyond 
the standard “dirty  bomb,”  in  which 
radioactive  material  is simply  mixed with 
e x p l o s i v e s . 47  T h o u g h  t h e c o m m o n 
assumption is that  such  a  device would 
produce catastrophic effects, the authors 
argue that the death  toll would be “very 
unlikely  to reach three figures.”  By  contrast, 
attacks involving  ingestion, inhalation,  and 
immersion of radiation,  which  they  dub I3 
attacks, may  claim  an  order  of magnitude 
more victims and would be less technically 
challenging to carry  out. 48  While their 
analysis stops short  of providing  instructions 
to terrorists, the authors have arguably 
p r o v i d e d s e v e r a l k e r n e l s o f u s e f u l 
information.
Just  as in  the case of advertising 
vulnerabilities,  government  officials are often 
the source of worrisome scenarios. In  2009, 
for  example,  Charles R. Gallaway,  then  head 
of the Domestic  Nuclear  Detection  Office, 
testified before Congress on  the challenge of 
interdicting attempts to smuggle a nuclear 
device  into the United States.  Citing  a 
government  study, he noted that  “the most 
difficult scenario to counter  was the use of 
[general aviation] aircraft  delivering  a 
weapon from  outside the borders of the U.S. 
directly  to a  target.”  Gallaway  observed that 
such  an attack  “would enable an  adversary  to 
bypass…multiple detection  and interdiction 
opportunities.” 49 Because a  system  to defeat 
this scenario would obviously  require great 
time and expense to implement,  and may 
ultimately  be unachievable, the decision to 
emphasize this attack  mode is curious. At  the 
very  least, Gallaway  may  have given 
adversaries inspiration  that  they  did not 
previously possess.
On the question  of giving terrorists novel 
ideas, commentators usually  argue that  our 
adversaries are sufficiently  clever  to discern 
the nation’s vulnerabilities.  As Cetron  avers, 
“I no longer  worry  about  giving the bad guys 
ideas…. They  will think of any  attack we 
can...” 50 Yet  a  private admission  by  al  Qaeda 
leader  Ayman al-Zawahiri  casts doubt  on  this 
assumption.   In a  captured 1999  memo to an 
associate,  Zawahiri conceded that  “Despite 
their  extreme danger,  we only  became aware 
of [biological  and chemical weapons] when 
the enemy  drew  our  attention  to them  by 
repeatedly  expressing  concerns that they  can 
be produced simply  with  easily  available 
materials.”51
The year  after  Zawahiri’s memo was 
written, columnist  Colbert I.  King authored a 
detailed scenario to highlight  the capital’s 
vulnerability.  King  described two heavily 
armed terrorists seizing control of the 
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Washington  Monument, blocking  the 
staircases with  explosives,  and firing  from  the 
windows with  a  .50 caliber  rifle.52 In  his view, 
“Gain  control  of the monument  and you  hold 
sway  over  a  large area  of the world’s most 
powerful capital, at  least  for  several days.”   So 
attractive is the scenario, he suggests, that 
the monument  “easily  makes a  terrorist’s 
list.” 53 Some variation  of this rationale is the 
default  response of those who publicly 
speculate about  terrorist  scenarios and wish 
to avoid criticism  for  doing  so. However,  an 
argument can  be made that his attack  had not 
occurred to a single terrorist  before King 
described it. Elliot  Panek considers this 
question  in  assessing  the effect  of “Wisdom  of 
Crowds wiki-logic”  in  the context  of 
terrorism, or  whether  aggregating  creative 
scenarios constitutes “doing the terrorists’ 
work  for  them.” 54 He notes that  generating 
plausible scenarios requires considerable 
thoughtfulness,  and while “[o]ne writer  (e.g., 
Tom  Clancy) could be pretty  good at that, and 
a  bunch  of devoted terrorists could be just  as 
good if not  better…a larger  group of well-
educated,  creative people…would certainly  be 
better  at it  than  either  Clancy  or  the 
terrorist.”  Panek rejects the assumption  that 
terrorists have already  conceived of every 
brilliant scenario,  arguing  that  “the most 
sophisticated think tank is probably  no match 
for  the collective wisdom  of the [New  York 
Times] readership…” 55
However  irresponsible these descriptions, 
authors who publish  them  usually  insist  that 
terrorists could, with  the proper  effort  and 
imagination,  conceive them  without 
assistance.   The same is true for  the 
identification  of domestic  vulnerabilities. 
What  distinguishes the final species of 
information  considered in  this article is its 
inaccessibility  to all but the most  rarefied 
circle of thinkers.  If the first two categories 
concern  insights that would be difficult  for 
adversaries to gain  themselves, the last 
consists of information that  requires the 
complicity of a third party.  
PUBLISHING POTENTIALLY  HARMFUL 
INFORMATION
Sensitive information  is often  revealed in  the 
service of a  beneficial purpose even  if its 
immediate impact appears harmful.   One 
famous case fitting  this description  is the 
New  York Times’ revelation  of the Bush 
administration’s domestic wiretapping 
program. After  first  learning of the program, 
the Times’ refrained from  publishing the 
story  for  a year,  in  part  due to the urging  of 
administration  officials.56 In  December 2005, 
just before publishing their  sensational 
scoop, journalist  Eric Lichtblau  and the 
newspaper’s editors were summoned to the 
White House,  where these officials again 
attempted to dissuade them  from  going to 
print. Their  case was compelling: disclosure 
of the program  would instantly  eliminate its 
effectiveness and place American  lives in 
danger.  As Lichtblau  later  recounted,  “the 
message was unmistakable: If the New  York 
Times  went ahead and published this story, 
we would share the blame for  the next 
terrorist  attack.” 57  This argument  was 
ultimately  unpersuasive, although  the Times’ 
account of the program  did omit certain 
sensitive details.58 While the revelation  was 
highly  controversial—President Bush 
described it  as “a  shameful  act”  – the story 
prompted a  constructive  national  debate on 
wartime executive power. 59  Many  civil 
libertarians applauded the skepticism  of a 
press corps that since 9/11  had been supine in 
its coverage of the administration’s 
counterterrorism policies.
In  other  cases,  dissemination  of sensitive 
information  resembles plain  vandalism. This 
motive is evident in  the work of John Young, 
founder  of the web site Cryptome.org. 60 
Young’s hobby  is to make public the 
government’s most  closely  held secrets, his 
motivation  appearing to extend no further 
than  his conviction  that  “There’s nothing  that 
should be secret. Period.” 61  Among  the 
information  he has published are the 
locations of nuclear  weapon  storage facilities 
a n d t h e h o m e a d d r e s s e s o f s e n i o r 
government officials.62  In  2009, Young 
embarrassed TSA  by  posting  an  inadequately 
redacted manual that  included airport  metal 
detectors settings and a  list of countries 
whose passport-holders require special 
scrutiny. 63 The following month  he posted a 
similar  document  on  screening  procedures 
for  explosive residue in  checked baggage.64 
While these revelations have an  impish 
quality,  an argument  can  be made that they 
impose greater  discipline on  the government 
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to protect  sensitive information, if only  to 
avoid embarrassment. The same cannot be 
said for  the amateur  satellite trackers who 
gleefully  publish  the orbital inclinations of 
classified U.S.  satellites.  This phenomenon 
l e d a c o m m i s s i o n o n  t h e N a t i o n a l 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO),  which 
operates the nation’s spy  satellites,  to note 
that “public speculation  on  how  NRO 
satellites are used has aided terrorists and 
other  potential adversaries in  developing 
techniques of denial  and deception  to thwart 
U.S.  intelligence efforts.” 65  Despite this 
admonition, the  practice continues,  most 
recently  in  2010 when the orbit  of the 
Pentagon’s classified X-37B spacecraft  was 
revealed less than a month after its launch.66  
Though  the damage that results from 
these revelations may  be quite severe,  those 
who make them  often belong to professions 
whose ethic sometimes requires disdain  for 
government  secrecy.  In  other  cases the 
disseminators are everyday  citizens with  a 
penchant  for  mischief.  In  recent  years, 
neither  group has been  particularly  amenable 
to pleas for  discretion.   The government  has 
had greater  success in managing the 
communication  of another  cohort—scientists 
who conduct  “dual-use”  research. However, 
several recent  lapses in  caution  among this 
group demonstrate the continued risk  that 
attends the dissemination  of sensitive 
information.
Dual-Use Scientific Research
In  the early  1980s,  many  U.S.  officials grew 
concerned that  the Soviet  Union  was 
c o m p e n s a t i n g  f o r i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
inadequacy  by  mining  the U.S. scientific 
literature. A 1982  incident  conveys the 
climate at  the time.  Days before a  major 
engineering  conference,  the Department  of 
Defense (DoD) blocked the delivery  of more 
than  100  unclassified papers on the grounds 
that  Soviet  bloc representatives would be 
present  at  the conference. 67  In response to 
the broader  concern, the National  Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) convened the Panel on 
Scientific Communication  and National 
Security  to explore tighter  controls on 
academic  communication.68  While federal 
law  grants broad authority  to classify 
scientific  research  and thereby  restrict  its 
publication, deference to scientific openness 
had made the government reluctant to 
exercise this power. 69  The panel’s findings, 
known as the Corson  Report,  acknowledged 
that  a  Soviet intelligence-gathering effort  was 
directed at  the American sc ient i f ic 
community  and that  a  substantial transfer  of 
U.S. technology  had indeed occurred. 
However, the panel determined that 
American  universities,  and open  scientific 
communication more generally,  were the 
source of very  little of this transfer. 
Moreover, it  concluded that formal policies to 
restrict  scientific  communication  “could be 
extremely  damaging to overall [U.S.] 
scientific  and economic advance as well as to 
military  progress.”   Calling for  a  strategy  of 
“security  by  accomplishment”  rather  than 
secrecy, the  report argued that  the “limited 
and uncertain benefits of such controls are, 
except in  isolated areas, outweighed by  the 
importance of scientific progress...” 70 Though 
the demise of the Soviet  Union  appeared to 
vindicate this conclusion,  the emergence of 
transnational terrorism  revived the unease 
that  inspired the Corson  panel.  Rather  than 
the loss of military  technology, recent 
anxieties have centered on publications in the 
life sciences and their  potential utility  to 
bioterrorists.
The danger of publishing  sensitive 
scientific  material  was powerfully  illustrated 
by  a group of Australian  scientists conducting 
pest control research  in  the late 1990s. 71 In  a 
now-infamous experiment, the scientists 
inserted the interleukin-4  gene into the 
mousepox virus with  the aim  of producing  an 
“infectious contraceptive”  for  mice.72  Rather 
than  sterilizing  the subjects,  however,  the 
modified mousepox  killed them,  including 
many  mice  that  had been  immunized against 
the unaltered virus.  The implications were 
ominous – a similar  modification  could yield 
vaccine-resistant  viruses that  are lethal  to 
humans, including smallpox.  Both  the 
scientists and the editors of the journal  to 
which  the work was submitted understood its 
potential for  misuse. 73  Their  controversial 
decision  to publish was based on  the 
conclusion  that  the crucial  elements of the 
research  had already  appeared elsewhere and 
that  so much  dangerous information  was 
already  available that  one additional article 
would be inconsequential.74 Nonetheless, the 
mousepox episode would be the catalyst  for 
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yet  another NAS study  on  the dangers of 
scientific  communication.75  Yet  even  before 
its commencement,  scrutiny  of dual-use 
research  had greatly  increased in  the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks.
The d i lemma in  publ i sh ing  such 
information  is a  familiar  one. While certain 
scientific  findings could aid malevolent 
actors, failing  to air  them  in  the open 
literature might  inhibit  research  that holds 
the key  to the defense.   After  contemplating 
this quandary,  the American  Society  for 
Microbiology  released guidelines in  2002  for 
reviewing  manuscripts submitted to the 
journals under  its purview. Under this 
voluntary  process, peer reviewers would alert 
editors if material “might  be misused or 
might  pose a  threat  to public health  safety,” 
and a  determination would be made 
concerning modifications.76  (While only  a 
handful of manuscripts have since been 
flagged, editors have deleted sensitive details 
on  several  occasions. 77)  The following  year, 
the editors and publishers of the nation’s 
leading  life-science journals met to discuss 
the publication  of such  information. During 
this meeting, a  near-consensus emerged that 
“there is information  that…presents enough 
risk of use by  terrorists that  it  should not be 
published.”  The group recommended that  in 
circumstances in  which  the potential danger 
of publication  exceeds the potential  benefit  to 
the public,  sensitive papers should be 
modified or  not  published at  all.  In  these 
cases, alternative means of communication 
such  as academic seminars should be used to 
minimize the risk of misuse. 78 The eventual 
NAS report  also reflected a  preference for 
self-regulation,  noting  that  “imposing 
mandatory  information controls on  research 
in  the life sciences…[would]  be difficult  and 
expensive with  little likely  gain  in  genuine 
security.” 79  As an  alternative to government 
oversight,  the NAS panel endorsed the 
concept  of “voluntary  self-governance of the 
scientific community  rather  than formal 
regulation by government.” 80
The presumption underlying  this system  is 
that  scientists will  censor  themselves 
responsibly,  obviat ing the need for 
government  oversight,  and that there will  be 
agreement  on what  should not be published. 
The mousepox  case calls both  of these 
assumptions into question. After a  review  of 
the case,  the editor of the Journal of Virology 
expressed no misgivings about  the decision to 
publish.81  Likewise,  the NAS panel deemed 
the publication  “appropriate,”  stating  that 
there was “little technical information that 
was not  already  abundantly  available in  the 
literature.”82 Moreover, the research  “alerted 
the scientific community  to such  a  possibility 
o c c u r r i n g  e i t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o r 
spontaneously.” 83  However, at least one of 
the researchers involved in  the experiment 
later  expressed misgivings about  its merit. 
Dr.  Ian Ramshaw  noted that even  before 
discovering a  method to increase the lethality 
of pox  viruses, his team  had stumbled upon 
another “dual-use dilemma”  – creating an 
agent of contagious sterility  – that  was 
scarcely  less sinister.  As a  weapon  against 
humans, Ramshaw  considered this “as bad as 
making  a  virus that kills the individual”  and 
concluded that  the original research  “should 
never have started in the first place.” 84
Another  article published after  the NAS 
report  reinforces the limits of self-censorship. 
In  2005,  the Proceedings  of the National 
A c a d e m y o f S c i e n c e s  a p p r o v e d f o r 
publication  the research  of Stanford 
University  scholars Lawrence Wein  and Yifan 
Liu, who had analyzed a  release of botulinum 
toxin  in  the milk  distribution system.85 Wein 
and Liu  had determined that  absent 
detection, an  attack  involving  less than  1g of 
the toxin  would poison  100,000 people. 86 
Among  this exposed group, Wein  later 
elaborated, more than  half would likely 
perish.87 Just  prior  to publication,  an  official 
of the Department  of Health  and Human 
Services requested that the journal  hold the 
piece, calling it  “a  road map for  terrorists.” 88 
After  a  brief delay  to review  the request,  the 
editors proceeded with  publication,  which 
NAS president Dr.  Bruce Alberts defended by 
noting  that  all of the information  that  could 
be useful to terrorists was “immediately 
accessible…through  a  simple Google 
search.”89  This is a  familiar,  yet  spurious, 
defense.  Putting aside that  simply  conceiving 
the attack  mode is an  important  element of 
every  plot,  the  existence of information  on 
the Internet is not  evidence of i ts 
h a r m l e s s n e s s . D i s p a r a t e , m u n d a n e 
information  can  be aggregated in  such  a  way 
that the ultimate product is highly sensitive.
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Aggregating Sensitive Public 
Information
The “Nth Country” experiment,  a  little-known 
exercise during  the Cold War, illustrates the 
potential dividend that  open-source research 
can  yield. In 1964, the U.S.  government 
recruited three young  physics postdocs with 
no knowledge of nuclear  weapons and tasked 
them  with  designing  a  bomb with  a 
“militarily  significant yield”  using  only  open-
source literature.   To the dismay  of many 
officials,  their ultimate design  was deemed 
workable. 90  In  a  later  instance,  journalist 
Howard Morland used public  information 
and expert  interviews to approximate the 
design  of a  hydrogen  bomb, which he 
described in  a  piece for  Progressive 
magazine.91  After  receiving  a copy  of the 
article,  the government  attempted to 
suppress its publication, setting  off a  highly 
public  legal battle. 92  Only  after  similar 
information  appeared in  a  separate 
publication  – its author  inspired by  the 
Progressive  case to commit an  act of civil 
disobedience – did the government  cease its 
attempt to silence Morland.93
A  more recent  case involves the doctoral 
dissertation  of Sean  Gorman, a George 
Mason University  graduate student. Gorman 
and his research  partner  used public 
information  culled from  the Internet to map 
the fiber-optic network that connects 
American  industry. The result was a  tool that 
a  government  official  described as a 
“ c o o k b o o k o f h o w  t o e x p l o i t  t h e 
v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f o u r  n a t i o n ’ s 
infrastructure.” 94 According  to its description 
in  the press, the tool allowed a  user  to “click 
on  a  bank  in Manhattan  and see who has 
communication  lines running into it and 
where… [or] drill  into a  cable  trench  between 
Kansas and Colorado and determine how  to 
create the most havoc with  a  hedge clipper.” 
When the pair  presented their  research  to a 
room  full of chief information  officers of U.S. 
financial firms, it was suggested that they  not 
be allowed to leave with  their  briefing. At  the 
urging  of government officials, the university 
directed that  only  general summaries of their 
findings be published.95  This outcome, in 
which  private citizens acted voluntarily  to 
mollify  the government,  provides some 
optimism  that  sensitive information  can  be 
protected without formal  restrictions. Yet  the 
ad hoc  nature of these interventions,  and the 
absence of a  culture of discretion  that  would 
make them  unnecessary,  ensures that much 
dangerous knowledge will  continue to be 
available.
IMPLICATIONS
Perhaps the greatest  obstacle to sanitizing 
discussion of sensitive information  is the 
unresolved question  of its harmfulness.  Since 
9/11,  vulnerabilities have been  identified in 
countless targets without terrorists ’ 
exploiting  them.   Several  high-impact, easily 
replicable attacks have occurred and have not 
been  copied.  Consider, for  example, the 
Beltway  Sniper  attacks, in  which  two snipers 
killed 10  people from  a  converted sedan  in 
October  2002. These shootings fairly 
traumatized the Washington, D.C., area  and 
are often  cited as an  ideal template for  future 
attacks.96  Yet  after  eight  years no similar 
attack  has occurred.  The few  attacks that 
have been attempted,  such  as Najibullah 
Zazi’s 2009  plot  to bomb the New  York City 
s u b w a y , h a v e r e q u i r e d n o s p e c i a l 
choreography  or  insight into security  gaps. 97 
While  this observation  might  explain  the 
c o m p l a c e n c y  s u r r o u n d i n g s e n s i t i v e 
information, a  spectacular  attack  may  quickly 
invalidate it,  especially  if such  information 
turns out  to have enabled its success.  The 
d a n g e r  o f d i s s e m i n a t i n g  s e n s i t i v e 
information  should be evaluated a priori and 
not on the basis of recent experience.
If one accepts the premise that  sensitive 
information  may  be useful to attentive 
adversaries, the central question is how  to 
manage this information  more appropriately. 
Previous wartime restrictions on  speech  are 
n e i t h e r p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e n o r 
technologically  feasible in the present day. 
Perhaps the most famous of these is the 1917 
Espionage Act, which  criminalized the 
transmission  of “information  relating  to the 
national defense”  to the country’s enemies. 98 
Latter-day  incarnations of this law  were 
proposed after 9/11,  such  as Dennis 
Pluchinsky’s suggestion—risible even  in  those 
fearful days – that  laws should be enacted 
“temporarily  restricting the media  from 
publishing  any  security  information that can 
be used by  our  enemies.” 99 Such  proposals 
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have little chance of enactment,  but 
variations are  being  pursued that are only 
slightly  less troubling.  The following 
discussion  examines the efficacy  of the 
government’s usual  approach  to managing 
sensitive information.  Additionally, several 
alternatives are put  forward that are both  less 
intrusive and potentially  more effective than 
the bald restrictions on  speech  that  are often 
proposed.
The Perils of Censorship
Even  when  the government has legitimate 
objections to the release of information, 
either  classified or  merely  sensitive,  efforts to 
suppress its publication  occasionally 
backfire.100 This occurred in 1979  when  the 
government  attempted to censor  Howard 
Morland’s hydrogen bomb article.  Hugh  E. 
DeWitt, a  retired government physicist,  noted 
then  that  the genesis of the controversy  was 
the Department  of Energy’s (DOE)  response 
to Progressive’s  editors,  who had submitted 
Morland’s manuscript  for  confirmation  of its 
technical  accuracy.  According  to DeWitt, 
“Had [DOE] responded with  their  usual  curt 
‘no comment’ the article would have 
appeared, attracted little attention, and been 
quickly  forgotten.” 101  The pursuit of an 
injunction  implicitly  confirmed the value of 
its content.  A  similar  episode unfolded in  late 
2010  when  the Pentagon purchased and 
destroyed 9,500 copies of Operation Dark 
Heart, the memoir  of a  former intelligence 
officer  in  Afghanistan.102  DoD officials had 
determined that  the book  contained classified 
operational  details.  However,  because dozens 
of advance copies had already  been 
distributed, comparison  of the censored 
second printing  with  the original  work 
allowed for the identification  of its sensitive 
revelations.103 As a  result  of the publicity,  the 
redacted version  of the book  soon topped 
Amazon’s bestseller list. 104
Stil l more vexing  than  protecting 
appropriately  classified information, which 
the government has a  clear justification to 
safeguard, is managing  the potential  harm  of 
unclassified information in  the public 
domain. As Science Editor-in-Chief Donald 
Kennedy  notes,  “[government officials]  can’t 
order  the nonpublication  of a  paper  just 
because they  consider  the findings ‘sensitive.’ 
No such category  short  of classification 
exists…” 105 Often  the appropriate response is 
not to impose formal restrictions at  all, which 
are likely  to be ineffective,  incompatible with 
the First  Amendment,  or  both. Indeed, the 
government’s inability  to silence WikiLeaks 
illustrates its impotence in  policing speech  in 
the Internet age.106  Public leaders should 
instead promote a  culture of voluntary 
restraint,  in  which  gratuitous revelations of 
sensitive information are collectively  frowned 
upon. After  9/11,  the government  took 
tentative steps to encourage this approach, 
but they  rarely  extended beyond the advice 
issued by  the National  Infrastructure 
Protection  Center,  which  asked Americans to 
“apply  common  sense in  deciding  what  to 
publish  on  the Internet.” 107  While many 
commentators would ignore any  request to 
r e f r a i n  f r o m  p u b l i s h i n g  s e n s i t i v e 
information,  even  a  small reduction in 
irresponsible discussion  would be preferable 
to the current paradigm.
Self-restraint as a Civic Duty
Changes in  societal mores are probably  more 
re s p ons ib l e t han  any  t e chnol og ica l 
development for  the increased traffic in 
sensit ive information.  Irresponsible 
disclosures frequently  occur without  any 
social penalty  for those who make them. This 
represents a  dramatic  shift  from  earlier 
generations,  when  cooperation  with  the 
government  on  security  matters was more 
uniform. In  one well-known  example, 
American  physic ists refrained from 
publishing results on nuclear  fission 
experiments during  World War  II for  fear of 
assisting  the Nazi bomb program.108  Even 
among  provocateurs,  there is precedent for 
self-restraint.  Daniel Ellsberg’s name is 
synonymous with  exposing  government 
secrets, having leaked the Pentagon  Papers. 
Yet  Ellsberg conscientiously  withheld four 
volumes regarding  sensitive negotiations out 
of concern that they  would disrupt the peace 
process. 109 Such  discretion can  still  be found, 
although it is uncommon enough  to be 
conspicuous. In  their  analysis of radiological 
terrorism, for  example,  James Acton et  al. 
stopped short  of revealing a  radiation 
immersion scenario that they  claimed would 
“readily  kill several hundreds and disrupt  a 
large city.”  As for  the specifics of the plot, 
they  wrote,  “We will  not  describe it.” 110 In an 
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earlier  episode, the government  sought a 
voluntary  embargo of the details of a  1984 
incident  in  which  religious cultists poisoned 
751  people in  Oregon  with  Salmonella. 
Fearing  the attack would inspire copycats, 
officials asked the Journal of the American 
Medical Association  to refrain  from 
describing  the method for  twelve years; the 
editors agreed.111
As an alternative to formal restrictions on 
communication, professional  societies and 
influential figures should promote voluntary 
self-censorship as a  civic  duty.  As this 
practice is already  accepted among many 
scientists, it  may  be transferrable to members 
of other professions. As part  of this effort, 
formal channels should be established in 
which  citizens can alert  the government to 
v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a n d o t h e r  s e n s i t i v e 
information  without  exposing it to a wide 
audience.  Concurrent  with  this campaign 
should be the stigmatization of those who 
recklessly  disseminate sensitive information. 
This censure would be aided by  the fact  that 
many  such  people are unattractive figures 
whose writings betray  their intellectual 
vanity.  The public  should be quick to furnish 
the opprobrium  that presently  escapes these 
individuals.  
The need to influence the behavior  of 
scientists is particularly  acute.  The Corson 
panel,  while expressing  little enthusiasm  for 
restrictions on  scientific communication, 
noted the existence of a  category  of research 
that  merited “limited restrictions short  of 
classification”  on  a  largely  voluntary  basis. 
This category  represented a  “gray  area”  lying 
between  research  that  can  be discussed 
openly  and that which  the government has 
good cause to classify. 112 While the need for 
voluntary  self-censorship among  scientists is 
already  well recognized, there is still  some 
resistance to the idea  that  scientific 
communication  should ever  be constrained. 
To wit, one of the researchers involved in  the 
Australian  mousepox  experiment defended 
their  publication  on the grounds that 
“Anything  scientifically  interesting  should be 
published.” 113  An  effort  must  be made to 
temper this attitude and make clear  that  the 
pursuit  of scientific knowledge does not 
abso lve re se arche rs o f the i r  soc ia l 
responsibility.
An  understandable objection to self-
censorship arises when one considers that 
huge quantities of classified  information  are 
being maliciously  leaked under  the auspices 
of WikiLeaks.  It  might seem  curious to 
criticize well-meaning  professionals for 
discussing  unclassified information  that  is far 
less damaging  than the genuine secrets being 
revealed.  Yet the nihilism  of this small group 
is not  the standard against  which  one’s 
actions should be measured. Nor  does it 
release conscientious citizens from  their  duty 
not to endanger the nation.
Self-censorship among Journalists
Outside of the laboratory, discretion  in 
national security  matters is nowhere more 
important than  in the field  of journalism. The 
World War  II-era  Office of Censorship owed 
much  of its success to the voluntary 
cooperation of the press.114  The relationship 
between  the government  and the media  is 
more adversarial today,  but  vestiges of past 
cooperation  remain.  For example, in 
journalist  Bob  Woodward’s account  of the 
2007  troop “surge” in  Iraq,  he pointedly 
refused to describe a secret  technology  used 
to target  insurgent leaders, which  he credited 
with  much  of the campaign’s success.115  In 
o t h e r  c a s e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  j o u r n a l i s t s ’ 
carelessness has caused considerable damage 
to the nation’s security. The authorized 
biography  of Timothy  McVeigh  provides a 
useful example. Based on  interviews with 
McVeigh, two journalists described in  detail 
the bomb he used in  the Oklahoma City 
attack,  including  its triply  redundant  fusing 
mechanism. 116  Because information  that 
appears in  major  newspapers or  works from 
leading  publishing  houses bears a  certain 
institutional  imprimatur,  terrorists may  find 
it  useful. Would-be bombers face the 
dilemma of not  knowing  which  of the 
multitude of Internet bomb designs are 
feasible, and operational  security  may 
preclude their  testing  a  device. Given  that 
McVeigh’s design  had been  dramatically 
demonstrated,  detailed instructions on  how 
to replicate it  should not  have been 
provided.117
Even more important  than  omitting 
certain sensitive details is to refrain  from 
sensational reporting that  magnifies rather 
than  diminishes security  threats. Calling 
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attention  to alarming information,  ostensibly 
to prompt its redress, may  instead compound 
the danger, especially  if a  remedy  is not 
practicable.  Once such  incident  took place in 
1975  when  Britain’s Sunday Times  reported 
that  the U.K. patent  office had allowed the 
formerly  secret  formula  for  the VX  nerve 
agent  to be published. 118  British  officials 
scrambled to remove the of fending 
documents from  public libraries.119 However, 
far  from  eliminating a  threat,  the story  drew 
attention  to information that  was already 
widely  available, having  been  declassified in 
several countries years before.120 One British 
patent  agent  noted that  “without the 
indiscretion  of the Sunday Times  an  amateur 
would have been  unable to identify  and locate 
the relevant  document.”121 Worse, according 
to Geoffrey  Forden,  the Times  story  was the 
catalyst  that initiated Iraq’s nerve gas 
program.122 Another  example can  be found in 
the reporting  on the WikiLeaks releases. 
Several media  outlets described a  leaked 
State Department  cable  that listed sites 
around the world whose destruction would 
“critically  impact”  U.S. national security. 
Among these were African  mines that 
produce cobalt  and bauxite as well as 
locations where underwater  communications 
cables reach  land.  One article defended these 
revelations on the specious grounds that  “any 
would-be terrorist with  Internet  access and a 
bit of ingenuity  might quickly  have 
identified”  the sites.123 Yet  as a  result  of this 
carelessness,  a  terrorist  would require neither 
ingenuity  nor  the  patience to scour  thousands 
of leaked documents to identify  the most 
sensitive information.
Journalists should be encouraged to resist 
the notoriety  that  attends such  reporting  by 
appeals to their  sense of civic  responsibility. 
However,  it  is not  the purpose of this essay  to 
suggest that self-censorship should always be 
the default response when  sensitive 
information  is obtained.  The media’s role in 
exposing  government incompetence plays a 
crucial  function  in  maintaining the nation’s 
civic  hygiene, and revealing  secrets is 
occasionally  necessary  for  this purpose. Yet 
for  revelations that  potentially  threaten 
public safety,  a set  of criteria should be 
established that assist  the media  in  choosing 
responsibly  between silence and disclosure. 
Regarding  security  vulnerabilities,  the crucial 
question  is whether  the potential exists for 
timely  remediation. If it  does not,  little is 
gained by  drawing attention  to weaknesses in 
the nation’s defenses. An  additional 
determinant  should be whether  alternative 
mechanisms exist  to alert the government  to 
a  deficiency. Here the government  has a  clear 
responsibility  to ensure that  public exposés 
are not  the only  means to correct a 
shortcoming in security.
CONCLUSION
Whatever  the excesses of the U.S. response to 
9/11,  avoiding  wholesale restrictions on  the 
discuss ion  of sensi t ive informat ion 
represents a  triumph  of moderation.  Yet  in 
o u r  r e v e r e n c e f o r  f r e e e x p r e s s i o n , 
communication  has been tolerated that 
carries considerable security  risks while 
delivering  questionable benefits to society. 
Greater discipline can  be imposed on  the 
discussion of sensitive information without 
formal, coercive restrictions on speech. 
Indeed, this effort  should be predicated on 
forestalling even  greater  erosions of liberties 
that  may  occur  after another  devastating 
attack.
Just  as the evolution  of social  mores has 
been a  factor  in  making  irresponsible 
communication  more acceptable,  efforts to 
discourage these discussions should center 
on  challenging  their  basic  appropriateness. 
Civic and professional leaders possess 
considerable power  to influence popular 
perception. This power  should be harnessed 
to place the burden of policing  irresponsible 
discussion  squarely  in  the hands of the 
public. Its success will ultimately  be achieved 
not  by  coercion  but  by  persuasion – 
specifically,  by  convincing citizens that  the 
government  is not the sole arbiter of the 
sensi t iv i ty  of information  and that 
responsibility  for  protecting the nation 
extends to every citizen who possesses it.
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A Guide for Homeland Security Instructors Preparing Physical 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Courses
Steven Hart and Jim Ramsay
ABSTRACT
Over 350 academic programs  in the  United 
States currently offer instruction in the field 
of homeland defense and security. In spite  of 
this growth at the program level over the 
past ten years, there still exists  a shortage of 
instructors  and coursework  in critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP).  Traditional 
i n s t r u c t o r p r e p a r a t i o n ( w h i c h i s 
accomplished through the attainment of an 
advanced degree coupled with research and 
professional experience) does  not currently 
produce enough instructors qualified in CIP 
because of the extremely limited number of 
CIP-related educational opportunities. 
Therefore, an alternate venue for instructor 
preparation must be provided. This  article 
addresses  that need by providing a guide  for 
educators  who desire  to engage in a 
deliberate self-study program  to develop 
sufficient expertise to teach  a first course in 
physical CIP at the undergraduate or 
master’s  degree level.  This  information is 
also useful for professionals  who have had to 
assume CIP-related duties  and functions 
w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t o f s u p p o r t i n g 
coursework. This  article introduces  a five-
part framework  for understanding CIP – 
policy,  networks, level of hazard, level of 
protection,  and system  design – and 
provides  resources  for understanding each 
part of the framework.  Each element of the 
framework  is  introduced and briefly 
explained and then resources  are presented 
which will allow  the reader to explore this 
particular topic in detail.  Where possible, 
resources are presented as web links to 
allow  the  reader to  directly  access  the 
learning resource,  free of charge. The article 
concludes with  guidance for adapting the 
five-part framework and the materials 
presented in designing a CIP course tailored 
to  the needs  of a specific  instructor and 
institution.
INTRODUCTION
Over  the past  fifty  years, as societies became 
more interconnected and interdependent,  our 
government  recognized the importance of 
protecting  the infrastructures that  are 
essential to the functioning of the nation.  In 
1963,  President Kennedy  established the 
National Communications System  (NCS) to 
ensure the federal  government’s ability  to 
communicate in  emergency  situations 
including nuclear  attack. In 1979,  the Federal 
Emergency  Management  Agency  (FEMA) 
was established with  responsibilities 
including civil  defense and hurricane and 
earthquake risk reduction. In the 1980s,  our 
c u r r e n t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure began  to evolve when 
President  Reagan,  in  an  executive order, 
charged the head of each  federal department 
and agency  with  the responsibility  of 
protecting essential resources and facilities 
within their organizations. 1
The first  World Trade Center  bombing 
(1993) and the bombing  of the Murrah 
Federal  Building  in  Oklahoma  City  (1995)  in 
the continental United States,  together  with 
the Sarin  gas attack in  a  Tokyo subway 
(1995), the bombings of the Nairobi,  Kenya 
and Dar  es Salaam,  Tanzania embassies 
(1998),  and the small boat  attack on  the USS 
Cole (2000) all  served to raise the awareness 
of acts of terror  within  the American people 
and government. Concurrent with  these 
events, policy  decisions were made by  the 
federal  government,  which  began  a 
coordinated effort  to protect critical 
infrastructures. In 1996, President  Clinton 
established the Presidential  Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection.  The work 
of the commission  resulted in  the definition 
of eight  critical infrastructure sectors in 
Presidential Decision Directive 63  (PDD63) 
in 1998.2  
The events of September  11,  2001  brought 
about a  rapid expansion of crit ical 
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infrastructure protection efforts. The first 
National Strategy for Homeland Security 
was published in  2002  and was followed by 
the National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures  and 
Key Assets  and Homeland Securi ty 
Presidential Directive 7, which replaced 
PDD63, in  2003. These documents expanded 
critical infrastructure to thirteen sectors and 
added five key  resources and led to the 
p u b l i c a t i o n  o f t h e f i r s t  N a t i o n a l 
Infrastructure Protection  Plan (NIPP) in 
2006,  with  the second edition  following in 
2009.  Currently,  the NIPP defines Critical 
Infrastructure as:3
Systems and assets, whether physical  or 
virtual, so vital  that the incapacity  or 
d e s t r u c t i o n  o f s u c h  m a y h a v e a 
debilitating impact on  the security, 
economy, public health  or safety, 
environment, or any  combination  of these 
matters, across any  Federal, State, 
regional, territorial, or local jurisdiction.
The eighteen  Critical Infrastructure and Key 
































Each  CIKR sector  and specific  components 
in  each  sector  have physical, human, and 
cyber  elements. The proportion  of these 
elements and the associated vulnerabilities 
vary  between  sectors. Some sectors such  as 
water, energy,  and government facilities rely 
heavily  on  physical  elements while others – 
like banking  and finance,  information 
technology,  and communications – have 
predominately cyber elements. 
This article  provides recommendations to 
educators and professionals who desire to 
increase their  knowledge, skills,  and abilities 
in  the protection  of physical  critical 
infrastructure elements for  the purpose of 
developing or  improving  courses in  critical 
infrastructure protection  (CIP).  The focus of 
this paper is on physical and human elements 
that  predominate in sectors such  as water, 
energy, government  facilities,  critical 
manufacturing, and dams.  The principles and 
concepts also extend to the physical elements 
of predominately  cyber  and human 
infrastructures like information  technology, 
communications, and banking and finance.  
Rather  than  being  simply  a  literature 
review,  this article points to selected 
elements of the literature and best  practices 
to enable a  prospective CIP instructor  to gain 
a  basic understanding of the fundamental 
aspects of CIP.  Each  section  begins with 
learning  objectives and then  provides 
suggested resources for  mastering  these 
objectives. The endnote references contain 
live links so the source documents can be 
directly  accessed from  the article. Each 
section  concludes with  a  statement  of what 
the reader  should be able  to accomplish  after 
studying the recommended documents and 
resources. A  disciplined application  of this 
program  of study  will provide the knowledge, 
skills,  and abilities to develop and teach  a  CIP 
course appropriately  flavored by  the 
instructor’s expertise and the institutions 
goals. 
In  addition  to educators,  another  group 
that can  benefit from  this article are 
professionals who have had to assume CIP 
related duties and functions without  the 
benefit  of supporting  education  and training. 
This document  provides an  outline for  a self-
directed course in  the physical and human 
aspects of critical infrastructure protection.  A 
disciplined application of this program  of 
study  will enable the reader  to better  perform 
CIP-related duties as they  pertain  to the 
physical and human dimensions.
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SAMPLE CIP PROGRAMS AND 
RESOURCES AROUND THE 
NATION
The prospective CIP instructor should begin 
by  reviewing  existing  programs teaching 
critical infrastructure protection. This is not 
done to copy  someone else’s program, but 
rather  to develop a  more comprehensive 
understanding  of the depth,  breadth,  and 
focus of existing CIP courses and programs. 
Additionally, understanding  the broader 
body  of work enables an  instructor  to decide 
which  of the many  aspects of CIP are 
appropriate for  in-depth  study  and inclusion 
in  a  particular  program’s course work. To 
that  end,  this section describes the content 
and location  of many  of the more notable CIP 
programs.
The Center  for  Homeland Defense and 
Security  (CHDS) is located in  Monterey, CA 
and is jointly  sponsored by  the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and FEMA’s 
National  Preparedness Directorate. In 
operation  since 2002,  the CHDS mission  is 
“To strengthen  the national security  of the 
United States by  providing  graduate level 
educational programs and services that  meet 
the immediate and long-term  leadership 
needs of organizations responsible  for 
homeland defense and security”  and the 
center  provides both  master  degrees and 
executive education  programs in  homeland 
security.4  CHDS also provides substantial 
resources to anyone engaging in  professional 
self-development or  developing a CIP course, 
most notably  through  the University  and 
Agency  Partnership Initiative  and Homeland 
Security  Self-Study  Courses,  which operate in 
a password-protected secure environment.
The University  and Agency  Partnership 
I n i t i a t i v e ( U A P I ) p r o v i d e s c o n t a c t 
information for  209  programs offering 
educational programs in  homeland security 
and defense. This portal  provides access to a 
wealth  of resources including recorded 
lectures, instructor  guides,  and upcoming 
homeland security  education conferences. 
Recommended courses and course content 
for  graduate and undergraduate homeland 
security  education  programs are also posted 
here.  The site contains presentations from 
the Homeland Security  and Education 
Summit held annually  for  the past  four  years. 
These presentations contain  information on 
how  educators from  all  over  the country  are 
teaching homeland security. 5
The Homeland Security  Self-Study  Course 
section  contains over  thirty  courses from 
schools in  the UAPI that  can be accessed by 
UAPI members. This information  ranges 
from  fully  interactive web-based instruction 
to outlines of course content.  The material 
can  be used for  self-study  by  prospective 
i n s t r u c t o r s ,  g u i d e l i n e s f o r  c o u r s e 
development, and supplemental material in 
coursework. Five of the courses available 
from  NPS through  this portal provide 
certificates of completion  that  can be used to 
satisfy  continuing professional  development 
requirements for  certain  professions and 
credential instructors.6 
The “Resources”  tab  on  the CHDS 
homepage contains a  link  to the Homeland 
Security  Digital Library,  an electronic 
collection of documents related to homeland 
security  policy,  strategy,  management,  and 
operations.  As of this writing, it  contains over 
73,200 items,  about half of which  require an 
authenticated login.7  Other  information 
available includes lectures, software, leader 
viewpoints,  and the current  Homeland 
Security  Book List.8 The philosophy  of CHDS 
is clearly  one of easy  access to shared 
information  and this is an  essential  resource 
in researching, learning, and teaching CIP.
Another  excellent source of information 
and different perspectives is the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection  Program  (CIP 
Program) at  George Mason  University 
(GMU).  The CIP Program  is sponsored by  the 
National Institute  of Standards and 
Technology  (NIST) and the Department  of 
Commerce and is located in  GMU’s School of 
Law. The CIP Program  conducts core 
research  on  CIP issues funded by  the NIST 
grant and externally  funded research  on 
infrastructure vulnerability, risk  mitigation, 
and infrastructure resilience.  Much  of the 
research  is archived and available on the 
website.  Another  excellent resource available 
through  GMU’s CIP Program  is The CIP 
Report,  a  monthly  electronic publication 
containing  short articles by  researchers, 
practitioners, and foundations on  a variety  of 
infrastructure-related topics.  Back  issues are 
archived so the evolution  of CIP related 
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issues can  be studied. Like CHDS, the GMU 
CIP Program  maintains an electronic  library 
of selected publications,  government 
documents,  and government  reports on  CIP 
related issues. 9
In  contrast  to the broad,  policy-focused 
educational mission  of the Center  for 
Homeland Defense and Security  and the 
research  focus of the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection  Program  at George Mason 
University, the Center  for  Infrastructure 
Protection  and Physical Security  (CIPPS) 
focuses on  the architecture, engineering, and 
design  of protective structures. CIPPS resides 
in  the University  of Florida’s Department  of 
Civil and Coastal  Engineering  and is led by 
Dr.  Ted Krauthammer,  a  noted researcher 
and designer  in  the realm  of blast resistant 
construction. CIPPS is an  engineering center 
within  an  engineering  school that is 
concerned with  issues of progressive collapse 
of large structures, software development, 
and the response of material  and structures 
to explosives loading.10 CIPPS also sponsors a 
weeklong  short  course on  the design  of 
modern  protective structures based on  Dr. 
Krauthammer’s book of the same name. 11
T w o o t h e r  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e - r e l a t e d 
university  programs bear  mentioning. First, 
the Institute for  Crisis,  Disaster,  and Risk 
Management  at The George Washington 
University  provides education  and research 
in  the areas of crisis, emergency,  and risk 
management.12  Second,  Carleton  University 
in  Ottawa,  Ontario, Canada established,  in 
2010, a  Master  of Infrastructure Protection 
and International Security  program.  This is a 
joint  project  between  the Norman  Paterson 
School of International Affairs and the 
Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering  with both  faculties providing 
instruction  and leadership. This promises to 
be a  unique program  and may  set  a  standard 
for  multi-disciplinary  education  in  this 
inherently multi-disciplinary field.13
A  review  of these academic programs 
demonstrates the complexity  and variety  of 
approaches currently  taken with  regard to 
CIP. After  reviewing  these programs, the 
prospective CIP instructor  can  see the 
different approaches of selected institutions 
to the complex  fields of homeland defense 
and security and CIP education.  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK CIP
A  review  of these programs can  leave a 
potential instructor  overwhelmed with the 
amount  of information  available and 
struggling to process it  all.  One of the critical 
pieces of information  that may  not  be readily 
apparent  is a  conceptual framework for 
organizing,  relating, and understanding  all of 
the information discovered in  such  a  review. 
Accordingly, the fol lowing  f ive-part 
conceptual  framework, graphically  illustrated 
in  Figure 1,  is suggested as a  tool  for  mentally 
organizing  and relating  CIP information. To 
borrow  a  mathematical term, each  concept is 
necessary, but  not  sufficient,  for  an overall 
understanding of CIP. 
Figure 1. CIP Conceptual Framework
Information  encountered during this 
review  process can  typically  be placed in one 
of these f ive categories, as wil l  be 
demonstrated in  the following  sections. 
Additionally,  this conceptual framework  can 
also be used to frame the objectives for  an 
introductory  CIP course.  Using  the 
framework as a tool  for  self-development and 
for  subsequent course design  ensures that 
instructor  preparation  is tightly  linked to 
classroom  instruction.  The program  of study 
proposed in  this article is organized around 
the five concepts in  this conceptual 
framework.
The CIP conceptual  framework  is rendered 
as sample course objectives in  Figure 2.  As is 
appropriate for  an  introductory  course, these 
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are at  the lower  three levels of Bloom’s 
taxonomy:  knowledge, comprehension,  and 
application.14 Achievement of these objectives 
results in  a student  who understands and can 
apply  the basic principles of CIP and is 
prepared to explore specific  topics in greater 
depth.
1. Explain national strategies and 
p o l i c i e s o n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
protection.
2. Identify critical components of a 
complex infrastructure network.
3. D e s c r i b e t h e A l l H a z a r d s 
Environment for those critical 
components.
4. Specify the level of  protection or 
resi l iency for those cri t ical 
components.
5. D e s c r i b e s y s t e m s d e s i g n 
concepts to achieve the desired 
protection and resiliency.
Figure 2. CIP Conceptual Framework Rendered 
as Course Objectives
POLICY
Investigation into the CIP conceptual 
framework begins with  the policy, strategy, 
plans, and laws that  establish  the operating 
environment  within  which  all CIP activities 
take place. The best place to start  is with  the 
two hour IS-860.a  National Infrastructure 
P r o t e c t i o n  P l a n  ( N I P P ) o n - l i n e 
correspondence course offered by  FEMA’s 
Emergency  Management  Institute (http://
www.training.fema.gov/).  FEMA’s IS-860a 
course  offers an  overview  of the NIPP,  which 
provides the structure and procedures for 
implementing  protection and resiliency  of 
critical infrastructure and key  resources.15 
This course on the NIPP does not start  at  the 
highest  level of policy,  but  it  provides a  basic 
understanding  of the implementing 
document  for  infrastructure policy. After 
completing  this course, read the documents 
that  led to the development  of the NIPP and 
place it in  a  broader  national context. 
Starting  with  the implementing  law, this 
process flows through  policy  to strategy  to 
subordinate strategies to implementing 
plans.
Simply  put,  a  law  is the authority  to do 
something  and the law  that leads to all  our 
efforts in  CIP is the Homeland Security  Act of 
2002.  This law  establishes and organizes the 
Department of Homeland Security,  including 
its subordinate directorates. It also 
establishes a  framework  for  the sharing, 
protection, and dissemination  of critical 
infrastructure information. 16  Most  of the 
agencies and departments working  on  CIP 
issues trace their origin to this law. 
Homeland Security  Presidential  Directives 
(HSPD) are the documents that  establish 
national policy.  Of these,  HSPD 7,  Critical 
Infrastructure Identification,  Prioritization, 
and Protection,  is essential to understanding 
CIP. HSPD 7  “establishes a  national  policy  for 
Federal  departments and agencies to identify 
and prioritize United States critical 
infrastructure and key  resources and to 
protect  them  from  terrorist attacks.”  This 
document establishes policy,  assigns roles 
and responsibilities to DHS,  sector-specific 
federal agencies, and other  departments, 
agencies, and offices and concludes with 
implementation guidance.17  Also related to 
overall  CIP efforts are HSPD 8,  National 
Preparedness, which  requires establishing a 
national domestic all-hazards preparedness 
goal and improves federal, state,  local,  and 
tribal  preparedness coordination, 18  and 
HSPD 5,  Management of Domestic Incidents, 
which  establishes the Nation Incident 
Management System. 19  A  list of all HSPD 
with  links to the complete documents is 
available on  the DHS website at http://
w w w . d h s . g o v / x a b o u t / l a w s /
editorial_0607.shtm. 
From  policy  flows strategy,  which may  be 
defined as the direction  and coordination  of 
all  national resources to achieve a  national 
policy.  The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security,  most  recently  published in  October 
2007, defines the hazardous environment 
currently  facing  the country  and establishes 
the strategic objectives to prevent terrorist 
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attacks, protect  people and cri t ical 
infrastructure,  and respond to and recover 
from  incidents.20 Within  this framework, The 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructures  and Key Assets, 
most recently  published in February  2003, 
promulgates national policy, guiding 
principles, and organization  for  protecting 
critical infrastructure.  This document 
additionally  addresses the partnerships 
necessary  between  government,  industry, and 
citizens to implement the strategy.21 
Conceptually, the NIPP follows from  The 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructures  and Key Assets 
and implements the policies described 
therein. In  implementing  the NIPP, each 
critical infrastructure sector  develops a  sector 
specific plan  that  implements the NIPP risk 
management framework.  The current 
versions of the thirteen  published sector-
specific  plans are available on the DHS 
website. 22 Potential instructors should review 
these plans to see how  the NIPP risk 
m a n a g e m e n t  f r a m e w o r k  h a s b e e n 
implemented under different conditions.
Organizationally,  the NIPP follows from 
The National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures  and 
Key Assets . Noting  the most recent 
publication  dates of these three documents 
highlights a  critical  issue that complicates 
trying to understand their  relationships. 
These documents are politically  driven  and 
change with  the political climate and 
leadership.  The process,  however,  is 
sometimes slow,  and is often  non-linear. The 
first  NIPP, published in 2006, implemented 
The National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures  and 
Key Assets  as published in 2003,  which was 
developed from  the 2002  version of The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
The current  National Strategy for Homeland 
Security  was published in 2007  under the 
previous presidential  administration  and the 
current NIPP in  2009  – while an updated 
version  of The National Strategy for the 
P h y s i c a l P r o t e c t i o n o f C r i t i c a l 
Infrastructures and Key Assets  – has yet  to 
be published. These politically  driven 
changes can lead to discontinuities between 
the documents and a  reader  should bear  in 
mind the document publication dates.
Taking  the IS-860.a  correspondence 
course  and studying  these documents will 
provide a  potential CIP instructor  a  sufficient 
depth  of knowledge to teach  an  introduction 
to CIP policy. This depth  of knowledge is 
sufficient for  an  introductory  CIP course,  but 
other  resources are available for  those 
instructors and programs seeking  greater 
depth  in  protection  policy  and its relationship 
to emergency  management. For  institutions 
focused at  the regional  or  state level, 
instructors will certainly  review  regional or 
state planning  documents. As a  prospective 
CIP instructor  seeks to expand his or  her 
expertise, the next  two documents of interest 
are most likely  the National Response 
Framework  (NRF)  which  “presents the 
guiding principles that  enable all  response 
partners to prepare for  and provide a  unified 
nat ional response to d isasters and 
emergencies - from  the smallest incident  to 
the largest catastrophe 23  and the National 
Incident Management System  (NIMS) which 
implements the NRF across all  levels of 
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  t h e a l l - h a z a r d s 
environment. 24 Fortunately,  FEMA’s EMI has 
two correspondence courses introducing 
these two documents.  The three-hour 
IS-800.b  National Response Framework, An 
Introduction  course is available at  http://
training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS800b.asp 
and the three-hour IS-700.a  National 
Incident Management System  (NIMS), An 
I n t r o d u c t i o n c o u r s e i s a t h t t p : / /
www.tra ining . fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/
is700a.asp.  
NETWORKS
Most  critical infrastructures are networks 
that  are intra-dependent  on  critical  assets 
within  the network and inter-dependent  on 
elements of other  critical infrastructures. 
These interconnected infrastructures behave 
as networks according to certain  principles 
and these principles can  reveal how  the 
network  will behave when  degraded by 
random  events or deliberate attack.  Potential 
CIP instructors must understand network 
behavior  to determine the critical  assets in 
any  system  and the critical connections 
between  systems.  This section provides 
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resources to enable potential CIP instructors 
to develop this understanding.
M u c h  o f t h e o r y  t h a t  r e l a t e s t o 
infrastructure networks is based on  the work 
of Albert  László Barabási. An  excellent 
primer  is available in  the article “Scale-Free 
Networks”  (published in Scientific  American)
25  which  explains the basic concepts and 
behaviors of different  types of networks and 
how  these concepts apply  to infrastructure.  A 
more rigorous treatment of medium  length 
on  the topic  is “The Structure and Function  of 
Complex Networks”  by  M.E.J. Newman 26 
from  2003. This article explains network 
analysis in  mathematical terms and its 
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o s o c i a l ,  i n f o r m a t i o n , 
technological,  and biological networks.  The 
article uses the work of Barabási but  also 
e x p l a i n s i t s s h o r t c o m i n g s i n  s o m e 
applications and considers the work of other 
network researchers.
Dr.  Ted G.  Lewis applies these concepts of 
network analysis to the field of critical 
infrastructure protection  in  his textbook 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in 
Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation.27 The book, which  resulted from  the 
development of a  course on  this topic at  the 
Naval Postgraduate School, presents a 
scientific  treatment  of infrastructure 
networks and provides tools to assess the 
vulnerability  of these networks. An on-line 
version  of this course and selected topics 
from  the textbook is available through  the 
Center  for Homeland Defense and Security 
Homeland Security  Self Study  Course section 
previously discussed. 
Upon reading  these two articles and 
completing  this course,  the prospective CIP 
instructor  will be able to describe the 
principles of network science, explain  the 
behavior  of an  infrastructure network 
according  to these principles, and determine 
the critical  elements within  an infrastructure 
network. For the potential  instructor who 
desires a  deeper  understanding  of network 
science or  additional network tools the 
following resources are suggested. 
The Center for Computational  Analysis of 
Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) 
is a  university  wide center at Carnegie Mellon 
University  conducting multi-disciplinary 
research  on  network  dynamics.  From  this 
site, a  free software package called ORA 
(Organizational Risk  Analyzer) can be 
downloaded. ORA  is designed for  social 
network analysis but is readily  adaptable for 
analyzing  inter- and intra-dependencies of 
infrastructures. ORA  provides statistical  tools 
for  network analysis, network  visualization 
tools including  an  option for  geospatial 
visualization,  and time based change 
d e t e c t i o n . 28  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e 
Interdisciplinary  Center for Network Science 
and Application  at  the University  of Norte 
Dame addresses network  science problems in 
social,  biological,  organizational,  technical, 
and defense systems. The webpage contains 
an  extensive list  of links to network  related 
publications. 29
Each  of these resources provides 
information  on  how  to analyze networks,  but 
not on  where or  how  to collect  the network 
data  to be analyzed.   One source of 
nationwide infrastructure data  is the DHS 
Integrated Common Analysis Viewer  (iCAV), 
a  web based,  secure, geospatial visualization 
t o o l t h a t p r o v i d e s a c c e s s t o 4 0 0 
infrastructure data  layers, population 
information,  weather  information, and 
analysis tools.  It  is useful for  providing data 
for  analysis in  other  programs such as ORA, 
situational  awareness, and emergency 
response.  Access is through  the Homeland 
Security  Information  Network (HSIN), and 
HSIN accounts are available through  the 
DHS website.30   Clicking  the link  in  the 
footnote will take one to the appropriate page 
to request HSIN and iCAV access.
LEVEL OF HAZARD - LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION
At this point a  prospective CIP instructor 
understands national and regional policy  on 
infrastructure protection  and is able to 
identify  the critical  elements within  an 
infrastructure network. With  this knowledge, 
the next questions are obvious,  “What can  go 
wrong  with  those critical elements and what 
should be done about it?”  While the 
questions may  be phrased and investigated 
separately,  they  are linked through  the risk 
management  process.  Investigation of this 
process begins with  understanding  these  key 
definitions.
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Risk: The potential for  an unwanted 
outcome resulting  from  an incident, 
event, or  occurrence, as determined by 
its likelihood and the associated 
consequence.31 
Risk Analysis: The process of 
determining relative levels of risk  for  a 
group of assets, generally  a  function  of 
threat likelihood, asset  value, and 
consequence.32
Risk Management: The process of 
evaluating  how  changes in  applied 
countermeasures affect risk levels and 
costs for  the purpose of decision 
making.33
When considering  risk, the undesirable 
outcomes are described in  the All Hazards 
Environment.   To consideration  of threats 
and hazards,  risk analysis adds consideration 
of the value of the asset  and the consequence 
of its loss or  damage to determine a relative 
level of risk.  Then  appropriate levels of 
protection  considering  cost  and acceptable 
risk are selected through  an  appropriate risk 
management procedure.  In  studying  the 
following  resources,  the  prospective CIP 
instructor  develops the ability  to balance the 
level of hazard with  an  appropriate level  of 
protection  through  the risk  management 
process. 
THE ALL HAZARDS 
ENVIRONMENT
T h e N I P P d e f i n e s t h e A l l  H a z a r d s 
Environment  as “a grouping  classification 
encompassing all conditions,  environmental 
or  manmade, that  have the potential to cause 
injury, illness,  or  death; damage to or loss of 
equipment,  infrastructure services,  or 
property; or  alternatively  causing functional 
degradation  to social ,  economic, or 
environmental aspects.” 34  One way  to make 
this more manageable is to consider 
terrorism, earth  effects and natural disasters, 
accidents,  and deterioration  individually. 
Since terrorism  and earth effects and natural 
disasters have been  the areas of greatest 
concern  and most  recent  research,  they  will 
be discussed in  detail  here. Accidents and 
deterioration  are currently  best studied 
through  current events.  It  may  be that  recent 
events such  as the I-35  bridge collapse and 
the Deepwater  Horizons explosion (BP oil 
spill in  the Gulf of Mexico) and resulting oil 
leak lead to the establishment  of centers to 
study these issues.
TERRORISM
The impact of terrorism  has been  a  driving 
force in  the need for  improving critical 
infrastructure protection, but  the threat  of 
terrorism  is not new.  Many  would agree with 
the statement that,  “the complexity  of the 
modern  world and the intr icacy  of 
international relations allow  guerrilla  warfare 
to be drawn  out by  new  methods of deceit 
and subversion.  In  many  causes the  use of 
terrorism  is regarded as a  new  way  to wage 
war.”  However, most  would be surprised that 
the source of this quotation is the Second 
Vatican Council  in  1965 35.  While large-scale 
t e r r o r i s m  m a y  b e a  r e l a t i v e l y  n e w 
phenomenon  for  the United States, other 
areas of the world have been  dealing  with  it 
for  many  years. For  the prospective CIP 
instructor, several  references are useful in 
gaining both  a  historical and current 
understanding of this “new way to wage war.”
One starting point  is A Military Guide to 
Terrorism  in the Twenty-First Century. 
Though  published for  the U.S. Army, it  is 
useful to anyone interested in  terrorism  and 
p r o v i d e s a  c o n c i s e s u m m a r y  f o r 
understanding  it. The Guide  is an overview 
document  describing terrorist  behavior, 
motivation, and operations that is supported 
by  six  supplements.36  Supplement  1,  Terror 
Operations: Case Studies  in Terrorism, 
contains descriptions and assessments of six 
terrorist  incidents: the Tokyo subway  sarin 
attack, the Murrah Federal  Building 
bombing, the Khobar  Towers bombing, the 
USS Cole  bombing,  the July  7,  2005  London 
bombings, and the Beslan  hostage crisis and 
mass murder. 37  Supplement  2, Critical 
Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism, 
examines the history  of critical infrastructure 
protection  and provides guidance in 
assessing  threats to critical infrastructure. 38 
These documents,  along  with the other 
supplements, are readily available on line.
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The U.S.  government  maintains several 
terrorism  information  and intelligence 
resources available  on  line that provide up to 
date information  on  terrorist activity. The 
U.S. Department of State Office of the 
C o o r d i n a t o r  f o r  C o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m 
coordinates government  policies and 
programs aimed at  countering  terrorism 
overseas.  This office produces and maintains 
on  line the congressionally  mandated 
Country Reports  on Terrorism,  which,  in 
2004,  replaced the previously  published 
Patterns of Global Terrorism. 39 The Federal 
Bureau  of Investigation (FBI)  maintains a 
counterterrorism  homepage that contains 
information  on the most-wanted terrorists, 
w o r l d w i d e t h r e a t s ,  a n d t e r r o r i s m 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 40  T h e N a t i o n a l 
Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC),  in 
operation  since 2004, operates under  the 
Office  of the Director of National Intelligence 
and is responsible for threat  analysis and 
information  sharing.  From  their  website,  the 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking  System 
(WITS) can be accessed. The WITS is a 
searchable and sortable database that  also 
has a  mapping  capability  enabling  a  user  to 
plot terrorist  events based on  a  variety  of 
criteria. Publications,  including  the NCTC 
Report on Terrorism  and the Intelligence 
Guide for First Responders  are available on 
t h e w e b s i t e .41  W h i l e m u c h  o f t h e 
counterterrorism  work  of the Central 
Intelligence Agency  is classified,  unclassified 
extracts are available at  the Center  for  the 
Study  of Intelligence along with  information 
on relations with academic institutions. 42
The National Consortium  for  the Study  of 
Terrorism  and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) is a  DHS center  of excellence based 
at  the University  of Maryland. START 
research  is focused in three areas: terrorist 
group formation  and recruitment,  terrorist 
group persistence and dynamics,  and societal 
responses to terrorist  threats and attacks. 
One very  useful tool on  the START website, 
www.start.umd.edu/start/, is the Global 
Terrorism  Database (GTD). The GTD is an 
open-source searchable database containing 
information  on  over  80,000  cases from  1970 
to 2010  with  the most  recent  update posted 
July  2, 2010. Another useful tool is the 
Terrorist  Organization  Profiles,  a  searchable 
database of 800 terrorist  organizations last 
updated on  March  1, 2008. Both  of these 
databases were created by  the Memorial 
Institute for  the Prevention of Terrorism  but 
are now being managed by START.43 
The Memorial Institute for  the Prevention 
of Terrorism  (MIPT) has its origins in  the 
responses to the 1995  attack on  the Alfred P. 
Murrah  Federal  Building in  Oklahoma  City.  It 
began  operations in  2000 and is a  non-profit 
organization  focused on  preventing terrorism 
through  research, knowledge bases, and 
training.  MIPT is supported by  the FEMA 
National Preparedness Directorate,  Training 
Division  and provides counter-terrorism 
training to the Nation’s 850,000 uniformed 
law  enforcement  officers. MIPT  Lawson 
Library  consists of the Terrorism  Resource 
Guide, a  series of links to terrorism  data 
bases,  studies and reports,  and counter-
terrorism  foundations; the Law  Enforcement 
Guide, an  extensive collection  of intelligence 
and policing resources; and the Open  Access 
Journals and Magazines section, links to 
open access,  professional  intelligence, 
homeland security,  and law  enforcement 
publications. 44
The Combating  Terrorism  Center  (CTC) at 
West  Point  conducts educational programs 
and scholarly  research  on  terrorist  threats 
facing  the United States.  Their educational 
programs have served the Fire Department of 
New  York and the FBI. Each  month, the CTC 
publishes the CTC Sentinel electronic 
newsletter  to disseminate research, 
contemporary  threat  analysis,  and recent 
terrorist  activities. The CTC Sentinel and 
other  research, links, and resources is 
available on the CTC’s website. 45
After studying  these sources,  the 
prospective CIP instructor  can  describe the 
historical impact and development  of 
terrorism, describe current trends, tactics, 
and targets of terrorism,  and use terrorism 
databases in  support  of education and 
research. While  terrorist  events can  be very 
devastating,  they  are extremely  unlikely  when 
compared to natural events that are more 
common,  and can  cause greater  human  and 
economic dislocation.
EARTH EFFECTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS
Most  individuals,  communities, and regions 
are much  more likely  to deal  with  earth 
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effects and natural  disasters than  they  are 
with  terrorism.  Unlike terrorism, earth 
effects and natural  disasters can be modeled 
probabilistically  based on  over  100  years of 
collected data. Several resources are available 
to assist potential  CIP instructors in 
understanding  and describing  the hazards 
posed by  earth  effects and natural disasters 
several centers are currently  involved in 
mitigation of these hazards.
The principal  source of data on earth 
effects and natural disasters is the United 
States Geological Survey  (USGS) whose 
website contains specific information  on 
earthquakes,  floods,  hurricanes,  landslides, 
tsunamis, volcanoes, and wildfires. Fact 
sheets, disaster  trends, engineering  design 
data, and current,  real-time hazards are 
available within  each of these categories.46 
For  example,  a  fact  sheet  on  flood hazards, 
flow  estimates for  rivers in Tennessee,  an 
explanation  of the term  “100 year  flood,”  and 
Large Floods in the United States: Where 
They Happen and Why  can all be found in 
the f lood hazard section. 47  Similar 
information  is available for  the other  earth 
effects. Also available is the Natural Hazards 
Support  System, which  reports real-time data 
on  current  natural  hazard events. Sample 
output  from  this system  collected on June 1, 
2010  is shown  in  Figure 3. 48 While the USGS 
specifies hazards,  other resources must  be 
accessed to describe and understand 
mitigation efforts.
The Natural Hazards Center  (NHC) at  the 
University  of Colorado at  Boulder focuses on 
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Figure 3. Natural Hazard Support System Screenshot Captured June 1, 2010
the social  science and policy  aspects of hazard 
mitigation and disaster preparedness, 
response, and recovery. The NHC supports a 
wide variety  of research  and publications, 
much  of which  is available on their  website.49 
The Department  of Homeland Security 
Center  of Excellence – Natural  Disaster, 
Costal Infrastructure,  and Emergency 
Management (DIEM) is headquartered at  the 
University  of North  Carolina  at Chapel  Hill 
w i t h  p a r t n e r s f r o m  n i n e t e e n  o t h e r 
institutions.  The DIEM focuses on  four  areas: 
Costal Hazard Modeling, Engineering 
Resil ience in  the Built  and Natural 
Environments, Disaster  Response and Social 
Resilience,  and Resilience Planning. DIEM 
research  available on their  website includes 
the Deepwater  Horizons oil spill,  Haiti  and 
Chile Earthquakes, and the Hazard Research 
Colloquia  Series. 50  The National  Science 
Foundation  supports three earthquake 
engineering research  centers: the Pacific 
Earthquake Engineering Research Center 
(PEER) led by  the University  of California, 
Berkeley,51  the Multidisciplinary  Center for 
Earthquake Engineering Research  (MCEER) 
headed by  the University  of Buffalo,  The 
State University  of New  York, 52 and the Mid-
A m e r i c a E a r t h q u a k e C e n t e r ( M A E ) 
headquartered at  the University  of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign.53  All  three centers 
support  the work  of geologists,  engineers, 
and social scientists conducting  research  on 
e a r t h q u a k e s , e a r t h q u a k e r e s i s t a n t 
construction,  and potential earthquake 
hazards.  Review  of the websites of these 
organizations and the materials contained 
therein  provides a  perspective on the current 
state of the art for mitigating hazards through 
engineering design.
After  studying  these resources,  the 
prospective CIP instructor  should be able to 
describe the different earth  effects and 
natural disasters in  both  engineering  and 
societal  terms as well as articulate current 
efforts to quantify  and understand these 
hazards and implement engineering  and 
societal responses to them. 
ANALYZING AND MANAGING 
RISK
RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk  analysis methodologies calculate a 
relative level of risk  for  an  asset based on  a 
set  of criteria.  One example of this is 
Engineering Security: Protective Design for 
High Risk Buildings,  published by  the New 
York City  Police  Department in  2009.  It 
contains a  methodology  to rank  major 
buildings into low, medium, and high  hazards 
as well as limited design recommendations 
for  high  hazard facilities.  A  building’s risk  tier 
is determined based on  threat,  vulnerability, 
and impact  and considers the following sub-













• Critical Infrastructure Proximity
This process allows New  York  City  to 
identify  the highest hazard buildings within 
the metropolitan  area. While it is useful  for 
this purpose, i t also highlights the 
shortcomings of relying  solely  on  risk 
analysis.  This method is only  suitable under 
one set of specific  conditions: large buildings 
located in  an  extremely  large metropolitan 
area.  Its measure of risk  is both relative and 
qualitative and can only  result  in  statements 
such  as,  “The risk  to Building  A  is ‘high’ while 
the risk  to Building  C is ‘low.’”   Most 
important ly , i t does not  conta in a 
methodology  of directly  evaluating  the 
reduction in  risk due to specific action and 
comparing  the cost effectiveness of 
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competing  risk reduction  strategies. 54  To 
alleviate this shortcoming, one must  progress 
beyond risk analysis to risk management.
RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk  management  involves the identification, 
consideration,  selection, implementation, 
and continuous evaluation  of risk  mitigation 
strategies.  It  is begins with  a  risk  analysis, but 
results in  a  changed, and hopefully  improved, 
risk  posture. Three risk  management 
frameworks are presented here. In  studying 
these frameworks, the potential  CIP 
instructor  will gain  an  appreciation of the 
principles of risk  management and how  they 
are applied in  the context of different 
frameworks.
The Risk Management Series from  FEMA 
is an  ongoing effort to publish  techniques, 
tools,  and guidance to reduce the impact of 
threats and hazards to society  and the built 
environment.  All publications, along with 
several training courses, are available on the 
FEMA  website at http://www.fema.gov/
plan/prevent/rms/index.shtm#2. The 
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings,  FEMA 
426 is an  excellent first  reference for 
understanding counter-terrorism  risk 
management. The six  step process addresses 
the elements shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Risk Management Process of FEMA 42655
The asset  valuation  section  considers a 
building’s core functions, the individual 
infrastructure elements within  the building, 
and the impact  of the loss of each  element. 
The Threat/Hazard Assessment  section 
considers twelve different  human  caused 
threats to building  elements but  does not 
address natural hazards.  The Vulnerability 
A s s e s s m e n t s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s s i t e 
characteristics, population, and other  factors 
to measure a  building’s vulnerability. Relative 
Risk  is then assessed as a  function  of Asset 
Value, Threat Rating,  and Vulnerability 
Rating  for each  asset or  system  against 
multiple different threats.  High-risk  areas are 
then  targeted for  mitigation  using  strategies 
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that  address site layout,  building  design, blast 
resistance, and chemical,  biological, and 
radiological considerations.56 
The Reference Manual provides a 
comprehensive approach  to risk management 
that  is useful  for  professional self-
development, application to actual projects, 
and classroom  instruction.  Its major 
limitations are that  it  is focused solely  on 
buildings and the mitigation chapters address 
general  strategies rather  than  specific  design 
requirements.
Because of the scope of their construction 
program  and real estate holdings as well as 
the threat  of terrorist attack,  the Department 
of Defense,  has established a  series of 
planning  and design manuals that establish  a 
minimum  level  of protection  and a  procedure 
for  designing facilities that  demonstrate a 
requirement  for higher  levels of protection. 
The baseline standard,  detailed in  UFC 
4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards  for Buildings, applies to all new 
and substantially  renovated facilities and is 
focused on  preventing mass casualty  events. 
The risk management process, outlined in 
UFC 4-020-01, DoD Security Engineering 
Facilities  Planning Manual,  is very  similar  to 
the risk  management process of FEMA  426 
shown  in  Figure 4. The UFC 4-020-01 
process considers a  variety  of assets within 
different facilities,  relative values of these 
assets,  multiple aggressor  categories,  and a 
wide array  of aggressor  tactics. Initial  and 
adjusted levels of protection  are selected 
based on  asset  value, threat  likelihood, and 
effectiveness of protection.  This manual  also 
provides detailed design  guidance on  how  to 
construct  a  facility  to achieve a  specific  level 
of protection  and the increase in  cost  above 
conventional  construction,57  which  FEMA 
426 does not do. 
In  addition  to these two manuals, the UFC 
S e c u r i t y  E n g i n e e r i n g  S e r i e s i s a 
comprehensive set of manuals that  covers 
many  aspects of antiterrorism  planning  and 
design.  The series is available online at  the 
W h o l e B u i l d i n g  D e s i g n  G u i d e 
(www.wbdg.org).  The WBDG is managed by 
the National  Institute of Building Sciences 
and combines government criteria,  non-
government  standards, research, and design 
guidance to achieve high-performance 
buildings.58 The principle disadvantage of the 
UFC series is that  some of the manuals are 
classified For  Official  Use Only  (FOUO), 
meaning  that  their  release is restricted to 
g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c i e s a n d s e l e c t e d 
contractors. Accordingly,  this series is not 
generally  recommended as a  textbook or 
course  reference where the FOUO material 
cannot be accessed.
While  the New  York  City  manual  provides 
only  risk  analysis and FEMA  426  and UFC 
4-020-01  focus on risk  management for 
buildings, the risk  management framework of 
the NIPP is a  general process that can be 
applied to individual assets,  systems, 
networks,  and even entire infrastructure 
sectors. The framework is a  closed loop 
process represented graphically  in  Figure 5. 
It has six  steps and works across physical, 
cyber, and human  dimensions.59 Since it  is a 
framework rather  than  a process or  method, 
the NIPP describes what  must be done in 
each  step.  How  this is accomplished is left to 
the agency implementing the framework.  
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Figure 5. NIPP Risk Management Framework60
The NIPP Risk Management  Framework 
has the advantage of being general enough  to 
be applicable to almost  any  infrastructure 
asset. The accompanying disadvantage is that 
it  lacks the detailed procedures to be applied 
to a specific infrastructure asset.  It  is 
essential for  understanding  and executing 
infrastructure protection  in  a  general sense, 
b u t  m u s t  b e p a i r e d w i t h  d e t a i l e d 
methodologies, research,  and analysis for 
practical application. By  applying this 
framework, CIP practitioners can relate a 
desired level of protection to an  identified 
level of hazard,  implement  the programs to 
achieve the level of protection, and assess the 
effectiveness of the programs.
After  studying  the Engineering Security: 
Protective Design for High Risk Buildings 
process of risk  analysis, the FEMA  426  and 
UFC 4-020-01  methods of risk management, 
and the NIPP Risk Management  Framework, 
the prospect ive CIP instructor can 
differentiate between  risk analysis and risk 
management, relate level of protection  and 
level of hazard through  a  risk  management 
process,  and explain  how  risk  management 
applies to infrastructure sectors at large. 
FURTHER STUDIES IN RISK MANAGEMENT
While  the procedures of FEMA  426  and UFC 
4-020-01  work well  when applied to 
buildings, they  are not suitable under  other 
conditions.  To address risk in  other 
infrastructure facilities and sectors, different 
methods are required. MSRAM,  the Maritime 
Security  Risk Analysis Model, is a  tool used 
by  the United States Coast Guard to assess 
and manage critical infrastructure risk in  our 
nation’s ports. 60 The Transit Risk  Assessment 
Methodology  (TRAM) arose from  the efforts 
of the Port  Authority  of New  York and New 
Jersey  to develop a  risk based funding 
allocation  strategy  for  the protection  of 
transportation  assets and has since been used 
b y  m a n y  r e g i o n a l  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n 
authorities. 61  RAMCAP (Risk Analysis and 
Management for  Critical Asset  Protection) is 
a  product of the American  Society  of 
M e c h a n i c a l E n g i n e e r s I n n o v a t i v e 
Technologies Institute (ASME-ITI).   The 
current  version,  RAMCAP Plus,  includes 
protection  and resilience themes and can  be 
applied to a  wide range of facilities from 
college campuses to industrial facilities. 
ASME-ITI, together with  the American  Water 
Works Association  (AWWA), has recently 
adapted the  RAMCAP methodology  to 
publish  a  new  ANSI standard J100 RAMCAP 
Risk  and Resilience Management of Water 
and Wastewater Systems.62 Like FEMA  426 
and UFC 4-020-01,  these risk  tools are 
appropriate for  managing risk  in  discrete 
infrastructure elements and systems. 
At the infrastructure sector  level,  the 
application  of the NIPP Risk Management 
Framework can  be seen  in  the thirteen 
currently  published CIKR Sector Specific 
Plans.  For  example,  the Dam  Sector  Specific 
Plan explains the Consequence-Based Top-
Screen process used to conduct a  sector wide 
risk assessment  and program  prioritization.63 
In  contrast, the Water  Sector  Specific  Plan 
applies the NIPP Risk  Management 
Framework in  the context of the Safe 
Drinking  Water and Clean  Water  Acts to an 
infrastructure with  over  160,000  individual 
systems that are locally  owned and operated 
yet  highly  inter-dependent  with  other 
infrastructures.64  Sector  Specific Plans are 
also published for  Agriculture and Food, 
Banking  and Finance,  Chemical,  Commercial 
Faci l i t ies ,  Communicat ions,  Cri t ical 
Manufacturing, Defense Industrial Base, 
Energy, Information  Technology,  and 
National Monuments and Icons and 
demonstrate the application  of the NIPP Risk 
Management  Framework across different 
infrastructures.65
These are examples of actual risk 
management  tools currently  in  use.   While 
they  might  be too advanced for  an 
introduction  to risk  course,  they  are certainly 
the standard for  advanced courses and 
professional applications in  CIP and risk 
management.
SYSTEM DESIGN
The design of protective systems is perhaps 
the broadest topic  in  the CIP conceptual 
framework and the course of investigation  a 
prospective CIP instructor  would naturally 
follow  depends on  program  focus.  However, a 
complete protective system  encompasses 
physical,  human,  and cyber  elements. The 
physical  design  of the facility  tends to be the 
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province of engineers and architects while 
physical security  or  law  enforcement 
professionals address the equipment  and 
procedures employed by  the personnel using 
and securing  the facility. On top of these are 
the elements of cyber  security,  including 
information  assurance,  information  security, 
and control and defense of SCADA 
(supervisory  control  and data  acquisition) 
systems. A  prospective CIP instructor  does 
not need to be an expert  in  each of these 
f i e l d s b u t s h o u l d h a v e a  g e n e r a l 
understanding  of each  and how  they  relate to 
one another. Basic information on  these 
areas is readily  available from  a  variety  of 
open source resources and written  in 
layman’s terms. In  studying  these  resources, 
the potential  CIP instructor  develops the 
a b i l i t y  t o d e s c r i b e t h e p r o c e s s e s , 
considerations,  and design  constraints 
necessary for a complete protective system.
THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION—DESIGN 
CONCEPTS FOR BUILDINGS
Buildings and the people,  processes, and 
equipment  they  house are a  component of 
every  infrastructure system  and they  must  be 
protected from  terrorist  attack and natural 
hazards.   In many  of these cases,  particularly 
f o r  h u m a n - a n d c y b e r - f o c u s e d 
infrastructures, the purpose of the building  is 
protection  of the infrastructure. Therefore,  all 
CIP professionals and educators should be 
familiar  with  the fundaments of building 
performance. The single best  resource for 
gaining a conceptual understanding of 
protective design  against  a  variety  of threats 
and hazards is the resource page of the Whole 
Building  Design  Guide available at  http://
www.wbdg.org/resources/rpindex.php#.66 
The articles are prepared by  a  variety  of 
professionals from  different architectural and 
engineering  firms and generally  follow  the 
format of Introduction,  Description, 
Fundamentals,  Applications, Relevant  Codes 
and Standards, and Additional Resources.  A 
recommended set of articles for  gaining  a 
conceptual understanding  of protective 
design  is included in  Table 1  (below). Reading 
these articles does not make one an 
engineering  design  professional.  Instead,  the 
articles provide an  understanding  of how 
engineers and architects approach protective 
design  and the difficulties in  associated with 
this complex topic.





Blast Safety of the Building Envelope
Designing Buildings to Resist Explosive Threats
Retrofitting Existing Buildings to Resist Explosive Threats
Landscape Architecture and the Site Security Design Process




Flood Resistance of the Building Envelope
Seismic Design Principles
Seismic Safety of the Building Envelope
Wind Safety of the Building Envelope
Planning
Balancing Security/Safety and Sustainability Objectives
Cost Impact of the ISC Security Design Criteria
Threat/Vulnerability Assessments and Risk Analysis
UFC/ISC Security Design Criteria Overview and Comparison
HART AND RAMSAY, GUIDE FOR CIP COURSES  15
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, (MAY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Prospective CIP instructors in  engineering 
programs are probably  familiar  with  seismic, 
flood,  and wind design  procedures and may 
want to explore the technical aspects of blast 
design  in  more depth.  Throughout  the 1990s, 
conventional  blast resistant design  tended to 
focus on  accidental explosions.  Army 
Technical  Manual (TM) 5-1300, Structures  to 
Resist the Effects  of Accidental Explosions, 
dated 1990  is a  guide for  protective design  of 
facilities for the production,  testing,  storage, 
and demilitarization  of explosive material. 67 
Although  TM 5-1300  is focused on accidental 
explosions rather  terrorist  acts,  the science 
behind this document  formed the basis for 
many  current  publications.  Design of Blast 
Resistant Buildings  in Petrochemical 
Facilities,  published by  the American Society 
of Civil Engineers in  1997,  provides 
guidelines for  the design of buildings 
s u b j e c t e d t o a c c i d e n t e x p l o s i o n  i n 
petrochemical  facilities.  The progressive 
collapse of the Murrah  Federal Building  in 
Oklahoma  City  on  April  19, 1995  and the 
events of September  11, 2001  resulted in 
protective design  manuals focused on 
protecting structures and occupants from 
terrorist bombings. Structural  design  to 
prevent  progressive collapse has been 
addressed by  the American  Institute of Steel 
Construction  in  Blast and Progressive 
Collapse, 68  and in the Unified Facilities 
Criteria  4-023-03  Design of Buildings to 
Resist Progressive Collapse. 69  The UFC 
series also addresses topics of electronic 
security  systems, vehicle barriers,  direct fire 
weapons effects,  and airborne chemical, 
biological, and radiological protection. 
Finally, the American  Society  of Civil 
Engineers is developing  a  voluntary  standard 
on  Blast Protection of Buildings  (expected to 
publish  in  2011).  These are technical design 
manuals that  are only  of interest  to, and 
should only  be employed by, engineering 
professionals.
After  reviewing the materials through  the 
W h o l e B u i l d i n g  D e s i g n  G u i d e , t h e 
prospective CIP instructor  can  describe the 
engineering,  architectural,  and site design 
approaches to hardening facilities against 
terrorist threats and natural  disasters. 
Furthermore,  the instructor  can  discuss the 
cost  implications of increasing physical 
protection  and the tradeoffs between security 
and other  concerns including sustainability 
and accessibility.  Prospective CIP instructors 
in  engineering programs should also be 
familiar  with  current codes and standards for 
blast  resistant  construction and prevention of 
progressive collapse.
THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION — DESIGN 
C O N C E P T S F O R O T H E R P H Y S I C A L 
ELEMENTS
The resources for  understanding  the physical 
protection  of buildings are robust  and 
accessible at  a  non-technical  level,  primarily 
because everyone is familiar  with, routinely 
uses, and is interested in  the protection and 
resilience of where they  live and work.  The 
resources for  other  physical infrastructure 
sectors are somewhat  harder  to access 
because they  are more specialized and 
require a  greater  level  of technical expertise. 
In  addition  to the Sector  Specific  Plans, 
suggested references are presented here for 
three more physical  infrastructure  elements: 
dams, water resources, and electricity,
The Association  of State Dam  Safety 
Officials (ASDSO) is an  organization of dam 
operators,  owners, regulators,  officials, and 
others interested in dam  safety.   Through 
education,  training, standards,  and outreach, 
their  goal is to envision  and achieve a  future 
where all dams are safe.  Their website, 
www.damsafety.org,  provides excellent 
resources for  anyone interested in  dam 
safety, security, and resilience. The site 
provides links to dam  owner manuals, 
inspection  guides,  safety  standards, The 
Journal of Dam  Safety,  and links to other 
resources.   There is also a  tab for 
Infrastructure Security, which  relates dam 
safety  to the work  of the Dams Sector  done 
under DHS.70
A  starting point  for  understanding  water 
protection  issues is the American  Water 
Works Association  (AWWA). Since 1881, 
AWWA has united educators,  scientists, 
engineers,  and operators to provide safe, 
sufficient,  and protected water  systems 
across North  America.   On the AWWA 
website  (www.awwa.org), the Professional 
and Technical  Resources tab contains 
standards, manuals of practice, assessment 
HART AND RAMSAY, GUIDE FOR CIP COURSES  16
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, (MAY 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
tools,  and management  tools.  Also available 
is the Water  Infrastructure Security 
Enhancements (WISE) program, which  is a 
joint  program  the American  Society  of Civil 
E n g i n e e r s ( A S C E ) a n d t h e W a t e r 
Environment  Federation  (WEF) that 
provides security  guidelines and training 
materials for those who have a  role in  the 
physical  protection of water  infrastructure 
systems. This website also contains a  link  to 
purchase training  on the J100 RAMCAP Risk 
and Resilience Management of Water and 
Wastewater Systems  previously  discussed.  71  
AWWA  has been  one of the leaders and 
innovators in  risk management  of physical 
infrastructures and their  work  can  inform 
and illuminate protection  efforts for  other 
infrastructures.
The nation’s electrical  system  is a  highly 
networked infrastructure with  substantial 
physical,  cyber, and operational  security 
elements. A  prospective CIP instructor 
without  a  background in  electrical science, 
engineering,  or  operations might  be tempted 
to completely  shy  away  from  this critical 
infrastructure,  but  a  basic  understanding of 
the functioning  of the electrical  system  can  be 
obtained through  the use of several  useful 
resources. Electrical Power System  Basics 
for the Nonelectrical Professional by  Steven 
W. Blume explains the elements of the 
electrical  distribution  system  from  generation 
to consumption  conceptually  and without 
complex mathematics.72  The Department of 
Energy  (DOE)  website contains sections on 
Electricity  101,  Smart Grid Primers,  Fact 
Sheets,  a  Document Library, and an 
Interact ive Grid demonstrat ing  the 
i n t e r a c t i o n  b e t w e e n g e n e r a t i o n , 
transmission, and consumption. 73  The DOE 
website and Blume’s book  provide a 
prospect ive CIP instructor  wi th  an 
understanding  of system  function  without 
delving  into detailed system  and component 
design. 
The North  American Electric Reliability 
Corporation  (NERC) operates under  the 
auspices of Federal  Energy  Regulatory 
Commiss ion  (FERC) wi th  the lega l 
responsibility  to enforce electrical  reliability 
standards for  power  generators and 
distributors in  the United States and Ontario 
and New  Brunswick, Canada.  The NERC 
website,  www.nerc.com, contains reliability 
standards, reliability  assessment  data, and 
system  performance trends for  the North 
American  electrical grid along  with  analysis 
of adverse electrical events. Because of their 
charge to maintain  electrical reliability, 
NERC is responsible for  many  aspects of CIP 
in  the electrical system  and has published 
these nine CIP standards:74
CIP-001-1a Sabotage Reporting
CIP-002-3 Cyber Security—Critical 
Cyber Asset Identification
CIP003-3 Cyber Security—Security 
Management Controls
CIP004-3 Cyber Security—Personnel 
and Training
CIP005-2a Cyber Security— Electronic 
Security Perimeters
CIP006-3c Cyber Security—Physical 
Security of Critical Cyber 
Assets
CIP007-3 Cyber Security—Systems 
Security Management
CIP008-3 Cyber Security—Incident 
Reporting and Response 
Planning
CIP009-3 Cyber Security—Recovery 
Plans for Critical Cyber 
Assets
The information  on  the NERC website is 
technically  complex and may  not  be of 
interest  to a  prospective instructor  in  a 
general  CIP course, but  it would be essential 
in  a  detailed study  of the reliability, 
resilience, and protection  of the electrical 
grid.
These references provide a  prospective 
CIP instructor  wi th a  fundamenta l 
understanding  of protection  in  the dams, 
water,  and electrical sectors.  They  also 
highlight  the complexity  of physical 
infrastructure protection  and the need to 
engage with  experts in  each  sector  when 
detailed protective and resilient  design is 
necessary. When  needed, the same research 
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procedure can  be used with  other  physical 
infrastructure elements.  Begin  with  the 
sector specific plan  then progress to 
professional  and trade organizations 
operating  in  that  sector.  These organizations 
often  supply  information, training,  and 
standards and – in  many  cases – are fully 
integrated with  protection  and resiliency 
efforts.
THE HUMAN DIMENSION –  PROTECTIVE 
PERSONNEL AND PROCEDURES
Security  and vulnerability  analysis (SVA) is a 
tool that  directly  enables assessment  of 
specif ical ly  identif ied threats to an 
organization  (or  its assets) and which 
identifies appropriate countermeasures. SVA 
can  be considered an  intellectual framework 
that  includes the use of personnel and all 
organizational resources,  the traditional 
“gates,  guns and guards” of security.  Like 
enterprise risk management (ERM),  SVA  is a 
continuous process,  developed by  the 
American  Institute of Chemical Engineers 
(AIChE),  of evaluating the effectiveness or 
adequacy  of the personnel and procedures 
responsible  for  protecting  a  piece of critical 
infrastructure against  identified hazards. 75 
The overall intent of SVA  is to identify  and 
respond (a priori) to known  or  suspected 
security  risks and to protect people, property, 
and the environment. 
In  an  SVA, risk  is a  function  of the product 
of the perceived likelihood of the hazard, the 
likelihood the threat could happen,  and the 
severity  of harm  inflicted if the threat were to 
occur.  Using  this logic, all risks can  be 
displayed in a  risk  matrix  that  facilitates their 
re lat ive rankings assuming that  no 
organization  can  afford to protect  all their 
assets all the time from  everything.  Inasmuch 
as both  ERM and SVA  are disciplined 
processes designed to combine and correlate 
organizational  strategy,  personnel,  resources 
(e.g.,  technology),  and upper management in 
order  to mitigate risk,76  SVA  is ultimately  a 
process that  operates as a component  of 
ERM. In  this way, SVA  is a  qualitative risk-
based assessment tool that  guides how 
organizations might address the likelihood of 
intentional acts of terrorism  or  other  threats 
(e.g.,  natural  disasters) that could result in 
loss or  harm  to the organization.  The AIChE 
maintains a  robust  website regarding SVA 
within  their  Center  for  Chemical Process 
Safety  (CCPS),  which  was developed 
following  the Bhopal India  disaster  in  1984. 
The AIChE website (http://www.aiche.org/
ccps/index.aspx) offers guidelines and 
networking, but it is not free. 
As a  component of the overall  risk 
m a n a g e m e n t a p p r o a c h  w i t h i n  a n 
organization, the principles surrounding  SVA 
include continuous quality  improvement  and 
total organizational commitment.  According 




3. Threat identification/assessment 
4. Vulnerability analysis
5. Countermeasure identification/ 
selection
The CCPS model of SVA  is elucidated as 
follows.  Step 1  – Project  Planning  – entails 
the identification  of an  interdisciplinary  team 
of security  personnel and personnel directly 
tied to the piece of critical infrastructure the 
organization  wishes to protect  (i.e.,  the target 
assets).  This team  sets the objectives and 
scope of the SVA and begins to develop the 
s e c u r i t y  p l a n . S t e p 2  – F a c i l i t y 
Character izat ion – includes several 
components including  identification of the 
target  assets and the technical details from 
each  asset (e.g.,  the vulnerabilities of each 
asset and recommended methods of 
p r o t e c t i n g  t h o s e a s s e t s ) ,  s p e c i f i c 
identification  of the hazards and their 
consequences were they  to be realized to the 
assets (or  the organization) including 
characterizing  the target attractiveness, 
identification  of existing  security  layers,  and 
determination  of the likelihood each  threat 
presents including  consequence analysis. 
Step 3  – Threat Assessment – considers all 
possible threats, both  internal to the 
organization  and external  to the organization. 
Regarding  human-based threats, the team 
would also attempt  to characterize the 
presumed adversaries in  terms of their 
capabilities and their  characteristics. 
Working  with  local agencies (intelligence 
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a g e n c i e s ,  w e a t h e r b u r e a u s ,  e t c ) i s 
recommended. Step 4  – Vulnerability 
Analysis – matches each  asset  and the threat 
to that  asset  in  order  to elucidate the 
presumed vulnerability  of that  asset. The SVA 
team  would also identify  and incorporate any 
existing countermeasures and the degree to 
which  such has been  effective in  reducing  the 
vulnerability  of the asset  to date. By  devising 
and discussing  security-based scenarios, the 
S V A t e a m  c a n  b e t t e r  e v a l u a t e t h e 
vulnerability  of each asset vis-à-vis the 
identified threat.  The SVA  team  should build 
a  threat matrix in  order  to rank each  threat 
and facilitate prioritization  of risks.  Step 5  is 
Countermeasure Identification/Selection. 
Selecting countermeasures is often  difficult 
and needs to consider  many  competing 
organizational objectives.  In  the event 
current countermeasures are in place, the 
team  would consider  the consequences to the 
organization  if those countermeasures fail or 
the layers of security  are breached,  and 
therefore ,  which  addit ional  or  new 
countermeasures are required. In the event 
that  no countermeasures are currently  in 
place (say  for  example due the adoption  of 
new  technology  or  the construction  of a  new 
facility),  the team  would devise a  set of 
countermeasures that  would delay, reduce, 
mitigate,  or  prevent the threat  from 
impacting the target asset. 
Once completed, the SVA  team  generates a 
report  for  upper management. It is important 
to consider  the cost benefit  of all  SVA 
generated recommendations. Generally 
speaking, if the vulnerability  presents a  lesser 
economic  harm  to the organization  than  the 
proposed solution, many  organizations may 
decide to live with  the vulnerability. Over 
time, the SVA  team  performs follow  up (i.e., 
the continuous improvement  portion) and 
determines adequacy  of the implemented 
c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s o r  w h e t h e r  n e w 
vulnerabilities have arisen.
THE CYBER DIMENSION — ELECTRONIC 
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
Cyber  Security  is an incredibly  complex  area 
involving skilled professionals working  in 
very  specialized areas.  At its core are efforts 
to protect  and secure information and secure 
and defend control systems.  The United 
States Computer  Emergency  Response Team 
(US-CERT)  has the responsibility  to protect 
the executive branch  from  cyber  attacks and 
disseminate cyber  security  information to 
both  other  government agencies and the 
public;77 it  provides a  good starting  point  for 
understanding cyber security.
Cyber  systems process information  – 
credit card numbers,  bank accounts,  birth 
records,  and family  photos.  Information 
Assurance (IA) is a  risk  management  process 
that  protects the use,  transmission,  and 
storage of this information and the hardware 
and software that  enable  these processes. 
F u n d a m e n t a l  I A  c o n c e p t s i n c l u d e 
confidentiality  (information is disclosed only 
to authorized users),  integrity  (data  is 
complete and correct), and availability  (data 
is accessible when  requested).78  Formal 
education  and training  in  information 
assurance is available at many  institutions 
including over one hundred colleges and 
universities designated as National Security 
Agency  Centers of Excellence.79  The NSA-
COE webpage provides links to these 
programs,  some of which  provide open 
source educational materials.  One such  site is 
the National  Information  Assurance Training 
and Education  Center at  the University  of 
Idaho, which  provides audio, video,  text,  and 
web-linked instructional materials on IA. 80  
SCADA systems are essential  to the 
operation  of the infrastructure.  They  allow 
operators in  a  centralized control  facility  to 
remotely  operate  pump stations, track 
movements of trains,  monitor  pressure in 
pipelines, and manage frequency  and voltage 
in the electrical  grid.  Attacks on  these 
systems can  disable an  infrastructure without 
physical  contact  and result  in  anything  from 
complete destruction  to no damage.  One US-
CERT effort  to secure SCADA  systems is the 
Control  Systems Security  Program  (CSSP), 
which  provides information,  recommended 
practices, assessments, and training. Two 
useful web based training  segments are 
“OPSEC for  Control Systems,”  which  teaches 
fundamentals of operations security  as 
applied to SCADA  systems,  and “Cyber 
Security  for  Control Systems Engineers and 
Operators,”  which  addresses cyber  risk, 
threats, and mitigations as applied to modern 
control  systems.81  These training  sessions 
each  last about  one hour  and provide a 
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f u n d a m e n t a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e 
importance of, and processes involved in, 
security SCADA systems.
These resources provide a  prospective CIP 
instructor, regardless of background,  with  an 
understanding  of the fundamentals of cyber 
security. These concepts must  then  be 
integrated with  personnel  and procedures 
and physical  architectural and engineering 
design  to provide a  complete protective 
system for critical infrastructures.
EMERGENCE
The field of critical  infrastructure protection 
is in  a  constant state of emergence.  New 
threats and hazards arise each  day  and 
changes in demographics,  society, and land 
use redefine old threats and the severity  of 
existing hazards. CIP instructors and 
professionals must take a proactive approach 
to anticipating  future developments.  Some of 
these will come from  predictable sources. For 
example,  in  March  2008, Toffler Associates 
a s s e m b l e d l e a d e r s o f i n d u s t r y  a n d 
government  experts to address the most 
critical infrastructure challenges of the next 
fifteen  years.  The issues discussed included 
public-private sector  coordination,  asset 
concentration,  infrastructure deterioration, 
f o r e i g n  o w n e r s h i p ,  a n d c y b e r -
interdependency. 82  Other  perspectives on 
emergent issues may  come from  unexpected 
directions.  The perception  that  the attacks of 
September  11, 2001  were “inconceivable”  is 
false. In  a  1995  bestselling  novel,  Debt of 
Honor, one of Tom  Clancy’s characters flew  a 
747  jumbo jet into the United States Capitol 
Building  for the purpose of decapitating  the 
U.S. Government. In  the 1999  novel  Train 
Man ,  P.T.  Deutermann’s protagonist 
sequentially  destroys railroad bridges 
crossing  the Mississippi River. Anyone with 
an  understanding  of the relationships 
between  the rail, coal mining, and power 
infrastructures will quickly  see that the 
potential infrastructure disruption  of this 
kind of attack greatly  exceeds the difficulties 
in  Deutermann’s plot.  The world continues to 
change, visionaries still try  to foresee the 
future,  and we should assume our enemies 
read our  novels.  CIP educators and 
professionals must constantly  remember  the 
emergent state of our  discipline and adapt 
accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Faculty  expertise to develop and teach  a 
college level course is traditionally  developed 
through  a  combination  of formal education 
and professional experience.  Relying on this 
model in  developing  critical infrastructure 
protection  education is not  currently  viable; it 
will  not produce enough instructors fast 
enough  to meet  the educational demands of 
either  students or  employers in  the homeland 
security  field. The large number  of homeland 
security  and engineering  programs currently 
lacking critical  infrastructure protection 
courses is evidence of this. One solution is to 
grow  the instructor  base through  instructor 
self-education using  the outline provided in 
this paper.  This guide directs a  faculty 
member  with  expertise in  a  field related to 
CIP to the resources necessary  to acquire 
sufficient breadth and depth  of knowledge to 
teach  an  introductory  course in  CIP.  The 
resources further  provide a  foundation  for 
the deeper  study  necessary  for  more 
advanced courses. At  the completion  of this 
self-study,  the prospective CIP instructor  will, 
to a  depth appropriate to the instructor’s and 
the institution’s specialization  and mission, 
be able to:
1. Explain  national  strategies and policies 
on infrastructure protection;
2. Identify  critical components of a complex 
infrastructure network;
3. Describe the All Hazards Environment  for 
these critical components;
4. Specify  the level of protection  or 
resiliency for these critical components;
5. Describe systems design  concepts to 
achieve the desired protection  and 
resiliency.
Building  on  this foundation,  the new  CIP 
instructor  can then  explore particular topics 
in greater depth.
The ultimate purpose in  engaging in  this 
course  of self-study  is to develop and teach  a 
CIP course. The conceptual  framework for 
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understanding  and assimilating  CIP 
information  presented in  this paper  – Policy, 
Networks,  All-Hazards,  Level  of Threat,  Level 
of Protection,  and System  Design – is also 
useful for  organizing a  course and forms the 
basic  blocks of instruction in  an  introductory 
CIP course.  The knowledge gained by  the new 
CIP instructor  can  now  be translated into 
lesson  titles, lesson objectives,  reading 
assignments, learning  activities,  course notes, 
projects,  and homework.  Through  this 
process both  the ranks of CIP instructors and 
the quality  and quantity  of crit ical 
infrastructure protection  courses can  grow  to 
meet the demands of both  homeland security 
students and professionals. 
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Letter to the Editor
April 2000
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCY
Understanding  the social determinants of community  health is frequently  discussed these 
days in  public  health  circles as a  means for  constructing effective and long-term  preventive 
strategies associated with  reduction  of acute and chronic disease and injury  within a  population. 
Identification  of what is often  referred to as the “upstream” or  root  causes of illness as well as 
population health  disparities can be found through  careful examination of how  income,  race and 
education influence community  health  patterns,  behavior  and outcomes.  This approach  truly 
embodies the philosophy  of prevention  that  is the foundation  of modern  public  health  practice 
as well as in the discipline of emergency management 
It is well known  that  health  conditions in  populations pose special challenges to emergency 
management  planning  and response.  Some of these are being  met  with  renewed attention to 
functional needs and behavioral health  dimensions of preparedness planning such  as pre-
assessment of populations including engagement or  partnerships with  various faith-based, 
community  and social  service agencies.  However, the current  planning paradigm  does not 
sufficiently  recognize or  account for  other  unique cultural and social facets of a  community  that 
are integral  to its successful preparation  for  and response to a  catastrophic  incident  as well  as 
achieving  a  high  level  of resiliency.   The result, as we have seen with  Katrina, are inefficient  and 
less than robust response and recovery  efforts that  failed to consider  and incorporate  the 
underlying socio-environmental dynamics of a  region  into a  cogent  and successful strategic 
plan.
Consideration  of community  unemployment,  high  school graduation and crime rates, along 
with  levels of segregation,  social cohesiveness, and economic vitality  are all part  of the socio-
environmental matrix  in  which  contemporary  communities operate. Yet seldom  is this type of 
data  considered or  made part  of equation input in  current  preparedness and response planning. 
However,  it is not  a stretch  of the imagination to envision that these types of social  and 
economic  dynamics strongly  impact community  recovery  as well as resiliency  to any 
catastrophic  event. The flaw  squarely  lies in  our  continued inability  as homeland security  and 
emergency  management professionals to reconcile  the evolving social fabric of our  communities 
big and small into a flexible and adaptable emergency planning model.
Identifying  and studying  social determinants of community  preparedness and resiliency  is an 
area that  requires new  attention  and focus at all levels of government.  Katrina in  many  ways 
continues to be a grim  reminder  of how  socio-economic and health  disparities around race and 
income created unanticipated and unprecedented response and recovery  challenges that  haunt 
us yet  today. Addressing these upstream  factors in  emergency  planning is not only  preventive 
but assures a  better-prepared and resilient  community  and nation.  Katrina  need not be 
repeated.
Paul A. Biedrzycki
Director of Disease Control and Environmental Health
City of Milwaukee Health Department
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In the world of homeland security,  mobile 
phones are too often viewed as  detonation 
devices  rather than vital communication 
mechanisms to prevent terrorist attacks 
from occurring. I t takes col lect ive 
intelligence from  federal, state,  and local 
entities,  as well as  the public,  to  prevent 
terrorist attacks.  Mobile technology 
empowers  collective intelligence in ways 
that were never before possible.  This  essay 
a r g u e s  t h a t t h e n a t i o n ’ s  c r i s i s 
communication strategy must be broader 
and more innovative  than commercial 
broadcast alerts,  mobile text messages, and 
social media sites such as  Facebook and 
Twitter.   Federal,  state,  and local officials,  in 
concert with  the  public,  should adopt a 
strategy that leverages  mobile technology 
and harnesses  the power of mobile 
applications that allow  communication 
between the government and individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Crises are unpredictable events that  demand 
adaptation  and flexibility. During  a crisis, 
many  communication  experts contend that 
the public engages in information-seeking 
behaviors to reduce uncertainty. 1  Research 
indicates that  effective crisis communication 
with  the public requires a  clear, relevant,  and 
timely  narrative,  openness to dialogic 
communication, and source credibility.2 
However,  as Sung  Yung Yang  and others 
note,  the content  of the message is only  half 
t h e c h a l l e n g e : “ D i f f e r e n t  f o r m s o f 
communication  can  bring  out  a  completely 
different individual  interpretation  – and in 
turn , var ious post -cr i s i s react ions , 
including… attitudinal  and behavioral 
outcomes.” 3 Traditional  media  used for  crisis 
communication  typically  includes television 
and radio broadcasts,  print,  and the Internet. 
Social media  is quickly  emerging  as another 
form  of communication  that  shapes attitudes 
and behaviors by  allowing the public to better 
seek and share crisis information.
During the 2008  Mumbai terrorist 
attacks, for  example,  vital information, such 
as emergency  phone numbers and hospitals 
needing blood donations, was distributed via 
Twitter. 4  Closer  to home,  Twitter  provided 
valuable situational awareness to the public 
and military  families in  the aftermath  of the 
Ft. Hood shooting  in  2009. 5 Research  on  the 
September 11th attacks also reveals that 
individuals actively  sought to reduce 
uncertainty  by  accessing information  through 
a  variety  of means. 6  The American  public, 
increasingly  accustomed to the distribution 
and receipt  of information  in real-time, will 
likely  engage in  similar  information  seeking 
behaviors that  leverage technology  during the 
next crisis.  Consequently,  the United States 
government  is taking  important steps to 
prepare for  this likelihood.  Craig  Fugate, 
administrator  of the Federal  Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), stated: 
As social media  becomes more a  part of 
our daily  lives, people are turning to it 
during emergencies as  well. We need to 
utilize these tools, to the best of our 
abilities, to engage and inform the public, 
because no matter how much federal, 
state and local  officials do, we will only be 
successful  if the public is brought in as 
part of the team.7  
But  are current crisis communication  tools 
such  as television and radio broadcasts, print, 
the Internet,  and social media  effective at 
leveraging  the public during a  crisis? Is a 
more robust platform  needed to prevent 
terrorist attacks from occurring? 8
This essay  argues that television and radio 
broadcasts, print,  the Internet, and social 
media  are not  optimally  suited to mobilizing 
the public to prevent  a  terrorist attack from 
occurring.  The United States government,  in 
partnership with  the public,  and state and 
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local  entities,  should explore ways to better 
leverage the convergence of the Internet and 
mobile devices via  smart  phones to engage 
the public.  Today,  more Americans have 
cellular  mobile phone subscriptions than 
Internet subscriptions and smart  phones are 
quickly  becoming the standard cellular 
phone.9  As of December  2010,  63.2  million 
people in the United States owned smart 
phones, which  is a  60 percent  increase since 
2009. 10 The increasingly  mobile nature of the 
public through  sophisticated smart  phones 
presents a  significant opportunity  to improve 
the role of the public  in  preventing  terrorist 
attacks in the United States.
CURRENT CRISIS COMMUNICATION TOOLS
The U.S. government  is reinvigorating  the 
notion that the public can serve as a  useful 
ally  during a crisis.  In  the 2010  National 
Security Strategy ,  President  Obama 
appropriately  recognized that  “the ideas, 
values,  energy, creativity,  and resilience of 
our  c i t izens are  America ’s greatest 
resource.” 11  In  pursuit  of this goal,  the 
secretary  of homeland security  launched New 
York ’s Metropol i tan  Transportat ion 
Authority’s “see something,  say  something” 
campaign  on  a  national scale to encourage 
citizens to remain  vigilant and report 
suspicious activity. Similar  public  awareness 
campaigns occurred during World War II and 
the Cold War, but this slogan, written one day 
after  9/11,  is used in  a  more diverse and 
ambiguous threat  environment.  In  order  for 
the campaign  to be effective, it  must issue a 
clear  message on  what is suspicious. 
Although  the “see something, say  something” 
campaign  comes from  a  credible source and 
is an  important  start  to opening dialogic 
communication  with  the public,  the narrative 
provides scant  details of what  the American 
public should look for  that  might  increase, 
rather than decrease, uncertainty.  
Internet-based social networking tools are 
also playing an  increasingly  important role as 
the U.S. government  looks to forge stronger 
bonds with  the public.  As of July  2010, 
twenty-two of twenty-four  major  federal 
agencies have official  Facebook,  Twitter, and 
YouTube accounts. 12 Many  of these agencies, 
including FEMA, also maintain  blogs and 
mobile websites. 13  These internet-based 
social  networking  tools, however,  require 
users to pull information from  the sites. They 
have limited capability  to leverage the public 
as force multipliers by  distributing  actionable 
information in real-time.
On the mobile front, FEMA  is leading  the 
development of an  important  outreach  tool  to 
improve public  safety  that  will employ  new 
and existing  communication  platforms to 
rapidly  disseminate emergency  messages to 
as many  people as possible. This outreach 
tool  – the Integrated Public  Alert and 
Warning  System  (IPAWS) – will  transform 
the traditional  audio-only  warnings sent  via 
radio and television.  Once implemented,  the 
U.S. government  will have the means to send 
emergency  text  alerts to cell-phone users 
within county-sized geographic areas.  
Text  alerts using  IPAWS have a maximum 
displayable  message size of ninety  characters, 
which  severely  limits the narrative  the 
government  can  provide to the public. 14 
Valuable information  can  be relayed to the 
public  in  ninety  characters, but these 
parameters will make it difficult  to 
disseminate enough  actionable information 
to mobilize the public  to prevent an 
imminent attack from  occurring. At  this time, 
there is no clear plan  to leverage IPAWS to 
create a  bidirectional architecture to 
communicate with the public during a crisis.
Current and future crisis communication 
mechanisms such  as “see something,  say 
something,”  social media  sites like Twitter 
and Facebook,  and IPAWS are not the best 
tools for  harnessing public  capital  in  a  crisis. 
None of these communication  platforms 
provide a  capability  that can  fully  meet  the 
t h r e e c r i t e r i o n  o f e f f e c t i v e c r i s i s 
communication: a  clear, relevant,  and timely 
n a r r a t i v e ; o p e n n e s s t o d i a l o g i c 
communication; and source credibility. 
Moreover, even  though cellular  infrastructure 
cannot be relied upon  post-incident,  existing 
m o b i l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t o o l s a r e 
overwhelmingly  tailored towards response. 
Crisis communication  in  the face of an 
imminent terrorist  attack requires a  more 
robust  communication  platform; the 
operating  environment  for  prevention is far 
more ambiguous than that  for  response. 
Whereas response operations manage the 
consequences of an  incident that  has already 
occurred,  prevention  operations attempt  to 
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thwart an incident  before  it  occurs despite 
many  unknowns. It will  take collective 
intelligence from  federal,  state,  and local 
entities,  as well  as the  public,  to reveal usable 
information  about  the potential  perpetrator, 
the targeted region,  and/or  the approach 
vector.
THE WAY FORWARD:
TAPPING INTO THE MOBILE REVOLUTION 
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t , i n 
partnership with  state and local entities, 
should explore the feasibility  of developing a 
mobile application  that  can  more effectively 
help the public prevent terrorist attacks. The 
mobile application  should include the 
capability  to disseminate images and 
descriptive information  of the threat  to a 
geographically  targeted audience; enable 
individuals to report  suspicious activity  by 
pressing a  button  to automatically  call or  text 
authorities; and notify  mobile application 
users through  an active,  audible, unique ring 
tone. 
There are several benefits to developing  a 
United States government sponsored mobile 
application  with  these capabilities. First,  a 
mobile application  meets key  elements for 
effective crisis communication: a  clear  and 
relevant  narrative,  openness to dialogic 
communication, and source credibility. With 
potentially  millions of eyes on  the ground 
that  know  who or  what  to look for, the public 
would become a valuable bottom-up resource 
that  significantly  increases our  ability  to 
prevent an  imminent  terrorist  attack from 
occurring  and/or  to capture a  perpetrator. 
Popular  social  media  outlets like Facebook 
and Twitter  rely  on  the user  to pull 
information from  the site. There is no 
automatic  pushing of information  to the user. 
A  crisis communication mobile application 
fills that  void by  allowing  officials to rapidly 
push generalized or  localized information  to 
the user  and pull information  back from  the 
public. This capability  would enable a  large 
segment of the American public to play  a 
productive role in  preventing  a  crisis from 
occurring or spreading.
S e c o n d , m o b i l e a p p l i c a t i o n s a r e 
inexpensive and easy  to develop.  The AMBER 
Alert iPhone application  went from  an  idea  to 
a  finished, fully  functional  product in  one 
day. This application includes all current, 
active AMBER alerts with  a  small photo of 
the victim.  Each  alert  contains detailed 
information  about the abduction,  including 
p h y s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n ,  l a s t  k n o w n 
whereabouts, and any  details or  photos of 
suspects.  A  "Report Sighting" button  allows 
an  individual to report a  sighting  of a  victim 
or  suspects along with  the current GPS 
coordinates to the investigative agency.  These 
reported sightings can then  be geographically 
aggregated so investigators can  better  assess 
the credibility of multiple reports. 15 
Lastly, the plethora  of information  sources 
– including media outlets,  blogs, and twitter 
feeds – creates a  “fog  of war”  that hinders 
credible and transparent engagement with 
the public. A  government sponsored mobile 
application  provides a  mechanism  to manage 
the message by  distributing  credible and clear 
information  to users. The public would have a 
precise understanding  of who or  what  to look 
for  and how  to report a sighting. Public 
s ight ings made through  the mobi le 
application  then  could be visualized on  a map 
or  timeline by  using free and open  source 
technology  such  as the Ushahidi Platform. 
This platform  aided the Haiti Earthquake 
response and the 2010 Washington,  D.C. 
“snowmaggedon” clean  up. During a  terrorist 
incident,  officials could plot  public  reports on 
a  map, identify  geographic clusters to quickly 
corroborate reports, and dispatch  resources 
accordingly. This inexpensive,  prevalent, and 
intuitive technology  creates a  dynamic, 
multidimensional platform  that  would enable 
the U.S.  government to do more than  simply 
communicate with  the public  during  a  crisis. 
It also provides a  valuable mechanism  for  the 
public to communicate with the government 
during  a  crisis and for  the government  to 
filter,  validate,  and manage a  high  volume of 
reports.
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE:CRISIS 
COMMUNICATION DURING A BIOLOGICAL 
ATTACK 
Imagining  a  scenario provides a  practical way 
to understand the uti l i ty  of mobile 
applications in  preventing  a  terrorist attack. 
This hypothetical biological terrorist  attack 
provides a strong starting point. 
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The BioWatch Program  in New 
York  City, using a series of pathogen 
detectors, provides  initial indications 
of a widespread aerosol release. 
State, local, and federal officials 
scramble to confirm the positive 
finding and identify the pathogen. If 
it is  a  biological attack,  prophylaxis 
must be  delivered to all individuals  in 
the affected area within forty-eight 
hours or the consequences will be 
dire.  As a result, state,  local, and 
federal officials  preposition assets 
and prepare for the distribution of 
medicine from the  Strategic National 
Stockpile managed by  the Centers  for 
Disease Control.  
A few  hours  later,  the  Laboratory 
Response Network  for Bioterrorism 
confirms that the pathogen is 
anthrax. The FBI immediately 
i n i t i a t e s a m a n h u n t f o r t h e 
perpetrators of this  attack  (and likely 
other near simultaneous  or follow-on 
attacks).  In support of the FBI,  the 
intelligence community reprioritizes 
intelligence assets to assist with the 
identification of perpetrators.  These 
agencies  identify a suspect and find 
indicators that a follow-on biological 
attack is imminent; however,  they 
cannot pinpoint the expected target 
or locate  the suspect.  The president 
uses the Emergency Alert System to 
disseminate the threat through 
traditional means such as  television 
and radio. Local officials  with  text 
messaging emergency  notification 
capabilities  also  deploy messages  to 
the public. 
Twelve hours  into  the incident, 
communication via the Emergency 
Alert System and local means have 
yielded few  results.  Misguided calls 
inundate local law  enforcement 
a g e n c i e s , w a s t i n g t i m e a n d 
resources. The federal government 
decides to use a mobile application to 
disseminate information,  including a 
photo, of the suspect.  Those with the 
mobile application on their phone 
now  know  exactly who to  look  for 
and, recognizing the seriousness  of 
the situation,  forward the picture to 
their families and friends. Local law 
enforcement receives a plethora of 
tips, but the mobile application, by 
geographically aggregating all 
reports, allows investigators  to 
assess  the  credibility of multiple 
reports and efficiently deploy assets. 
Eight different people report 
seeing the individual in a white van 
at a Washington, DC gas  station. 
L a w  e n f o r c e m e n t s c r a m b l e s 
resources to the scene and uses  the 
gas  station’s security cameras to 
obtain the license  plate of the  van. 
Federal officials,  working closely 
with state and local officials,  then 
disseminate a second,  targeted 
message to those in the metro  DC 
area with the mobile  application. The 
message includes  the license plate 
number in addition to  the photo of 
the individual. A tourist outside the 
U.S.  Capitol sees  the van parked 
across  the street and immediately 
reports  the sighting through her 
mobile phone.  Shortly thereafter,  law 
e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c i a l s  r e c e i v e 
additional tips  via the mobile 
application.  All of these reports  are 
automatically plotted in Google Maps 
and law  enforcement officials  quickly 
recognize that the follow-on tips 
provide strong evidence that the 
initial report was  credible.  All 
r e s o u r c e s a r e i m m e d i a t e l y 
dispatched to the incident scene. The 
perpetrator is  apprehended and the 
second attack is prevented.  
It may  be just  a  matter  of time until  a 
scenario such  as this occurs.  The proposed 
mobile application  will not necessarily 
prevent  all  terrorist  attacks. It  could, 
however, give the nation  its best  chance to 
prevent an  imminent  terrorist  attack from 
occurring  by  rapidly  marshaling  the public in 
a cost-effective and timely manner.
THE PRIVACY CHALLENGE 
Pursuing this initiative will  entail overcoming 
a  significant, but  not  insurmountable, privacy 
issue. Individuals will likely  express concerns 
about  having  a  government  sponsored 
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application  on  their  mobile device.  In  order 
to address these challenges, the federal 
government  should construct the mobile 
application  program  along  the following 
guidelines.  First, it  must be a  free service for 
all  users. Second, individuals who do not 
want to participate may  opt  out  at  any  time. 
Third, the mobile application  must adhere to 
the most  stringent privacy  controls available 
and will  not collect  personal data. Fourth,  the 
government  must  only  transmit  messages via 
the mobile application during  an emergency. 
The mobile application  should not  bombard 
individuals with  daily  or  even  monthly 
messages from  the government. Lastly,  an 
outreach campaign  should include a frank 
discussion  with  the American  public 
regarding  the vital role  of individuals in 
preventing  terrorist  attacks and the benefits 
of participating  in  the mobile application 
program. 
CONCLUSION
In  the world of homeland security,  mobile 
phones are too often  viewed as detonation 
devices rather  than  crucial communication 
mechanisms.  In  order  to significantly  tilt  the 
odds against  the terrorists and in  favor of the 
“ g o o d g u y s , ”  t h e n a t i o n ’ s c r i s i s 
communication  strategy  must  be broader  and 
more innovative than  commercial  broadcast 
alerts,  mobile text  messages,  and social 
media  sites such as Facebook and Twitter. 
Federal,  state,  and local officials,  in  concert 
with  the public,  should adopt  a  strategy  that 
leverages mobile technology  and harnesses 
the power of mobile applications.  There is no 
silver  bullet  solution  to preventing terrorist 
attacks, but mobile applications provide a 
more robust mechanism  to tap into millions 
of eyes on  the ground during  a  crisis and the 
tool  the public needs to “see something, say 
something.”  It  is a new  form  of the old 
neighborhood watch  concept,  providing 
expanded situational awareness to the public 
during  a crisis and better  intelligence leads to 
prevent and apprehend the “bad guys.” 
About the Author
Andrew Heighington serves as  the special 
assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for 
Homeland Defense  and America’s  Security 
Affairs.  In this  role, Mr. Heighington assists the 
assistant secretary on several cross-cutting 
portfolios  related to homeland defense and 
h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y p l a n n i n g , n a t i o n a l 
p r e p a r e d n e s s , a n d c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m . 
Heighington graduated summa cum laude  from 
the  University of Richmond and is a member of 
Phi Beta Kappa.  He is  currently pursuing his 
master’s  degree  in Security Policy Studies at 
George Washington ’s El l iot t School of 
International Affairs. He  may be  contacted at 
Andrew.Heighington@osd.mil. 
The opinions expressed here are the views of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
opinions of the United States government or of 
the Department of Defense.
HEIGHINGTON, HOMELAND SECURITY IN REAL-TIME  5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 13 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
HEIGHINGTON, HOMELAND SECURITY IN REAL-TIME  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 13 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 Charles R. Berger and Richard J. Calabrese, “Some Explorations in Initial Interaction and Beyond: Toward a 
Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication,” Human Communication Research (Fall 1975): 99-112.
2 Sung Yung Yang, Minjeong Kang, and Philip Johnson, “Effects of Narratives, Openness to Dialogic Communication, 
and Credibility on Engagement in Crisis Communication through Organizational Blogs,” Communication Research 
37 (2010): 475.
3 Ibid., 474.
4 Brian Stelter and Noam Cohen, “Citizen Journalists Provided Glimpses of Mumbai Attacks,” New York Times, 
November 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/asia/30twitter.html. 
5 Chris Kanalley, “Fort Hood Shooting Shows How Twitter, Lists Can be Used for Breaking News,” Poynter, 
November 6, 2009, http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/digital-strategies/e-media-tidbits/99282/fort-hood-shooting-
shows-how-twitter-lists-can-be-used-for-breaking-news/#. 
6 Michael P. Boyle and others, “Information Seeking and Emotional Reactions to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks.” 
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 81, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 155-167.
7 “FEMA Administrator Fugate Addresses American Red Cross on Use of Social Media in Emergency Management,” 
August 12, 2010, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=52362. 
8 This essay adopts the National Response Framework definition of response: “Immediate actions to save lives, 
protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs;” and the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act definition of prevention: “any activity undertaken to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or 
actual act of terrorism.”
9 89 percent of Americans have cellular mobile phone subscriptions compared to 79 percent of Americans who use the 
Internet. Source: World Bank, “Mobile Cellular Subscriptions,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IT.CEL.SETS.P2?cid=GPD_43. 
10 “comScore Reports December 2010 U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market Share,” February 7, 2011, http://
www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2011/2/
comScore_Reports_December_2010_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share. 
11 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010: 16.
12 Gregory Wilshusen, “Challenges in Federal Agencies Use of Web 2.0 Technologies,” Government Accountability 
Office, July 22, 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10872t.pdf. 
13 For more information on FEMA’s blog see: http://blog.fema.gov. 
14  Federal Communications Commission, “New Commercial Mobile Alert System” (2010), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/cmas.html. 
15 Chris Foresman, “iPhone forensics expert creates AMBER Alert app for iPhone,” February 17, 2009, http://
arstechnica.com/apple/news/2009/02/iphone-forensics-expert-creates-amber-alert-app-for-iphone.ars. 




This  article  argues  for a fundamental 
change in national preparedness 
guidelines and their requirements 
from centralized to decentralized 
governance using management 
s y s t e m s t a n da r ds . T h e f e de r a l 
government’s  national preparedness 
requirements  encompassed in the 
Department of  Homeland Security’s 
(DHS) National Preparedness Guidelines 
should be replaced by the application 
o f n a t i o n a l o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
preparedness management system 
standards. In addition to  calls  for 
p r e p a r e d n e s s s t a n d a r d s , t h e 
widespread and growing use of 
standards  is  consistent with a number 
of significant homeland security 
management developments. These 
include the general stabilization and 
institutionalization of the federal 
homeland security mission and goals, 
the availability and use of robust 
preparedness management system 
standards, challenges  in assessing 
preparedness capabil it ies, and 
considerations of federalism and 
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l r e l a t i o n s 
cooperation. If the  Guidelines are 
replaced by management system 
standards, then two other issues must 
be resolved: whether the standards 
should be mandated and certification 
or accreditation processes applied.
INTRODUCTION
It may  well be time for  a  fundamental  change 
in  national preparedness guidelines and their 
requirements, moving  from  centralized to 
decentralized governance via management 
system  standards. Over  the past  decade, the 
federal  government’s national preparedness 
activism  has had its roots in  Homeland 
Security  Presidential Directive 8  (HSPD 8). 
Issued in  2003,  HSPD 8 requires a  national 
preparedness goal  with  readiness priorities 
and targets that  are measurable.1 Public Law 
109-295  codified HSPD 8, requiring  the 
president to complete, revise,  and update a 
national preparedness goal to define the 
target  level of preparedness. 2  The law  also 
established the national  preparedness 
system, which  was to include (1) target 
capabilities and preparedness priorities,  (2) 
equipment  and training standards,  (3) 
training and exercises,  (4) a  comprehensive 
assessment system, (5) a  remedial  action 
management  program, (6)  a  federal response 
c a p a b i l i t y  i n v e n t o r y , ( 7 ) r e p o r t i n g 
requirements, and (8)  federal preparedness. 
National planning  scenarios are part of the 
system. 3  The goal  and system  components 
are encompassed in  the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) National 
Preparedness Guidelines, last issued in 
2007.4
While  a  new  design  might  accept  the 
fundamental goals of HSPD 8,  the aim  is a 
shift from  compliance rooted in  the 
Guidelines components to the application 
of national or  international  management 
system  standards for  preparedness. The 
fundamental reason is that  management 
system  standards embrace what an 
organization  itself must do to manage its 
processes or  activities.  As illustrated later  in 
this article,  management system  standards 
foster  flexibility,  adaptability,  and more 
localized decision-making  as they  rarely  state 
specific “down  in  the weeds”  performance 
criteria  to judge performance.  Instead, they 
set  a  condition  the individual organization  is 
to meet through  its own  specific performance 
criteria  and management  system.5  For 
example,  a  standard element  might simply 
state, “communication  and warning  systems 
s h a l l  b e r e l i a b l e ,  r e d u n d a n t ,  a n d 
interoperable.”  An organization then must 
ensure implementation  to meet this element. 
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r e a l  a n d u s a b l e b e n c h m a r k s f o r 
organizational accountability  based on 
national and international consensus 
understandings.  And because management 
system  standards are nationally  and 
internationally  developed, used, and revised, 
they  can  facilitate a whole-of-government (if 
not a  whole-of-all-sectors) approach  through 
stability  and standardization common  to 
individual organizations. Another  benefit  to a 
change to management  system  standards is 
that  the federal government would no longer 
need to maintain the Guidelines  and its 
voluminous supporting  documents. State and 
local  governments would not need to contend 
with  changes in  requirements and oversight 
as federal administrations come and go.
THE BASICS: MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
STANDARDS
Standards generally  are a uniform  set  of 
measures,  agreements,  conditions,  or 
specifications that  establish  benchmarks for 
per formance.6  Management  system 
standards address planning, implementation 
and operation,  evaluation and the like. 
Drawing  on information from  the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), ISO, 
and the United States Standards Strategy, 
Table 1  summarizes the primary  elements of 
the management system  standards process 
and principles.7
Table 1. Management System Standards Elements
Element Management System Standards
Objective • Coverage of what the organization does to manage its processes or activities 
producing products and services satisfying customers, complying with 
regulations, or meeting environmental objectives
• Performance-based in specifying essential characteristics but not detailed 
designs as to how they should be met in any particular organization




• Organizations of all sizes, in all sectors, all cultures, and all products and 
services
• Voluntary adoption but may be part of national regulatory frameworks or 
legislation, or a market requirement
Developer • Accredited standards developers through technical committees of experts 
representing materially affected and interested parties
Development 
Process
• Strict rules for development with committee consensus on a proposed standard
• Broad-based public review and comments on draft standards with 
consideration of and response to comments; incorporation into a draft standard 
with right to appeal
• Reviewed at least every five years after publication by technical experts
• Avoidance of overlapping or conflicting standards
Audit and 
Certification
• Organization must audit its management system to verify processes are being 
managed effectively
• Organization may have external audits, such as from clients
• Independent system certification body can certify; certification is not a 
requirement
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Wel l -known  management sys tem 
standards are set  forth  in the International 
Organisation  for  Standardization  (ISO) 9000 
(the international  standard for  quality 
management) and ISO 14000 (environmental 
management).  Formal committees employing 
a  very  strict  development, implementation, 
and revis ion process develop these 
management  system  standards consensually. 
This is an  open  process designed to keep the 
standards “evergreen.” 8  An evaluative 
component requires an  ongoing audit  process 
to ensure the standards’  processes are being 
managed effectively.  Management  system 
s t a n d a r d s h a v e b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l l y 
implemented by  organizations in  all sectors 
and of all sizes. 9  Adopting  the management 
system  standards is most  often  voluntary, but 
some industries may  apply  them  as an 
obligatory standard of care.
Such standards promote flexibility  and 
provide a  common  set of requirements and 
reference language between  organizations 
and their  customers, regulators, the public, 
and other stakeholders. They  provide 
direction and assessment  criteria  for  the 
e n t i r e “ p r o d u c t  c h a i n ”  a n d a l l o f 
m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e r e s u l t e x p a n d s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f r o m  a n i n d i v i d u a l 
organization  and its activities to the whole 
product chain and its actions. 10 Further,  the 
standards support  alliances and facilitate a 
coordinated effort  across national  interest 
areas and across the globe. 11  They  also 
emphasize the management  of processes and 
activities independent  of an organization’s 
products and services.
FOUNDATION FOR ADOPTION OF 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARDS
There have been  a  number  of calls for 
adopt ing  formal  homeland secur i ty 
preparedness standards both  before and after 
the issuance of HSPD 8,  the resulting 
construction  of the National Preparedness 
Guidelines,  and other  activities,  such  as 
development of federal scenario-based 
strategic  plans. Shortly  after  the September  11 
terrorist  attacks, the first  National Strategy 
for Homeland Security  included language 
recommending national  standards for 
emergency  response and training, including a 
certification  program  for  first responders.12 
According  to Ben  Canada, 13  some state and 
local  officials called for  national preparedness 
standards,  including  authoritative rules, 
principles, or  measures against  which the 
quality,  level,  or  degree of preparedness could 
be measured.  These standards could serve as 
a  baseline of preparedness goals for  state and 
local  assessment and provide Congress and 
federal  agencies a means to measure the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f n e w  a n d e x i s t i n g 
preparedness programs paid for  by  federal 
assistance.
T e s t i f y i n g b e f o r e t h e N a t i o n a l 
Commission on  Terrorist  Attacks Upon  the 
United States (generally  referred to as the 
9/11  Commission) in  2003, Randall  Yim  saw 
standards as improving coordination  across 
federal,  state,  local, and private sectors and 
enhancing measurement  of continued 
preparedness.14  Standards,  he noted, could 
clarify  the role(s) each  organization  plays in 
homeland security,  factor  in  costs,  and legal, 
jurisdictional,  and other  constraints,  and 
identify  ways to embed homeland security 
criteria into business and government 
systems in  ways compatible with  other 
important social  and economic goals.  The 
standards emphasize  execution  and are 
particularly  suitable for  areas requiring 
s t a b l e ,  r e l i a b l e , a n d m u l t i - f a c e t e d 
participation, he noted. Certification to 
standards also emphasizes both  best  business 
practice and standard of care in  many 
industries.  They  are also scalable and 
replicable across geographic regions, a 
central  need in  homeland security.  Later 
work  by  Yim  and Sharon  Caudle, 15 Caudle, 16 
and Caudle and Yim 17  further  encourages 
m a n a g e m e n t s y s t e m  s t a n d a r d s a s 
a p p r o p r i a t e f o r  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
preparedness.
More recently, national  standards have 
been proposed in specific  areas.  Ashley 
Bowen  discusses standards for  a  minimum 
number  of emergency  exercises and a  review 
of emergency  plans and practices by  a  third 
party  to assess their  functionality  and 
appropriateness. 18  Bowen  also believes that 
federal  security  grant allocations should be 
contingent upon a rubric of standards.  Paul 
Light 19 recommends that Congress and other 
policymakers establish  voluntary  standards 
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for  crisis readiness through  statutes and 
award programs. Such  standards would 
include benchmarks for  increasing crisis 
readiness, with  oversight  by  a  quasi-
independent  monitoring agency  modeled on 
federal  organizations such  as the Security 
Exchange Commission.
Calls such as these for  preparedness 
standards are  informative. Moreover,  the 
widespread and growing  use of standards is 
consistent  with  a  number  of significant 
h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  m a n a g e m e n t 
developments.  At  a  minimum, these include 
t h e g e n e r a l s t a b i l i z a t i o n  a n d 
institutionalization of the federal homeland 
security  mission  and goals, the availability 
and use of robust  preparedness management 
system  standards,  challenges in  assessing 
preparedness capabilities,  and considerations 
of federalism  and intergovernmental 
relations cooperation.
STABILIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Over  the last  several years, there has been  a 
general  stabilization and institutionalization 
of the federal homeland security  mission  and 
its goals.  In  its first  issue, the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review  Report,  intended 
to present  a  strategy  for  the homeland 
security  enterprise as a  whole,  not just  the 
Department of Homeland Security, 20 
marginally  updated the scope and content of 
homeland security  compared to earlier 
homeland security  doctrine.  The 2010  Report 
detailed key  mission  priorities and goals for 
each  mission  area. It also expanded the 
definition  of homeland security,  which  is now 
“a  concerted national  effort  to ensure a 
homeland that  is safe, secure,  and resilient 
against terrorism  and other  hazards where 
American  interests, aspirations,  and way  of 
life can thrive.” 21
The Review  Report’s mission  areas, 
priorities,  and goals are consistent  with  and 
only  marginally  different  from  those 
presented in  past  policy  and budget 
d o c u m e n t s . I n d e e d , t h e y  m i g h t  b e 
characterized as enhancements of policies 
and resource allocations instead of sea 
changes in  the direction  of homeland 
security. For  example, 2010’s mission  areas 
remain virtually  the same as those identified 
in  policy  documents such  as the 2007 
National Homeland Security Strategy.22 
These include preventing  terrorism  and 
enhancing  security,  securing  and managing 
the borders, enforcing and administering 
immigration laws, safeguarding  and securing 
cyberspace,  and ensuring  reliance to 
disasters.  Similar  themes are presented in the 
most  recent National Security Strategy, 
issued by  the White House in May  2010.23 
According  to Christopher  Bellavita,  most 
issues defining  homeland security  over the 
past  several  years are now  fairly  consistent.24 
It is reasonable  to conclude that substantial 
stability  exists in  national homeland security 
missions and objectives, as well  as in policy 
and operational issues.
STANDARDS’ AVAILABILITY AND USE
A  second development is the availability  and 
use of robust  preparedness management 
system  standards.  A  number  of national and 
international voluntary  standards are in  use 
t o d a y ,  a l l c o n t a i n i n g v e r y  s i m i l a r 
preparedness management  program 
elements.  These standard elements, in  turn, 
are implemented as a  complete preparedness 
program in an organization.
For  example, in  the United States,  the 
National Fire  Protection  Association (NFPA) 
1600  Standard on Disaster/Emergency 
Management and Business  Continuity 
Programs  covers disaster/emergency 
management and business continuity 
programs. It  is intended to establish  a 
common set  of criteria  for  those programs.25 
The standard provides the criteria  to 
“develop, implement,  assess,  and maintain 
the [al l  hazards disaster/emergency 
management  and business continuity] 
program  for  prevention, mitigation, 
preparedness,  response, continuity,  and 
recovery.”26 The 2007  version  of NFPA  1600 
incorporated changes to the 2004  edition, 
including  updating  aspects of mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery  and 
adding  prevention as a  fifth  and distinct 
concept.  The 2010  version  included changes 
such  as emphasizing the importance of 
leadership and commitment and new 
requirements for  defining  performance 
objectives. The American  national standard, 
A S I S S P C . 1 - 2 0 0 9  ( O r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
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Resilience: Security,  Preparedness, and 
C o n t i n u i t y M a n a g e m e n t S y s t e m s —
Requirements  with Guidance for Use),  is a 
comprehensive management  systems 
approach  for  security, preparedness, 
response, mitigation,  business/operational 
continuity, and recovery  for  disruptive 
incidents resulting in  an  emergency, crisis,  or 
disaster.27
The American  national standard, ASIS/
BSI BCM.01-2010  (Business  Continuity 
Management Systems: Requirements with 
Guidance for Use),  also is an  accepted 
s t a n d a r d b y  t h e B r i t i s h  S t a n d a r d s 
Institution. 28  The international  ISO/PAS 
223999:2007  Societal Security: Guideline for 
Incident Preparedness  and Operational 
Continuity Management standard presents 
principles and elements for  an  organization’s 
preparedness and operational continuity.  It  is 
designed for  private, governmental, and 
nongovernmental organizations to develop 
specific  performance criteria  and an 
appropriate management system. 29
As an  illustration,  Table  2  provides 
selected examples of common  elements from 
the NFPA 1600  2010 edition  standards.  The 
ASIS SPC.1-2009  and ASIS/BSI BCM.
01-2010 standards have consistent  elements. 
Recognized preparedness standards, 
including those covering  business continuity, 
disaster  management, and emergency 
management, are tested and tailored to 
organizational needs. Organizational 
decision-makers focus on  their  near  and 
long-term  preparedness goals,  using  the 
standard elements as criteria  to develop, 
implement,  and sustain  their  preparedness 
programs.  These preparedness standards are 
reviewed continually  and revised to reflect 
new knowledge.
Table 2. Selected Examples of Preparedness Management System Standard Common Elements
Element Selected Examples of Standard Coverage
Program 
Management
• Leadership shall demonstrate commitment to the program to prevent, mitigate 
the consequences of, prepare for, respond to, maintain continuity during, and 
recover from incidents.
• Top management shall define, document, and provide resources for the 
organization management policy.
• The entity shall establish performance objectives for program requirements.
• There shall be crisis management procedures to provide coordinated situation-
specific authorization levels and appropriate control measures.
• The entity shall develop and enforce procedures coordinating the access and 
circulation of records within and outside the organization.
Planning • The program shall follow a planning process that develops strategic, crisis 
management, prevention, mitigation, emergency operations/response, continuity, 
and recovery plans.
• Crisis management planning shall address issues that threaten the strategic, 
reputational, and intangible elements of the entity.
• The entity shall conduct a risk assessment to identify strategies for prevention 
and mitigation and to gather information to develop plans for response, 
continuity, and recovery.
• The prevention strategy shall be based on the results of hazard identification and 
risk assessment, impact analysis, program constraints, operational experience, 
and cost benefit analysis.
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Element Selected Examples of Standard Coverage
Implementation • The entity shall establish procedures to locate, acquire, store, distribute, 
maintain, test, and account for services, human resources, equipment, materials, 
and facilities procured or donated to support the program.
• Communication and warning systems shall be reliable, redundant, and 
interoperable.
• Emergency operations/response plans shall assign responsibilities for carrying 
out specific actions in an emergency.
• The recovery plan shall provide for restoration of functions, services, resources, 
facilities, programs, and infrastructure.




• The entity shall evaluate program plans, procedures, and capabilities through 
periodic testing and exercises.
• Testing and exercises shall be conducted on the frequency needed to establish 
and maintain required capabilities.
Program 
Improvement
• The entity shall improve effectiveness of the program through management 
review of the policies, performance objectives, evaluation of program 
implementation, and changes resulting from preventive and corrective action.
• The entity shall establish a corrective action process.
The elements are in  harmony  with 
contemporary  work on  evaluating  emergency 
management  programs. Daniel  Henstra 
provides a  framework for  evaluating  local 
government emergency  management 
programs. 30 His work draws together  criteria 
to evaluate the quality  of local emergency 
management, centered on  the planning  and 
capacity  necessary  for  an  event  that  may 
n e v e r  o c c u r . H e d e f i n e s a q u a l i t y 
management  program  as “the extent  to which 
a  local  government  has adopted policies to 
prepare for  emergencies, mitigate their 
impacts,  ensure an  effective emergency 
response, and fac i l i tate community 
recovery.” 31  His high-quality  emergency 
program  includes preparedness,  mitigation, 
response, and recovery  policies. Management 
system  standards also respond to evaluative 
frameworks for  disaster  and emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery, such 
as that  recommended by  Liesel Ritchie and 
Wayne MacDonald.32  Their  work  identifies 
the phases of preparedness, response,  and 
recovery  connected to responsibility  for  the 
evaluation  (intra-organizational, inter-
organizational,  and system-wide)  and how 
the evaluation  will  be used (developmental, 
formative, and summative).
Standards such as NFPA  1600  and ASIS 
SPC.1-2009  typically  offer  explicit guidance 
on  the use of the standard and technical 
experts who can  assist  with  implementation. 
For  example, the explanatory  material  in 
NFPA  1600  (2010 edition) covers every 
element and most of the sub-elements.  The 
material  contains a  wealth  of information  to 
aid in implementation, from  definitions to 
observations on  practical decision-making. 
Supporting  annexes cover  resources to 
develop a  preparedness program, a self-
assessment guide in  determining  conformity 
with  the requirements, management  system 
guidel ines, and other  informational 
references.
To illustrate, one NFPA  1600 program 
management  element  (4.1.1)  is “The entity 
leadership shall demonstrate commitment to 
the program  to prevent,  mitigate the 
consequences of,  prepare for,  respond to, 
maintain  continuity  during, and recover  from 
incidents.”  The explanatory  information 
states that: 
Leadership should identify  and have 
access to applicable legal, regulatory, and 
other  requirements to which the 
organization  subscribes that are related to 
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the organization’s  hazards, threats, and 
risks that are associated with  its facilities, 
activities, functions, products, services, 
and supply  chain, the environment, and 
stakeholders. The way these requirements 
apply to its hazards, threats, and risks, 
and their potential  impact should be 
determined. The organization  should 
document this information  and keep it  up 
to date.33
Two national  programs already  voluntarily 
implement the preparedness standards. The 
9/11  Commission, subsequent  legislation, and 
DHS rules crafted a  management system 
standard program  for  the private sector.  In 
2004,  the 9/11  Commission stated that  the 
ANSI NFPA 1600 standard should define the 
standard of care that  any  company  owed to 
its employees and the public.  Adoption of the 
ANSI standard was considered essential  in 
p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a t e l y  o w n e d c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure,  although the Commission  did 
not mandate the adoption  of the standard for 
emergency  preparedness. 34  Subsequently, 
Section 524  of the August  2007  P.L.  110-53 
called for DHS to create a  voluntary  private 
sector  preparedness program  and standards, 
including  accreditation  and certification 
processes. The law  defined voluntary 
preparedness standards as “a common  set of 
c r i t e r i a  f o r  p r e p a r e d n e s s , d i s a s t e r 
management, emergency  management,  and 
business continuity, programs,” such  as 
NFPA 1600.35
DHS is implementing  the requirements 
through the Private Sector  Preparedness 
Accreditation  and Certification  Program  (PS-
Prep).  In  June 2010,  DHS approved three 
accepted management system  standards for 
the PS-Prep program: ASIS SPC.1-2009 
Organizational Resi l ience: Security 
Preparedness, and Continuity Management 
System; British  Standard 25999-2:2007 
Business Continuity  Management; and 
National Fire Protection  Association 1600: 
2 0 0 7 / 2 0 1 0  S t a n d a r d o n D i s a s t e r /
Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity Programs.  At the end of 
September  2010, DHS announced a 
certification  program  tailored to the needs of 
small business.36  The work  on  the PS-Prep 
program  has provided the homeland security 
community  with  a  more comprehensive 
understanding  of the principles and 
processes of standards development, which  is 
something it may not have had before. 37
A  second national effort  is the current 
v o l u n t a r y  E m e r g e n c y  M a n a g e m e n t 
Accreditation  Program  (EMAP), a  voluntary 
review  process for  state and local  emergency 
management programs. EMAP certifies 
government  programs against  standards 
direct ly  based on  NFPA  1600.  The 
accreditation  starts with  a self-assessment  by 
state, regional,  territorial, tribal, county, and 
municipal  government  programs responsible 
for  emergency  management  and homeland 
security. An  independent team  of assessors 
trained by  EMAP then  evaluates the 
programs for  accreditation, valid for  five 
years.  More than  thirty  programs, mostly 
state governments, are now accredited.38
PREPAREDNESS PROGRESS
A  third development is the challenge in 
assessing  preparedness capabilities that  are 
to be built  in  compliance with the Guidelines. 
FEMA  has that responsibility,  with  uneven 
results.  The Post-Katrina  Reform  Act 
requires each  state to submit a  preparedness 
report,  including current  preparedness 
capability  levels and estimates of needed 
investments.  In  recent  reports ,  the 
Government  Accountability  Office (GAO) 
identified a  number  of ongoing issues with 
FEMA’s progress in  assessing  preparedness 
capabilities and challenges with  the overall 
infrastructure for  that  assessment  and 
subsequent reporting. 39
Of course,  the main  concern  is national 
preparedness funding  and its results.  In  April 
2010, Shawn  Reese noted that one issue for 
further  Congressional attention  might  be the 
evaluation of DHS assistance to state and 
localities and its impact. DHS has only  taken 
limited action  in  assessing to what  extent 
federal  grant funding  – guided by  federal 
preparedness requirements – has enhanced 
the nation’s homeland security,  if at  all.  The 
capability  assessment  was troubled by 
grantee self-assessments and reporting, 
including the lack of analytical  training  and 
experience. Reviews of state and urban  area 
management  of homeland security  grant 
programs revealed weaknesses in  costs, 
monitoring, and oversight; measurable 
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program  goals and objectives; and needs 
assessment.40  Reese further  noted that 
Congress had appropriated a  total of $34 
billion  for  state and local homeland security 
assistance from  fiscal year  2002  through 
2009,  with  fiscal year 2010 appropriations 
totaling  $4.2  billion.41 However, DHS had not 
reported to what extent  this funding  has 
resulted in  state and local  homeland security 
capabilities – a key goal of the Guidelines.
The Local, State,  Tribal,  and Federal 
Preparedness Task  Force 2010 report  to 
Congress noted, as did GAO,  that specific, 
measurable  outcomes for preparedness 
efforts had yet to be defined and assessed. 
The Task Force interestingly  observed that 
preparedness assessment metrics and targets 
in  any  DHS capability  level guidance should 
be based on  existing  standards,  such  as the 
Emergency  Management  Accreditation 
Program  standards. 42 As discussed further  in 
this article, preparedness can  be consistently 
assessed against  the standards through  well-




A  fourth  development is federalism  and 
intergovernmental  relations,  specifically  the 
tension  between  central and decentralized 
functional control when  national interests are 
at  stake. In  today’s environment,  the interest 
i n  n a t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s a n d 
intergovernmental relationships might  be 
better  served by  a  cooperative relationship 
with  the end goal  of strong preparedness 
implementation and adaptation  in  mind – 
exactly  the aim  of preparedness management 
system standards.
The 2001  terrorist attacks and the 
aftermath  of Hurricane Katrina  fostered a 
belief in  strong federal control,  but  with  a 
growing  recognition that a  more collaborative 
framework was needed. For  example, a  year 
after  the 9/11  attacks, John  Kincaid and 
Richard Cole surveyed experts on  federalism 
and intergovernmental relations who 
believed the terrorist  attacks would result  in  a 
highly  federalized response to terrorism, but 
with  intergovernmental  cooperation  and 
coordination.43  Deil  Wright also notes that 
the 2001  terrorist  attacks resulted in  what  he 
views as a massive shift  in  federalism  and 
intergovernmental  relations. Domestic-
targeted terrorism  resulted in  the national 
government,  initially, and then the new 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y 
controlling  functions that  were previously 
controlled at state and local levels.  He 
advocates a  more collaborative relationship 
fostering  joint or  concurrent  operations.44 
Because of national interests,  Charles Wise 
and Rania  Nader  as well observe there was a 
demand for  federal  leadership and top-down 
decision-making in  setting  priorities and 
standards. The perception  is that  federal 
preparedness guidelines do not  take into 
account local  or regional priorities and needs. 
However,  they  also believe federal,  state,  and 
local  agencies implementing  these priorities 
should be able to adapt strategies more 
responsive to changing threats and differing 
local conditions. 45
Specifically  writing about preparedness, 
Samuel Clovis noted in  2006  that  the 
homeland security  grant programs and 
federal,  state,  and local arrangements focused 
on  conditions, one-size-fits-all  solutions, 
compliance,  and reporting.  He favors much 
more collaborative approaches. The role of 
Congress and DHS,  he believes, should be to 
provide guidelines, milestones,  and sufficient 
funding. State and local governments should 
have maximum  flexibility  in  implementing 
homeland security  programs. Moreover, state 
and local jurisdictions should collaborate 
with  other  jurisdictions where possible in 
aggregating capabilities.46  In  a  later article, 
Clovis observed that  the expansion, 
development, and implementation  of 
directives for  HSPD 8  moved the tone and 
directness from  partnering  and facilitation  to 
dictates and compliance. 47  His judgment is 
that  “HSPD-8  and its spawn  could be 
characterized as a  direct assault  on  the 
stability  of American  federalism  and 
intergovernmental  relations,  particularly  in 
this policy arena.” 48
Paul  Posner’s work is also instructive.  In 
2003,  Posner  noted that a  major governance 
challenge was how  to institutionalize 
preparedness to prevent  or  better  prepare for 
the next event. He details the emergency  of 
what  he called protective federalism. 49  In 
subsequent  work, Posner  describes trends, 
over  the past  forty  years, moving toward a 
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more coercive and centralized federalism 
(including policy  actions such  as instituting 
more statutory  mandates,  grant  conditions, 
a n d r e g u l a t i o n ) .  I m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e 
nationalization  of priorities and policies – 
such  as those concerning  security  – relegated 
f e d e r a l i s m  i s s u e s t o s e c o n d a r y 
considerations. The federal  role in  homeland 
security  expanded via  intergovernmental 
grants and mandates because of factors such 
as the high-stakes national interest  and 
extensive interdependencies. In  Posner’s 
view, the high  stakes in  particular  provided 
the strong  incentive for  federal,  state,  and 
local  leaders to accept regulatory  standards. 
Acceptance meant protection  from  problems 
in  deciding how  much preparedness was 
adequate. The result, of course,  was the 
Guidelines,  which Posner  views as a  sweeping 
mandate. Quite simply,  Congress,  the 
president,  and state and local governments 
took  advantage of the opportunity  in 
responding to a national crisis.50
Now  there is recognition that  strong 
federal  control may  be problematic  and might 
be said to help seed the movement  towards 
management system  standards. A  2008 
report  by  the Project  on  National Security 
Reform’s Homeland Security  Team  observed 
that  the primary  responsibility  and authority 
for  homeland security  might  have to devolve 
from  the federal to the state level.  The report 
s tated that an  integrated, nat ional 
preparedness and operational  framework at 
the federal level  may  aid, but  does not 
require, interagency  coordination  and 
collaboration. Instead of hierarchical 
controls,  the Project  believed that  a  more 
concrete national governance model should 
be put in place to achieve national objectives. 
One of the Project’s suggested solutions was 
adopting  cooperative standard-setting 
regimes, such  as the standards of the 
National Fire Protection  Association, instead 
of detailed prescriptive requirements such  as 
the Target Capabilities List (TCL)  and 
Universal Task List (UTL).51
OTHER DECISION CONSIDERATIONS
I f t h e G u i d e l i n e s  a r e r e p l a c e d b y 
management system  standards,  then  two 
other issues must be resolved. One is whether 
the standards should be mandated and 
another is certification  or  accreditation 
processes.
MANDATORY ADOPTION
Normally,  management  system  standards 
such  as those under the PS-Prep program, 
EMAP,  or ISO adoption are voluntary, 
although  compliance with  such  standards 
may  be seen  as part of a  legal standard of care 
across an  industry.  Caudle has recommended 
that  the current  federally  developed,  top-
down preparedness framework be replaced 
by  mandated nationally  and internationally 
recognized consensus management system 
standards.52
Discussed above are the overall benefits of 
management  system  standards operating in  a 
stable  policy  and doctrine environment. 
Whether  these are mandated or  optional 
d e p e n d s o n e x p e c t e d p o l i c y  g o a l s . 
Government  agencies could implicitly 
mandate standards by  using them  as 
guidelines for  complying with  regulatory 
requirements. Or  the agencies may  forego a 
mandatory  regulation  if they  view  voluntary 
compliance as meeting policy  goals. This 
seems to be the legislative and executive 
branch  approach  taken  with  the PS-Prep 
voluntary standards for the private sector.
The Government  Accountability  Office53 
has identified several mechanisms where the 
federal  government and the states share 
regulatory  objectives. They  offer  different 
options for  implementation and enforcement. 
These are described in Table 3. 54
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Table 3. Shared Regulatory Mechanisms and Implementation/Enforcement Options
Mechanisms Implementation/Enforcement Options
Fixed federal standards
Fixed federal standards that preempt all state 
regulatory action in the subject area covered
Direct  implementation  by the federal 
agency
Federal minimum standards
Federal minimum standards that preempt 
less stringent state laws but permit states to 
establish standards more stringent than the 
federal
Implementation by the states, approved by 
and under some degree of oversight by the 
federal agency
Grant conditions
Inclusion of federal regulatory provisions in 
grants or other forms of assistance as a 
condition of eligibility to receive support
Combination  of federal  agency  and 
federally approved state implementation
Cooperative programs
Cooperative programs in which voluntary 
national standards are formulated by federal 
and state officials working together
Implementation by the states, approved by 
and under some degree of oversight by the 
federal agency
State adoption of externally set standards
Widespread state adoption of voluntary 
standards formulated by quasi-official 
entities to provide a uniform approach and 
virtually national coverage
Direct implementation by  the state under 
its own authority
The last mechanism  speaks to the 
adoption  of existing international  or  national 
preparedness standards.  As GAO points out, 
other entities,  such  as the National  Fire 
Protection  Association,  can  set national or 
international standards for  a given  material, 
product, service,  or  practice.  If these 
external ly  deve loped s tandards are 
incorporated into a  U.S.-ratified treaty  or 
adopted by  a federal  agency,  they  have the 
status of federal  law.55  GAO also assessed 
each  of these mechanisms against  factors in 
the federal and state balance in  the context  of 
a  national regulatory  objective. These factors 
include (1)  providing uniform  standards and 
nationwide coverage if essential to the 
national objective; (2) allowing flexibility 
where appropriate to that objective; (3) 
assigning  responsibility  appropriate to each 
level of government’s capacity  to do the job at 
hand given  the breadth  of jurisdiction, 
enforcement  powers,  resources, and location; 
and (4)  incorporating accountability  to the 
federal  government  into the mechanism  if 
essential to achieving the national objective. 
GAO observed that external standards can 
provide uniform  model standards that  states 
could adopt in  their  entirety  or  in  part. 
However,  unless these are incorporated into 
federal  regulation,  coverage is limited to 
adopting  states (for  states may  adopt  these 
standards or use others), reliance may  be 
primarily  on state capacity,  or  state agencies 
are accountable to state officials.56
There are established provisions that  can 
be invoked for  mandatory  adoption  as part  of 
national regulatory  frameworks or  legislation. 
The National Technology  Transfer  and 
Advancement  Act  of 1995  and resulting  Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 
A-119  (revised in  1998) mandated federal 
agencies use management system  standards 
developed by  either  domestic of international 
standards bodies instead of federal 
government-unique standards (e.g.,  the 
National Preparedness  Guidelines) in  their 
regulatory  or  procurement  activities.  The 
exception would be standards that  are 
inconsistent with  law  or  impractical. 
Impracticality  includes circumstances where 
use of management system  standards would 
not serve an  agency’s program  needs; are 
infeasible,  inadequate,  ineffectual, inefficient, 
or  inconsistent  with  the agency  mission; or 
impose burdens that  would not be the case if 
another  standard is used.  Preferred are 
p e r f o r m a n c e s t a n d a r d s t h a t  s t a t e 
requirements in  “terms of required results 
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with  criteria for  verifying  compliance but 
without  stating  the methods for  achieving 
performance results.”57
The debate over  whether  these standards 
should be mandatory  or  voluntary  is ongoing, 
most often  linked to market forces and the 
need for  government intervention. For 
example,  Kathleen  Segerson  and KPMG 
Global  Sustainability  Services and the United 
Nations Environment  Programme (KPMG 
and UNEP) discuss conditions when 
voluntary  approaches result  in the needed 
protection.58 Segerson, discussing food safety 
policy,  draws on literature covering 
environmental protection.  KPMG and UNEP 
discuss trends and approaches in  voluntary 
and mandatory  standards for  sustainability 
reporting.  In a  nutshell,  KPMG and UNEP 
observe that voluntary  standards and self-
regulation have a  number  of advantages.  For 
example,  self-regulation  occurs in  the same 
industry  or sector,  promoting access to more 
detailed and current  information than may  be 
avai lable to government  regulators. 
Organizations can  act  with  greater  flexibility 
and there may  be a higher  rate  of compliance 
with  the self-interests of the sector  being 
protected. On  the other  hand,  self-regulation 
may  mean conflicts of interest, inadequate 
s a n c t i o n s ,  u n d e r - e n f o r c e m e n t , a n d 
insufficient resourcing. 
Mandatory  standards have a number  of 
advantages, such  as providing credibility  in 
using  recognized guidelines, allowing 
comparability  of practices and promotion  of 
standardization, providing a  standard of care 
for  legal  disputes,  and addressing  market 
failures for  social welfare.  Disadvantages 
include regulators’ lack  of knowledge of the 
industry,  inflexibility  when  there are 
changing  circumstances and technologies, the 
lack  of incentive for  innovation, and the 
possible addition  of costs that  undermine 
efficiency  and competitiveness. Segerson 
argues that  adequate consumer protection 
may  need mandatory  standards if consumers 
cannot readily  detect safety  characteristics or 
risks and it  is not  certain  that  firms would be 
held liable for damages.
If standards are legislatively  mandated, 
Keith  Bea cautions that  they  could be viewed 
as an  unfunded mandate on  state and local 
governments.59 Mandates also can be seen as 
interfering with  state  and local sovereignty  or 
private sector  business practices.  However, 
Susan  Clarke and Erica  Chenoweth  argue a 
regulatory  preparedness approach  provides 
incentives for  local capacity  for, and 
commitment  to, preparedness. 60  This latter 
point  is important  because there have been 
calls for  a  return  to federalism  and 
Constitutional limits on  the power  of the 
federal  government (see,  for  example, articles 
by  Kenneth Jost  and Matt Mayer  and Lee 
Baca).61 It  is also important to remember that 
the Guidelines  are tied to federal funding, 
and adherence to preparedness management 
system  standards could be readily  tied to 
homeland security grants.
Even  with the political will  to make the 
change, there may  be disagreement  over  what 
policy  option  is best  to make the transition  to 
preparedness management  system  standards. 
According  to NIST,  government agencies can 
adopt standards in several regulatory  ways. 
They  can adopt  them  without change. They 
might  grant a  strong  deference to standards 
for  a  specific  purpose. Government  agencies 
also could revise a  standard and publish  it  as 
a  proposed regulation or  permit adherence to 
a  specific  standard as a way  of complying 
with  a  regulation.62  For  example,  Congress 
might  legislate, and the president approve, 
the stipulation  of regulations to replace  the 
Guidelines  with  one or more existing 
preparedness management  system  standards. 
This would ensure a  solid link to federal 
financial assistance and considerable funding 
opportunities for  state and local governments 
in  compliance with  the preparedness 
standards. Federal agencies would be 
governed through the budgeting process.
Unless mandated, it appears that the only 
overt incentive is “standard of care”  pressure 
to adopt  management  system  standards. In 
fact,  the slow  penetration  of standard 
adoption  in the private  sector  on a voluntary 
basis resulted in  a  report  card grade of “C” 
from  the 9/11  Public Discourse Project in 
2 0 0 5 , t h e s u c c e s s o r  t o t h e 9 / 1 1 
Commission. 63  Voluntary  standards may 
result  in  uneven  or  low  levels of preparedness 
because of factors such  as insufficient 
re s ou rc ing  and u nd e r-e nf orce me nt . 
Advantages such  as using  recognized 
guidelines and promoting standardization  are 
important  for nat ional consistency, 
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collaboration,  and the sharing  of better 
practices.
CERTIFICATION OR ACCREDITATION 
REQUIREMENTS
Decisions will be required on  certification  or 
accreditation  requirements to evaluate 
conformation with  the standards for 
organizations responsible for national 
preparedness. In  the standards community, 
certification  means an independent external 
body  has audited an organizat ion’s 
management  system  and the organization’s 
system  conforms to the standard. 64 It could 
be claimed that  formal  certification 
requirements should exist  where national 
preparedness is involved.  The rationale is 
that  the National Preparedness  Guidelines 
are intended to emphasize preparedness for 
hazards that may  result in  disasters or 
catastrophes requiring  rapid and coordinated 
nat ional act ion. Using  management 
standards in  lieu  of unique federally 
developed standards such as the Guidelines 
would require substantial  compliance with 
the preparedness standards.65 Unless there is 
a  recognized certification  process beyond 
self-certification,  many  would argue that  the 
regulatory  adoption of the management 
system standards is meaningless.
Implementing  a  certification program  will 
create a  number  of practical  difficulties, 
beginning with  the number  of entities 
needing  certification. Undoubtedly  one 
approach  would be to establish  authority  for 
certification  against  the management  system 
s t a n d a r d s . D i s a s t e r  o r  c a t a s t r o p h e 
preparedness would seem  to indicate that, at 
a  minimum, the organizations subject  to 
standard certification in  a  first phase should 
be states, the large urban areas,  and the 
private sector  responsible for  critical 
infrastructure.  In  the past,  DHS has struggled 
with  its own  certification  of homeland 
security  plans of states and urban  areas and 
assessing  general preparedness.66  Work on 
the current  voluntary  private sector 
accreditation  and certification  preparedness 
program  could be instructive in  expanding 
certification to federal, state,  and local 
government  agencies involved in  homeland 
security  preparedness.  The EMAP mentioned 
earlier  also might serve as a  model for 
certification.  Certification could either  be 
done by  a similar  body  or  by  federal  staff now 
allocated to the current  federal homeland 
security  Guidelines. Those components that 
might  support  preparedness technical 
assistance could be retained at the federal 
level with  DHS,  or  placed in an  existing 
university  or  center  of excellence geared to 
technical assistance.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A  key  “take away” is that  the actual standard 
elements are succinct  and contained in  a 
small number  of pages that  are supplemented 
by  explicit guidance for  use. The language 
used in Table 2  is actual standards language. 
Organizations who implement  these 
standards are expected to assess their 
structure, processes, and security  needs and 
develop their  own management  systems and 
performance criteria. This is in  stark contrast 
to the Guidelines  and supporting  voluminous 
components such  as the Universal Task List 
and the Target Capabilities  List,  where 
organizations are  faced with  hundreds of 
pages of direction  and guidance.  However, 
the full set  of elements across the existing 
preparedness management  system  standards 
is completely  consistent  with  the intent  of the 
National Preparedness  Guidelines  without 
its prescriptive specificity. For example:
• The preparedness standards call for 
identifying  potential hazards and threats 
and assessing  r isks and impacts 
appropriate for any  organization. These 
hazards and threats include natural 
hazards, accidental and intentional 
human-caused events,  and accidental  and 
intentional technologically  caused events. 
The Guidelines emphasize preparedness 
for  a  number of high-consequence threat 
scenarios,  including  potential terrorist 
attacks and natural disasters.
• The standards call  for  each  organization 
to analyze its organizational and 
stakeholder requirements and define 
those processes that  contribute  to its 
overall  success.  Each organization is to 
manage its own preparedness actions, 
such  as those to determine roles and 
responsibilities,  manage preparedness 
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and response resources and mutual aid 
agreements , mainta in  p lans and 
procedures, and train and exercise to test 
capabilities. They  foster  integration  with 
q u a l i t y , s a f e t y ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l , 
information  security,  risk, and other 
m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m s w i t h i n a n 
organization. They  emphasize  the role of 
other organizations – partners – in 
preparedness, such  as through  mutual aid 
or  direct support. The Guidelines detail 
more than  1,600 unique tasks to build 
capabilities that communities,  the private 
sector,  and all levels of government 
should collectively  share. The many  states 
that  have already  been  certified under  the 
Emergency  Management Accreditation 
P r o g r a m  s p e a k  t h e e f f i c a c y  o f 
management system standards.
That said, adoption of management 
system  standards certainly  will  test  the mettle 
of many  organizations. Rodger  Holdsworth 
cautions that  many  organizations wanting  to 
establish  a management system  do not fully 
understand that  formal management  systems 
truly  are formal or  documented.67  For  an 
organization  to transition from  an  informal 
or  semi-formal approach  in  managing its 
operations to a  more effective formal 
approach  requires careful planning, 
organization, and clear  goals and objectives. 
The program  elements in a  standard assist  in 
planning  and organizing  what  must be 
established and implemented to reduce risk 
and assist  owners,  as well as regulators, in 
measuring  performance to specif ied 
requirements. Holdsworth  also notes that 
audits have shown that  management  systems 
evolve,  not  by  design,  but  over  time based 
upon  process specific, regulatory  and 
company needs and or requirements.
This observation  is supported by  work by 
Neil Gunningham  and Darren  Sinclair, 68 who 
highlight  concerns with  moving  to process 
and management  system  standards,  which 
they  call  management-based regulation. Such 
regulation encourages organizations to put  in 
place processes and management  systems 
that  are least-cost, flexible solutions ensuring 
consistency  across the organization  and more 
than  compliance with  minimum  legal 
standards. However, they  suggest  that  there 
might  be different  levels of commitment  to 
standards and capacity  to implement  them 
within  the organization’s hierarchy  and 
cultures. They  argue that management-based 
regulation works well when  standards are 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e y o n d c o r p o r a t e 
management  and are supported by  informal 
systems of trust , commitment ,  and 
engagement.
Without a doubt,  there will  be ongoing 
uncertainty  in  meeting  and sustaining  the 
commitment  and capacity  need to comply 
with  the elements of the preparedness 
management  system  standards. For  some, 
t h e v e r y  d e t a i l e d a n d v o l u m i n o u s 
requirements of the current  Guidelines 
provide a convenient  cover  for  decision-
making, particularly  in  the absence of a 
strong audit  or oversight  mechanism. The 
standards for  preparedness are much  more 
concise for  clarity  of management attention 
and define specific  preparedness program 
elements,  coupled with  considerable 
flexibility  in  actions, to meet  required 
program  elements.  Accountability  comes 
from  the central program  element  in  the 
standards requiring audits and possible 
certification.
Overall, this article has argued that  a 
number  of trends support  the adoption  of 
management  system  standards.  Management 
system  standards can  be adopted by  all 
organizations,  regardless of size, type of 
product  or  service, culture,  or  location. 
Standards provide a  common  preparedness 
language for  all involved organizations, 
seamless integration  with  other  management 
systems such  as those for  quality  and safety, a 
transparent and consistent development and 
revision process,  and supporting  guidance 
and expert  assistance. By  adopting  and 
complying  with  these established standards, 
organizations should be in  a  much  better 
position to craft  preparedness programs 
appropriate for  their situation, their 
p r e p a r e d n e s s p a r t n e r s ,  t h e e n t i r e 
preparedness product  chain, and the public 
expectation  for  homeland security  results and 
accountability.  Transitioning  to management 
system  standards for  all levels of government 
will confront a number  of challenges, but 
these are outweighed by the benefits.
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Special Report: Key Issues from the UAPI Continental Security 
Conference
Stanley Supinski, Phillip Treglia, Donna Cayson, and Jeffrey Burkett




The University  and Agency  Partnership 
Initiative (UAPI)  of the Center  for  Homeland 
Defense and Security  conducted its first  ever 
Continental Security  Conference (CSC) on 
December  7/8,  2010 in  Colorado Springs. 
The event brought together  participants from 
Canada,  Mexico, and the United States,  and 
focused on  common  security  issues of 
interest to all three nations with an  emphasis 
on  academic perspectives and contributions. 
This report  provides background, a summary 
of the proceedings, and proposes a  way  ahead 
for this initiative. 
The genesis of the conference stems from 
the expansion  of the UAPI into the 
international arena.1 In  late 2009, the UAPI 
reached across the border  to Canada in an 
effort  to learn  of their academic programs, 
better  inform  our comparative homeland 
security  courses, and offer  Canadian 
programs the academic support  provided to 
UAPI partners domestically.2 After  that  visit, 
a  decision  was made to reach  out to Mexico 
as well, through  a  conference that  bought 
together academics, practitioners, and 
policymakers from  the three countries that 
share the North American continent.
The goals coming  in  to the CSC were 
straightforward. First was to develop 
knowledge and educate the participants on 
security  issues and academic efforts as 
undertaken  in  each  country.  Second was to 
build relationships between the participants 
and to begin  institutionalizing  those relations 
between their  organizations. Once the 
conference began, an additional  goal was 
added: to generate a  concrete list  of 
objectives for future conferences.
A t t e n d i n g t h e c o n f e r e n c e w e r e 
representatives from  academia,  including  two 
from  Mexico, four  from  Canada, and nine 
from  the U.S.  military.3 The Department of 
Homeland Security/Federal Emergency 
Management  Agency  (FEMA) and Public 
Safety  Canada  (PSC)  were among  the 
organizations representing  the practitioner 
community.  A  complete list of organizations 
represented at the conference is in  appendix 
A.
Despite the participant nations’ proximity 
to each other  and the nature of today’s 
natural and manmade threat  environment, 
few  long-term  initiatives of this type exist. 
None of these has a  primarily  academic 
focus. 4
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The conference began with  a  keynote address 
by  Ambassador  Andres Rozental,  the former 
Mexican  ambassador  to the United Kingdom 
and founding  president of the Mexican 
Council on  Foreign  Relations. The address 
focused on  several  key  areas: shared security 
threats, increased cooperation,  criminality, 
and cultural differences.
The events of 9/11  were seen  by  many  as 
an  opportunity  to redefine the relationship 
between  the countries on  the North  American 
continent. Both  formal and informal 
discussions were conducted at the secretary 
of state level regarding a  “security  perimeter” 
that  included the entire continent.  However, 
the issue of sovereignty, particularly  for 
Canada,  was one of several issues that 
precluded making  much progress in  this area. 
Another  issue then,  as now, is the security 
threat  posed by  undocumented people in  all 
three countries.
There has been  gradual but  significant 
change during  the past  decade that  has 
increased security  cooperation, particularly 
between  Mexico and the U.S.  Evidence of 
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these changes includes visits by  secretaries of 
defense; a  “sea  change”  in  sharing of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t 
information; and an  increase in  formal and 
i n f o r m a l e x c h a n g e s ( h a v i n g  f i v e 
representatives from  Mexico attending this 
conference is one example of these 
exchanges).  Mexico’s formal  liaison  with  the 
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is 
also strong  evidence of increased cooperation 
and improved relations. 
The U.S./Mexican  border  continues to 
pose significant  issues.  The border, stated 
Ambassador  Rosental, is “insecure,  criminal, 
and dysfunctional, and on  the Mexican  side is 
an  inconsistent structure to deal  with  it.”  An 
effort  to identify  the issues and propose 
potential solutions was undertaken  jointly  via 
a  task force (which  Ambassador  Rozental  co-
chaired) consisting of representatives from 
the Pacific  Council on International  Policy 
a n d C o n s e j o M e x i c a n d e A s u n t o s 
Internacionales A.C (COMEXI). The report 
from  this task force,  Managing the United 
States-Mexico Border: Cooperative  Solutions 
to  Common Challenges,  focuses on  making 
the border  friendlier, more secure, and 
conducive to increased trade.  It  includes 
recommendations for  a  trusted traveler 
program, pre-clearance procedures for  both 
goods and travelers,  proposals for  furthering 
security  cooperation, and development  of 
more crossings and infrastructure.  The report 
has become a  key  document  for  political 
leadership in both countries.
Transnational crime has always been  an 
issue,  but  with  the tremendous level of 
growth  in  the recent  past,  it  has become a 
serious threat  to North  American security. 
The overwhelming majority  of crime is drug 
related,  and production, transport, and usage 
pose a threat  to all three nations. There is a 
sense that  too little emphasis has been  given 
to the problem  of drug use and demand. 
There is also general consensus that the 
transnational crime threat is currently  the 
greatest security issue.
Despite improvements in  relations, 
Ambassador  Rozental  pointed out,  “we still 
don’t know  each  other  well  enough; there 
remain gaps in  knowledge, perceptions,  and 
we clearly  don’t  understand each  other’s 
cultures.”  Knowledge gaps result in a  lack of 
trust,  and this has been amplified with 
Mexico because of corruption  issues. 
Portrayal in  the media  of a  Mexican  “culture 
of criminality” has hindered moving forward.  
Changes in  political administrations have 
also been  a factor  in  making  progress in 
terms of relations and security, the 
Ambassador  concluded; new  administrations 
take trust  backwards temporarily, so it  is 
important to institutionalize  relationships at 
the operational levels. 
The remainder  of the conference focused 
on  three issues or  questions: (1) what is 
continental security, (2) does continental 
security  matter, and (3)  how  can academia 
contribute to this issue? These areas were 
provided as starting  points only.  Each  major 
issue discussion began  with  a  primer, 
provided by  selected attendees, and was 
followed by  a  plenary  discussion. Then each 
question  was discussed in  breakout  groups, 
and each  group included attendees from  each 
nation.  Following are overviews of the 
discussions surrounding the topic in  both 
plenary  and breakout  sessions. Essays from 
selected primer  presenters are included in  the 
appendices. 
WHAT IS CONTINENTAL SECURITY?
The first  presenter, Rodrigo Nieto Gómez, 
pointed out that borders mean many  things 
and the first,  essential,  step to consider in 
“continental”  security  is to make explicit 
some of the differences in  how  the countries 
involved in this discussion filter  and 
represent  objective facts. A  summary  of his 
comments can be found in  his essay  “What is 
Continental Security? Avoiding  Getting  Lost 
in Translation,” in Appendix B. 
The second presenter  was David McIntyre 
of the National  Graduate School. McIntyre 
suggested,  “Continental  Security  is North 
American unity  in  promoting systemic, 
sustainable, well-being  of national  power  in 
the face of national  attack.”  His presentation 
highlighted talking  points of incentives and 
“words that  matter.”  This was instrumental  in 
understanding  that “attacks”  required a 
response and that  focusing  on  external 
attacks would miss some of the internal 
problems and the commonality  for  each 
country. By  disassociating  specific  issues 
such  as immigration  or  smuggling, a 
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framework for  cooperation  can  be established 
and advanced without the baggage of existing 
issues/competing  interests that  hinder 
meaningful holistic progress.   
Discussions of the question “what  is 
continental security”  focused on  several 
major themes.
First  was the concept  that  three nations 
combined and collaborating would obtain 
improved results over  individual efforts 
against security  concerns with  transnational 
consequences. While the threats were 
deemed to vary  somewhat between  nations, 
common  concerns include these major 
categories (listed without  ranking  or 
priority): pandemics,  natural or  manmade 
disasters (such  as the earthquakes or  the 
Deep Horizon  o i l  sp i l l ) ,  terror ism, 
transnational  illegal trafficking operations 
(drugs,  weapons,  people,  or  money), 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,  global 
warming/climate change/environmental 
issues, non-state  entities operating  within 
each  country,  and cyber  attacks.  Additional 
areas of concern were threats to critical 
infrastructure (i.e. electrical systems), 
f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s a n d e c o n o m i c s , 
immigration,  farming/food security, and 
water  resources and rights issues. The threat 
posed by  the recent  H1N1  virus provided an 
ideal case for  study: analyzing  how  it  was 
handled by  each  nation, including  what  was 
done well and not  so well, could provide 
insight  into improving  cooperation and 
learning  from  each  others’ respective lessons. 
It was generally  agreed that  the number  one 
issue confronting  all three nations is 
organized crime.  
Second, participants agreed that  North 
American  security  must  be grounded in 
shared interests. It  was generally  agreed that 
the agenda  driving  shared interests has been 
focused more on  preventing  terrorist  attacks 
and largely  driven  by  U.S. concerns. There 
was overwhelming  consensus that  terrorism 
should perhaps be replaced as the driving 
factor  for  promoting  security  cooperation. 
Instead,  focusing on  the positive benefits of 
cooperation may  be a  more useful approach 
to moving  the agenda  forward because it  has 
more relevancy/impact  on  individual citizens 
(i.e.  economic impact)  and has universal 
political appeal.  It  was noted that  only 
thirteen U.S. citizens have died from  terrorist 
acts since 9/11,  yet hundreds of thousands 
have died from  automobile accidents and 
heart disease. 
The third point of agreement  was that 
actors other  than  governments also define 
continental  security.  For  example, the 
medical  community’s reaction  to H1N1 
transcended all  three borders and provided 
the basis for  the public health  response, 
which  in  turn  was supported by  each  nation. 
It is important to recognize the influence of 
the medical  community  in defining the 
threat, advising government, and responding. 
Incentives are critical in  creating  an  accepted 
definition  for  continental security. In 
addition to it being  important to those 
policymakers of each  nation  that are 
ultimately  responsible for  carrying out 
security  related activity,  the private sector 
benefits must be addressed as well.
Finally,  defining  continental  security  is 
complicated by  the fact that  a  concept of a 
North  American  identity  does not  exist.  The 
absence of a  political  and cultural  identity 
challenges widespread acceptance of the 
continental security  concept  because 
nationalism  and sovereignty  arguments 
p r e v a i l .  U n t i l t h e r e i s a  f o c u s o n 
interdependencies – such  as energy, 
agricultural  and economic production – a 
common identity  will be lacking  and the 
imperative to secure that  collective identity 
will be absent.  
In  summarizing  this session, Ambassador 
Rozental  pointed out that spending  excessive 
time on defining  terms is wasteful;  focusing 
on  processes to improve conditions for 
security  is more valuable.  Furthermore,  the 
goals of gaining knowledge about the subject 
matter  and connecting  with  fellow  colleagues 
and professionals far  outweigh  any  working 
definitions this workshop could create.
DOES CONTINENTAL SECURITY 
MATTER?
The primers for  this discussion  were provided 
by  Pamela Matthews (Public Safety  Canada) 
and David Schanzer  (Duke University). 
Matthews provided background on  Public 
Safety  Canada and suggested that, from  her 
perspective, the key  issues for developing  the 
continental agenda are driven by:
SUPINSKI, ET AL, CONTINENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE  3
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 15 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
• The interconnectedness of economies;  the 
U.S.-Mexican-Canadian  marketplace is 
among  the largest  in  the world, with 
billions flowing across borders everyday;
• Shared interests in  preventing  criminal 
activity  (drugs, human  trafficking, 
weapons smuggling, etc.), terrorism,  and 
radicalization;
• Publ ic sa fe ty  matters , inc luding 
emergency  management along  shared 
borders;
• Infrastructure matters: food supplies, 
e l e c t r i c a l g r i d ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 
communications, etc.;
• Geography, proximity, and shared 
airspace/over flight concerns; 
• Common  governmental  obligations to 
protect  citizens’ safety  and well-being; the 
value placed on  democratic principles and 
maintaining  free/open  societies; and not 
improving security  at the expense of 
liberty and privacy.
Schanzer, whose essay  “Continental 
Security  – A  Skeptic’s View,”  is available  in 
Appendix C,  briefed that the threshold should 
be high  for  a  continental security  agenda 
because governments are already  stressed 
and only  limited additional efforts can  be 
supported.  Any  new  paradigm  must consider 
potential value and include only  issues that 
impact  and benefit  all three partners,  arise 
from  the geographic proximity,  and consider 
the positive and negative aspects of large 
scale economic integration.  
Much  of the discussion  surrounding the 
question  “does continental  security  matter?” 
revolved around Matthew’s and Schanzer’s 
advocacy  for  a  new  paradigm  that focuses on 
issues of mutual benefit,  shared values, and 
increased economic prosperity .  The 
participants agreed that  continental security 
should feature a privileged relationship – 
where each  nation  benefits more than others 
outside the group would – similar  to the 
concept  behind NAFTA.  Progress on  such  an 
agenda would serve to build trust,  increase 
the ability  to solve crises,  and keep lines of 
communication  open. Operationally, such  an 
undertaking  must  be politically  and popularly 
acceptable; it  must  show  that it  will improve 
upon  the status quo; the “low  hanging  fruit” 
should be the first  attempted; timelines for 
showing  success must be reasonable; and 
efforts must  fall  within  acceptable human 
rights policies and legal parameters.  Finally, 
the group felt  that  emergency  management 
and humanitarian  efforts of the recent past 
might  provide good models for  cooperation, 
particularly  in  light  of experiences in  the 
Caribbean and following Hurricane Katrina.
Participants generally  concurred that  it  is 
more critical in today’s security  environment 
to address mutual cooperation.  Foreign 
relations have changed since the end of the 
cold war; there is an increase in  the scope and 
volume of trade; and there is both  greater 
interconnectivity  and shared infrastructure, 
w h i c h  m a n d a t e r e n e w e d a t t e n t i o n . 
Additionally,  existing  policy  and programs 
are moving too slowly or are not working.  
Moving an agenda  forward will require an 
overarching set of guiding  principles all  three 
nations can  use to shape domestic policy; it 
cannot be dominated and driven  solely  by 
U.S.  interests.  Such  guidelines will help 
synchronize national  strategies and make it 
easier  for  leaders to sell initiatives to their 
domestic populations, particularly  in  Canada 
and Mexico.  Overarching strategies and the 
requisite political endorsements have been 
missing  in  the past, which  has led to some 
ineffective multinational programs,  waste, 
and frustration.  Examples of this,  and further 
reason  to support  this mutual effort, are the 
spillover  effect  of trade and the corruption  of 
the Mexican  government.  It was agreed that 
Mexico’s government must  be reformed in 
order to move forward with  a  trilateral 
agreement as external i t ies such  as 
corruption, pandemics, and drugs radiate 
outward and have an  effect on  the entire 
continent.  In  this context, it  would be  best to 
look at what is already  being  done: port and 
airport  security, movement of goods,  and 
response to pandemics were identified as 
three areas that clearly fit.    
Stephane Roussel (University  of Quebec) 
asked “how  do we face a  major  crisis without 
closing  the borders?”  Participants agreed that 
managing  issues without doing  so is critical 
as such  closures adversely  affect  the 
economy.  Any  event that  impacts all three 
countries must be examined case by  case, 
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issue by  issue,  while at the same time keeping 
a  broad view,  which  a  continental security 
effort could clearly help frame in advance.  
In  summary, there was strong agreement 
a  continental  effort  is important  and how  it  is 
framed is crucial. Synergies would result 
from  such  an  effort. An incremental approach 
that  moves forward with  a  unity  of vision 
would be best; not having such  an effort 
could clearly hamper cross-border issues. 
HOW CAN ACADEMIA 
CONTRIBUTE TO THIS EFFORT?
Academia has a  long  tradition  of helping 
government  solve its most complex problems. 
North  American  security  is no exception, yet 
to date the intellectual capacity  of Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States has not  been 
fully  energized toward solving  our  common 
challenges.  
The first  primer addressing  this question, 
delivered by  Roussel,  focused on what 
academia  is “good and not  good at.”  He 
suggested that academia can  be a  tremendous 
resource because it  excels in  several key  areas 
such  as documenting  data, conducting 
fundamental research  and comparative 
analysis, providing  historical  examples, 
testing  and evaluation, and identifying 
options.  Academia  can  also reach  across 
borders and be instrumental in  developing a 
transnational lexicon  that could help frame 
multilateral  discourse. Conversely, what 
academia is not  good at  is making 
predic t ions , making dec is ions ,  and 
implementing policy.  
The second primer, “What Contributions 
Can Academics Make to Continental 
Security?”  was provided by  Harold Trinkunas 
(Naval  Postgraduate School) and is 
summarized in  Appendix  D.  His overview  of 
what  academics can  do was highlighted by 
the notion  of nurturing  hemispheric  research 
by  shaping  panel discussions at  relevant 
professional conferences and sponsoring 
research. He further  suggested that  this 
forum  should determine how  to identify 
common research  topics,  what models are 
best  suited to sustain  research,  which 
networks need to be engaged,  and who 
should support  and sponsor  multilateral 
multiagency efforts. 
The participants concurred that  the focus 
of academia  should be restricted to what  it  is 
best at,  particularly  education  of both  policy 
makers and the public, research, and how  to 
draw  lessons from  past  historical data  and 
operational  experience. Academics can help 
frame the strategic communications message 
by  helping  the state department, minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  and other  government 
organizations.  Broadening  the network of 
stakeholders and extending the discussion 
will create momentum  and the imperative for 
action.5
 There are some potential negatives to 
using academia.  Ambassador  Rozental 
estimated that  – despite the contributions 
academics can  make – only  roughly  ten 
percent  of policy  makers are interested in  or 
open  to outside views; this may  account  for 
why  academia has not  been  engaged in the 
past. Preservation  of academic  independence 
is also an  issue; maintaining  objectivity 
during  the examination  of highly  politicized 
issues, such  as immigration policy, is vital  to 
p r o v i d i n g a p o l i t i c a l a n d s o u n d 
recommendations. Furthermore, academia 
generally  does not  work  quickly, as analytic 
research  is time consuming; it  requires clear 
objectives, which  government often  fails to 
provide; and there must be a  commitment  of 
resources.  In  al l cases,  expectat ion 
management is essential for all stakeholders.  
T h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s i n  m o s t 
government  to academia  relationships 
involve the lack of a  “common language,” 
poor  expectation  management, an  absence of 
established networks,  limited access to 
i n f o r m a t i o n a n d p e o p l e ,  a n d a 
misunderstanding  of academic  incentives. 
For  academic  involvement  to be effective, 
projects should be managed at  the lowest 
level  possible to encourage realistic  and 
practical  recommendations and findings. 
Nevertheless,  even  with  the expected benefit, 
RADM Ortega  (Mexican  Navy) commented: 
“The Mexican  government  does not  use the 
academic  community”  and conveyed that 
they would be unlikely to do so in the future.  
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CLOSING COMMENTS AND 
THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
The closing  group’s consensus was that 
academia  has much  to offer  in  strengthening 
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. security  and 
cooperation. The following items were 
proposed as a  starting  point  for  moving  the 
Canadian-U.S.-Mexican  security  agenda for 
academia forward. 
• Per  Ambassador  Rozental’s suggestion, 
r e v i s e t h e C o n t i n e n t a l S e c u r i t y 
Conference name to “Canada-US-Mexico: 
Our New Common Security Agenda.”
• Disseminate, share, and improve access 
to cooperative efforts,  including  the use of 
social media  to expand the discussion  and 
reach more participants.
• Clearly  define the goals of this group and 
consider  formalizing  its propose with  a 
statement of principles.
• Broaden  the network; consider  who might 
be missing from the discussions.
• Establish  a  Center  of Excellence for  the 
study  of Canadian-U.S.-Mexican  security 
that  is apolitical and non-partisan, can 
reach out to other  institutions to 
collaborate on  research  agendas, will 
explore multinational  funding  sources to 
encourage dialogue,  will  encourage 
h e m i s p h e r i c  i s s u e r e s e a r c h  a n d 
publication, and can network with  and 
support interested stakeholders.
Closing  comments by  Ambassador 
Rozental  best  summarize key  points of the 
conference.  He saw  this as “an extraordinary 
event  that  brought  together  an  impressive 
group of people with  a  broad variety  of 
backgrounds,  and as a  genuine learning 
experience.”  The contributions academia  can 
make to our  joint security  are great, 
particularly  with  its ability  to think outside of 
the box  and to look  beyond the horizon.  As 
we move forward, we must  ensure that  we 
consider  security  in  other  areas, such  as those 
that  affect  our economies. We must  also 
ensure that  our trilateral  shield should not 
interrupt bilateral efforts,  but  focus on  those 
areas where three is better  than  two. As the 
three largest nations sharing the North 
American  continent, we can  only  benefit  by 
using  the concept  of “privileged”  relations to 
improve our overall security.
Finally,  perhaps the best summary  of the 
importance of this event,  and the need to 
continue such a  dialog, was made by 
Ambassador  Rozental to this author  in  a 
private comment:  In  the event of a  natural or 
manmade disaster,  the best thing  our  three 
nations can  do is “close ranks,  not close 
borders.”
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1 The Initiative has as its mission to expand and support U.S. based homeland security education and training 
programs.  The UAPI has supported program development in all fifty states, and has hosted dozens of conferences 
and workshops, including the Annual Homeland Defense and Security Education Summit held in the National Capital  
Region each spring.  Program support includes development of comparative homeland security courses – those which 
look at how security is conducted in other nations and learning of best practices, procedures, and lessons learned.
2 The visit to Ottawa included the University of Ottawa, Carleton University, and the policy office of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada.
3 Representatives were present from the Mexican Navy, the North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. 
Northern Command, as well as from military schools, including the National Defense University.
4 The World Affairs Council has conducted an annual North American Forum, which brings together key thought 
leaders to interact for the “mutually reinforcing goals of security, prosperity and enhanced quality of life.” (http://
www.itsyourworld.org/wac/North_American_Forum.asp) The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
was created in 2005 to conduct regional dialog on security and economic issues, and it also included Canada, Mexico 
and the U.S. (See M. Villereal and J. Lake, J., (2009) Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An 
Overview and Selected Issues, Congressional Research Service, 2009.)    This effort was initiated by the leaders of the 
three countries at that time (Paul Martin, Vicente Fox, and George Bush), but did not continue with their successors; 
the Partnership ceased to be active after August 2009. (See Pacific Council on International Relations, “Managing the  
United States - Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems,” 2009.) Several trilateral agreements 
exist, most notably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as numerous bilateral accords, but 
none of which institutionalize regular gatherings to discuss security issues and the perspective of academia and its 
potential contribution.
5 Several ideas emerged to improve this forum in the future such as holding the next conference in Mexico or Canada, 
co-authoring papers within the working group, providing a historical perspective at the next event, and establishing a 
wiki site to encourage dialogue.
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APPENDIX B
What is Continental Security?  Avoiding Getting Lost in Translation
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez
It is tempting to conclude that  thinking  about  continental security  only  requires from  us that  we 
move our  vantage point  one step higher, articulating  the “continental  dimension”  to the 
national, regional, and local scales.
The reality  is more complicated than  that. Borders represent many  things.  They  certainly  are 
artificial  or  natural lines in  the territory  that demarcate the point where jurisdictions, 
constitutions,  and authorities change.  Michel  Foucher describes the borders as “territorial 
discontinuities that  highlight  political divisions. In  that sense,  they  are  legal  institutions, 
negotiated or imposed, established by political decisions, and governed by the law.” 1
Nevertheless,  they  also possess an  aspirational  and imagined function  that transcends their 
important institutional nature.  They  are  the containers of geopolitical representations that give 
to the people who live inside those territories a  series of lenses and discursive frameworks that 
can  be and often are unique to them, creating  different  or  “alternate”  realities and priorities vis-
à-vis the same “transborder” facts.
Therefore,  borders are also the place where public discourse changes, sometimes radically.  As 
a  consequence, the first  essential step to consider, including a  continental scale for  security 
issues in  North America,  is to make explicit some of the most  important  differences in  the way 
North  American national subjective agendas filter  and represent objective facts. Only  then will 
we be able to “localize”  the national  interests and priorities of the three nations into something 
each  nation  can  understand using  its own lens.  Otherwise,  the concept of continental  security 
might “get lost in translation.”
I propose here a  series of exploratory  interrogations to guide us in  this quest. Finding some of 
their  multiple answers would allow  us to - if I might  continue using  the idiomatic  metaphor  - 
carve  our  own  trilateral Rosetta  Stone for  security  issues,  decoding  the multiple meanings that 
Americans, Canadians and Mexicans attribute to the same facts. 
This list  of questions is by  no means exhaustive,  and more could be included as these are 
answered. Nevertheless, they  seemed to me a good starting  point  to begin  a  continuous and 
emergent conversation.
1. Is there a real need for a continental or North American security framework? Why? 
2. Can  a truly  cooperative North  American security  framework even  exist,  given the enormous 
disparities in  the size  and scale of interests between  the United States, the only  current 
global superpower, and Mexico and Canada?
3. Can  we talk about  a continental  scale for  security  in  North  America  today, or  are we being 
fooled by  two bilateral  security  relations that sometimes pose as a  trilateral one: The 
Canadian-American  relationship (defined by  the strong  bonds that were forged thanks to 
NORAD) and the weaker  narcotized relationship between  the U.S.  and Mexico,  with  both 
relations pivoting around the United States and with  little practical contact  between  Canada 
and Mexico?
4. Is it  valid to talk  about  a  North American security  framework, if there are no North 
American security institutions?
5. Is the harmonization  of internal policies,  laws,  and regulations a  sufficient  response to North 
American  security  threats,  or should the North  American  nations move towards a  more 
formal and binding  security  treaty? Is this even  conceivable or  will their  respective public 
opinions stop any such a process?
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6. Is North  American  security  a  hegemonic construct put  together  by  the United States to 
impose its definitions of security  to the whole continent? Or is it  the opposite: a  framework 
that  helps sensitize the global superpower to the problems, threats, and vulnerabilities of its 
own world region?
7. A  core element  of the geopolitics of both “internal”  border  zones of North  America  is the 
presence of a  few  highly  active points of entry  that  measure just  a  few  miles, surrounded by 
large unpopulated zones where governance is scarce and situational  awareness hard to 
obtain  and expensive to keep. Can the three nations produce the necessary  agreements and 
assume the necessary  costs to protect those key  empty  territories and bring governance to 
them? 
8. Furthermore,  is it  in  the best  interest  of the three North  American nations to do this,  or  will 
competing  agendas and objectives make it  a  zero sum  scenario?  (E.g., border security 
between  Mexico and the U.S. would affect immigration dynamics, putting  pressure  on 
Mexican policymakers.)
9. Supranational regions are geopolitical  representations themselves.  Where does North 
America  stop? Can  a regional  security  policy  be built without the inclusion  of the Central 
American  and Caribbean  nations? If not,  wouldn’t  that  make the concept  of North  American 
security  redundant  or  unnecessary, in  light of this rediscovered version  of pan-
Americanism?
10. How  do the three nations deal  with  the “elephants in the room”  of the prior  relationships? 
Can  American  and Mexican  stakeholders overcome their  historical  mistrust  of one another? 
Can  Canada deal with  Mexico as an  equal partner at  the trilateral level  without  losing its 
special relationship with  the U.S.,  and without seeing  that relationship “Mexicanized”? What 
other kinds of reciprocal mistrusts are out there, waiting to hinder any coordinated efforts?  
11. What  is the role of American  homeland security  in  shaping  North  American  security 
interests,  and should Mexico and Canada  accept the fundamental objectives of this policy 
(e.g.,  critical infrastructure protection, border  security,  resilience,  and an  all-hazard 
approach  to threats)  as the unavoidable starting points for  their  own  domestic security 
policies?  Do they have to?
12. What  other  issues are important  for  Mexico and Canada,  and are not currently  part  of the 
respective American  bilateral  agenda with  these nations? Should any  of those be considered 
to be part of a North American security framework?
Most  of these questions have more than  one answer  and none is intrinsically  correct or  false. 
What  it  is important from  the point of view  of implementing  an  effective continental security 
policy  is to identify  which  of those different answers have clear  national cleavages and biases, 
thereby  dealing with  policy  “faux-amis” in  a  way  that inserts empathy  as a  core element of the 
dialogue. 
Ambiguity  and uncertainty  are not  the same.  Nikolaos Zahariadis rightly  observes that while 
“ambiguity  refers to a  state  of having  many  ways of thinking about  the same circumstances or 
phenomena. ...  [and it]  may  be thought as ambivalence,  ...  uncertainty  may  be referred to as 
ignorance or  imprecision.  Although  more information  may  (or  not) reduce uncertainty, more 
information  does not reduce ambiguity.” 2  Therefore,  ambiguity  will always be part of any 
continental security  framework,  as many  of the answers to the questions presented earlier  do 
not have a  definitive “objective”  answer.  However,  information  about  the distinct frameworks 
and lenses used by  the three nations of the continent  would certainly  reduce the level  of 
uncertainty, creating a more manageable negotiation environment for the three administrations.
Not all  conflictive issues have to be resolved at  once,  but  conflict  where it  may  exist  should at 
least  be understood,  to avoid what has probably  been  the most common  pitfall in  the North 
American security dialogue: Getting lost in bad national discourse’s translations.
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1 Michel Foucher, L’Obsession des Frontières, translated from French by the author (Paris: Perrin, 2007).
2 N. Zahariadis, Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy. Political Decision Making in Modern Democracies [Kindle 
version, 2003].
APPENDIX C
Continental Security – A Skeptic’s View
David H. Schanzer
“Continental  Security”  can  be a  useful concept only  if it  is narrowly  defined to encompass 
exclusively  issues where there is a  shared security  concern between the United States,  Canada, 
and Mexico that  can  be concretely  addressed through  joint action. There are already  a  plethora 
of multi-lateral forums in  which  both  physical and economic security  matters can  be addressed 
– the United Nations, the Organization of American  States, and NAFTA to name a  few,  and we 
have robust bi-lateral relationships through  which  many  issues can  be addressed.  We should not 
further  burden government officials with  another  institutional  framework that must be 
supported with  staff,  regular  meetings, and the like unless we can  articulate a  precise  purpose 
for  the new  institution  that is not  currently  being  met.  Canadians do not  have a  core interest in 
the problem  of Mexican  migration  through  the Arizona  desert.  Mexicans need not be involved in 
discussions about  shipping  lanes through  the Arctic.  Both  are security  issues. Both  have a 
geographical dimension. But neither should be the subject, to my mind, of continental security.
The types of security  issues that  might  benefit from  a trilateral, continental security 
framework are those that  (1)  substantially  affect  all  three nations,  (2) arise from  our  geographic 
proximity, and (3) require coordinated action by all three nations to address effectively.  
There are a number of issues that do rise to this level. 
The crisis created by  cross-continental  drug  trafficking  and the violence that spins out from  it 
is the prime candidate for  a continental security  dialogue.  Drugs are transported across both 
borders and continued violence and instability  in  Mexico caused by  the prevalence of highly 
organized and dangerous cartels could threaten  long-term  economic integration  of the three 
countries. Counter-narcotics efforts could be enhanced by  an institution  dedicated to developing 
and implementing  a  consistent,  coordinated strategy  to deal with  the complexities of the 
problem  from  both  the supply  and demand sides.  Regular  high  level meetings and staffing will 
help to sustain the focus, attention, and resources that this problem deserves.
Response to pandemic  disease is also a  critical  issue that could benefit from  coordinated 
activity  between  the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The SARS and H1N1  outbreaks 
demonstrate that  a problem  in  any  one of these countries quickly  and inevitably  becomes a 
serious problem  for  all  the others. There is a  need for  common  public health  protocols,  health 
screening  procedures at  the borders, and sharing  of expertise and information.  A  continental 
stockpile of antibiotics and vaccines that could be drawn  upon  to attempt  to isolate an  outbreak 
at  its early  stages should also be considered.  Perhaps the most important  subject of the security 
dialogue on  this issue would be to develop a  common  communications plan, so that leaders from 
all  three countries are delivering  a consistent  message to all inhabitants of the continent  to 
reduce fear and explain the elements of the response.      
Preparedness for  and response to catastrophic  natural disasters could benefit  from  a 
continental security  framework.  This could include planning  for  how  to deal with  cross-border 
infrastructure failures,  such  as if energy  supplies are disrupted by  disasters or  even  a terrorist 
attack.  Developing  a  means to quickly  deploy  response capabilities from  the other  countries to 
the site of the disaster should be a core topic of planning activities.  
Defining  continental security  to include immigration  and border  security  policy  is unwise and 
would have the likely  effect  of undercutting  support  for  the entire concept.  The question  of the 
disparity  between  the way  the United States handles immigration  and border  security  issues 
between  the Mexico and Canada  is a  hot  button  political  issue.  Placing  this matter  under  a 
continental security  umbrella  will  be perceived by  the U.S.  domestic  audience as a ruse to 
liberalize security  policy  with  respect to the Mexican  border.  Consequently,  it is a  political  non-
starter.  
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It is also difficult to see how  counterterrorism  could benefit from  a  continental security 
institutional  framework. Information  exchange is taking  place through  intelligence service to 
intelligence service. Muslim  radicalization  is not an issue in  Mexico,  but  it is in  the United States 
and Canada. Fears about  the Mexican  border  being a conduit  for al Qaeda  terrorists have been 
over-hyped. For  these reasons, it  is difficult to make the case that  a  continental dialogue on 
terrorism is necessary or would be useful.   
The one terrorism  related issue that  could benefit from  continental treatment  is cargo and 
supply  chain  security. Clearly,  goods crossing  the Mexican  border  can transit  right  through  the 
United States and into Canada.  It  simply  makes no sense for  the same goods to face a  different 
set  of security  requirements when they  cross the Mexico-U.S. border  as they  do when  they  travel 
into Canada. Harmonization  of driver  identification requirements and screening  procedures 
makes a  great  deal of sense. Ideally,  this should happen through  the NAFTA  process, but 
perhaps a  multi-agency  forum  like the envisioned continental security  apparatus could make 
more substantial progress than what has occurred to date. 
Since 9/11,  there has been a tendency  to make every  issue a  security  issue,  mistake 
procedural  reform  for  substantive resolution of issues, and pretend that new  bureaucracies will 
be more effective than  old ones. Eight  years into the experiment  of creating  the Department of 
Homeland Security  and six  years after  formation  of the Director  of National  Intelligence, the 
jury  is still out on  whether  these innovations have improved the problems they  were designed to 
solve.  I am  therefore a  skeptic about adding to the international institutions that are already 
present  to deal with  the challenges of our  post-9/11  world unless there is a compelling  case to be 
made for them.  
My  suggestion  for  those advocating for  continental security  is to start  slowly, perhaps 
identifying  a  single issue that can be managed through  a  continental  security  framework. 
Counter-narcotics is the obvious choice. If, after  a period of years, the parties believe a 
continental approach  has made a  valuable contribution  to this topic,  then  the scope of matters 
dealt with  through this framework  can  be expanded. If not,  it  can  be easily  discarded.  Until  this 
is applied on  a  small scale to see if it is useful, legislation  to create a  new  continental  security 
bureaucracy, with high level meetings, staff, office buildings, and the like should be put on hold.  
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APPENDIX D
What Contributions Can Academics Make to Continental Security?
Harold A. Trinkunas
What  can academics contribute to continental security? North  American  continental  security  is 
an  awkward concept  from  both  an  academic and a  policy  perspective. In  the traditional 
academic  disciplines concerned with the study  of national and international  security, there  is 
not a strong  tradition  of studying the North American  continent  as a security  issue in  and of 
itself.  Since the beginning of the twentieth  century, many  of the security  threats to the countries 
that  share North America  were either  perceived to have originated far  from  their  homelands or 
were issues of domestic security.  For  example,  since the 1940s the United States and Canada 
have shared a  security  identity,  but it is one that is centered on the North  Atlantic Treaty 
Organization  and focused largely  on  the defense of Europe (at  least until the end of the Cold 
War).  Mexico, on  the other  hand, has not  shared a  security  identity  with  other  North  American 
states for  well-established historical and political  reasons that  have not faded with  the increase 
of U.S.  concern  over  international terrorism  since 9/11,  the trafficking  of illicit  goods,  and cross-
border  migration.  As a result,  policy-makers (many  of them  educated in  the same disciplines as 
the academics studying  international security) have not  found a  broad body  of knowledge, 
research, or  policy  recommendations in  the academic community  dealing  with  North  American 
security. This can change if steps are taken  to foster  the emergence of a  community  of experts 
that  leverage existing strengths in  the academic study  of security  to develop the kind of 
knowledge that is common  (and helpful) when  it  comes to the study  of other  regions and 
security problems.
Academic disciplines are not  good at providing  short-fused responses to the most  pressing 
issues crowding  the inboxes of policy  makers. This is not the time horizon  on  which  basic or 
even  policy-relevant research  occurs. However,  what  academics can do is provide frameworks 
for  the systematic  analysis of problems and evaluation  of proposed policy  responses.  Given 
enough  time, this can  provide the policy  community  with  tools that  define both  the problem  set 
and the range of useful solutions,  sorting  through  the rush  of initial  responses to a  problem  to 
figure out what  works best.  Similarly, academics, in  so far  as they  may  not be vested in the 
preferred policy  option  of any  particular  government agency, have more latitude to think  outside 
the box  and avoid the self-reinforcing  echo chamber  that sometimes stifles debate in  the policy 
world.  Finally,  once a  body  of knowledge develops around a  problem  set, such  as North 
American  security,  academics can  provide the education and capacity  building  that  the policy 
community  needs to bring  its new  members up to speed in  preparing to deal  with emerging 
threats.
The benefits of academic study  of North  American security  are unlikely  to arise 
spontaneously  from  the normal workings of universities and think tanks. To focus academics on 
a  new  problem  and get them  working  on  building  new  knowledge requires new  resources.  The 
most obvious of these is funding  to support  research and build capacity  in  the academic 
community.  For  example, when the United States government  realized that  it  needed more 
researchers with  critical language and culture skills after  the Cold War, it  created the National 
Security  Education  Program  in  1991  to support  academics and professionals focused on  the 
regions and countries of interest  for  U.S.  national security. The other thing  the policy 
community  can  do to support the generation  of new  knowledge is provide access.  The 
participants in the policy  making  process are vital sources of information  about  emerging  issues, 
obstacles, and possible solutions to North  American  security.  This information  is grist  for  the 
mill of academic  research. Academic exchanges, discussions with  academics, participation  in 
conferences all provide venues where the two communities can communicate easily. 
We need to keep in mind that  the natural (and hoped for)  consequence of the academic 
process is publishing research  results.  Here,  the policy  community  can  be supportive by  keeping 
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an  open mind about  the kinds of publications that  matter  to academics, typically  those that 
appear  in  peer  reviewed journals and publications in  their  disciplines. While a  technical report 
may  be more useful to someone in  government,  attracting  the interest of leading  academics to a 
specific problem  set  means not  only  funding research  but also supporting  its publication  in  open 
sources rather  than allowing it  to be strangled by  pre-publication  review. After  all, these 
publications,  even  those that are critical of the policy  community,  attract  attention  from  the 
academic  world for  the issues associated with  continental security, and this new  area  for 
research will only benefit from a focus by more experts.
Policymakers can  also get  the best  support  from  academics by  offering  them  the opportunity 
to make a  difference,  not  only  by  developing new  knowledge but  also by  developing  capacity  and 
expertise. Students are the lifeblood of academic communities, and they  carry  the analytic 
mindset  with them  into jobs in  the policy  community. By  supporting  education  on  North 
American  security, the policy  community  will attract  the attention  of academics to this emerging 
issue, if only by generating a student-based demand signal.
However,  academics also have much  work  to do in  fostering  a  community  of interest  in  North 
American  security.  This involves listening carefully  to the problems that those in  government 
and in  the policy  community  have identified. It means communicating  results effectively, 
especially  to research  sponsors.  It  also means genuinely  engaging the subject  matter  of 
continental security  rather  than merely  repurposing  new  funding or  education  opportunities as 
a  mechanism  for  supporting  existing  research  agendas. Finally,  it  means creating  avenues for 
new  entrants into the study  of continental  security  to get  up to speed.  The Summer Workshop 
on  Military  Operations and Strategy, hosted by  Cornell University  every  year, was started in 
1997  as a  means for  senior  academics and policy  practitioners to attract  and support  the interest 
of graduate students and junior  academics in  military  affairs.  It has since evolved into an 
organization  with  a life of its own  that keeps the academic research  agenda  on  this subject 
moving  forward through  participation in  yearly  workshops and conferences.  This model may 
provide a  way  to bring the study  of continental security  into greater focus and attract  more 
attention for it from scholars and practitioners of security.
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Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security
John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart
ABSTRACT
The cumulative increase in expenditures  on 
U.S. domestic  homeland security over the 
decade since 9/11 exceeds one trillion dollars. 
It is  clearly  time to examine these massive 
expenditures  applying risk assessment and 
cost-benefit approaches  that have been 
standard for decades. Thus  far, officials  do 
not seem  to have done so  and have engaged 
in various forms  of probability  neglect by 
focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, 
rather than multiplying,  the probabilities; 
assessing relative, rather than absolute, 
risk; and inflating terrorist capacities  and 
the importance of potential terrorist targets. 
We find that enhanced expenditures have 
been excessive.  To  be deemed cost-effective 
in analyses  that substantially  bias the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o w a r d t h e o p p o s i t e 
conclusion,  the security measures would 
have to  deter,  prevent,  foil,  or protect each 
year against 1,667 otherwise successful 
attacks  that each inflicted some $100 million 
in damage (more  than four per day) or 167 
attacks  inflicting $1 billion in damage 
(nearly one  every two days).  This  is in the 
range of destruction of what might have 
happened had the  Times-Square bomber of 
2010 been successful.  Although there are 
emotional and political pressures  on the 
terrorism  issue, this  does  not relieve 
pol i t ic ians and bureaucrats of the 
fundamental responsibility of informing the 
public of the limited risk that terrorism 
presents,  of seeking to expend funds  wisely, 
and of bearing in mind opportunity  costs. 
Moreover, political concerns  may be over-
wrought: restrained reaction has often 
proved to be entirely acceptable politically. 
And avoiding overreaction is  by far the most 
cost-effective counterterrorism measure.
INTRODUCTION
In  seeking  to evaluate the  effectiveness of the 
massive increases in  homeland security 
expenditures since the terrorist  attacks on  the 
United States of September 11, 2001,  the 
common and urgent query  has been “are  we 
safer?”  This, however,  is the wrong question. 
Of course we are “safer”— the posting of a 
single security  guard at one building’s 
e n t r a n c e e n h a n c e s s a f e t y , h o w e v e r 
microscopically.  The correct  question is “are 
the gains in security  worth  the funds 
expended?”  Or  as this absolutely  central 
question  was posed shortly  after  9/11  by  risk 
analyst  Howard Kunreuther,  "How  much 
should we be willing  to pay  for  a  small 
reduction in  probabilities that  are already 
extremely low?"1
TALLYING THE COSTS – ONE 
TRILLION DOLLARS AND 
COUNTING
We have,  in  fact,  paid – or been  willing  to pay 
– a  lot.  In  the years immediately  following 
the terrorist  attacks of September  11,  2001  on 
W a s h i n g t o n  a n d N e w  Y o r k , i t  w a s 
understandable that  there was a  tendency  to 
fashion policy  and to expend funds in  haste 
and confusion, and maybe even  hysteria,  on 
homeland security.  After  all,  intelligence was 
estimating  at the time that  there were as 
many  as 5,000 al  Qaeda  operatives at  large in 
the country,2  and as New  York  Mayor  Rudy 
Giuliani reflected later,  "Anybody, any  one of 
these security  experts, including myself, 
would have told you  on September  11,  2001, 
we're looking  at  dozens and dozens and 
multi-years of attacks like this."3
The intelligence claims and the anxieties 
of Giuliani and other  “security  experts”  have 
clearly  proved,  putting it  mildly, to be 
unjustified.  In  the frantic interim, however, 
the United States government increased its 
expenditures for  dealing with  terrorism 
massively.  As we approach  the tenth 
anniversary  of 9/11,  federal  expenditures on 
domestic homeland security  have increased 
by  some $360 billion over  those in  place in 
2001. Moreover, federal national intelligence 
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expenditures aimed at  defeating terrorists at 
home and abroad have gone up by  $110 
billion, while state, local, and private sector 
expenditures have increased by  two hundred 
billion  more. And the vast  majority  of this 
increase, of course, has been  driven  by  much 
heightened fears of terrorism,  not by  growing 
concerns about  other  hazards – as Veronique 
de Rugy  has noted,  by  2008 federal  spending 
o n c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m  h a d i n c r e a s e d 
enormously  while protection  for  such 
comparable risks as fraud and violent crime 
had not,  to the point  where homeland 
security  expenditures had outpaced spending 
on all crime by $15 billion.4
Tallying  all these expenditures and adding 
in  opportunity  costs – but  leaving  out the 
costs of the terrorism-related (or  terrorism-
determined) wars in  Iraq and Afghanistan 
and quite a  few  other  items that might  be 
included – the increase in expenditures on 
domestic homeland security  over  the decade 
exceeds one trillion dollars. The details are in 
Table 1. This has not  been enough  to move 
the country  into bankruptcy, Osama  bin 
Laden’s stated goal  after  9/11,  but  it  clearly 
adds up to real money,  even  by  Washington 
standards.5  Other  countries like Britain, 
Canada,  and Australia have also dramatically 
increased their expenditures.
Table 1. The Trillion Dollar Table
Enhanced Costs of Homeland Security since 9/11, in billions of 2010 dollars
Enhanced Direct Expenditures 2009 2001-11
Federal homeland security expenditures 50 360
Federal intelligence expenditures 15 110
Local and state expenditures 10 110
Private-sector spending 10 110
                                                                                               Total 85 690
Opportunity Costs
Terrorism risk insurance premiums 4 40
Passenger delays caused by airport screening 10 100
Increase in short-haul traffic fatalities for people avoiding airport delays 3 32
Deadweight losses and losses in consumer welfare 30 245
                                                                                              Total 47 417
Relevant spending elements not included in the table: 
• Terror-related wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Costs  of  crime facilitated by  focus of  police and FBI 
on, or preoccupation with, terrorism
• Costs  resulting from hurricane Katrina that might 
have been mitigated if  DHS had not been so 
preoccupied by terrorism
• Additional Post Office expenditures to deal with the 
effects of 9/11 and the anthrax letters
• Effects on tourism, property  and stock market values, 
business location decisions, etc. though dead weight 
losses might capture some of these
• In addition to the short-haul fatality  effect included in 
the table,  the increase in traffic fatalities in the U.S. of 
2,300 lives to the end of  2003 due to the fear of  flying 
and the inconvenience of extra passenger screening 
• Extra fuel cost to airlines because of  the weight of 
hardened (heavier) cockpit doors
• Free airline seats to Federal Air Marshals
• Passenger delays and inconvenience cause by  false 
positive identification on TSA’s no fly list.
• Cutbacks to Medicare, Medicaid, education, social 
security, and other government services in an effort 
to reign in budget deficits caused by  wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and mushrooming homeland security 
budgets
Note: For sources and full explanation of  these 
numbers, see John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, 
Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, 
Benefits,  and Costs of Homeland Security (New York 
and Oxford, UK: Oxford Universi ty  Press, 
forthcoming in early September 2011).
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EVALUATING THE 
EXPENDITURES
In  this article we seek  to apply  conventional 
cost-benefit  and risk analytic approaches to 
this massive increase in  expenditure in  an 
effort  to provide an answer  to Kureuther’s 
exceedingly  apt  question.  These approaches 
have been  recommended for many  years by 
the United States Office  of Management and 
Budget,  and they  are routinely  used by  such 
agencies as the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,  the Environmental Protection 
A g e n c y ,  a n d t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n 
Administration, and in  2004  the 9/11 
Commission  specifically  called on  the 
government  to apply  them  to assess the risks 
and cost-effectiveness of security  measures 
put  in place to deal with  terrorism. 6 However, 
it appears that this simply has not been done.
Upon  taking  office in  2005,  Department  of 
Homeland Security  Secretary  Michael 
Chertoff did strongly  advocate a  risk-based 
approach, insisting that  the department 
"must base its work on  priorities driven  by 
risk."7  Yet,  a  year  later,  when DHS 
expenditures had increased by  some $135 
billion  beyond those already  in  place in  2001 
and when  the department had become the 
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s l a r g e s t  n o n - m i l i t a r y 
bureaucracy,  one of its senior  economists 
wistfully  noted,  “We really  don't know  a 
whole lot about the overall costs and benefits 
of homeland security."8
By  2007, RAND President  James 
Thomson  was contending  that  DHS leaders 
"manage by  inbox" with  the "dominant  mode 
of DHS behavior being  crisis management." 
Most  programs are implemented, he 
continued,  "with  little or no evaluation”  of 
their  performance or effectiveness, and the 
agency  "receives little analytical  advice on 
issues of policy, program, and budget."9  And, 
after an  exhaustive assessment, the 
Congressional  Research  Service concluded at 
the same time that DHS simply  could not 
answer  the "central question" about  the "rate 
of return,  as defined by  quantifiable and 
e m p i r i c a l  r i s k r e d u c t i o n s " o n  i t s 
expenditure.10
The boilerplate emphasis on  risk-informed 
decision  making  continued with  the change 
of administrations after  the 2008  elections, 
as Secretary Janet Napolitano insisted that
Development and implementation  of  a 
process and methodology to assess 
national  risk is a fundamental  and critical 
element of an  overall risk management 
process, with the ultimate goal of 
improving  the ability of  decision  makers 
to make rational  judgments about 
tradeoffs between  courses of action to 
manage homeland security risk. 11
Such  declarations notwithstanding, 
however, we have been able to find only  one 
published reference to a  numerical estimate 
of risk  reduction  after  an  extensive search  of 
the agency’s reports and documents.12 
Moreover, we have been  able to find no 
reference whatever  to the likelihood of a 
terrorist  attack beyond rather vague 
references such  as “high,”  “imminent,” 
“dynamic,” “persistent,” and “emerging.”
Indeed, at  times DHS has ignored specific 
calls by  other government agencies to 
conduct  risk assessments.  In  2010, the 
Department began  deploying full-body 
scanners at  airports,  a  technology  that will 
cost  $1.2  billion per  year. The Government 
Accountability  Office specifically declared 
that  conducting a  cost-benefit analysis of this 
new  technology  to be “important.” 13 As far  as 
we can see,  no such  study  was conducted. Or 
there was GAO’s request that DHS conduct a 
full cost/benefit  analysis of the extremely 
costly  process of scanning 100 percent of 
U.S.-bound containers. To do so would 
require the dedicated work of a  few  skilled 
analysts for  a  few  months or  possibly  a  year. 
Yet,  DHS replied that,  although  it agreed that 
such  a  study  would help to “frame the 
discussion and better  inform  Congress,”  to 
actually  carry  it  out  “would place significant 
burdens on agency resources.” 14
Clearly, DHS focuses all  or  almost all  of its 
analyses on the contemplation  of the 
consequences of a  terrorist attack  while 
substantially  ignoring the equally  important 
likelihood component  of risk  assessment as 
well  as the key  issue of risk  reduction.  In 
general,  risk assessment  seems to be simply  a 
process of identifying  a  potential  source of 
harm  and then trying  to do something about 
it  without  evaluating whether  the new 
measures reduce risk  sufficiently  to justify 
their costs.
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This conclusion  was strongly  supported by 
a  2010 report of the National Research 
Council of the National Academies of 
Sciences,  Engineering,  and Medicine. 
Requested by  Congress to assess the activities 
of the Department  of Homeland Security,  a 
committee worked for  nearly  two years on  the 
project and came up with  some striking 
conclusions.  Except for the analysis of 
natural disasters, the committee “did not  find 
any  DHS risk analysis capabilities and 
methods that are yet adequate for supporting 
DHS decision making,”  and therefore “only 
low  confidence should be placed in  most of 
the risk  analyses conducted by  DHS.”  Indeed, 
“little  effective attention  was paid to the 
features of the risk problem  that  are 
fundamental.”  It also found an  “absence of 
documentation of methods and processes” 
with  the result  that  the committee sometimes 
had to infer details about DHS risk  modeling. 
Indeed, “in a  number  of cases examined by 
the committee, it  is not  clear  what problem  is 
being addressed.”  It also found “a pattern”  of 
“trusting numbers that  are highly  uncertain.” 
And, concluded the committee rather glumly, 
“it  is not yet clear  that  DHS is on  a trajectory 
for  development  of methods and capability 
that  is sufficient  to ensure reliable risk 
analyses”: although  it  found that “there are 
people at  DHS who are aware of these current 
limitations,”  it  “did not  hear of efforts to 
remedy them.” 15
Overall, it  seems,  security  concerns that 
happen  to rise to the top of the agenda  are 
serviced without much  in the way  of full 
evaluation – security  trumps economics,  as 
one insider puts it  – and such  key  issues as 
acceptable risk  are rarely  discussed while 
extravagant worst  case scenario thinking 
dominates, and frequently  savagely  distorts, 
the discussion.
It is clearly  time to examine massive 
homeland security  expenditures in  a  careful 
and systematic  way,  applying  the kind of 
analytic risk  management  approaches 
emphasizing  cost-benefit  analysis and 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b l e a n d 
unacceptable risks that  are routinely  required 
of other  governmental  agencies and that  have 
been standard coin  for  policy  decision-
making  for  decades throughout the world 
when  determining  regulations even  in  such 
highly  charged and politicized decisions as 
those regarding  where to situate  nuclear 
power  plants, how  to dispose of toxic  waste, 
and how  to control  pollution—decisions that 
engage the interests and passions of multiple 
groups.
PROBABILITY NEGLECT
A  recent  book  by  Gregory  Treverton, a risk 
analyst  at  the RAND Corporation whose work 
we have found highly  valuable at  various 
points in this study,  contains a  curious 
reflection: 
When I spoke about the terrorist threat, 
especially  in  the first years after 2001, I 
was often asked what people could do to 
protect their  family and home. I usually 
responded by giving the analyst’s  answer, 
what I labeled “the RAND answer.” 
Anyone’s probability  of being killed by a 
terrorist today  was essentially zero and 
would be tomorrow, barring a major 
discontinuity. So, they should do nothing. 
It is not surprising that the answer was 
hardly  satisfying, and I did not regard it at 
such.16
From  this experience, he concluded, “People 
want  information,  but  the challenge for 
government is to warn without terrifying.” 17
It is not  clear  why  anyone should find his 
observation  unsatisfying  since it  simply  puts 
the terrorist  threat  in  general and in  personal 
context, suggesting that excessive alarm 
about  the issue is scarcely  called for.  It  is,  one 
might  suspect,  exactly  the kind of accurate, 
reassuring, adult, and non-terrifying 
information  people have been  yearning  for. 
And it  deals frontally  with  a  key  issue in  risk 
assessment: evaluating the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack.
Treverton’s “RAND answer,”  calmly  (and 
accurately)  detailing  the likelihood of the 
terrorist  hazard and putting  it  in  reasonable 
context,  has scarcely  ever  been  duplicated by 
politicians and officials in  charge of providing 
public safety. Instead the awkward problem 
of dealing  with exceedingly  low  probabilities 
has been finessed – and questionable 
expenditures accordingly  justified – by  five 
stratagems that  in  various ways embrace a 
form  of risk  aversion  that  can  be called 
"probability neglect."
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FOCUSING ON WORST CASE SCENARIOS
Cass Sunstein,  who seems to have invented 
the phrase, “probability  neglect,”  assesses the 
version  of the phenomena  that  comes into 
being when “emotions are intensely 
engaged.”  Under that circumstance,  he 
argues, “people’s attention  is focused on  the 
bad outcome itself, and they  are inattentive to 
the fact that it  is unlikely  to occur.”  Moreover, 
they  are inclined to “demand a  substantial 
governmental response – even if the 
magnitude of the risk does not  warrant the 
response.” 18 It  may  be this phenomenon  that 
Treverton experienced.
Playing  to this demand,  government 
officials are inclined to focus on worst  case 
scenarios,  presumably  in the knowledge, 
following  Sunstein’s insight,  that  this can 
e m o t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f y  j u s t  a b o u t a n y 
expenditure no matter  how  unlikely  the 
prospect  the dire event  will actually  take 
place. Accordingly, there is a  preoccupation 
with  “low  probability/high consequence” 
events such as the detonation  of a  sizeable 
nuclear  device in midtown  Manhattan  even 
though  the vast bulk of homeland security 
expenditures are focused on  comparatively 
low  consequence events like explosions set  off 
by individual amateurs.
It is sometimes argued that  conventional 
risk analysis breaks down under  extreme 
conditions because the risk is now  a  very 
large number  (losses) multiplied by  a  very 
small number (attack probability).  However, 
it  is not the risk  analysis methodology  that  is 
at  fault  here, but  our  ability  to use the 
information  obtained from  the analysis for 
decision-making.  Analyst  Bruce Schneier has 
written  penetratingly  of worst-case thinking. 
He points out that
[It] involves imagining the worst possible 
outcome and then acting as if  it  were a 
certainty. It substitutes imagination for 
thinking, speculation  for risk analysis, 
a n d f e a r f o r r e a s o n . I t f o s t e r s 
powerlessness and vulnerability and 
magnifies social  paralysis. And it makes 
us more vulnerable to the effects of 
terrorism.19
It leads to bad decision making because
It's  only half of the cost-benefit equation. 
Every decision  has costs and benefits, 
risks and rewards. By speculating about 
what can possibly go wrong, and then 
acting as if  that is likely to happen, worst-
case thinking focuses only on  the extreme 
but improbable risks and does  a poor job 
at assessing outcomes.20
It also assumes “that  a  proponent  of an 
action  must prove that  the nightmare 
scenario is impossible,”  and it  “can be used to 
support  any  position  or  its opposite.  If we 
build a  nuclear  power plant,  it  could melt 
down.  If we don't  build it,  we will  run short of 
power  and society  will collapse into anarchy.” 
And worst,  it  “validates ignorance”  because, 
“instead of focusing  on  what  we know,  it 
focuses on  what we don't  know  – and what 
we can imagine.”  In  the process “risk 
assessment is devalued” and “probabilistic 
t h i n k i n g i s r e p u d i a t e d i n  f a v o r  o f 
"possibilistic thinking."21
What  is necessary  is due consideration  to 
the spectrum  of threats,  not simply  the worst 
one imaginable,  in  order  to properly 
understand,  and to coherently  deal with,  the 
risks to people,  institutions,  and the 
economy.  The relevant  decision-makers are 
professionals, and it  is not unreasonable to 
suggest that they  should do so seriously. 
Notwithstanding political  pressures,  the fact 
that  the public  has difficulties with 
probabilities when emotions are involved 
does not relieve those in  charge of the 
requirement, even  the duty, to make 
decisions about  the expenditures of vast 
quantities of public monies in  a  responsible 
manner.
ADDING, RATHER THAN MULTIPLYING, THE 
PROBABILITIES
A  second stratagem  for  neglecting probability 
that  is sometimes applied at DHS is to devise 
a  rating  scale where probabilities of attack 
are added to the losses. Thus,  as a 
Congressional Research  Service analysis 
points out,  to determine whether  a  potential 
target should be protected, DHS has 
frequently  assessed the target's vulnerability 
and the consequences of an  attack  on it  on  an 
80  point scale and the likelihood it  will  be 
attacked on a  20  point  ranked scale.  It then 
adds these together. 22  Thus, a  vulnerable 
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target  whose destruction  would be highly 
consequential would be protected even  if the 
likelihood it  will be attacked is zero, and a 
l e s s c o n s e q u e n t i a l t a r g e t  c o u l d g o 
unprotected even  if the likelihood it  will  be 
attacked is 100 percent.
This procedure violates the principles 
espoused in  all risk  assessment  techniques 
such  as those codified in  international risk 
management  standards supported by  twenty-
six  countries including  the United States.23 In 
these risk  is invariably  taken  to be a  product 
in  which  the attack probability  is multiplied 
by  the losses,  not added to them. Essentially, 
what  often  seems to be happening  is that 
DHS has a  pot  of money  to dole  out, and it 
has worked out a  method for  determining 
which  projects are most  worthy  while 
avoiding determining  whether  any  of them 
are actually worth any money at all.
ASSESSING RELATIVE, RATHER THAN 
ABSOLUTE, RISK
A  third technique, related to the second, is, as 
the CRS study  points out, simply  to rank 
relative risk while neglecting to determine the 
actual magnitude of the risk.24  The 2010 
National Research  Council study  finds this 
approach to be wanting:
Risk management decisions seek to reduce 
risks in  accordance with specified, absolute 
risk criteria for human  health protection. 
Many of the risk analyses thus far 
conducted by DHS involve risk ranking, 
based on scales  of  presumed relative risks, 
and do not include attempts to provide 
absolute measures of risk.25
It may  be true that  New  York is more 
likely  to be struck by  a  terrorist  than, say, 
Columbus, Ohio.  But it  is also more likely  to 
be struck  by  a  tsunami, and not  only  in 
Hollywood disaster  thrillers. Before spending 
a  lot of money  protecting  New  York  from  a 
tsunami,  we need to get  some sort  of sense 
about what  the likelihood of that  event 
actually  is, not  simply  how  the risk compares 
to that borne by  other  cities. And the same 
goes for terrorism.
INFLATING THE IMPORTANCE OF  POTENTIAL 
TERRORIST TARGETS
A  fourth stratagem  is to inflate the 
importance of potential terrorist  targets. 
Thus, nearly  half of American  federal 
homeland security  expenditure  is devoted to 
protect ing what the Department  of 
Homeland Security  and various presidential 
and Congressional reports and directives 
r a t h e r  e x t r a v a g a n t l y  c a l l " c r i t i c a l 
infrastructure" and "key resources.”
Applying common  sense English  about 
what  “critical infrastructure”  could be taken 
to mean, it  should be an  empty  category.  If 
any  element  in  the infrastructure is truly 
"critical" to the operation of the country, 
steps should be taken  immediately  to provide 
redundancies or backup systems so that  it  is 
no longer  so.  An  official definition designates 
“critical  infrastructure”  to include “the assets, 
systems, and networks, whether  physical  or 
virtual,  so vital  to the United States that their 
incapacitation  or  destruction  would have a 
debilitating  effect on  security,  national 
economic  security, public health  or  safety, or 
any  combination  thereof.” 26 Yet vast sums of 
money  are spent under  the program  to 
protect  elements of the infrastructure whose 
i n c a p a c i t a t i o n  w o u l d s c a r c e l y  b e 
“debilitating” and would at  most impose 
minor inconvenience and quite limited costs.
And the same essentially  holds for  what 
DHS designates as "key  resources," or 
formerly  as “key  assets.”  These are defined to 
be those that  are "essential to the minimal 
operations of the economy  or government."27 
It is difficult  to imagine what a  terrorist 
group armed with  anything  less than  a 
massive thermonuclear  arsenal could do to 
hamper  such  "minimal operations." The 
terrorist  attacks of 9/11  were by  far  the most 
damaging in history, yet,  even  though  several 
m a j o r  c o m m e r c i a l b u i l d i n g s w e r e 
demolished,  both  the economy  and 
government  continued to function  at 
considerably above the "minimal" level.
The very  phrase,  “homeland security,” 
contains aspects of a  similar inflation  in  its 
suggestion that  that  essential security  of the 
entire country  is at  stake. In  Canada, the 
comparable department  is labeled with  more 
accuracy  and less drama  simply  as “public 
safety.”  Given the actually  magnitude of the 
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terrorist  hazard,  the homeland is, as it 
happens, really  quite  secure,  though  there 
may  be justifiable concerns about  the public’s 
safety under some conditions.
INFLATING TERRORIST CAPACITIES
A  final stratagem  is to fail to assess,  or 
massively  to inflate, the capacities of the 
terrorists, and therefore by  inference both  the 
l ikel ihood they  wi l l attack and the 
consequences of that attack.  This is 
something  that should be of absolutely  key 
importance yet , in i ts big nat ional 
infrastructure protection report  of 2009,  the 
DHS devotes only  two paragraphs to 
describing  the nature of the “terrorist 
adversary" – a  designation  that implies far 
more coordination  among  terrorists than 
experience suggests is valid. 28  Moreover, 
none of this fleeting  discussion shows any 
depth, and the report prefers instead to spew 
out adjectives like "relentless," "patient," and 
"flexible," terms that  scarcely  characterize the 
vast majority of potential terrorists.
The report  goes on  to argue without 
qualification  that the “terrorist adversary” 
not only  “shows an understanding  of the 
potential consequence of carefully  planned 
attacks on  economic, transportation,  and 
symbolic  targets,”  but  that  it  “seriously 
threatens national security,  and could inflict 
mass casualties, weaken the economy, and 
damage public morale and confidence.”  This 
too is a  rather  extravagant exaggeration  of 
the threat most terrorists present.
The ultimate in  such  thinking  – common 
during  the administration of George W. Bush 
and continued more sporadically  in  the 
administration  of his successor,  Barack 
Obama  – is to characterize the terrorist 
threat  as “existential.”  In  2008, Homeland 
Security  Secretary  Michael Chertoff even 
proclaimed the “struggle”  against  terrorism 
to be a  “significant existential”  one – carefully 
differentiating it,  apparently, from  all  those 
insignificant  existential struggles Americans 
have waged in  the past. 29 Rather  amazingly, 
such  extreme expressions,  which  if accepted 
as valid, can close off all judicious evaluation 
of the problem, have only  rarely  been  called 
into question.
In  stark contrast,  Glenn  Carle,  a twenty-
three-year  veteran  of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, where he was deputy  national 
intelligence officer  for  transnational threats, 
has warned "We must  not take fright  at  the 
specter our  leaders have exaggerated. In  fact, 
we must  see jihadists for  the small,  lethal, 
disjointed and miserable opponents that they 
are." Al-Qaeda "has only  a  handful of 
individuals capable of planning,  organizing 
and leading a  terrorist organization," and 
although  they  have threatened attacks, "its 
capabilities are far inferior to its desires."30
In  evaluating  al-Qaeda’s present capacity 
to inflict  damage and its likelihood of doing 
so,  a  good place to start  is with analyses 
provided by  Marc Sageman.31  A  former 
intelligence officer  with  experience in 
Afghanistan, Sageman has carefully  and 
systematically  combed through  both  open 
and classified data  on  jihadists and would-be 
jihadists around the world.
Al-Qaeda  central, he concludes,  consists of 
a  cluster  less than  150 actual people. Other 
estimates of the size of al-Qaeda central 
generally  come in  with  numbers in  the same 
order  of magnitude as those suggested by 
Sageman.32  Sageman may  be going  too far 
when  he argues "there  is not much  left  of al-
Qaeda except in the minds of those inside the 
beltway."33  But  that  possibility  should be 
included in the discussion  at  least as much  as 
ones that  confer  on  al-Qaeda  capacities that 
are at once monumental and mounting.
Beyond the tiny  band that constitutes al-
Qaeda central,  there are, continues Sageman, 
thousands of sympathizers and wouldbe 
jihadists spread around the globe who mainly 
connect in  Internet chat  rooms,  engage in 
radicalizing  conversations,  and variously  dare 
each  other  to actually  do something. 34 All  of 
these rather  hapless – perhaps even  pathetic 
– people should of course be considered to be 
potentially  dangerous. From  time to time 
they  may  be able to coalesce enough  to carry 
out acts of terrorist  violence,  and policing 
efforts to stop them  before they  can  do so are 
certainly  justified.  But the notion  that they 
present  an existential threat  to just about 
anybody  seems at least as fanciful  as some of 
their schemes.
By  2005, after  years of well-funded 
sleuthing, the FBI and other  investigative 
agencies noted in  a report  that they  had been 
unable to uncover  a  single true al-Qaeda 
sleeper  cell anywhere in  the United States,  a 
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f i n d i n g  ( o r  n o n - f i n d i n g ) p u b l i c l y 
acknowledged two years later  in  a  press 
conference and when  the officer  who drafted 
that  year’s National Intelligence Estimate 
testified that “we do not  see”  al-Qaeda 
operatives functioning  inside the United 
States.35 Indeed, they  have been scarcely  able 
to unearth  anyone who might  even  be 
deemed to have a  “connection”  to the 
diabolical group.
It follows that  any  terrorism  problem  in 
the United States and the West  principally 
derives from  rather  small numbers of 
homegrown people, often  isolated from  each 
other,  who fantasize about  performing  dire 
deeds and sometimes receive a  bit  of training 
and inspiration  overseas.  Indeed, in 
testimony  on January  11,  2007,  Mueller 
stressed that  his chief concern  within  the 
United States had become homegrown 
groups,  a  sentiment  later  endorsed by 
Obama’s Homeland Security  Secretary  Janet 
Napolitano in 2009.36
Assessing  the threat from  homegrown 
Islamist terrorists, Brian  Jenkins stresses 
that  their  number is “tiny,”  representing  one 
out of every  30,000 Muslims in  the United 
States. This “very  low  level”  of recruitment 
finds very  little support  in  the Muslim 
community  at large: “they  are not Mao’s 
guerrillas swimming  in  a  friendly  sea.”  Given 
this situation,  concludes Jenkins, what  is to 
be anticipated is “tiny  conspiracies, lone 
gunmen, one-off attacks rather  than 
sustained terrorist  campaigns.” 37  In  the 
meantime, note other  researchers, Muslim 
extremists have been responsible for one 
fiftieth  of one percent of the homicides 
committed in the United States since 9/11.38
Because terrorism  of a  considerably 
destructive nature can  be perpetrated by  a 
very  small number of people, or  even  by  a 
single individual,  the fact that  terrorists are 
few  in  number  does not  mean  there is no 
problem, and from  time to time some of these 
people may  actually  manage to do some 
harm, though  in  most  cases their  capacities 
and schemes – or  alleged schemes – seem  to 
be far  less dangerous than  initial press 
reports suggest. 
The situation seems scarcely  different in 
Europe and other Western locations.  Political 
scientist  Michael Kenney  has interviewed 
dozens of officials and intelligence agents and 
analyzed court  documents.  He finds that, in 
sharp contrast with  the boi lerplate 
characterizations favored by  the DHS, 
Islamic  militants there are operationally 
unsophisticated, short  on  knowhow,  prone to 
make mistakes,  poor  at  planning, and limited 
in  their  capacity  to learn.39  Another  study 
documents the difficulties of network 
coordination  that continually  threaten 
operational  unity, trust,  cohesion,  and the 
ability to act collectively.40
For  several decades, the United States 
State Department  collected data  on 
international  or  transnational terrorism, 
defining  the act  as premeditated, politically 
m o t i v a t e d v i o l e n c e p e r p e t r a t e d b y 
subnational  groups or  clandestine agents 
against noncombatant targets (civilians and 
military  personnel who at the time of the 
incident  are unarmed or  not on duty) that 
involve citizens or  the territory  of more than 
one country. 41  The number of people 
worldwide who died during  the period as a 
result  of all  forms of transnational terrorism 
(Islamist  or  other) by  this definition  is 482  a 
year.  Another  study  using comparable data 
for  the longer period from  1968  to 2006 
arrives at an average of 420 per year.42
Another  approach  is to focus on  the kind 
of terrorism  that  really  concerns people in  the 
deve loped wor ld by  res tr ic t ing  the 
consideration  to violence committed by 
Muslim  extremists outside of war zones, 
whether  that violence be perpetrated by 
domestic Islamist  terrorists or  by  ones with 
international connections. Included in  the 
count  would be terrorism  of the much 
publicized sort  that occurred in  Bali in  2002 
and 2005, in  Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and 
Turkey  in  2003,  in  the Philippines,  Madrid, 
and Egypt in  2004,  and in  London  and 
Jordan  in  2005.  Three publications from 
think tanks have independently  provided lists 
or  tallies of such  violence committed in  the 
several years after the 9/11  attacks.43 The lists 
include not  only  attacks by  al-Qaeda but  also 
those by  its imitators, enthusiasts,  lookalikes, 
and wannabes,  as well as ones by  groups with 
no apparent  connection to it  whatever. 
Although  these tallies make for  grim  reading, 
the total number of people killed in  the years 
after  9/11  by  Muslim  extremists outside of 
war  zones comes to some 200 to 300  per 
year.  That, of course, is 200  to 300 too many, 
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but it  hardly  suggests that  the destructive 
capacities of the terrorists are monumental. 
For  comparison, during the same period 
more people – 320  per  year  – drowned in 
bathtubs in  the United States alone.44  Or 
there is another, rather  unpleasant 
comparison. Increased delays and added 
costs at  U.S.  airports due to new  security 
procedures provide incentive for  many  short-
haul passengers to drive to their  destination 
rather  than  flying, and,  since driving  is far 
riskier  than  air  travel, the extra  automobile 
traffic generated has been  estimated in  one 
study  to result  in  500  or  more extra  road 
fatalities per year.45
EVALUATING INCREASES IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY SPENDING 
IN THE UNITED STATES
In  the end,  one might  darkly  suspect, various 
versions of probability  neglect  are  grasped 
because, if realistic probabilities that a  given 
target  would be struck by  terrorists were 
multiplied into the risk calculation  and if the 
costs of protection  from  unlikely  threats were 
sensibly  calculated following standard 
procedures, it  would be found that  vast 
amounts of money have been misspent.
Although  measuring  risk can  be difficult, it 
is done as a matter of course in other  areas 
including such  highly  charged ones as nuclear 
power  plant  accidents (where malevolent 
threats are explicitly  considered),  aviation 
safety,  and environmental protection. 
Moreover, there is plenty  of data  on  how 
much  damage terrorists have been  able to do 
over  the decades and about  how  frequently 
they  attack. Seen  in  reasonable  context, both 
of these numbers are exceedingly  small, at 
least outside of war zones.
The insurance industry  has a  distinct 
financial imperative to understand terrorism 
risks. In  the immediate aftermath  of the 9/11 
attacks in  which  insured losses reached $35 
billion,  most insurance firms placed 
terrorism  exclusions on  their  policies.46 Since 
then, however, the United States government 
implemented the Terrorism  Risk Insurance 
Act  to provide “a  temporary  window  of 
reinsurance relief to help insurers manage 
the ongoing  risk of terrorism.” 47  With  that, 
insurance firms re-entered the terrorism 
insurance market, and by  2009  the median 
terrorism  insurance premium  for  a  $303 
million property  had more than halved to 
only  $9,541  per  year. 48  This represents a 
conservative measure of expected loss or  risk, 
and a simple back-calculation  in  the risk 
equation suggests that the insurer  estimates 
the likelihood of a  terrorist attack  on a 
property  to be very  low: less than  one in 
thirty  thousand per  year.49  If the private 
sector  can estimate terrorism  risks and is 
willing to risk its own  money  on  the validity 
of the estimate, why can’t the DHS?
It  is certainly  true that improbable 
disastrous events – like the 9/11  attacks – do 
sometimes transpire. That  is,  in  fact,  why  we 
call them  improbable as opposed to 
impossible. But  because improbable events 
sometimes do take place does not mean that 
all improbable events therefore become 
probable. To avoid or  to ignore this elemental 
consideration  is to engage in  faulty,  even 
irrational, planning and decision-making. 
A  conventional approach  to cost-
effectiveness compares the costs of security 
measures with  the benefits as tallied in  lives 
saved and damages averted. A  security 
measure is cost-effective when  the benefit  of 
the measure outweighs the costs of providing 
the security measures.
BENEFIT
The benefit of a security measure is a 
function of three elements:
Benefit = (probability of a successful attack) × 
(losses sustained in the successful attack) × 
(reduction in risk)
In  the matter  at hand,  where we are 
concerned with  the cost-effectiveness of 
enhanced (post-9/11) security  expenditures, 
the probability of a successful attack  is the 
likelihood a  successful  terrorist  attack will 
take place if no new  security  measures were 
put into place.  As discussed earlier, 
terrorism, at  least outside war  zones,  is very 
infrequent: it is a low-probability event.
The losses sustained in the successful 
attack  include the fatalities and other 
damage – both  direct  and indirect  – caused 
by  the terrorist  attack, taking  into account the 
value and vulnerability  of people and 
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infrastructure as well as any  psychological 
and political effects. A  successful terrorist 
attack  can  inflict costs in  the tens of millions 
of dollars.  Exceptional attacks, like the one 
on  9/11, can  cost  $200 billion, and losses 
could conceivably  reach  five trillion  dollars 
for  the nightmare scenario of the detonation 
of a  sizeable nuclear  device in  a  densely 
populated area of a city.50
The third and final consideration  in 
calculating the benefit  of the security 
expenditures is the reduction in risk,  which 
in  this case concerns the effectiveness of the 
security  measures to foil, deter,  disrupt,  or 
protect  against a  terrorist  attack. 51 That is,  it 
is the degree to which  new  security  measures 
reduce the  likelihood of a successful terrorist 
attack  and/or the losses sustained in such an 
attack.
In  assessing  risk  reduction,  it is important 
first  to look at the effectiveness of homeland 
security  measures that  were in  place before 
9/11  in reducing risk.  The 9/11  Commission’s 
report  points to a  number  of failures, but  it 
acknowledges as well  that  terrorism  was 
already  a  high priority  of the United States 
government  before 9/11.52 More pointed is an 
observation  of Michael Sheehan, former  New 
York City  Deputy  Commissioner  for 
Counterterrorism:
The most important work in  protecting our 
country since 9/11  has been  accomplished 
with  the capacity that was in place when 
the event happened, not with  any of the 
new capability  bought since 9/11. I firmly 
believe that those huge budget increases 
have not significantly  contributed to our 
post-9/11 security…. The big  wins had little 
to do with the new programs.53
As this suggests, police and domestic 
intelligence agencies have long  had in  place 
procedures, techniques,  trained personnel, 
and action plans to deal with  bombs and 
shootings and those who plot  them. Indeed, 
according  to 9/11’s chief planner,  Khalid 
Sheikh  Mohammed, the greatest  difficulty  the 
plotters faced was getting  their  band of 
terrorists into the United States.  It  may  be 
even  more difficult  now, but the strictures 
before already  presented a  considerable 
hurdle.54 
There is another  consideration.  The tragic 
events of 9/11  massively  heightened the 
awareness of the public to the threat of 
terrorism, resulting in  extra vigilance that  has 
often  resulted in  the arrest of terrorists or  the 
f o i l i n g  o f t e r r o r i s t a t t e m p t s .  M o s t 
dramatically,  because airplane passengers 
have become much more attuned to 
suspicious or  dodgy  behavior  of their  fellow 
passengers, two terrorist  attempts to blow  up 
airliners have been  foiled: the  shoe bombing 
effort  of 2001  and the underwear effort of 
2009.  Both  were detected and restrained by 
crews and passengers,  not  by  the many  costly 
enhanced security  measures put into place by 
the TSA. The same holds for  the peddler in 
New  York who reported the smoking  vehicle 
bomb in Times Square in 2010.  Indeed,  tip-
offs have been  key  to prosecutions in  many  of 
the terrorism  cases in  the United States since 
9/11.  Importantly, the inspiration  of extra 
vigilance comes at no cost to the taxpayer.
In  our  analysis we will assume that  risk 
reduction caused by  the security  measures in 
place before 9/11  and by  the extra  vigilance of 
the public after that  event  reduced risk  by  50 
percent.  This is an  exceedingly  conservative 
estimate not  only  because of Sheehan’s 
observation, but because security  measures 
that  are at once effective and relatively 
inexpensive are generally  the first  to be 
implemented – for  example,  one erects 
warning signs on a  potentially  dangerous 
curve in the road before rebuilding  the 
highway.  Furthermore,  most terrorists (or 
would-be terrorists) do not show  much 
intelligence, cleverness, resourcefulness,  or 
initiative, and therefore measures to deal 
with  them  are relatively  inexpensive and are 
likely  to be instituted first.  Dealing  with  the 
smarter  and more capable terrorists is more 
difficult and expensive,  but these people 
represent, it certainly  appears, a  decided 
minority among terrorists.
In addition, we will assume that the 
increase in  US expenditures on homeland 
security  since 2001  has been  dramatically 
effective,  reducing the remaining  risk by  an 
additional 45  percent. Total risk reduction, 
then  is generously  assumed to be 95  percent 
with  the pre-existing  measures and the extra 
public vigilance responsible  for  50  percent  of 
the risk reduction  and the enhanced 
expenditures responsible for  the remaining 
45 percent.
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COST
As indicated, benefits are a  multiplicative 
composite of three considerations: the 
probability  of a  successful attack,  the losses 
sustained in  a  successful attack, and the 
reduction  in  risk  furnished by  security 
measures. This product,  the benefit,  is then 
compared to the cost  of the security  measures 
instituted to attain the benefit.
For  the purposes of this analysis, we 
assess only  the costs of increased  government 
expenditures on homeland security  after  the 
9/11  attacks. That  is,  we assume homeland 
security  measures in  place before the attacks 
continue,  and we evaluate the additional 
funds that  have been  allocated to homeland 
security, almost  all of it designed,  of course, 
to deal  with  terrorism,  the only  hazard that 
notably  inspired increased alarm  after  the 
attacks.
United States federal government 
spending  on homeland security  increased 
from  $20.1  billion  in  2001,55 to $75  billion  in 
2009. 56  In  all,  federal  government  spending 
on  homeland security  for  2009  was $75 
billion  or  $50 billion  higher  in  2010  dollars 
than in 2001, adjusting for inflation.57
To limit  our  focus to increases in 
expenditures by  the federal government 
reported by  the OMB would be a  considerable 
restriction  because this ignores the recently 
declassified national  intelligence costs as well 
as state and local government outlays on 
homeland security.  As shown  in  Table 1,  we 
conservatively  estimate enhanced intelligence 
expenditures since 9/11  devoted to domestic 
homeland security  to be $15  billion  in  2009. 
As the Table also indicates,  enhanced outlays 
for  state and local homeland security 
spending  are approximately  $10 billion per 
year. 
The increase in  annual federal government 
outlays,  then, is $50  billion  per  year,  and the 
addition of national intelligence and state 
and local homeland security  outlays of $25 
billion  gives a  total of $75  billion. We will  use 
this figure,  although  it  is a very  conservative 
measure of the degree to which  homeland 
security  expenditures have risen  since 9/11 
because we do not  include several other  items 
totaling  (far) more than $200 billion  per  year 
as tallied in Table 1.  These include (1) private 
sector  expenditures on  homeland security 
related measures costing  $10 billion  per  year; 
(2) terrorism  risk  insurance premiums of 
nearly  $4  billion  per  year; (3) hidden  and 
indirect  costs or  “dead weight losses”  of 
implementing  security-related regulations 
that  amounted to at  least  $30 billion  in  lost 
output  per  year; (4)  various opportunity  costs 
including those attendant  on  the increase of 
500  traffic  fatalities per  year  due to increased 
delays and added costs at  airports diverting 
many  short-haul  passengers to their  cars 
instead valued at  $3.2  billion,  as well as other 
opportunity  costs; and (5) the costs of the 
terror-related wars in  Iraq and Afghanistan 
which reached $150 billion in 2009.
RESULTS
To summarize, our  analysis for the United 
States appl ies these es t imates and 
assumptions:
1.  We assume those security  measures in 
place before 9/11  continue and that these, 
combined with  the extra  public vigilance 
induced by  9/11, reduce the likelihood of a 
successful  terrorist attack  or reduce the 
losses sustained in  such an attack by  50 
percent;
2.  We assume the enhanced security 
expenditures since 9/11  have successfully 
reduced the likelihood of a  successful 
terrorist attack or  have reduced the losses 
sustained in  such  an attack by  a  further  45 
percent,  leading  to an  overall  risk  reduction 
of 95 percent; and
3. We include in  our  cost  measure only 
enhanced local, state,  and federal security 
expenditures and enhanced intelligence 
costs since 9/11  (totaling  $75  billion per 
y e a r ) ,  l e a v i n g o u t m a n y  o t h e r 
expenditures including  those incurred by 
the private sector,  opportunity  costs, and 
the costs of the terror-related wars in  Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
Table 2  puts this all together. It  displays the 
benefit  generated by  enhanced security 
measures if they  have been  able to prevent  or 
protect  against  an  otherwise successful  attack 
for  a  range of losses from  a  successful attack 
and for a range of annual attack probabilities.
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Table 2. Net benefit in billions of dollars for US enhanced homeland security expenditures of 
$75 billion per year assuming these have reduced risks by 45 percent
Losses from a successful terrorist attack
Annual Probability
of a successful attack 
in the absence of 
security expenditures
$100 




billion $1 trillion $5 trillion
London 
Bombing
9/11 Nuclear Port Nuclear 
Grand Central
0.1% -75 -75 -75 -75 -75 -75 -73
1.0% -75 -75 -75 -75 -74 -71 -53
5.0% -75 -75 -75 -73 -71 -53 38
10.0% -75 -75 -75 -71 -66 -30 150
25.0% -75 -75 -74 -64 -53 38 488
50.0% -75 -75 -74 -53 -30 150 1050
100%1 -75 -75 -73 -30 15 375 2175
Note: Each entry  above represents the benefit-minus-cost result for each loss and for 
each attack probability. Entries that  are positive would be considered to be cost-
effective. A value of -75 denotes no benefit.
Break-Even Analysis
The number of  otherwise successful attacks averted by  security  expenditures required for 
the enhanced expenditures to be cost-effective at several levels of  loss—that is, for the 















1 One per year.
In  the years since 2001  (or, for  that 
matter,  in  those previous to it),  al-Qaeda-like 
terrorists operating  outside of war  zones have 
generally  inflicted less than  $1  million  in 
property  damage and a  limited number of 
fatalities in  each successful  attack. A 
monetary  value of the destruction  wreaked in 
attacks like that would be tens of millions of 
dollars.58 Something  like that  would probably 
have been the losses inflicted if the Times 
Square bomber  of 2010 had carried out what 
seems to have been  his mission, though 
possibly  the damage could have been  higher. 
Of late,  a  number  of analysts and policy 
makers have suggested that  these are the 
kind of attacks that  are far  the most  likely.  If 
a  loss of $100  million – a  high  estimate for 
small successful attacks – is taken to be the 
approximate norm, Table 2  indicates in the 
first  column  that,  even if the likelihood of 
such  an  attack  were 100 percent per  year 
without  the security  measures,  the money 
spent  to prevent or  protect  against  them 
would not  be worth  it: the costs of security 
would outweigh the benefit of the security.
There is another way to look at this. If
Benefit = (probability of a successful attack) × 
(losses sustained in the successful attack) × 
(reduction in risk)
the same equation can be used in  a  break-
even  analysis to calculate how  many  attacks 
would have to take place to justify  the 
expenditure. That is,  thinking  of the “benefit” 
as the cost of the security measure:
(probability of a successful attack) = security 
cost/[(losses sustained in the successful 
attack) × (reduction in risk)]
Thus for  a  successful  terrorist  attack  in  which 
the security  cost  in  $75  billion,  losses 
sustained are $100  million, and the reduction 
in  risk  is .45, the probability  of a successful 
attack would need to be at least
(probability of a successful attack) > $75 
billion/[$100 million × .45] = 1667 attacks per 
year
That  is,  in  order  for enhanced United 
States expenditures on  homeland security  to 
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be deemed cost-effective under  our  approach 
– w h i c h  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  b i a s e s t h e 
consideration  toward the opposite conclusion 
– they  would have to deter,  prevent, foil,  or 
protect  each  year  against  1,667  otherwise 
successful  attacks something  like the one 
attempted on  Times Square in  2010,  or  more 
than  four  per day.  The array  of numbers at 
the bottom  on  Table 2  gives this quantity  for 
a  variety  of loss levels.  Even for  attacks 
inflicting  $1  billion  in damage,  the frequency 
would have to be about one every other day.
The losses from  attacks like those of July 
2005  in  London  would not  exceed five billion 
dollars. For  enhanced security  measures to be 
cost-effective for  attacks of that magnitude, 
their  rate of occurrence without those 
enhanced measures would have had to 
exceed thirty  per  year. 59 If we posit  that  such 
an  attack is thwarted once per  year  (a 
conservative  threat  likelihood by  any 
measure) the ratio of benefit  to cost  is a 
meager 0.03  meaning  that spending  $1  buys 
only three cents of benefits.60
For  a  terrorist  attack, or  set of attacks, 
that,  like those of September  11,  2001, caused 
$200 bi l l ion  dol lars of destruct ion 
(something  that has only  occurred once in  all 
of history),  enhanced expenditures would be 
cost-effective only  if that  sort  of attack would 
have occurred more than once a  year  without 
them. Moreover,  it  is not  clear  that other 
9/11-like attacks would trigger  the extreme 
economic  reaction  engendered by  the original 
intensely  shocking event – that  is, the full 
costs of another  9/11  might  not reach  those 
sustained in the original event.
An extreme upper  bound would be the 
detonation of a  10-kiloton nuclear device at 
New  York’s Grand Central Terminal  on a 
busy  day,  a  nightmare scenario that  might 
exact losses of up to $5  trillion. Enhanced 
homeland security  expenditures would be 
cost-effective in  this case only  if,  without 
them, such  an  extreme attack would have 
successfully  been  executed once every  thirty 
years. 61  The same,  roughly, would hold for 
another extreme scenario,  one in which  the 
terrorist  attack triggers an  expensive war  like 
the one in Iraq.62
There are extreme scenarios that can  be 
taken  to suggest that  enhanced U.S.  security 
expenditures could be cost-effective – the 
nightmare nuclear  vision  as well  as the costly 
overreaction  scenario. However,  for  those 
who find such  outcomes dangerously  likely, 
the policy  response would logically  be to 
spend on  reducing  the risk  of nuclear 
terrorism  in  the one case and to develop 
strictures to overreaction  in the other. The 
logical policy  response would not be,  for 
example,  to spend tens of billions of dollars 
each year on protection measures.
In virtually  all contexts,  then, overall 
enhanced expenditures on homeland security 
in  the United States fail  to be cost-effective – 
spectacularly  so in  most  instances – even  in 
an  analysis that  very  substantially  biases the 
calculations in  favor  of the opposite 
conclusion. In  consequence,  a  great deal of 
money  appears to have been  misspent  and 
would have been far  more productive – saved 
far  more lives – if it  had been  expended in 
other ways.
We are not arguing that  much  of 
homeland security  spending  is wasteful 
because we believe there will  be no more 
terrorist  attacks.  Like crime and vandalism, 
terrorism  will always be a  feature of life, and 
a  condition of zero vulnerability  is impossible 
to achieve.  However, future attacks might not 
be as devastating  as 9/11,  as evidenced by  the 
attacks on  Western  targets in  the ten years 
since 9/11  that,  although  tragic,  have claimed 
victims numbering in  the tens to a  few 
hundred — and none, certainly, have posed 
an  existential threat.  The frequency  and 
severity  of terrorist  attacks are low,  very  low 
in  fact,  which  makes the benefits of enhanced 
counterterrorism  expenditures of a  trillion 
dollars since 9/11  challenging,  to say  the 
least,  to justify  by  any  rational and accepted 
standard of cost-benefit analysis.
Our  findings dealing with  the total 
enhanced homeland security  expenditures 
should not be taken to suggest that  all 
security  measures necessarily  fail to be cost-
effective: there may  be specific measures that 
are cost-effective.63  But each  should be 
subjected to the kind of risk  analysis we have 
appl ied to the overal l increases in 
expenditure.
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GAUGING THE IMPACT OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
MEASURES ON THE HAZARD
We have assessed the hazard terrorism  poses 
under present conditions – which  include, of 
course,  the existence of counter-terrorism 
measures specifically  designed to reduce that 
hazard. The analysis suggests that additional 
efforts to reduce its likelihood are scarcely 
justified.
It is possible,  of course,  that any  relaxation 
in  these measures will  increase the terrorism 
hazard, that  it  is the counter-terrorism  effort 
is the reason  for  the low  hazard terrorism 
currently  presents. However, in  order  for  the 
terrorism  risk to border  on  becoming 
“ u n a c c e p t a b l e ”  b y  e s t a b l i s h e d r i s k 
conventions — that  is,  to reach an annual 
fatality  rate of one in  100,000  — the number 
of fatalities from  all  forms of terrorism  in  the 
U.S. would have to increase thirty-five-fold.64
Thus, to justify  current counterterrorism 
efforts in  this manner, one would need to 
establish, in  the case of the United States, 
that  the measures have successfully  deterred, 
derailed,  disrupted,  or  protected against 
attacks that would otherwise have resulted in 
the deaths of more than  3,000  people in the 
c o u n t r y  e v e r y  y e a r ,  e q u i v a l e n t t o 
experiencing  attacks as devastating  as those 
on  9/11  at  least once a  year  or  eighteen 
Oklahoma  City  bombings every  year. Even  if 
all  the (mostly  embryonic and in  many  cases 
moronic)  terrorist plots exposed since 9/11  in 
the United States had been  successfully 
carried out,  their  likely  consequences would 
have been  much  lower.  Indeed, as the earlier 
discussion indicates, the number of people 
killed by  terrorists throughout  the world 
outside (and sometimes within) war  zones 
both  before and after 2001  generally  registers 
at far below that number.
A FUTURE INCREASE IN 
TERRORIST DESTRUCTION?
We have been  using  “historical”  data  here, 
and these suggest  the chances an  American 
will perish  at  the hands of a  terrorist is about 
one in  3.5  million per  year.65  However, 
although  there is no guarantee that  the 
terrorism  frequencies of the past  will 
necessarily  persist  into the future,  there 
seems to be little evidence terrorists are 
becoming  any  more destructive, particularly 
in  the West. In  fact, if anything,  there seems 
to be a diminishing, not  expanding, level of 
terrorist  activity  and destruction  at  least 
outside of war  zones.  As Andrew  Mack 
concludes, there is “no evidence of any 
substantial increase in the fatality  toll  since 
data  on  both  domestic and international 
terrorism  began  to be collected in  1998.” 
Indeed, the two datasets he examines that 
have statistics going  back to that year both 
“reveal a decline in deaths from terrorism.” 66
Moreover, as discussed earlier,  according 
both  to official  and prominent  academic 
accounts,  the levels of violence likely  to be 
committed by  Islamic extremists within 
Western countries seems,  if anything  to be in 
decline. Fears about  large,  sophisticated 
attacks have been  replaced by  fears 
concerning tiny  conspiracies,  lone wolves, 
and one-off attackers.
Those who wish  to discount such 
arguments and project ions need to 
demonstrate why  they  think terrorists will 
suddenly  get their  act  together  and inflict 
massively  increased violence, visiting  savage 
discontinuities on  the historical data  series. 67 
Moreover, they  should also restrain 
themselves from  using historical  data 
themselves to explain, for  example, why 
attacks on  New  York  are more likely  than 
ones on Xenia, Ohio, or Perth, Australia.
Actually,  a  most  common  misjudgment 
has been  to embrace extreme events as 
harbingers presaging a  dire departure from 
historical patterns.  In  the months and then 
years after  9/11,  as noted at  the outset, it  was 
almost  universally  assumed that the terrorist 
event was a  harbinger  rather  than  an 
aberration.68 There were similar  reactions to 
Timothy  McVeigh’s 1995  truck bomb attack 
in Oklahoma  City  as concerns about  a 
repetition soared.  And in  1996,  shortly  after 
the terrorist  group Aum  Shinrikyo set  off 
deadly  gas in a  Tokyo subway  station,  one of 
terrorism  studies' top gurus, Walter  Laqueur, 
assured the world that  some terrorist groups 
"almost  certainly" will  use weapons of mass 
destruction  "in  the foreseeable future."69  
Presumably  any  future foreseeable in  1996  is 
now  history, and Laqueur’s near  “certainty” 
has yet to occur.
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THE TRADEOFFS, OPPORTUNITY 
COSTS
Risk  reduction  measures that  produce little 
or  no net  benefit  to society  or  produce it  at a 
very  high  cost cannot be justified on  rational 
life-safety  and economic grounds – they  are 
not only  irresponsible, but,  essentially, 
immoral. When  we spend resources on 
regulations that save lives at  a  high  cost,  we 
forgo the opportunity  to spend those same 
resources on  regulations and processes that 
can  save more lives at  the same cost, or  even 
at  a  lower  one. Homeland security 
expenditure invested in  a  wide range of more 
cost-effective risk  reduction  programs like 
flood protection, vaccination  and screening, 
vehicle  and road safety,  health  care,  and 
occupational health  and safety  would likely 
result  in  far  more significant  benefits to 
society.
For  example,  diverting  a  few  percent  of the 
nearly  $10  billion per  year  spent  on airline 
security  could save many  lives at  a  fraction  of 
the cost  if it  were instead spent on  such 
proven life savers as seat  belts,  bicycle 
helmets, tandem  mass spectrometry 
screening  programs, airbags,  smoke alarms, 
and tornado shelters.  A government obliged 
to allocate funds in  a  manner  that  best 
benefits society  must  explain  why  it  is 
spending  billions of dollars on  security 
measures with  very  little proven  benefit  and 
why  that  policy  is something other  than a 
reckless waste of resources.
It may  be useful  in  this light to put 
counterterrorism  expenditures in  broadest 
comparative context.  A  group of international 
experts assembled by  Bjorn  Lomborg applied 
cost-benefit  thinking  to a  wide range of issues 
and found many  in  which  the benefit  is ten 
times greater  than  the cost and in which  the 
number  of lives saved is spectacular. 
According  to these analysts,  an  investment  of 
merely  $2  billion  could save over  1.5  million 
lives: one million  child deaths could be 
averted by  expanded immunization  coverage 
while community-based nutrition  programs 
could save another  half a  million. If a  miserly 
$2  billion  were redirected from  the homeland 
security  budget ,  the l ikel ihood and 
consequences of such  attacks would hardly 
change, but anywhere from  300  to 60,000 
times more lives – albeit  not  necessarily 
American  or  Western ones – would be saved 
if the funds were instead spent  on  the risk 
reducing measures suggested by  Lomberg 
and his associates. 70
POLITICAL REALITIES
Politicians and bureaucrats do,  of course, face 
considerable political pressure on  the 
terrorism  issue. In  particular,  they  are  fully 
wary  of the fact  that Jeffrey  Rosen  is on to 
something  when he suggests that "we have 
come to believe that  life is risk free and that, 
if something bad happens, there must be a 
government official to blame."71
The dilemma  is nicely  parsed by  James 
Fallows. He points out that  “the political 
incentives here work  only  one way.”  A 
politician who supports more extravagant 
counterterrorism  measures “can  never  be 
proven  wrong”  because an  absence of attacks 
shows that  the “measures have ‘worked’,” 
while a  new  attack shows that we “must go 
farther  still.”  Conversely, a  politician seeking 
to limit expenditure “can  never  be proven 
‘right’”  while “any  future  attack  will always 
and forever be that politician’s ‘fault’.”  Or  in 
the words of Michael Sheehan,  “No terrorism 
expert  or  government  leader  wants to appear 
soft on  terrorism. It’s always safer  to predict 
the worst ; i f nothing  happens,  the 
exaggerators are rarely  held accountable for 
their nightmare scenarios.” 72
In  Friedman’s view, the problem  is quite 
general  not only  in  government and political 
agencies, but  in associated think  tanks: “the 
path  of least resistance is to write about how 
to control a danger  instead of evaluating its 
magnitude.”  And,  although  such  analysts 
“rarely  take orders,”  at the same time “few 
offer  analyses that  harms their  benefactors.” 
It is a  rare bureaucrat  or  expert, he contends, 
who “will  voice opinions harmful  to his 
organization  or  prospects for  appointment, 
but even fewer  will offer those opinions 
without  being asked, and few  policy-makers 
will ask.”73
EXPLAINING RISK VERSUS STOKING FEAR
However,  nothing  in  all  this relieves 
p o l i t i c i a n s a n d b u r e a u c r a t s o f t h e 
fundamental responsibility  of informing the 
public honestly  and accurately  of the risk that 
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terrorism  presents. Daniel  Gardner  notes that 
the failure of Bush administration  “to put  the 
risk in  perspective was total.” 74  That 
continues to be the case with the new one.
Instead, the emphasis has been  on 
exacerbating fears.  As Friedman aptly  notes, 
"For  questionable gains in preparedness,  we 
spread paranoia" and faci l i tate the 
bureaucratically  and politically  appealing 
notion that  "if the threat is everywhere, you 
must  spend everywhere," while developing 
and perpetrating the myth,  or  at  least  the 
impress ion , that  the terror i s ts are 
omnipotent and omnipresent.75
Thus it  was in 2003  that  Homeland 
Security  Secretary  Tom  Ridge divined that 
"extremists abroad are anticipating  near  term 
attacks that  they  believe will  either  rival, or 
exceed" those of 2001. And in 2004,  Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, with  FBI Director 
Robert  Mueller  at his side, announced that 
"credible intelligence from  multiple sources 
indicates that al-Qaeda  plans to attempt  an 
attack  on the United States in  the next  few 
months," that  its "specific  intention" was to 
hit  us "hard," and that the "arrangements" for 
that  attack were already  90  percent complete. 
(Oddly  enough,  Ashcroft  fails to mention this 
memorable headline-grabbing  episode in 
Never Again, his 2006 memoir  of the 
period.)  In  2003  Director  Mueller reported 
that,  although his agency  had yet  actually  to 
identify  an  al-Qaeda cell in  the U.S.,  such 
unident i f ied (or  imagined) ent i t ies 
nonetheless presented "the greatest threat," 
had "developed a  support  infrastructure" in 
the country, and had achieved both  the 
“ability”  and the “intent”  to inflict “significant 
casualties in the U.S.  with  little warning." In 
2005, at  a  time when  the FBI admitted it still 
had been  unable to unearth  a  single true al-
Qaeda cell,  Mueller  continued his dire I-
think-therefore-they-are projections: "I 
remain very  concerned about what  we are not 
seeing," he ominously  ruminated.76 Needless 
to say, the media  remained fully  in  step. 
Thus, on  the fifth  anniversary  of 9/11,  ABC's 
Charles Gibson  dutifully  intoned,  "Putting 
your  child on a  school bus or driving across a 
bridge or  just  going  to the mall  – each  of 
these things is a  small act  of courage – and 
peril is a part of everyday life."77
T e r r o r i s m  i n d u c e d f e a r s c a n b e 
debilitating.  For  one thing  they  can cause 
people routinely  to adopt  skittish, overly  risk 
averse behavior,  at  least for  a  while,  and this 
can  much magnify  the impact  of the terrorist 
attack,  particularly  economically.  That  is, the 
problem  is not  that people are trampling  each 
other in  a  rush  to vacate New  York or 
Washington, but  rather  that  they  may  widely 
adopt  other  forms of defensive behavior,  the 
c u m u l a t i v e c o s t s o f w h i c h  c a n  b e 
considerable.  As Cass Sunstein  notes, "in  the 
context  of terrorism,  fear  is likely  to make 
people reluctant to engage in  certain 
activities, such  as flying  on  airplanes and 
appearing  in  public  places," and "the 
resulting costs can be extremely high."78
Yet,  despite the importance to responsible 
policy  of seeking  to communicate risk and 
despite the costs of irresponsible fear-
mongering,  just  about  the only  official  who 
has ever openly  put the threat  presented by 
terrorism  in  some sort  of context is New 
York’s Mayor Michael  Bloomberg  who,  in 
2007, pointed out  that  people should “get a 
life”  and that they  have a  greater  chance of 
being hit  by  lightning  than  of being struck  by 
terrorism.79
Things are not much  better  in  the media. 
There seemed to be a  brief glimmer  on the 
December  28,  2009, PBS NewsHour when 
Gwen Ifill,  in  introducing a  segment on  the 
then-recent  underwear  bomber’s attempt  to 
down an  airliner,  actually  happened to note 
that  the number  of terrorist  incidents on 
American  airliners over the previous decade 
was one for  every  16.5  million flights.80 This 
interesting  bit  of information,  however, was 
never  brought  up again  either  by  Ifill  or by 
the three terrorism  experts she was 
interviewing. Nor, of course,  did anyone 
think of suggesting  that, at  that  rate,  maybe 
the airlines are already safe enough.
In 2007,  now-former  CIA  Director  Tenet 
revealed on CBS' 60 Minutes  that  his 
"operational intuition" was telling  him  that 
al-Qaeda  had “infiltrated a  second wave or a 
third wave into the United States at  the time 
of 9/11,”  though he added,  "Can I prove it  to 
you? No." (One might think that aging 
members of that  “wave” would have since had 
a  great  incentive  to actually  do  something 
since the longer  they  linger, the greater  the 
likelihood they  will  be exposed and caught.) 
And DHS Secretary  Michael Chertoff 
informed us a  few  months later  that  his gut 
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was telling him  there'd be an  attack during 
that  summer.  It  would seem  that  when 
officials responsible for  public  safety  issue 
fear-inducing  proclamations based by their 
own admission on  nothing, they  should be 
held to account. Then in  2010, Napolitano 
joined in announcing  that,  although  the 
likelihood of a  large-scale organized attack 
was reduced,  the continued danger  of a 
small-scale disorganized attack meant that 
the terrorist threat was somehow  now  higher 
than  at  any  time since 9/11.  As Ian Lustick 
puts it, the government "can never make 
enough  progress toward 'protecting  America' 
to reassure Americans against  the fears it  is 
helping to stoke."81
P o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s s u p p l y  a n 
understandable excuse for  expending money, 
but not a  valid one, and they  do not  relieve 
officials of the responsibility  of seeking  to 
expend public funds wisely.  It  is particularly 
important to do so with  homeland security 
expenditures. They  deal  not with  bridges to 
nowhere or  with  crop subsidies,  but with 
public safety  – or  domestic tranquility  – the 
central,  fundamental reason  for  the existence 
of government in  the first place. It  is 
imperative that  decisions be made sensibly 
and responsibly  in  this area. To be irrational 
with  your  own money  may  be to be foolhardy, 
to give in  to guilty  pleasure,  or  to wallow  in 
caprice.  But  to be irrational with  other 
people’s money, particularly  where public 
safety  is the issue, is to be irresponsible,  to 
betray  an essential trust.  In  the end, it 
becomes a  dereliction  of duty  that cannot be 
justified by  political pressure,  bureaucratic 
constraints, or emotional drives.
ARE POLITICAL CONCERNS 
OVERWROUGHT?
However,  although  political pressures may 
force actions and expenditures that are 
unwise, they  usually  do not precisely  dictate 
the level  of expenditure.  Thus,  although  there 
are public demands to “do something”  about 
terror ism,  nothing  in  that  demand 
specifically  requires removing  shoes in 
airport  security  lines, requiring passports to 
enter  Canada,  spreading  bollards like 
dandelions,  or  making  a  huge number of 
buildings into forbidding fortresses.
The United Kingdom,  which  seems to face 
an  internal threat  from  terrorism  that  is 
considerably  greater than  that  for  the United 
States,  appears nonetheless to spend 
proportionately  much  less than half as much 
on  homeland security, and the same holds for 
Canada  and Australia. Yet politicians and 
bureaucrats there do not  seem  to suffer 
threats to their  positions or  other  political 
problems because of it. 82
As this might  suggest, it  is possible 
politicians and bureaucrats are overly  fearful 
about  the political consequences.  It  is often 
argued that  there is a  political  imperative for 
public officials to "do something" (which 
usually  means overreact) when a  dramatic 
terrorist  event  takes place – "You  can't  just 
not do anything." However,  history  clearly 
demonstrates that overreaction  is not 
necessarily  required.  Sometimes,  in  fact, 
leaders have been able to restrain  their 
instinct  to overreact.  Even  more important, 
restrained reaction  – or  even  capitulation  to 
terrorist  acts – has often  proved to be entirely 
acceptable politically.  This is a particularly 
important issue because it  certainly  appears 
that  avoiding  overreaction  is by  far  the most 
cost-effective counterterrorism measure.
Consider,  for  example, the two instances 
of terrorism  that  killed the most  Americans 
before September  2001. Ronald Reagan's 
response to the first of these, the suicide 
bombing  in  Lebanon  in 1983  that resulted in 
the deaths of 241  American  Marines,  was to 
make a  few  speeches and eventually  to pull 
the troops out.  The venture seems to have 
had no negative impact  on  his reelection  a 
few  months later.  The other was the 
December  1988  bombing  of a  Pan Am  airliner 
over  Lockerbie,  Scotland,  in  which  187 
Americans perished.  Perhaps in  part  because 
this dramatic  and tragic event  took place 
after  the elections of that  year, the official 
response, beyond seeking  to obtain 
compensation  for  the victims,  was simply  to 
apply  meticulous police work  in  an  effort to 
tag the culprits,  a  process that bore fruit only 
three years later  and then  only  because of an 
unlikely  bit  of luck. 83 But  that  cautious, even 
laid back,  response proved to be entirely 
acceptable politically.
Similarly, after  an  unacceptable loss of 
American lives in  Somalia  in  1993, Bill 
Clinton  responded by  withdrawing  the troops 
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without  noticeable negative impact on  his 
1996  reelection  bid. Although  Clinton  reacted 
with  (apparently  counterproductive)  military 
retaliations after the two U.S.  embassies were 
bombed in  Africa  in  1998,  his administration 
did not  have a  notable response to terrorist 
attacks on American  targets in Saudi Arabia 
(Khobar  Towers) in  1996  or  to the bombing 
of the U.S.S.  Cole in 2000, and these non-
responses never  caused it political pain. 
George W. Bush's response to the anthrax 
attacks of 2001  did include a  costly  and 
wasteful stocking  up of anthrax vaccine and 
enormous extra  spending by  the U.S. Post 
Office.  However, beyond that,  it  was the same 
as Clinton's had been to the terrorist attacks 
against the World Trade Center  in  1993  and 
in  Oklahoma City  in  1995  and the same as the 
one applied in  Spain  when  terrorist  bombed 
trains there in 2004  or  in  Britain  after  attacks 
in  2005: the dedicated application  of police 
work  to try  to apprehend the perpetrators. 
This approach proved to be entirely 
acceptable politically. Similarly,  the Indian 
government was able to neglect  popular 
demands for  retaliatory  attacks on  Pakistan 
for  the damage inflicted on  Mumbai in  2008 
by terrorists based there.84
Thus, despite short-term  demands that 
some sort  of action  must be taken, experience 
suggests politicians can  often  successfully 
ride out  this demand after  the obligatory  and 
essentially  cost-free expressions of outrage 
are prominently issued.
It is true that  few  voters spend a  great 
amount  of time following  the ins and outs of 
policy  issues and even  fewer  are certifiable 
policy  wonks.  But they  are grown-ups, and it 
is just  possible they  would respond 
reasonably  to an  adult conversation  about 
terrorism. After  all, Mayor  Bloomberg’s “get a 
life”  outburst  in  2007  did not have negative 
consequences for him. He is still  in  office 
and, although  he had some difficulties in  his 
reelection two years later,  his blunt 
comments about  terrorism  were not  the 
cause.
There is also a  tendency  to assume that  the 
outsized reaction  to 9/11  will  necessarily  be 
repeated if there is another  attack  in  the 
United States. However, London  experienced 
a  double hit  in  2005: attacks on  the 
underground two weeks apart  (of which  only 
the first was successful). But the politicians in 
charge survived.  Also potentially  relevant 
here is the fact  that  terrorist  attacks on  resort 
areas in  Bali in  2002  had a  far  larger  negative 
impact  on  tourism  than  did subsequent ones 
in 2005.
Interest ing in  this regard is the 
remarkably  muted reaction  of the American 
public (and media) to the 2009  shootings by 
a  Muslim  psychiatrist at  Fort  Hood, Texas, 
that  killed thirteen  and injured thirty  more. 
Although  this could be considered to an act of 
a  deranged man, it  is generally  taken  to be a 
case of Islamic terrorism, and it  is by  far  the 
worst  since 9/11  in  the United States. 
Although  obviously  far  less costly  than  the 
earlier  terrorist  event, it  could have been 
taken  to be the next  step in  a  terrorist 
onslaught – something that Americans have 
long  been ominously  waiting  for.  However,  it 
failed to generate much  outrage or  demand 
for  an  outsized response. Indeed,  a  year  later 
it  was scarcely  remembered,  as when the 
prominent  journalist,  James Fallows,  mused 
about  raising  “the certainty  that some day 
another terrorist  attack  will succeed”  without 
noting that one had already taken place.85
Then  in 2010, President  Barack  Obama 
rather  candidly  observed to Washington Post 
reporter  Bob Woodward,  “We can  absorb  a 
terrorist  attack.  We'll do everything  we can  to 
prevent it, but even a  9/11,  even the biggest 
attack  ever  . . . we absorbed it  and we are 
stronger.” 86 This may  have been  the first  time 
any  official  acknowledged the issue in public, 
and Obama  even used the unpleasant  word 
“absorb”  rather than  the more politically 
c o r r e c t “ r e s i l i e n t . ”  O b a m a ’ s h i g h l y 
unconventional statement drew  great 
attention  in the press, but  it hardly  seems to 
have hurt the President’s effectiveness or 
approval ratings.
Terrorism  can  inspire self-destructive 
overreaction  like no other  hazard,  and this 
can  be massively  costly  – the two wars 
impelled or  facilitated by  9/11  are only  the 
most vivid examples.  Indeed, the costs of 
overreaction  can  be far  higher  than  those 
inflicted by  the terrorists themselves – as 
they  were even for  9/11,  by  far  the most 
destructive terrorist  act  in  history.87  Osama 
bin Laden  has gloated over  this phenomenon, 
claiming his goal is to bleed America into 
bankruptcy, something  only  the United States 
could do to itself.88
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The notion  that  this is a  problem  seems to 
be dawning on  people considering  terrorism. 
In  2004, Stephen  Flynn  began  an  article by 
dramatically  proclaiming  that  the United 
States is "living  on  borrowed time – and 
squandering  it" and ending  it  with a  warning 
about the "long,  deadly  struggle against 
terrorism." He also admitted that he often 
labored under  a  sense of despair  and dread 
and suggested that  officials must  assume that 
terrorists will "soon" launch  attacks far  more 
deadly  and disruptive than  those of 9/11.89 
And late in  the same year he contributed to 
an  op-ed article vividly  entitled “’Our Hair  Is 
on  Fire’,”  declaring  that  al-Qaeda  had both 
the ability  and the intent  to detonate  a 
weapon of mass destruction  in  the United 
States and envisioning graves by  the 
hundreds of thousands, the collapse of the 
economy,  and “perhaps a fatal  blow  to our 
way  of life.” 90  However,  by  2010,  he was 
arguing that  the greatest  threat  from 
terrorism  “comes from  what we would do to 
ourselves when we are spooked”  and that  is it 
this “that  makes it  an appealing  tool for  our 
adversaries.” 91
And in  early  2005,  Richard Clarke, 
counterterrorism  coordinator  from  the 
Clinton  administration,  issued a  scenario that 
appeared in  the Atlantic as a  cover  story  in 
which  he darkly  envisioned shootings at 
casinos, campgrounds,  theme parks,  and 
malls in  2005, bombings in  subways and 
railroads in  2006, missile attacks on  airliners 
in  2007,  and devastating cyber attacks in 
2008.92 By  2010,  however,  he was advocating 
that  “we should not  adopt procedures that 
inconvenience the public more than  they  do 
the terrorists and amount  to little more than 
security  theater,”  that “those who seek 
political gain  from  the murder  of Americans” 
should be “regarded as despicable,”  and that, 
should terrorists successfully  attack  again, we 
should “refine our tactics and procedures,” 
but “not overreact.”  To do this, however, 
notes Clarke,  would require “a good dose”  of 
that  oxymoronic  commodity,  “political 
courage.” 93
The 2004 art icle in  which  Flynn 
proclaimed the United States to be "living  on 
borrowed time – and squandering it" and 
warned about the "long,  deadly  struggle 
against terrorism" also includes something  of 
a  midcourse correction. In seeking  to supply 
a  standard for  "how  much  security  is 
enough,”  he suggested that  that  happy 
moment would come about  when  "the 
American  people can  conclude that  a  future 
attack  on  U.S.  soil will be an  exceptional 
event  that  does not  require wholesale 
changes in  how  they  go about their  lives."94 It 
seems reasonable to suggest  that  they  can  do 
so right  now  – and,  for  that matter, could 
have done so in 2004.
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Application of Social Network Analysis Methods to 
Quantitatively Assess Exercise Coordination 
Yee San Su
ABSTRACT
Previous  failures  in effective, large-scale 
disaster response (e.g.,  Hurricane Katrina) 
are  often traced to  failures  in effective 
coordination.  As  evidenced in after-action 
r e p o r t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a s s e s s m e n t s o f 
coordination performance are still largely 
anecdotal in nature. Network analysis  is a 
possible means  to  develop quantitative 
metrics  for coordination assessment.  In this 
paper, two  techniques  are proposed for 
characterizing coordination performance. 
First, Borgatti’s  technique for quantifying 
network  fragmentation was used to measure 
the extent to which various response 
agencies  play a role  in establishing efficient 
communications. Second, Girvan and 
Newman’s technique for community sub-
group identification was  used to identify 
potential breakdowns in information 
transfer. Both techniques were successfully 
implemented in a case-study analysis  of the 
Top Officials  4  exercise. The techniques  can 
provide additional insights  into  coordination 
p e r f o r m a n c e , i d e n t i f y i n g e x e r c i s e 
artificialities  and allowing meta-analysis  of 
coordination performance (e.g.,  over time, 
across regions, for different event scales).
INTRODUCTION
Coordination,  or  lack thereof,  has been 
identified as a  key  bottleneck in  effective 
management  of disasters such  as Hurricane 
Katrina.1  Large-scale events frequently 
demand more complex  forms of organization, 
larger  quantities of resources,  and access to 
specialized equipment and personnel under 
condit ions of decreased s i tuat ional 
awareness.2  As a  result,  the challenge of 
establishing  effective coordination  may 
increase nonlinearly  with  respect  to increases 
in  various event  scales (e.g.,  size, severity). 
Unfortunately, quantitative metrics for 
measuring  coordination  performance do not 
yet  exist. Assessments of coordination 
performance – such  as those found in  after-
action  reports – are still predominantly 
anecdotal. Development of quantitative 
metrics to characterize coordination  would 
allow  for a  more robust  method of measuring 
response coordination  progress and facilitate 
our  understanding  of how  coordination  is 
negatively affected by event scales.
Social network  analysis is a  possible 
means to obtain meaningful,  quantitative 
metrics. Recent  years have seen  an  increase 
in  the application  of social network analysis 
concepts to homeland security.  For  example, 
Naim  Kapucu cast  the evolution  of national 
response frameworks as a series of network 
graphs.3 Moreover,  researchers have studied 
coordination  and emergent  player  roles for 
events such as Hurricane Katrina  and 9/11.4 
Meanwhile,  social  network  analysis has also 
seen the development of a  variety  of new 
quantitative  methods to characterize 
networks.
To this end, two possible techniques are 
proposed to generate quantitative measures 
of coordination: (1) a  centrality  measure 
introduced by  Stephen Borgatti to address 
what  he called the negative variation of the 
Key  Player  Problem  (KPP-Negative);5 and (2) 
a  technique for  detecting community 
structure developed in  a  series of papers by 
Girvan  and Newman. 6 Borgatti’s technique is 
used to identify  key  coordinating  agencies 
and could potentially  be used to chart the 
development of emergency  operations 
centers (EOCs),  as well  as provide an 
outcome value for  statistical analysis. 7 
M e a n w h i l e ,  c o m m u n i t y  s u b - g r o u p 
examination  via  Girvan  and Newman’s 
technique could be used to identify  potential 
information stove-piping. The underlying 
basis and reasons for selecting  these 
techniques are discussed in the Data  and 
Approach section.
These approaches were applied in  an 
analysis of evaluator  logs from  the Portland, 
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Oregon  site of the 2007  Top Officials 4 
(TOPOFF 4) exercise. TOPOFF 4  provides a 
rare opportunity  to examine coordination  in 
the context  of a large-scale, catastrophic 
event. Thus far,  evaluator  records from 
TOPOFF 4  have been used to support 
construction  of various after-action  reports.8 
However,  the notion  was to explore whether 
additional insights on coordination  could be 
obtained – given the extensive database of 
communication-related information  collected 
– using the frequency  of communication  as a 
proxy  for  coordination  effectiveness. While 
highlighting  the potential  of social  network 
analysis,  this article also points out  the need 
for  additional research  and validation. Thus, 
it  includes recommendations for  improving 
data collection in future exercises.   
DATA AND APPROACH
TOPOFF 4 DATASET
TOPOFF 4  is one of what are now  designated 
Tier  I National  Level Exercises (NLE). Given 
the infrequent  occurrence of catastrophes, 
few  events involve the full  spectrum  of the 
response community  (spanning vertically 
across all  levels of government  and 
geographically  across regions, and involving 
both  non-governmental organizations and 
the private sector).  Tier  I NLE provide a rare 
glimpse of how  coordination  fairs in  a 
catastrophic  context,  including  participation 
at  local,  county, state, and federal levels, as 
well  as private sector  and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO).  Since the original 
TOPOFF in  2000,  a  primary  goal  has been  “…
to improve the capability  of government 
officials and agencies,  both  within the United 
States and abroad to provide an  effective, 
coordinated,  and strategic  response to a 
terrorist  attack.” 9 TOPOFF 4  took  place from 
October 15–19,  2007, involving  more than 
15,000 federal,  state,  local, and private sector 
participants. The scenario for  TOPOFF 4 
involved detonations of multiple radiological 
dispersal  devices, with  a coordinated series of 
attacks taking place in: Guam; Portland, 
Oregon; and Phoenix, Arizona. 
The specific data  source used for  this 
analysis was the TOPOFF 4  Full  Scale 
Exercise  Reconstruction  Database,  which  is a 
Microsoft Access database primarily 
composed of evaluator  “log-book”  style 
entries recorded during  the course of the 
exercise. In  total,  this database contains 
14,100 records. To simplify  content  analysis, 
only  records specific to the Portland,  Oregon 
location  were analyzed.  Since evaluators were 
not collecting information  for  the specific 
purpose of constructing  a  communication 
network, limitations to this dataset exist, 
which include but are not limited to: 
• Entries contingent on what  evaluators 
considered to be important;
• Entry  def in i t ion  i ssues : namely , 
evaluators may  have delineated entries 
b a s e d o n  c o n t e n t i n s t e a d o f 
communication  instance (i.e., multiple, 
separate entries may  have been  taken 
from a single conversation); 
• Accounting for  passive means of 
communication  (e.g. website posting, 
WebEOC, emails); 
• Collection  bias due to the availability  and 
placement of evaluators; 
• Evaluator  versus player  awareness (i.e., 
information  recorded by  the evaluator is 
not necessarily  information that  has been 
effectively  conveyed to all players at the 
location); 
• Inconsistent use of terminology;
• Referencing by name instead of position; 
• Failure to identify  injects and simulated 
players; and
• Failure to identify  all  participants 
involved in  conferences/meetings/ 
teleconferences. 
Even  so,  the database contains some of the 
highest  quality  data  to date on exercise 
communication  recorded as it  was taking 
place. As such,  it  is not subject  to some of the 
shortcomings associated with  post-event 
attempts at  reconstructing  communication 
networks (e.g., recollection bias).
CODING THE DATA
Among the fields recorded by  evaluators were 
time, description, and location. Descriptions 
were reviewed three times to identify 
communications taking  place between 
players.  The first  review  was broken  down  by 
site (the Portland,  OR location  included 
multiple sites of exercise  play).  The second 
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review  was performed with  all entries listed 
in  chronological order; this was done to 
enforce consistency  in  coding  and remove 
duplicate entries recorded by  multiple 
evaluators.10  The third and final review  was 
done for  those players with  small numbers of 
communication  counts. In  this case,  targeted 
keyword queries of the Access database were 
used to ensure counts were as accurate as 
possible.
A  positive communication  count  was 
tallied for  each instance in  which  “from”  and 
“to”  parties could be identified.  In some 
cases, multiple instances of communication 
were detailed in  the same description; these 
were split  into separate entries.  Directed (or 
one-way) communications were noted when 
possible; however,  the vast  majority  of 
communications were undirected in  nature. 
Failures to communicate (e.g., unanswered 
phone calls) were also noted; each  was coded 
as a negative  count  of communication  (i.e., 
equal to “-1”). 
Identification  of unique players was done 
iteratively,  beginning  with  a  set  of agencies 
identified in the TOPOFF 4  after-action 
reports. In  some cases, larger  agencies such 
as the Department of Energy  fielded multiple 
teams. These were sometimes treated as 
independent  nodes given  a  review  of their 
location  and communication entries. With 
respect to EOCs,  communications received by 
liaisons were assumed to come from  their 
p a r e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I n  a l l c a s e s , 
i n f o r m a t i o n  w a s a s s u m e d t o b e 
communicated by  the liaison to the 
emergency  operation center  leadership (but 
not necessarily  to other  liaisons or  players 
located at  the EOC unless indicated). 
Command staff (e.g.,  Director)  were treated 
as one node,  representing  the overall 
emergency operation center.
Ideal ly , coding would have been 
performed shortly  after  the exercise to allow 
for  follow-up with  evaluators in cases where 
descriptions lacked context/details (e.g.,  a 
communication  partner  was not identified). 
Lacking this informat ion, avai lable 
documents and after  action  reports were 
reviewed to assist  in: (1) deciphering  varying 
nomenclature; (2) identifying actual versus 
simulated players; and (3) determining 
periods of participation.11
ANALYSIS METRICS
As noted by  Weigand and others, “the 
rationale behind coordination  is the existence 
of dependencies between  the activities of 
entities,  and…the goal of coordination  is to 
manage these dependencies in  such a  way 
that  the activities become parts of a 
purposeful whole.” 12 One critical  assumption 
made in  this paper  is that communication  is 
an  adequate proxy  for  coordination  efficacy  – 
namely, more communication  equates to 
more effective coordination. In doing  so,  the 
resulting  analysis metrics are geared towards 
capturing  those aspects of coordination  that 
are influenced by  reducing  the “...information 
asymmetry  that usually  exists between 
actors.”13  Intrinsic to this is the argument 
that  actors seek to reach  a  “shared 
understanding,”  which  then  allows them  to 
c o o r d i n a t e  t h e i r  a c t i o n s . W h i l e 
communication  is not  the only  mechanism  by 
which  to achieve this shared understanding 
(e.g., precedents,  standard operating 
procedures), it  is certainly  a  foundational 
building  block. In  their  review  of Hurricane 
Katrina,  the Select  Bipartisan  Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation  for  and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina noted that  many  of the 
problems they  ident i f ied “could be 
categorized as ‘information gaps’ – or  at  least 
p r o b l e m s w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n - r e l a t e d 
implications, or failures to act  decisively 
because information  was sketchy  at best.”14 
Hence, it  should not  come as a  surprise  that 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  c a n  b e l i n k e d t o 
coordination.
Prior  to conducting  any  social network 
analysis,  the definition  of what  constitutes an 
edge and what  edge values mean (in  weighted 
networks)  must  be decided upon.  Raw 
communication counts were not  used to 
describe the edge strength  between  nodes. 
TOPOFF 4  took  place over  a  number  of days. 
Not  all  players participated for  the full 
duration  of the exercise.  To prevent positively 
biasing edge connectivity  for those players 
participating  for  the entire exercises,  the 
period of participation  for  each  player  was 
estimated either  by  registering  their  first  and 
last entries for  each  day  or, for  those players 
infrequently  mentioned, by  referencing  the 
participation  time frame of the primary 
agency  they  associated with  (for  each  day) 
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during  the exercise.  Overlapping time 
intervals of participation  were determined for 
all  pair-wise combinations of players. These 
overlapping  time intervals normalized 
communication  counts to convert  raw 
communication  counts into frequencies of 
communication. These values were then  used 
as the basis for  network construction. Social 
network analysis was predominantly 
conducted using  iGraph  library  subroutines 
in  R. Specifics as to the two social network 
analysis techniques used are discussed below.
KPP-NEGATIVE FOR VALUED EDGES
Centrality  metrics measure the importance of 
a  particular node or  edge within  the overall 
network. One class of centrality  measures is 
based on  the concept  of betweenness. For 
each  pair  of nodes in  a  network,  the geodesic 
(or  shortest  path between the two nodes)  is 
determined. The fraction  of all  shortest  paths 
that  pass through  a  given node determine its 
betweenness value. Higher  betweenness 
scores indicate greater  control over 
communication, since more communication 
optimally passes through this node.15  
There are ,  however ,  a couple o f 
shortcomings in  the use of traditional 
betweenness to evaluate the importance of a 
network node in  facilitating  coordination. 
Basic betweenness centrality  does not 
account for  the ability  of a  system  to 
compensate for  the absence of a node 
t h ro u g h  a l t e rn a t i ve c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
pathways.  In this sense, it  does not provide a 
stiff enough  penalty  to fragmentation of a 
network resulting from  the absence of a  node. 
One example is shown in  Figure 1. Here, the 
function of Node 8 as a  key  communication 
bridge in  this network  is obvious: loss of this 
node results in  fragmentation  of the network 
into two isolated components. However,  as 
calculated, Node 1  is shown  to have the larger 
betweenness score,  although its loss simply 
shifts communication  to alternative (albeit 
longer) communication pathways.
Figure 1. Betweenness scores for two nodes in a 
hypothetical network. As shown, while loss of  Node 8 
will result in fragmentation of  the network into two 
components, the betweenness score for Node 1 is 
higher.  Figure recreated based on an example provided 
by Borgatti.16
The second issue with  some centrality 
m e a s u r e s i s t h a t t h e y  a c c o u n t  f o r 
fragmentation  only; there  is no measure of 
the quality  of communication taking  place 
within  components. This is a  problem  with 
measures that  identify  whether  a  path exists 
between  two nodes,  but  fail to consider the 
corresponding  path length  (which can  be 
quite  large). 17 For  example, both networks in 
Figure 2  have two components.  However,  the 
path  length  of communication between Node 
1  and Node 5  within  each  network is very 
different. In  other  words,  the shape of each  of 
the components must be considered.
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Figure 2. Example of  two network exhibiting the same 
number of  components (two), but vastly  different 
connectedness within each fragment. Figure recreated 
based on an example provided by Borgatti. 18
Borgatti’s technique addresses both  of the 
aforementioned issues.  To determine the 
relative importance of each  node within  a 
network, that node is first  removed from  the 
network, and the corresponding change in 
the fragmentation, F,  is determined. F is 




dij = minimum  path  length  between 
nodes i and j
n = number of nodes
The use of the minimum  path  length 
concept  allows for  consideration  of shape 
effects, whereas the inverse functional  form 
for  path  length  ensures that  the function  is 
well behaved for  node pairs located in 
different fragments. 
Borgatti developed the F-value to range 
from  0  to 1,  with  higher  values corresponding 
to greater  network fragmentation. Implicit in 
the functional form  of Equation  1  is that it  is 
applicable to non-weighted networks (i.e.,  all 
edges have values of 1). 19  To expand 
Borgatti’s technique to weighted edges, a 
normalization  constant is utilized to 
r e p r e s e n t  t h e “ i d e a l ”  f r e q u e n c y  o f 
communication  (and,  in  turn,  the minimal 
path  length  value). Hence,  the proposed 
modified equation (Equation 2) is:
 
 (2)
where the only  difference is the inclusion  of 
the normalization term Dmin.
Since shorter path  lengths result  from 
higher  levels of frequency, note that the 
contribution to the path  length  of each 
individual edge is the inverse of the frequency 
of communication between  those two nodes. 
Two possibilities for  Dmin naturally  spring  to 
mind. In  the case where  the highest 
frequency  value is reasonable, this value can 
be used to fix Dmin.  In  cases where this value 
f a l l s s h o r t o f e x p e c t e d l e v e l s o f 
communication, a  reasonable maximum 
value can  be set (e.g., 1  communication/
hour).
SUB-GROUP IDENTIFICATION
Girvan  and Newman proposed an  algorithm 
for  community  structure identification, which 
Newman  generalized for  use with weighted 
networks. 20  The method relies on  the use of 
edge betweenness,  which is the edge variant 
(instead of nodes)  of betweenness discussed 
earlier.  Edges with  high  betweenness values 
can be thought  of as bottlenecks to 
information  flow.  Girvan  and Newman  argue 
that  the reason  these edges are bottlenecks is 
that  these  edges are really  intercommunity 
edges – those few  edges that  connect 
otherwise-unconnected portions of the 
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network. Hence,  their  removal will  result in 
isolation of sub-groups.  
Successive identification  and removal of 
the highest  betweenness valued edges can  be 
mapped to a  dendrogram  (see Figure 5  for 
example),  from  which  hierarchical  patterns of 
community  structure can be seen. However, 
to address the question, “How  many 
communities should a network be split  into?” 
a  threshold criterion  must  be applied.  Thus, 
Newman  and Girvan  introduced the concept 
of modularity,  Q, which  they  define as the 
difference in  the fraction  of edges falling 
within  communities versus that if edges were 
assigned at  random. More formally,  Q  is 
calculated using the equation (Equation 3):21
    (3)
Where i and j are player indices, Aij is the 
weight  of the connection  between  players i 
and j,  m  is the number  of edges in  the 
network, and ki and kj are the degree values 
for  players i and j, respectively. Similarly,  ci 
and cj are the sub-groups to which  players i 
and j are assigned, and δ(ci,cj)  is defined as 1 
if ci = cj, and 0,  otherwise. Nonzero values 
indicate deviations from  randomness, with  a 
maximum  possible Q-value of 1.  Based on 
evaluations of a  variety  of case networks with 
known  sub-groups,  Newman  and Girvan 
found that modularity  values of ~0.3  or  more 
usually  indicate good divisions.  Upon 
generating the hierarchical dendrogram, the 
modularity  of each  level within  the 
dendrogram  is calculated,  and the sub-
grouping with  the highest  modularity  value is 
chosen.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CODING RESULTS AND CLASSIFICATION
A  total  of 3681  evaluator  entries associated 
with  the Portland,  Oregon  portion  of 
TOPOFF 4  were coded.  Since some entries 
c o n t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n  o n m u l t i p l e 
communications or  meetings, 4241  entries 
were obtained after  coding. Of these, 2128 
(50 percent) contained information that 
could be cast  as a  “from-to”  communication; 
354  (8.3  percent) were duplicate entries 
resulting  from  more than  one evaluator 
recording the same event; 318  (7.5  percent) 
were entries in  which  one or  both  of the 
communicating parties were not identified; 
and 64  (1.5  percent)  were instances where 
evaluators noted a failure to achieve 
communication  (e.g.,  an  unanswered call). 
Remaining entries were unrelated to 
communication between players.
A  visual representation  of the resulting 
network is shown  in  Figure 3.  One hundred 
sixty-five distinct  players are represented as 
nodes; each  is assigned a numerical  label.  In 
the figure,  degree values are used to size node 
r a d i i . 22  T h e a d j a c e n c y  m a t r i x o f 
communication  between players is highly 
sparse – of the 13,530  possible edge 
combinations, only  741  (5.5  percent)  player 
pairs exhibit a  non-zero frequency  of 
communication. The distribution  of these 
frequencies of communication exhibits an 
exponential decay  (see Figure 4), with  the 
majority  (76  percent) of edges valued at  less 
than  0.2  instances of communication per 
h o u r .  T h e m a x i m u m  f r e q u e n c y  o f 
communication  observed was approximately 
three instances of communication per hour. 
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Figure 3.  Network representation of  the Portland,  Oregon site of  TOPOFF 4. Each numerically  labeled node 
represents a unique player participating in the exercise.  Node radii were scaled based on degree value. The degree 
of a node is simply a count of the number of other nodes with which it is directly connected.
Figure 4. Distribution of  the TOPOFF 4 (Portland, Oregon site) network edge values; edge values assigned based on 
the frequency of communication taking place between player pairs.
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Since part  of the benefit  of an exercise 
such  as TOPOFF is to examine the 
effectiveness of interactions taking  place 
between  levels of government (e.g., local, 
c o u n t y , s t a t e , f e d e r a l ) ,  p l a y e r 
communications were also sorted into the 
categories shown in  Table 1.  As listed, 
communication  volumes were quite low  for 
private,  volunteer,  and media  players, 
perhaps reflecting  low  participation  and 
incomplete integration of these player  types 
into the exercise.23 Communication  between 
agencies operating at  the same level of 
government was the highest.  Meanwhile, 
communication with  players at  adjoining 
levels of government tended to be higher 
than  communication  across multiple levels of 
government.  This is expected from  a 
hierarchical  communication  structure in 
which  a  player  communicates predominantly 
with  players at the same level  or  immediately 
above or  below  them  in  the organizational 
hierarchy.
Table 1. TOPOFF 4 Portland, Oregon site: Matrix of communication across player types by percentage
Local County State Federal Private Volunteer Media
Local 9.9% 9.1% 4.4% 7.0% 0.7% 1.8% 1.0%
County 10.5% 5.5% 4.3% 1.1% 2.3% 2.3%
State 14.4% 9.4% 1.6% 1.3% 0.7%
Federal 9.8% 1.0% 0.1% 1.7%




Early  in  the aftermath  of an event,  the chaos 
that  results,  the desire to rapidly  attain 
situational  awareness, and the eagerness to 
bring resources to bear  create a  more frenetic 
pace to the response. This presumably  settles 
down as the response matures. Table 3  lists 
the daily  percentage of unsuccessful 
communications occurring  for  the exercise. 
Data  show  that  the higher  number  of 
unsuccessful  communications taking place on 
the first  two days is a  result  of the higher 
volume of communication  taking  place. No 
trends in behavior  across days were readily 
observed.  This may  be due to exercise 
artificiality  (e.g.,  information injects), 
transitions in  mission  command (from  life 
safety  to crime scene investigation  to site 
assessment), and/or  incorporation of smaller 
component exercises (e.g.,  a  Medical Care 
Point exercise)  within  TOPOFF 4.  In other 
words,  what  we are  really  seeing  is something 
akin to an exercise of exercises.
Table 2. Unsuccessful communications as represented 





% of Total 
Communication
s Failing
Day 1 22 2.6%
Day 2 31 3.8%
Day 3 3 1.1%
Day 4 8 3.5%
KPP-NEGATIVE FOR VALUED EDGES
Network fragmentation was observed to be 
very  high  in the base case,  with  an F-value 
equal to 0.972. This is due to the sparseness 
of the matrix  of communication  edges.  The 
top five  players based on percent change in  F 
are shown  in  Table 3. These are the players 
whose absence resulted in  the greatest 
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increase in  network  fragmentation. Of these, 
the top four  are response-coordinating 
e n t i t i e s r e p r e s e n t i n g e a c h  l e v e l o f 
government.  Results confirm  their  critical 
role  in facilitating  communication exchange. 
In  contrast,  while playing a  significant  role in 
initial  response activities,  dispatch  (ranked 17 
out of 165  players),  police (ranked 45)  and 
fire (ranked 54) had less significant  impacts 
on  overall  communication  fragmentation  in 
the exercise. Thus, relatively  speaking, 
players expected to be central to coordination 
functioned as such in this exercise.24 
Table 3.  Percent change in fragmentation value 
associated with the removal of  players from the network 
of  participants. Top five players for the TOPOFF 4 
Portland, Oregon site listed.
Player % Change in 
F





Joint Field Office (JFO) 0.15
Port Office 0.14
SUB-GROUP IDENTIFICATION
The resulting  dendrogram  of player 
relationships is shown  in  Figure 5.  To 
simplify  representation  of the dendrogram, 
going from  the top of the figure to the 
bottom, the state of community  sub-
groupings is shown  at  regular intervals of 
twenty-five edges removed from  the 
network. 25  The bottom  row  of the 
dendrogram  corresponds to all players 
participating in  the exercise.  Players 
connected at lower levels of the dendrogram 
indicate stronger  ties to one another. Figure 5 
is meant  to highlight  the rich  layering  of 
community  structure found within  the 
exercise,  as captured by  this technique. The 
various sub-groups identified are  discussed 
below.
Figure 5. Dendrogram showing the community  structure of  players involved in the TOPOFF 4 Portland, Oregon site. 
The bottom row lists all 165 players identified. Horizontal lines are indicative of  sub-group relations. The presence of 
horizontal lines closer to the bottom of  the dendrogram is indicative of  greater closeness among the players 
connected.
To determine the correct  number of sub-
groups, modularity  values were calculated at 
all  levels of the dendrogram.  Results are 
shown in  Figure 6.  A  maximum  modularity  of 
0.371  was obtained, which  exceeds the 
threshold of 0.3  that Girvan  and Newman 
indicated gave good divisions.26 At this value, 
the community  is composed of numerous 
individual player  nodes,  four  sub-groups of 
two players, and twelve sub-groups of three 
or  more players.  With  respect to the larger 
sub-groups of three or  more players,  two 
arise from  incomplete integration  of smaller, 
one-day  exercises within  the main  exercise. 
Three others sub-groups stem  from 
peripheral players that had limited, sector-
specific  participation (e.g., transportation, 
utility).  Overall, no cases were found in 
reviewing  each  sub-group’s player  list  in 
which  players appeared to be incorrectly 
placed (i.e., players with  which the sub-group 
had little/no communication).  Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, fire  and EMS response 
elements were both  more strongly  associated 
with  a medical care point exercise  taking 
place the second day  than  with  on-site 
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incident  response activities the first day. 
Based on  a  review  of the evaluator  logs, this 
may  be due to an  emphasis on recording 
operational  versus communication  activities 
at the incident site during the first day.
Figure 6.  Modularity  values versus the number of 
edges removed from the network. Modularity  values 
were calculated at intervals of  25 edges removed, with 
additional points analyzed near the maximum. The 
maximum modularity  obtained was 0.371. A total of  741 
edges exist in the original network. Edges were 
removed based on the method developed by  Girvan 
and Newman.27
The TOPOFF 4 After Action Report noted 
that  six key  decision-making  nodes were 
present  during the exercise and that  these 
nodes operated largely  independent  of one 
another.28 The six  nodes were: (1) the state 
ECC and state  public health  agency 
operations center  (AOC); (2) the JFO; (3) the 
local  EOCs/ECCs; (4) the incident  site unified 
command; (5)  the public health  unified 
command; and (6)  the Federal Radiological 
Moni tor ing  and Assessment  Center 
(FRMAC).  The breakdown  in  sub-groups 
deviated somewhat from this picture in that:
• The state ECC  and AOC were found to 
operate in separate sub-groups;
• The JFO was found to be within the same 
sub-group as the state ECC; and
• Players at  the incident  site unified 
command, the public  health  unified 
command,  the local EOCs/ECCs and 
FRMAC were found in the same sub-group.
There are several possible explanations for 
these discrepancies.  As mentioned earlier, 
since the conclusions of the TOPOFF 4  after-
action report  were largely  drawn from  post-
exercise interviews,  its breakdown  of sub-
groups may  be subject  to recollection  bias. 
For  example, interviewees may  have formed 
their  opinions based on  a  few  instances of 
failed communication rather  than  taking  into 
consideration  the larger  volume of successful 
communication  taking place throughout the 
exercise.29 Furthermore,  this technique does 
not consider  the quality  of communications 
taking  place (i.e.,  the importance of the 
i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n v e y e d i n  t h e 
communication), which  undoubtedly  factors 
into interviewees’ perceptions.  Finally, 
perceived failures in  information  sharing may 
in  fact  be due to “internal”  communication 
failures (e.g., from  incident commander  to 
command staff and liaisons).  This was noted 
in  some of the evaluator  descriptions,  but not 
captured in this analysis.  Regardless, this 
technique provides a robust  breakdown  of 
sub-groups and points out  interesting aspects 
to consider  for  player  integration  and 
exercise design.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper  describes two social  network 
analysis techniques that  provide quantitative 
proxies for  coordination  assessment. 
Borgatti’s KPP-Negative technique for 
quantifying  network  fragmentation  was 
selected to identify  whether  coordinating 
entities (e.g.,  EOCs) were playing  a 
significant role in  establishing effective 
communications and expanded to deal  with 
valued edges.  Meanwhile,  Girvan  and 
Newman’s technique for  community  sub-
group examination  was selected to identify 
possible instances of information  stove-
piping. These techniques were successfully 
implemented in  a  case study  analysis of 
TOPOFF 4. Both  techniques show  promise 
for  providing  additional  insights into 
coordination performance, identifying 
exercise artificialities,  and opening  the door 
to possible meta-analysis of coordination 
performance (e.g., over  time,  across regions, 
for different types and scales of events). 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite providing valuable insights into the 
implementation of social network  analysis on 
a  somewhat large scale, the examination  of 
TOPOFF 4  discussed in  this article remains a 
single test  case. Analysis of additional 
datasets,  both  for  comparison to real-world 
events as well as different  exercises,  is 
necessary  to understand the benefits and 
limitations of the proposed techniques.  As 
noted earlier, since evaluators were not 
collecting information  for  the specific 
purpose of constructing  a  communication 
network, the quality  of the TOPOFF 4  dataset 
was impaired. A simple list of lessons learned 
from  this coding  effort  is provided in 
Appendix A  in  the hopes of improving  data 
collection for future exercises. 
While  application of network  techniques 
to new  areas such  as homeland security 
appears straightforward,  these techniques 
must  be tuned to reflect  the reality  and 
uniqueness of what we are trying to model for 
results to be meaningful.  One area  for 
continued exploration  is the valuation of 
edges. In particular,  two aspects come to 
mind.
First,  in  the current  analysis, frequencies 
of communication  for  all players are 
implicitly  measured against one standard 
(i.e.,  1/Dmin). However, circumstances can 
easily  be envisioned where a  player  would 
require a  much  lower  – but  equally  effective 
– frequency  of communication  with  one 
player  versus another.  For  example,  some 
teams may  operate in  a  self-sufficient 
manner, requiring only  initial information  as 
to where to mobilize.  Thus, the current 
approach  to edge weighting will be evolved 
into something  more akin  to a  utility-based 
approach. Based on  player-pair  combination 
types,  ideal frequencies of communication 
will be pre-defined via subject  matter 
expertise. In  turn, these will be used to 
normalize the actual frequencies of 
communication observed. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, instances of 
failed communication  were treated as simply 
cancelling out instances of successful 
communication  on a  one-to-one basis.  This 
may  not  be a  sufficient  penalty  to associate 
with  such  failures. Re-evaluation  of the 
network given  different assumptions for 
failed communication  may  be performed to 
identify  the sensitivity  of the network  to such 
assumptions and to see whether  sub-
groupings occur  that  align  better  with  after-
action report findings. 
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APPENDIX A 
Enhancing Exercise Data Collection for Social Network Analysis 
As mentioned previously, the TOPOFF 4  dataset used in this analysis was not  collected with  the 
construction  of a  communication  network in  mind.  In  order  to enhance the value of the 
techniques discussed, improvements to the underlying data  are necessary. With  respect  to 
future exercises, the following are recommended:
1. “To” and “From” agencies should be clearly identified in each log entry.
2. All agencies situated at each physical location must be identified.
3. One of the artificialities of an  exercise is that agencies participate  for  different amounts 
of time. Entry and exit of participants need to be noted.
4. If information about an  agency  is not  obtained directly  from  that agency,  but  through  a 
third party, the third-party should be clearly identified.
5. Distribution lists for documents, reports, and updates should be identified.
6. Participating individuals should be mapped to their associated agencies.
7. Email and phone logs should be collected.
8. Prior  to the exercise, participating agencies should be queried as to their  ideal 
frequencies of communication with one another.
9. For  teleconferences, meetings,  and briefings,  a  record of all participating  agencies should 
be made.
10. The beginning and endpoints of meetings should be clearly indicated.
11. Evaluators should synchronize watches for log  time-stamps.  This will  facilitate removal 
of duplicate entries.
12. Clear  and consistent use of acronyms and agency  names should be enforced.  For 
instance,  during  TOPOFF 4  there was both  a  federal DOE response as well  as a  state 
DOE response.
13. Shorthand used during  recording  should be clarified with  an associated key  or converted 
back into long-form.
14. If summary  recordings are made (detailing the communications taking  place over  a  long 
period of time), new  communications should be  distinguished from  those previously 
posted in  prior  evaluator  logs.  If possible,  a  sense of the frequency  of communication 
during that period should be indicated.
15. Posts to tools such as WebEOC and their  use as a source of evaluator log entries should 
be clearly  indicated.  WebEOC  entries should also include a signature of the individual 
responsible for making the entry.
SAN SU, EXERCISE COORDINATION  13
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 17 (DECEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Endnotes
SAN SU, EXERCISE COORDINATION  14
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 17 (DECEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 U.S. Congress, House of  Representatives, A Failure  of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee  to 
Investigate Preparation for and  Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, Report 109–377 
(2006); White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006).
2 A.M. Howitt and H. B. Leonard, eds., Managing Crises: Responses  to Large-scale Emergencies  (Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 2009). 
3 N. Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Environments of Disasters: The Evolution of 
Intergovernmental Disaster Response Systems,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 6, no. 
1 (2009): 47.
4 B.E. Lind, M. Tirado, C. T. Butts, and M. Petrescu-Prahova, “Brokerage Roles in Disaster  Response: Organizational 
Mediation  in the Wake of  Hurricane Katrina,” International Journal of Emergency  Management 5, nos. 1/2 (2008): 
77–99; M. Petrescu-Prahova and C.T. Butts, Emergent Coordination in  the World Trade Center Disaster (IMBS 
Technical  Report  MBS 05–03, 2005); N. Kapucu, “Interorganizational  Coordination in Dynamic  Context: Networks 
in Emergency Response Management,” Connections 26, no. 2 (2005): 33–48.
5  S.P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key  Players in a Social  Network,” Computational Mathematics  and 
Organizational Theory 12 (2006):21–34.
6 M. Girvan and M.E.J. Newman, “Community Structure in Social and Biological Networks,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 99, no. 12(2002): 7821–7826; M.E.J. Newman and M. Girvan, “Finding and 
Evaluating Community Structure in Networks,” Physical Review E 69 (2004): 026113.
7 For example, the impact of event scales on the importance of local EOCs could be evaluated.
8 U.S. Department of  Homeland Security, Federal  Emergency  Management Agency  (FEMA), Top Officials  4 (TOPOFF 
4) Full-Scale Exercise (FSE): After Action Quick  Look  Report (2007) and Top Officials  4 (TOPOFF 4) Full-Scale 
Exercise (FSE): October 15–17, 2007 After Action Report (2008).
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Exercise Program,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/training/gc_1179350946764.shtm (accessed November 15, 2011).
10 For example, evaluators assigned different names to the same agencies on occasion.
11 Anonymous, TOPOFF Rapid Screening Point Exercise  Responder Guide  (n.d.); FEMA, TOPOFF 4 (2007, 2008); J. 
Spitzer, Medical Care Point Exercise Responder Participant Guide (n.d.); J. Spitzer, After Action Report of 4th 
National Top  Officials  Exercise  Operations  Of: Heath/Environmental Unified Command; Medical Care Point; 
Rapid Screening Point (Multnomah County Health Department, 2008). 
12 H. Weigand, F. van der Poll, and A. de Moor, “Coordination through Communication,” Proceedings of the 8th 
International Working Conference on the Language-Action Perspective of Communication Modelling (2003).
13 Ibid. As such, these will be poor metrics in circumstance where other factors are largely responsible for limiting 
coordination (e.g., misunderstanding of communicated messages, failure to comply with directives). In some cases, 
more communication is not necessary or better. See, for instance, the first area for continued exploration discussed in 
the Future Directions section. Therefore, while the two techniques being proposed will add valuable insights, they are 
not the only means by which coordination should be examined.
14 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative.
15 D. Koschützki, K.A. Lehmann, L. Peeters, S. Richter, D. Tenfelde-Podehl, and O. Zlotowski, “Centrality indices,” in 
Network Analysis: Methodological Foundations, ed. U. Brandes and T. Erlebach (New York, NY: Springer, 2005), 
16–61.
16 Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network.”
17 Additionally, for some centrality measures, when the two nodes are not connected by a path, this causes additional 
errors as it treats this path length as infinite.
18 Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network.”
SAN SU, EXERCISE COORDINATION  15
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 17 (DECEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
19 In the case where nodes are directly connected to all other nodes, all dij values equal 1. With edge values of 1, the 
sum of the inverse path lengths of all nodes is equal to the number of pair-wise node combinations; namely (n)(n-1)/
2, which exactly cancels the remaining terms in the fraction on the right hand side. The result is a fragmentation value 
of 0.
20 M.E.J. Newman, “Analysis of Weighted Networks,” Physical Review E 70 (2004): 056131.
21 Ibid.
22 The degree of a node is simply a count of the number of other nodes with which it is directly connected.
23 While the TOPOFF 4 after action report discusses private sector participation at the national level and at the 
Arizona and Guam exercise locations, discussion of private sector/NGO participation at the Portland location is 
noticeably absent. Furthermore, the TOPOFF 4 after-action report notes as an area for improvement that “the 
mechanisms for private sector and NGO integration into emergency response structures are not clear.” FEMA, 
October 15-17, 2007 After Action Report.
24 This finding relates to previous work done by Lind and others, “Brokerage Roles in Disaster Response,” and 
Petrescu-Prahova and Butts, Emergent Coordination in the World Trade Center Disaster, on the relative importance 
of pre-defined versus “emergent” agents and their roles during catastrophic events. In TOPOFF 4, one possibility was 
that first responders (e.g., police, fire) might emerge as dominant coordination nodes.  However, as results indicate, 
this was not the case. The failure to observe this, however, may simply be due to exercise artificiality (i.e., the 
somewhat scripted nature of TOPOFF 4).    
25 For example, branching is represented at 25, 50, 75, 100, etc. edges removed.
26 Newman and Girvan, “Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks.”
27 Ibid., Girvan and Newman, “Community Structure in Social and Biological Networks.”
28 FEMA, October 15-17, 2007 After Action Report.
29 Conversely, this raises the question of what to assign as an appropriate penalty for communication failures. In this 
analysis, instances of failed communication were treated as simply canceling out instances of successful 
communication on a one-to-one basis.
 
The Power of “the Few”:
A Key Strategic Challenge for the Permanently Disrupted High-
Tech Homeland Security Environment
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez
To a greater degree than at any point in history, individuals and small groups—from 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the one hand to criminal networks and terrorist 
organizations on the other—have the ability to engage the world with far-reaching effects, 
including those that are disruptive and destructive.
-First Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 2009
ABSTRACT
This article argues  for a new  organizational 
approach to homeland security,  designed to 
confront the challenges  of a highly  disrupted 
environment in a more  efficient way. 
Initially,  it explains  how  the accelerating 
pace of innovation creates a set of homeland 
security  challenges that empower small 
groups  or individuals  – “the few” – in new 
a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e w a y s . N e x t ,  i t 
d e m o n s t r a t e s w h y t h e  c u r r e n t 
organizational model for homeland security 
is systemically  insufficient to respond to this 
permanently disrupted environment, despite 
the best efforts of its  members. This  is  done 
by dividing the  homeland security duties 
into  two distinct missions: an incremental or 
“systemic mission” and a disruptive or 
“future shock  mission.” The current 
institutional model is  seemingly well 
adapted to  respond to  the needs  of the first 
mission but ineffective to address  the  second. 
Lastly,  the article  proposes  a new  homeland 
security institutional model,  better adapted 
to  confront the negative effects  of disruption 
by fostering and harnessing the positive 
ones. This is accomplished by adapting Alvin 
Toffler’s concept of “adhocracy” to homeland 
security’s  needs and using DARPA as  an 
example of a successful “adhocratic” and 
disruptive security and defense institution. 
INTRODUCTION
The task  of defining a  homeland security 
environment  is tricky.  Framing  it  seems like 
an  invitation to oversimplify  its nature as a 
series of elements that  can be fitted into a 
tightly  packaged description  that might look 
elegant, but also provides us with  a  false 
sense of linear  order and predictability  for 
what  it  is in  reality  an  interactive,  complex, 
and evolving  web of forces, constraints, 
incentives, and conditions. 
This article will first describe how  the 
current pace of technological progress 
perpetuates the chaotic nature of the 
homeland security  environment and 
maintains it  in  a  permanent  state of 
disruption.   This has given birth  to a  new 
phenomenon  that I call  “the power  of the 
few,” where technology  has lowered the 
barriers to entry  for disruption, both  positive 
and negative,  thus creating  the need for a 
new  kind of security  strategy  to prevent 
innovation  and freedom  being  turned against 
the legitimate users of social  and physical 
infrastructure.  I conclude with  an  exploration 
of the limits of the current homeland security 
institutional framework to adapt  to this 
rapid ly  evo lv ing  and unpredic table 
environment,  and propose a new  strategic 
approach  to homeland security,  based on  the 
different  natures of incremental  and 
disruptive threats, to counter more effectively 
the negative effect of the power of the few.
Whereas the normal approach  to 
describing an  environment  for  strategic 
purposes is to think  of it  as a  static 
abstraction  of reality,  akin to the chessboard 
where players distribute their  pieces and 
make their  moves (think  of a battle map,  as 
shown in  Figure 1),  a  social  environment  for 
public policy  is not  a  snapshot  frozen  in  time, 
but a mutating  context  in  which people 
operate and interact  with  each  other  and with 
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the natural and man-made structures that 
surround them, and each  interaction  morphs 
a  little  bit  the state of the system. It is more 
an ecosystem than a photograph.
Figure 1. Cartographic representation of Operation Overlord strategic plan.1
A s s u c h , t h e h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
environment  should be understood as a 
chaotic  system  where long  term  planning  is 
very  difficult  and forecasting  is in  reality 
impossible. As Levy  explains it, “chaos 
systems do not reach  a  stable equilibrium; 
indeed, they  can  never  pass through the same 
exact state more than once.”  Therefore,  “we 
cannot learn  too much about  the future by 
studying the past: if history  is the sum  of 
complex and nonlinear  interactions among 
people and nations,  then history  does not 
repeat  itself.” 2  Trend analysis,  the basis of 
most forecasting  based planning, is not a 
useful tool to plan and prepare against  future 
disruptive threats because that previously 
mentioned metaphorical chessboard will  not 
have the same number  of squares twice, and 
the pieces constantly  change the way  they 
move.3
Secretary  of Defense Robert  Gates 
described the limitations of forecasting  for 
defense, strategy, and war:
We can’t know with  absolute certainty what 
the future of  warfare will  hold but we do 
know it will  be exceedingly complex, 
unpredictable, and – as they say in  the staff 
colleges – “unstructured.”  ... And I must 
tell  you, when  it comes to predicting the 
nature and location  of  our  next military 
engagements, since Vietnam, our record 
has been  perfect. We have never  once 
gotten it right.4
HERACLITUS AND ASIMOV WERE 
RIGHT
In  Cratylus, Plato imagines a  dialogue where 
Heraclitus expresses: “all  things are in 
motion  and nothing  at rest...[it  is] like the 
stream  of a  river  ...  that  you  cannot  go into 
the same water  twice.5  Isaac  Asimov,  the 
science fiction  writer,  updated the quote: “It 
is change, continuing  change,  inevitable 
change, that is the dominant factor  in  society 
today. No sensible  decision can  be made any 
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longer without  taking  into account  not  only 
the world as it is, but the world as it will be.” 6
That  is why  trying to describe  the current 
state of the homeland security  environment  is 
a  flawed approach to developing  a  strategy, 
mainly  because the current  state is just  an 
instant in  the evolution of this complex  and 
randomized system.  Instead,  I will  focus on 
d e m o n s t r a t i n g  h o w  s c i e n t i f i c  a n d 
technological  progress (two of the main 
m o t i v a t i o n a l f o r c e s f o r  s o c i e t a l 
transformations)  have accelerated the pace of 
this evolution,  reducing  in  the process the 
“shelf life”  of some of the security  paradigms 
and doctrines that condition  the reactions of 
our  institutions in  the homeland security 
environment.  This accelerated pace implies a 
change of scale that empowers small groups. 
Over  the last  century,  radical technological 
changes have disrupted the human 
environment  in  profound and permanent 
ways.  In this very  short amount of time, a 
100-year-old person  alive in 2011  would have 
witnessed the arrival of the power  grid, the 
te lephone gr id ,  the mass produced 
automobile and the interstate highway 
system,  radio broadcasting,  television,  the 
cell phone network (first  transmitting  only 
voice and then voice and data), the computer 
and, of course, the Internet. None of these 
technologies that  shape and sustain  the 
human ecosystem  today  were generally 
available the day he was born. 
In  those same 100  years, new  techniques 
and construction  materials have reshaped 
our  urban environment.  Reinforced concrete 
and the steel frame allowed us to build 
higher, giving  birth  to the modern  skyscraper 
and opening the door to a new  level of urban 
concentration.  Paradoxically,  stronger and 
more flexible infrastructures (dams, 
pipelines, power  plants, the grid, tunnels, 
bridges,  highways,  and airports) gave us the 
capacity  to locate  people and resources over 
much  greater  distances than  before,  enabling 
a technological urban sprawl.
This contemporary  urban environment is 
dependent on  technological  infrastructure 
operating  unceasingly. As Weisman’s 
provocative narrative describes, it  would take 
less than  a  week  without  functioning 
infrastructure for  places like New  York  City  to 
start a process of rapid decay. 7  
Because of innovations in transportation 
and information  technologies,  the rapport  of 
the individual with  space also suffered 
multiple disruptions and our  environment 
has “shrunk.”  Low  transportation  costs made 
possible unrestricted and rapid travel to 
almost  anywhere in  the world for  less than 
one thousand dollars using  the global  civilian 
aviation  network, and provided the ability  to 
ship any  product anywhere for  just a few 
hundred dollars.  This modified our  relation 
with  time,  as spatial  processes that used to 
take months – like sending a  shipment across 
the world,  traveling,  or  sending a  letter  – can 
now  be accomplished in  days for  what  used to 
take months,  and instantly  for  what it  used to 
take days. The grace period that  societies 
used to enjoy  to prepare for  a disruption 
coming from  overseas no longer  exists,  or  at 
least  it  has been greatly  reduced.  Disruptions 
not only  can travel far  and cheap,  they  can 
also travel fast.
Lastly, our  relationship with  the working 
and productive environment  also endured 
important changes that  affect the way  we deal 
with  technological innovation.  In the last  100 
years high  tech societies have become 
postindustrial,8 and knowledge creation  has 
replaced manufacturing  as the main added 
v a l u e f o r e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h , w i t h 
consequences for every production sector.  
The food industry  operates today  in  an 
e n v i r o n m e n t  w h e r e ,  t h a n k s t o 
agrotechnology,  produce is abundant and 
easily  transported from  its source to the 
consumer. In  this high-tech  environment, 
less than  4  percent of the population of any 
given  developed country  can  grow  enough 
food to feed all  its inhabitants and still  sell an 
“exportable surplus.” 9  Furthermore, the 
primary  sector is being disrupted by  the 
recently  gained knowledge of how  genetics 
work  and how  genes can  be converted into 
information  and manipulated digitally, 10 
freeing genetic  scientists from  the physical 
limits of Mendelian inheritance. 11 
Regarding  the secondary  sector,  affordable 
energy,  robotics,  and outsourced cheap labor 
made possible by  communication  and 
transportation  technologies have made dull 
and repet i t ive manufactur ing  tasks 
unprofitable and undesirable inside the labor 
environments of most  high-income nations, 
forcing  their  citizens into more information 
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driven  endeavors.  In  fact, this labor 
environment  has seen  “a  huge increase in  the 
number  of people paid to think  or  talk, rather 
than  produce or  transport  objects.” 12 That  is, 
people are being paid for  their  capacity  to 
produce and manage information (granted, 
not all  of it  creative)  and not for  their 
muscles,  thus multiplying as a  result  the 
amount  of knowledge that  can  be recombined 
and therefore the potential for  disruption 
( v o l u n t a r y  o r  i n v o l u n t a r y ) o f t h e 
environment in cumulative way. 
This takes us to the two main  patterns that 
govern our  innovation  and security 
environment  and are to blame for  the 
emergence of the phenomenon  of the “power 
of the few.” 
 The first one has to do with  the 
cumulative, combinatorial,  evolving and 
unpredictable behavior  of the system: waves 
of new  technologies lay  the foundations for 
the next  technologies with  cross-pollination 
d u r i n g  t h e s a m e w a v e .  S o m e n e w 
technologies,  like  the printing  press and the 
combustion  engine,  have ripple  disruptive 
effects across many  domains, and affect 
security  in  many  ways. Others are just 
incremental  upgrades from  previous 
technologies and security  strategies do not 
need to be altered.  Nonetheless, all  new 
technologies inherit  some elements from 
previous generations of scientific discovery 
and technological  advances.  While this 
process can  be traced back in  time,  in what 
Bryan  Arthur  denominated “Combinatorial 
evolution,” he also concluded:
[Modern technology  is now] becoming an 
open language for the creation of structures 
and functions in the economy… shifting 
from technologies that produced fixed 
physical  outputs to technologies whose 
main  character  is that they can  be 
combined and configured endlessly for 
fresh  purposes. Technology, once a  means 
of production, is becoming a chemistry.”13 
So, the first  pattern  exhibited by  the 
system  is that  technological environments 
evolve in  a  combinatorial  way,  and modern 
technology  has made recombination, 
including convergence, simpler. For  example, 
when  material products are transformed into 
binary  data, they  can  be manipulated with 
little to no associated manufacturing  cost.  As 
Chris Anderson  points out, “once something 
becomes software,  it  inevitably  becomes free 
– in  cost, certainly, and often  in  price.” 14 
Products that  used to be “things”  are today 
binary  code: music  CDs or  LPs, VHS tapes or 
DVDs,  typewri ters ,  so l i ta i re decks , 
blueprints,  calculators,  libraries full  of books, 
office files,  medical  test  results, genetic 
strings, to cite just a  few.  While this 
convergence might  seem  today  logical  and 
understandable, just a few  years ago (before 
the computer  era) it would have been  difficult 
to find something linking  medical research 
and film distribution. 
The second key  pattern  derivates from  the 
first  one.  As part  of this evolution  and the 
iterative learning  process that  comes with  it, 
technology  gets cheaper  and better  with time 
incrementally.  Any  early  adopter  of 
technology  has witnessed this phenomenon 
when, after  a  few  generations,  his or  her  first 
generation  model has become an  obsolete 
object  that  cost  twice as much as the new 
model. This kind of innovation  was baptized 
“sustaining”  by  Clayton  Christensen. In  his 
words,  sustaining  technologies "improve the 
performance of established products.”  But he 
also recognized that  sometimes “disruptive” 
technologies emerge.  They  bring  to “a  market 
[I would say  to the security  environment] a 
very  different value proposition  than  had 
been available previously.” 15 
So, for  the purposes of this article, the 
second important  environmental 
pattern  is that innovation brings change to 
the system  e i ther  incrementa l ly  or 
disruptively.  Incremental  improvements of 
existing mainstream  technologies makes 
them  better  and cheaper,  but disruptive 
innovation  can and often  does change the 
environment  in  unexpected ways,  disrupting 
(hence the name) the rules that  governed 
what seemed, for a while, a stable ecosystem. 
Disruptive technologies are the ones that 
normally  modify  the physical  qualities of our 
environment and more importantly, the 
fabric  of our  technologically  dependent 
civilization.  For  example,  the combustion 
engine not  only  replaced the horse as the 
main human  means of transportation,  it  also 
completely  disrupted the way  humans 
interact  with  their  urban  space, making 
modern  cities and suburban  sprawl possible; 
this created new  conditions and constraints 
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for  spatial planning. It  also created new  social 
vulnerabilities and risks,  as the thousands of 
road fatalities per  year  demonstrate, 
catapulting  accidents – in  less than  a  century 
– to the fifth  leading  cause of death  in  the 
United States and creating  the need for  a 
highway safety and security strategy.16 
Technological innovation is a natural 
consequence of scientific  progress.  Every 
time a new  phenomenon is understood or, to 
use Brian  Arthur’s words, every  time a 
phenomenon  or  effect  is “harnessed”  by 
science, it  can be exploited by  technology.17 
Then, market  forces and human behavior 
normally  determine how  and if these new 
technologies will  be assimilated and become 
a permanent part of the environment.18 
 Each  new  technology  that we adopt 
creates new  structural  vulnerabilities.  As Ted 
Lewis points out “highly  technological 
societies are vulnerable because they  depend 
heavily  on  technology.” 19  The more 
technology  we use,  the more potential 
vulnerabilities there are.  Because technology 
now  has such a  high  level of combinatorial 
complexity, it can  safely  be said that the 
environment  has reached a  state where the 
periods of stability  between disruptions are 
short  lived (certainly  shorter  than  before), 
and we should assume that disruption is the 
permanent default state.  
You  cannot  go to the same water  twice, 
and when the water  reaches the ocean,  the 
shape of its breaking waves cannot be 
predicted. Change is indeed the main  factor 
of society  today.  Therefore,  the current 
mutating  environment encourages disruptive 
participation of small groups of new  actors 
that,  until recently, had not  enough  resources 
to achieve disruption  on  a global scale. 
Because of the two previously  described 
environmental patterns (the combinatorial 
evolution  of the technological environment 
and the intr insic  character ist ics of 
“sustaining”  and “disruptive”  technologies), 
the scale has been  altered to favor  the small 
groups I refer  to as “the few,”  and away  from 
big organizations or  governments that  used 
to hold a  monopoly  on  system  based 
disruption.  
THE POWER OF THE FEW:
A 2001 ‘CELL’ HAS THE SIZE OF A 
1941 EMPIRE
On September 11,  2001,  “a  few” hijackers 
were able to bring  to a  halt  the entire nation, 
cripple the economy,  place continuity  of 
government  at  risk and inflict  more than 
3000  casualties. The only  other  occasion 
when  the United States suffered comparable 
loses from  a  single attack was during Pearl 
Harbor,  when  the combined fleet  of six 
carrier  battle  groups (the Kido Butai) backed 
by  the full power  of the Japanese Empire was 
deployed to accomplish a similar result.
In  2001, a cell  of nineteen hijackers did 
what  only  a  powerful empire could do in 
1941. 
How  is it possible that  a twenty-first 
century  cell has been empowered to provoke 
the same kind of damage as a  twentieth 
century empire?  
The more technologies we integrate 
incrementally  into our  society’s environment, 
t h e m o r e o p t i o n s o r  c h o i c e s f o r 
recombination  are created, and the more 
unforeseeable vulnerabilities appear. New 
technologies have commoditized certain key 
resources needed to affect  the environment 
on  a  global scale. In  addition, the expensive 
physical infrastructure that  was formerly 
required to do this has often  been  replaced by 
technologies that can  be modified and 
recombined without heavy  machinery  and big 
factories.   
The Quadrennial Defense Review  of 2010 
explicitly  recognized this as one of the key 
sources for  uncertainty  in  the current security 
ecosystem: 
Globalization has transformed the process 
of technological innovation while lowering 
entry barriers for  a  wider range of  actors to 
acquire advanced technologies. As 
technological innovation and global 
information flows accelerate, non-state 
actors [the  few] will  continue to gain 
influence and capabilities that, during the 
past century, remained largely  the purview 
of states.20
It is no longer  true that technological 
innovation  requires a heavy  investment to 
manipulate nature and produce a  result 
capable of having an impact in  the real world, 
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as when  most technology  represented a 
tangible  single-purpose achievement, 
designed to obtain a  specific  desired effect.  In 
the past,  the pace of disruption was limited 
by  the constraints of the physical world and 
as such,  disruption  moved more slowly  and 
was more expensive than  it  is now. Today, 
technology  is cheaper  to create,  easier  to 
recombine,  and more integrated in  our  social 
environment; because of this,  the barriers to 
entry  for  achieving  world wide disruption 
have been reduced. 
The price of the transistor,  backbone of 
the current computing  paradigm  and 
essential to recombining technology, has 
shrunk exponentially  since the 1960s,21 and 
computing  power  has become accessible to 
everybody  for  many  purposes. As a 
consequence, digital technology  has invaded 
our  environment, replacing  in  many 
instances the single purpose “moving  parts” 
that  existed before.  The digital world serves 
as a  common  denominator  for  an  enormous 
number  of social and natural  phenomena  and 
directly  affects the analog  (i.e.  the “real”) 
world: anything  that  can be transformed into 
binary  data  can  be processed digitally  and 
recombined with  other seemingly  unrelated 
phenomena, all for  a  marginal cost  that 
quickly approaches zero. 
We have assimilated into our  innovation 
landscape some of the positive consequences 
of this new  phenomenon. Nowadays,  some 
independent  blogs have a  readership as large 
(or  larger) than  established newspapers with 
more editorial influence and without the need 
for  expensive presses or  distribution 
channels.22  Small  groups of entrepreneurs 
were capable of creating  “garage startups” 
that  became big  multibillion household 
names like Apple,  Microsoft  or  Google, 
mainly  selling  a  programmable idea  without 
the initial requirement  of large industrial 
capacity. The original capital needed to 
jumpstart  these companies was in  the 
hundreds of thousands rather  than millions 
of dollars.
Grassroots movements of loosely 
interconnected individuals (at  the left  and 
right  of the political spectrum) have been 
emerging  around the world,  using Web 2.0 
tools to transform  political landscapes 
without the need for  cumbersome party 
b u r e a u c r a c i e s , b u t a l s o w i t h  n e w 
vulnerabilities hardwired into their  structure 
because of their  need to communicate 
online. 23   
Aggregators like Wikipedia  have started to 
take advantage of the fragmented knowledge 
and the free unstructured time of millions of 
individuals,  who are willing  to donate this 
time “just  for  fun,”  capitalizing  on what  Clay 
Shirky  calls an  enormous and yet  unexploited 
cognitive surplus.24 This effort  has created a 
source of information  many  times bigger  than 
any  physical library, accessible from 
anywhere where there is an  Internet 
connection.  This dematerialized knowledge 
distribution is leveling  the information  field, 
independently  of how  far people are  from  the 
cultural centers.  It  might be true that 
Wikipedia  is the result of the work of many 
thousands of volunteers working  together, 
but thanks to aggregation  and crowd sourcing 
technology, this is done at  the individual level 
(the scale of the few) replacing  big centralized 
teams. 
As all the previous examples demonstrate, 
global consequences for  the actions of small 
g r o u p s o f i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e b e e n 
commoditized to the extreme.  There is one 
last example that  is more dramatic  than any 
other: Thanks to computer  modeling, geo-
engineering  projects to alter  weather patterns 
are now  within  reach  of wealthy  individuals 
like former  Microsoft  CEO William  Gates.25 
In  2008 (well  before Gates announced that 
he had any  interest  in  funding  this kind of 
projects) David Victor  wrote “a  lone 
Greenfinger,  self-appointed protector  of the 
planet  and working with  a  small fraction  of 
Gates bank account,  could force a  lot  of geo-
engineering  on  his own.  Bond films of the 
future might  struggle with  the dilemma of 
unilateral planetary engineering.” 26 
Current technologies make it  possible for 
small groups of individuals (“the few”  or “the 
one”) to alter Earth’s weather  patterns.  This 
is the degree of change in  the scale  for 
disruption: one person,  financing  a  “few”,  can 
change the planet,  and not only  in  a 
metaphorical way.  In  less than fifty  years, 
individual disruption  potential  has reached a 
global scale. 
In  the 1970s, Alvin Toffler  coined the term 
“future shock”  to describe the effects of rapid 
and accelerating changes in  society.27  In  his 
words, 
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The rate of  change has implications quite 
apart from, and sometimes more important 
than, the directions of  change. No attempt 
to understand adaptivity can  succeed until 
this fact is  grasped. Any  attempt to define 
the “content” of  change must include the 
consequences of pace itself as part  of that 
content.28
In this rapidly  changing  environment, 
where consecutive waves of disruptive 
technologies are reshaping  society  faster  than 
it  can  adapt  to the last  wave,  the small and 
unstructured “few”  are capable of adapting  to 
the pace of change faster  than  vertical 
organizations or  big  governments.  As this is a 
tool-based phenomenon,  and tools have no 
morals or  ethics,  the “power  of the few”  can 
be moral or immoral, legal or illegal.
Without the proper  countermeasures, 
small groups (i.e.,  terrorist  cells, gangs or 
cartels) or  even  just  lone individuals (e.g., 
skilled hackers), have a  new  capacity  to inflict 
damage, fear,  and death due to potential 
access to the same tools that also empower 
p o s i t i v e b e h a v i o r  a n d s u s t a i n  o u r 
technologically dependent environment.
The implications of this are fundamental 
for  homeland security’s strategic culture. 
New  technologies,  especially  disruptive 
technologies,  come with  new  recombining 
potential. Because “the few”  have better 
adaptivity  than  “the many,”  small groups can 
take advantage of unforeseen  consequences 
of the new  altered environment  more rapidly 
than  authorities can  identify  a  new  potential 
threat and react  to it.  Convergence of 
different technologies makes this a  multi-
l a y e r e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y , b e y o n d j u s t 
information  technology  risks. For  example: 
human  beings outfitted with  Life Critical 
Implantable Medical Devices ,  (e .g . , 
p a c e m a k e r s , d e f i b r i l l a t o r s o r 
neurostimulators) have potentially  become 
“hackable”  targets. Most of the new  versions 
of these lifesaving  devices are activated and 
deactivated via  wireless protocols and “the 
lack  of authentication and integrity 
mechanisms put  patients at risk  from  attack 
by  anyone with  a  transmitter.” 29 Without  the 
proper  countermeasure,  “the few”  might 
conceivably  be empowered to literally  stop a 
heart  or a  mind by  just  thinking about  it  (and 
programming the proper code).
The permanently  disrupted environment 
cannot and should not  be reversed,  as its 
positive effects far  outweigh  its negative 
implications. In  those places where,  in  the 
last 200  years,  science and technology  have 
become permanent  fixtures of the social 
landscape, quality  of life and security  are 
greater  than  ever. As Indur  Goklany  explains 
in his thoroughly  researched book, 
meaningful  indicators like  hunger,  infant 
mortality,  life expectancy, education, political 
rights and the UN “human development 
index”  are all  positively  affected by  the 
presence of “unparalleled technological 
change, which  has transformed the world 
more in  the past  two centuries than  all  the 
other events put together  since the beginning 
of agriculture 10 millennia ago.”   He then 
p o i n t s o u t : “ E c o n o m i c g r o w t h  a n d 
technological change have redefined the role 
of women and children,  restructured the 
w o r k p l a c e , u n d e r m i n e d a g e - o l d 
arrangements of caste and class, expanded 
the middle  class,  and developed new 
institutions and organizations.” 30
A  policy  that would try  to stop innovation 
and progress in the name of security  would 
also be immoral,  as it  would do more harm 
than  good by  denying  solutions to some of 
our  most  pressing  problems.  It  would also 
would be Orwellian, as it  would transform  the 
creativity  and imagination of innovators into 
“thoughtcrimes”  punishable by  law. The 
suppression  of technology  has rarely  if ever 
been  proved to be an  effective strategy.31 
Instead,  we need a security  strategy  designed 
to protect the safety  of “the many”  from  this 
recently  acquired power  of “the few,”  while at 
the same time preserving the technological 
tools needed to unleash  innovation  and 
entrepreneurial creativity. 
A  high-tech  environment is also a target-
r i c h  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  w h e r e s o c i e t y ’ s 
infrastructure is not only  vulnerable to 
sabotage – it  can  even be "i l l icit ly 
appropriated,”32  by  clandestine actors, and 
turned against its legitimate users.  Even  the 
consequences of natural disasters are worse 
today  because of our  social  dependency  on 
technological infrastructure in dense 
population  centers.33  As Mitchell and 
Townsend observe: 
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By  bringing  down  the networks it depends 
upon, a city  can be killed. Those networks 
can  also be hijacked and turned against 
their creators  delivering destruction  by 
appropriating  the very  transfer  and 
distribution  capability that motivated their 
construction  … for  an  attacker  it can  be a 
better strategy to exploit, rather than 
destroy, an  enemy’s networks. If  access to 
large-scale network can  be gained, it 
eliminates  the need to expend a  lot of effort 
and energy  to get  to them. It isn’t even 
necessary  to possess comparable forces. 
Violence and destruction  can  be delivered 
with  modest means but  pinpoint accuracy, 
by  inf i l t rat ing or h i jack ing those 
networks.34 
Furthermore ,  complex  networked 
environments like the ones previously 
described tend to self-organize critically, 
injecting  a  degree of randomness into the 
security  landscape in  which, as Lewis points 
out,  catastrophe is hard to avoid: “A  small 
(random) perturbation  in  these systems can 
trip a  major  collapse,  unexpectedly, 
dramatically,  and resoundingly. Because the 
cause is not  obvious (until after  the fact),  and 
it  is often  a  very  minor perturbation, the 
collapse comes as a shock.” 35
On 9/11,  the illicit  appropriation  of the 
civilian  aviation  network  was catastrophically 
recombined with  the steel frame of the 
skyscrapers in  a  very  disruptive way,  to 
circumvent  the security  systems of the 
continental United States. Basically,  on  that 
day, the United States of America  was hacked 
by a terrorist cell.
While homeland security  has been 
redefining the role of the state in  the fight 
against asymmetrical  attacks, the current 
strategy  has structural  limitations in  its 
capacity  to deal  with  “out of the box” 
vulnerabilities created by  our  dependence on 
new  technologies and the accelerated pace of 
technological change. A  new  strategy  capable 
of taking  advantage of this disrupted 
environment  is urgently  needed for  our  era, 
as the  acceleration  changes in  new 
technologies – like bio or  nanotechnology, 
robotics and geo-engineering – means the 
clandestine “few”  can  find new  possibilities 
every  day  to appropriate more systems, 
recombining them in unforeseeable ways.
No traditional, slow  reacting  bureaucracy 
is agile enough  to respond to this challenge, 
and the current homeland secur i ty 
institutional  model is no exception. 
Therefore,  I argue here that  a  new 
organizational  change to America’s homeland 
security  institutions is needed to prepare 
them  to be proactive  actors in  this disrupted 
high-tech environment.  
THE LIMITS OF CURRENT HOMELAND 
SECURITY’S ADAPTABILITY TO DISRUPTION
How  can  a  traditional security  bureaucracy 
react to this permanently  disrupted 
environment  of innovation  and fast paced 
technological  evolution? How  can a  big 
enterprise made of bureaucratic  institutions 
composed in  their  turn  of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals,  respond to the new 
vulnerabilities and threats posed by 
disruptive multipurpose technologies that 
raise, recombine and fall  in  cycles measured 
in  months and not  years, empowering  the 
adaptable few in unexpected ways?
The answer is that it simply cannot. 
To understand why  and what choices are 
available to defend society’s freedoms in  this 
innovative but  unstable landscape, it  is 
essential to consider  two key  determinants 
regarding  the current nature of the threat and 
how  homeland security  institutions are 
expected to confront  this threat  with a  two-
pronged approach.
The first essential determinant  is that 
while terrorism  should be a  big part  of any 
current asymmetrical threat  assessment  – if 
only  because it  is the tactic  of choice not  just 
of the weak,  but  also of the clandestine few 
(while they  are more adaptable than  the 
many, they  are not always weaker)  – the 
narrow  framework of terrorist  conduct  does 
not suffice to describe the homeland security 
threat  posed by  the few. Most institutional 
definitions of terrorism  concur  that  one of the 
main elements of any  terrorist’s conduct is 
the motivation  behind the calculated use of 
violence. 36  Whether  this motivation  is 
political, religious,  or  ideological, the terrorist 
act  has to be  oriented to modify  the conduct 
or  policy  of a  government. Yet,  in  a 
permanently  disrupted environment,  what 
defines the threat  posed by  the few  has less to 
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do with  the motivation  than  with  the 
employed means. 
The new  vulnerabilities of this high  tech 
society  make motivation  irrelevant.  Whether 
a  critical  infrastructure is sabotaged or 
illicitly  appropriated to pursue a  political or 
religious agenda, to look for  personal gain, to 
just prove that it  can be hacked, 37 or  even  by 
accident,  the catastrophic consequences for 
“the many” are the same. 
In  that sense, homeland security’s 
response to the power of “the few”  has to shift 
its focus beyond motivation  to the means. To 
phrase it  differently, not  all homeland 
security  threats will  be terrorist attacks per se 
(i.e.  politically, religiously  or  ideologically 
motivated acts designed to affect the 
government’s policies), nor  will  all  homeland 
security  adversaries will be traditional 
terrorists. Nevertheless, understanding  how  a 
technology  can  be sabotaged, penetrated, or 
illicitly  appropriated to harm  society’s 
interests can be achieved independently  of 
the motivations of the adversarial actor, 38 
and a “homeland security  response”  can be 
preemptively  deployed to address this 
technological risk. 
Without  question,  confronting the 
underlying causes which  incite a  particular 
group of “the few”  to try  to do harm  to “the 
many”  must  be an  important  and permanent 
objective of the entire nation  and not  just  of 
the homeland security  enterprise.  These 
causes can  be diverse and are often beyond 
the reach  of any  security  policy.  Issues like 
international Islamist  radicalization, 
domestic racism  and xenophobia,  organized 
crime, radical rejection  of the federal 
authority,  bullying  and social rejection  in 
American  schools and colleges,  to name just a 
few, are all social problems for  which  a 
solution  has to be actively  pursued.  However, 
a  security  and defense policy  that would try 
to address all underlying  causes would be 
diluted in its diversity  and faulty  in  its means, 
since these and other asymmetrical sources 
of conflict, almost with  the only  exception  of 
international state sponsored terrorism,  are 
not  at the outset  a  security  or  defense 
problem, but a  social  one. Consequently, 
responding to these sources of conflict  is a 
mission  for  a  nation, not  for  a security 
strategy.
The second determinant is that  we 
demand from  homeland security  institutions 
(composed of more than  just  the Department 
of Homeland Security) a  two-pronged 
approach, shaped by  two seemingly  opposing 
missions.  On  the one hand, these agencies are 
supposed to manage an organizational 
system  of systems using  standardized 
procedures and best  practices to prevent 
known kinds of vulnerabilities in  our  high 
tech  environment.  When  a  traveler  removes 
his or  her  shoes to be x-rayed by  the 
Transportation  Security  Administration 
(TSA) before boarding  a  plane,  this 
bureaucracy  is applying  a  continuous security 
layer designed to counteract a  known  security 
vulnerability.  On  the other  hand,  homeland 
security  institutions are supposed to 
“connect”  the proverbial dots to anticipate all 
the threats and vulnerability  scenarios that 
have not  yet happened,  might  never  happen, 
but are morphing  rapidly  because of the 
complex  nature of the of recombining 
technologies (old and new), and then  patch 
the security  holes, before clandestine actors 
can exploit them.
Both  missions are critically  important, but 
their  relation  to innovation  and therefore to 
the power of the few  is very  different.  The 
difference resides in  the previously  explained 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  s u s t a i n i n g  o r 
incremental  technologies and disruptive 
technologies.  The first mission, that  I will call 
here the “systemic  mission,”  deals with 
sustaining  threats.  In contrast, the second 
one,  the “future shock  mission,”  is supposed 
to neutralize disruptive – almost random  – 
threats posed by  the rapid pace of 
technological evolution. These differences are 
key  to understanding  homeland security’s 
successes and “failures,”  and to establishing 
an  alternative strategy  to adapt to this 
complex ecosystem.
Contrary  to what one might think,  the 
majority  of potential threats against our  high 
tech  society  are incremental  and not 
disruptive in  nature. A  bomb used against  a 
soft transportation  target  like  a  subway  train 
or  a  bus (Madrid 2004  or  London 2005),  for 
example,  is a  well-rehearsed and well-proven 
method. It  has happened many  times before 
and it  will  probably  be tried again with  just 
small incremental innovations to adapt  it to 
the precise conditions of the chosen scenario 
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(i.e.,  size of the bomb depending on  the 
target,  method of concealment, etc.).  The 
same thing  can be said about  the suicide 
bomber  in  a  highly  dense urban  setting, the 
Columbine copycats, the car  bombing  of 
public  buildings,  and airplane bombings 
(such  as the Pan-Am  103  bombing  of 1988, 
the failed attempts of the so-called shoe 
bomber  in  2001,  and the Christmas bomber 
in 2009).
From  the point of view  of technology, 
these are all  sustaining  threats made possible 
by  the sabotage or  destruction of critical 
infrastructure,  exploiting  known  security 
holes that  are difficult  to close in  open  and 
technologically  dependent  societies. It  is for 
these kinds of hazards that  a  bureaucracy  is 
needed to manage,  maintain, and ameliorate 
a  system  designed to neutralize  incremental, 
known threats. An organizational  approach  is 
essential for  this systemic mission, as most  of 
the known security  deficiencies can  be 
corrected through  standardized measures 
and “best  practices,”  which  create a  more 
secure process for  the technology  user  and 
ultimately  for  society.  While in  some cases 
budget  constraints or  civil liberties issues 
might  limit  the full spectrum  of choices for 
the policymaker,  forcing  him  or  her  to 
imagine disruptive alternatives to solve an 
otherwise incremental problem, in  general 
the mission can  be handled well by  an 
efficient security bureaucracy.
As Henry  Mintzberg and others point out: 
“the key  to strategic management,  therefore, 
is to sustain  stability  or  at  least  adaptable 
strategic  change most  of the time, but 
periodically  to recognize the need for 
transformation and be able to manage that 
disruptive process without  destroying  the 
organization.” 39 
Bureaucracies are good organizations for 
managing  iterative processes that are subject 
to continuous improvement loops and must 
be executed every  time in  the same way, 
independently  of the specific individual who 
takes care  of the task any  given  day.  They  are 
the best  solution  to the problem  of 
maintaining  the same level of quality  in  a 
repetitive process. 
Figure 2. Iterative feedback loop of the homeland security Risk Management Framework. 40
In  fact, because of the iterative nature of 
t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s ,  t h i s 
organizational model embraces sustaining 
change. James Wilson explains,  “changes 
that  are consistent  with  existing task 
definitions [i.e.,  incremental innovation]  will 
be accepted … [and] only  those changes that 
require a  redefinition  of those tasks  [i.e. 
disruptive innovation] will be resisted.”41 
Mintzberg  goes one step further when he 
suggests: 
[ T r a d i t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ] u s u a l l y 
institutionalized a form of incrementalism 
[with  relation  to planned change] ... 
because incremental  change – change at 
the margin, with limited scope – is 
consistent with  the established orientation 
of the organization, and is planning itself. 
In  contrast, quantum change – which 
means comprehensive reorientation ... 
disrupts all  the established categories of  the 
organization, on which planning depends. 
As a  result, such  change tends to be 
resisted, or more commonly, ignored, in  the 
planning process. 42   
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For  Mintzberg, an organization pays the price 
of having  an  enunciated strategy  with  their 
“ability to change when it must.” 
The “systemic”  homeland security  mission 
appears to be executed in  an  acceptable way. 
Most  of the time there are no casualties 
linked to acts of sabotage against  or 
appropriation  of the critical infrastructure of 
the United States; since the establishment of 
the homeland security  policy,  only  one plane 
has been  used to perpetrate an  attack. In 
2010, a  single-engine plane was deliberately 
directed against  a  government  building in 
Austin,  Texas,  killing  one person  besides the 
pilot  and prompting  a vivid debate about  as 
to whether  or  not  this incident  qualified as an 
act  of terrorism, given  the sui generis 
motivations of the perpetrator (an IRS audit).
If I suggest that the systemic mission 
appears  to be well executed, it  is because 
measuring the success of the homeland 
security  deterrence strategy  takes us into the 
difficult realm  of measuring  the success of a 
negative.  How  do we “tally  the score”  of 
events that  did not  happen because they  were 
deterred by  a systemic approach? What 
statistical  indicators are available to 
determine i f the homeland security 
institutions are doing  a  better  job today  than 
yesterday  and a worse one than  tomorrow 
(the basis of continuous improvement)? And, 
what  is more important,  how  do we know 
that  we are safer  and more secure today  – 
because of all this organizational effort  – 
than before 9/11, our baseline? 
Answering these questions is essential for 
both,  the “incremental”  and the “future 
s h o c k ”  m i s s i o n s , a l b e i t e v e n m o r e 
complicated for  the second,  as I will  later 
demonstrate.
There is, of course, a  simple methodology 
to prove the effectiveness of most homeland 
security  measures to protect  our  security 
environment.  A  controlled experiment could, 
for  example, shut  down all iterative security 
measures at the airports of one state, while 
maintaining  them  at  all the other  airports in 
the United States.  Once all the protections 
and security  protocols in that state were 
removed,  we would just have to measure the 
difference between  the amount  of security 
incidents originating from  those airports 
(even  when  flights crossed state lines),  and 
compare them  with  the control group (the 
rest  of the US) to see if there was a  positive 
difference (i.e., the airports of that  state  were 
more secure) or  a negative difference (i.e.,  the 
airports of that  state where less secure).  This 
is the underlying logic  of the tests used by  the 
pharmaceutical industry  and the FDA  to 
determine the safety  of a drug, or  by  the 
computing  industry  to test the effectiveness 
of the security architecture of their networks.
 A  homemade version  of this test can be 
tried by  anyone: it  would just  be necessary  to 
take a  personal computer  and install a 
version  of Windows XP without Service Pack 
1  and 2,  no firewall and no antivirus program, 
and then  start using  the web with  Explorer 6. 
Then, the experimenter  will  have to wait  and 
see how  long  it  takes for  the computer  to get 
hacked or  infected by  a  virus. After  this test, 
he or  she will  now  know  with  certainty  how 
effective the previous security  measures were. 
(For  my  computer, it never took more than 
three minutes for  the OS kernel to be 
corrupted).
The moral, legal,  and political  implications 
of such  an  experimental  and controlled 
approach  to measure the effectiveness of a 
deterrence strategy  for  homeland security  are 
evident.
A  seemingly  less effective,  but certainly 
more humane alternative to address the task 
of assessing effectiveness has been  developed 
in  the form  of vulnerability  analysis 
methodology  for  critical  infrastructure 
protection, designed to study  and determine 
the best  way  to “allocate limited funding in 
such  a  way  as to minimize overall risk.” 43 
While this methodology  creates a more 
efficient  resource allocation  system  for 
homeland security  funding, the nature of the 
bureaucratic  culture signifies that risk 
reduction will  be perceived through  the lens 
of the continuous improvement  process and 
hence always as an incremental movement. 
As Christensen points out: 
One of  the dilemmas of management is 
that, by  their  very nature, processes are 
established so that  employees perform 
recurrent tasks in a consistent way, time 
after  time. To ensure consistency, they  are 
meant not to change or if  they must change, 
to change through tightly controlled 
procedures. This means that the very 
mechanisms through which organizations 
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create value are intrinsically  inimical to 
change.44
T h e r e f o r e ,  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
organizations will tend to evaluate critical 
infrastructure protection countermeasures, 
even  the disruptive ones, within the current 
continuous improvement paradigm. This is 
fine for  the systemic  mission,  but  everything 
related to the second mission,  the “future 
shock  mission,”  will  most  probably  be 
d i s c a r d e d ,  b e c a u s e d i s r u p t i v e a n d 
unpredictable  threats posed by  the 
recombining  nature of new  technologies 
cannot be confronted by  incremental 
methodologies. They  are by  definition outside 
of the feedback loop.
In  other words,  for the yet  to be planned 
homeland security  incident that  will use a 
new  combination  of technologies never  tried 
before, the current homeland security 
institutional  framework  cannot  connect the 
dots,  because there are no dots to be 
connected. What  makes Christensen’s 
concept  of disruptive technology  so troubling 
for  administrators all over the world is that 
he clearly  demonstrated that  good planning, 
and not the opposite,  was in  fact  one of the 
main reasons why  big companies failed and 
were crushed by  new  disruptive technologies. 
In  the context  of homeland security  policy, 
t h i s m e a n s t h a t w i t h  t h e c u r r e n t 
organizational  model,  the bureaucracy  might 
get  as good as it  can  possibly  be and still  miss 
the next threat precisely  because it has 
learned to be very  efficient in  its normal 
operation, thus resisting  any  change outside 
its sustaining  processes.  Hierarchical 
iterative bureaucracies are precisely  the worst 
kind of organizations to confront “out-of-the-
process” threats.  
This is why  I stated earlier  that a 
traditional bureaucracy  cannot  be the one 
reacting  to disruptive threats. Instead, to 
fight  this bureaucratic hysteresis the current 
homeland security  institutional design 
(indispensable for  the “systemic mission”) 
has to be complemented with  another  very 
different approach to security  to confront  the 
recombining threats of the permanently 
disrupted environment. A  new  ad-hocratic 
organization, with no direct  involvement  in 
the fight against incremental  threats or  the 
day-to-day  operation  of homeland security 
institutions,  should concentrate its efforts on 
producing  positive homeland security 
disruption to counteract the negative effects 
of the power of “the few.”
PUSHING THE BORDERS OF THE 
IMPOSSIBLE: DISRUPTING 
POSITIVELY THE HOMELAND 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
While  the first  homeland security  “systemic 
mission”  of neutralizing  incremental threats 
seems to be fulfilled in  an  acceptable way  by 
the current  homeland security  institutional 
model, the  second “future shock mission” 
focusing on  counteracting the threat  posed by 
the recombining  of disruptive technologies is 
almost  nonexistent.  In fact,  the relative 
success of the first  mission  is one of the 
biggest  obstacles to accomplishing  effectively 
the second one.  As the homeland security 
bureaucracy  becomes more effective  in 
limiting  the success ratio of incremental 
threats, it  creates a  political environment 
where it  is very  difficult for  the policymaker 
not to keep allocating  more resources to the 
same programs that  appear  to be working, 
therefore sustaining  the investment  cycle. 
This makes it  very  challenging for  the few  to 
repeat  the last  attack, but  it  also focuses the 
limited organizational resources and 
attention  span  on the last  incremental 
s c e n a r i o a n d a w a y  f r o m  t h e n e x t 
(unforeseeable) disruptive attack. Hence, the 
strategic  truism,  which states that  successful 
armies and navies are always preparing  to 
fight the last  war,  has, in this case, 
metaphorical and literal significance. 
In  this security  ecosystem  defined by  the 
accelerated pace of disruptive technological 
recombination, “connecting  the dots”  is not 
an  acceptable strategy  to avoid the next 
threat. Intelligence gathering is not possible 
for  attacks that  have not  yet  been  planned or 
even  conceived,  combining  technologies that 
are or  will  be available, but  were conceived 
for  other  purposes.  Also, while focused 
intelligence plays a  central role for avoiding 
specific threat  scenarios,  once these scenarios 
are identified and hopefully  neutralized they 
become, by  definition, part of the systemic 
mission and an incremental threat. 
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Instead,  homeland security  institutions 
addressing the “future shock mission”  have to 
be able to be proactive and become disruptive 
agents themselves.  In this way,  the state 
would reclaim  the initiative with  innovation 
(instead of fighting  against it),  provoking 
positive environmental  changes through  a 
sustained research  and development  effort. 
Doing  this requires an  organization  shielded 
from  the “systemic mission,”  designed to 
avoid the same things that  make other 
bureaucracies so successful: iteration  and 
incremental processes. 
Administrative reforms have a  bad name 
in  homeland security, probably  because there 
have been so many  of them  in  a  very  short 
amount of time. Wood and Waterman 
established that  political reorganizations 
might  not be enough  to break bureaucratic 
resistance to change when more than  one 
organizational culture exists inside the 
bureaucratic bodies. 45 That  is the case of the 
Department of Homeland Security, where the 
so-called department components (TSA,  CBP, 
the Coast  Guard,  FEMA, Secret  Service, etc.) 
have strong organizational  cultures that 
precede the merger  that created the 
department in 2002.  
It is precisely  for  this reason  that  a  new 
part ia l reorganizat ion  is necessary, 
addressing the limitations of the current 
structure to confront  the “future shock 
m i s s i o n . ”  T h e c u r r e n t  c o m p e t i n g 
organizational cultures of the homeland 
security  bureaucracy  are oriented to 
accomplish  the old missions of the 
department’s individual components,  fighting 
threats in  an  incremental  way.  Any  new  task 
given  to this existing structure will be 
watered down  by  an  older,  more successful, 
more proven  and more consolidated 
organizational ethos. Wilson explains it: 
Tasks that are not part of the culture will 
not be attended to with the same energy 
and resources as are devoted to tasks  that 
are part of it. Second, organizations in 
which  two or  more cultures struggle for 
supremacy will  experience serious conflict 
as defenders of  one seek to dominate 
representatives of the others. Third, 
organizations will resist taking on new 
tasks that  seem incompatible with its 
dominant culture. The stronger  and more 
uniform the culture – that  is, the more the 
culture approximates a sense of  mission – 
the more obvious these consequences.46 
In  the current homeland security 
administration  model ,  research  and 
development efforts are embedded in  the 
“systemic mission”  and most  if not all of its 
current  results are incremental  and not 
disruptive in  nature.  Therefore,  there is no 
incentive to look for  solutions to problems 
that  are not considered part of the 
operational objectives of the  current 
homeland security  environment.  That  is why 
there is so much  interest  and debate 
regarding, for  example,  the development  and 
implementation of the controversial  full body 
scanners (an  incremental  innovation  useful 
to the current  operational  mission of DHS), 47 
and so little interest  in countermeasures for 
security risks that have never been exploited.
 I n  f a c t , M i c h a e l  G r e e n b e r g e r 
demonstrated that  under  the current 
organizational  model,  homeland security’s 
institutions are unresponsive even  to 
technology  solutions that are widely 
available.  He found that  because of 
organizational  limits,  the  Department  of 
Homeland Security  was incapable of 
recognizing  widely  available technology 
solutions to security  threats in  at  least two 
cases: efficient  “see through”  technology  to 
screen  cargo,  and liquid explosive detection 
for  airplane passengers. To combat  this 
resistance, he proposed an institutional 
reform  to create inside DHS a  “Department 
o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y  T e c h n o l o g y 
Mobilization Board”  based on  the successful 
mobilizations boards used during  World War 
II to “review  and search out antiterrorism 
technology  and quickly  decide whether the 
new  technology  should be used and promoted 
in  the homeland security  effort.” 48  I would 
like to take this good proactive approach  a 
step further, using as a  model the most 
disruptive institution  for  military  research 
and development  in  the history  of mankind: 
the Defense Advanced Research  Projects 
Agency (DARPA).  
Created in 1958  after  the so-called 
“Sputnik  Crisis,”  when  the American 
government  was taken  by  surprise by  the 
successful  launching  of the Soviet  satellite 
Sputnik, DARPA’s mission  is “to maintain  the 
technological superiority  of the U.S.  military 
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and prevent  technological surprise from 
harming  our  national security  by  sponsoring 
revolutionary,  high-payoff research.” 49 It  is a 
highly  disruptive organization  “with  no 
operational  mission, no service requirements 
and designed to protect  fragile ephemeral 
projects.” 50  It  doesn’t  avoid future shocks 
surprises in  itself,  but tries to create its own 
surprises faster  than its adversaries,  thus 
controlling the pace of military innovation.
An organization  like DARPA  succeeds in 
managing  a  disrupted environment  because it 
does not  negate its disrupted or  disruptive-
prone nature,  but instead uses it  to its 
advantage.  This means that  it  fights surprise 
by  creating surprise, consciously  producing 
as many  environmental  disruptions as it  can. 
When DARPA succeeds,  it forces American 
adversaries into the uncomfortable position 
of being the ones reacting  to American 
military  disruption and trying  to guess the 
next move, robbing  those adversaries of the 
initiative that the few  naturally  tend to enjoy. 
By  doing  this, DARPA  does not counter 
specific future shock surprises, but  it creates 
a  security  environment where US Armed 
Forces have the upper hand. 
As any  investor  knows, high  return and 
high  risk  are directly  correlated. Therefore, 
high  payoff research  and development need a 
higher  institutional tolerance for  risk and 
failure.  Christensen points out  that  because 
“the ultimate uses or  applications for 
disruptive technologies are unknowable in 
advance ...  Failure is an intrinsic step toward 
success.” 51 DARPA’s creative process aims to 
“find an  area of technology  that  could go a 
long  way  toward serving  the needs of the 
country  if improved but  that wasn't  getting 
much  attention in  the private sector,  put 
some wel l -cons idered research  and 
development money  into it  to get  it  on its 
feet,  and then cut  it  loose.” 52 Because of this 
high-risk approach, some of its projects fail  in 
a  way  that  would put in  danger  the career  of 
t h e p r o j e c t  m a n a g e r  i n  a n y  o t h e r 
organization, while others,  like the Advanced 
R e s e a r c h  P r o j e c t s A g e n c y  N e t w o r k 
(ARPANET),  succeed in  forever transforming 
the human environment53.
For  this approach  to work in  the context  of 
homeland security,  it  is essential  to create an 
agency  isolated from  the core requirements of 
the “systemic mission.”  It  would have to be a 
task  oriented research  and development 
organization  designed to positively  disrupt 
the security  environment with  technology 
solutions for  problems not  yet identified by 
“the few.” 
Some, like Joshua  Cooper,  have used the 
metaphor  of an  institutional immune system 
to describe such  an  approach  to defend 
society  against the negative effect  of the 
accelerating  pace of change.  For  him, “this 
constant  surprise,  and the demand it  makes 
for  an  ‘always-on’ defense, is one of the 
reasons we need a  deep-security  immune 
system  instead of an  old-style Grand 
Strategy.” 54  An  evolving  homeland security 
immune system  requires a  risk  management 
approach  to identify  vulnerabilities with low 
investment-high  rewards opportunities to 
close a  technological security  hole while at 
the same time the usability  of the concerned 
technology  is preserved and, if possible, 
enhanced. 
DARPA’s success as the proactive 
component of the Department of Defense 
immune system  is due to the fact that  it  is 
structured as an adhocracy,  a  term  coined by 
Toffler  to describe an  organizational model 
where organic temporary  relations are 
established (hence the ad hoc  part  of the 
name) to respond to a particular  task  (or 
threat) with  very  little  or  no formal  hierarchy 
or  standardized behavior.  An adhocracy  is a 
“fast-moving,  information-rich, kinetic 
organization  of the future,  filled with 
transient  cells and extremely  mobile 
individuals.” 55  Such  a  model for homeland 
security  would create ephemeral  teams of 
experts used to close high risk security  holes 
that  would then  be disbanded to make place 
to another  team  formed to tackle another 
disruptive challenge.
In  fact,  as Christopher Ford identified, 
some of DARPA’s most recent projects have 
already  some unambiguous homeland 
security  implications. 56 The “DARPA  network 
challenge,”  for  example,  showed how  social 
networking  web tools and aggregators can  be 
engaged to gather  data,  mobilize participants, 
foster  collaboration, and build trust,57 in the 
context of multiple homeland security 
missions. 
For  the homeland security  “future shock” 
mission, the challenge is not  only  to pair  a 
disruptive solution  with  a  disruptive 
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problem; even  the problem  definitions 
themselves should be disruptive in nature: 
How  to neutralize  a  threat  that  no one has yet 
identified as a  threat? Thus, the “future 
shock”  prevention effort  must identify 
proactively  security  threats to the human 
environment  provoked by  the recombining  of 
technology  and human social and cultural 
behavior. 
Consequently, this new  homeland security 
institution  would have to invest  an important 
part  of its resources probing disruptive 
security  scenarios, using a “red team” 
m e t h o d o l o g y  t o i d e n t i f y  s e c u r i t y 
shortcomings. These “white hat”  hackers 
would try  to hack the whole United States of 
A m e r i c a t e c h n o l o g y  e n v i r o n m e n t , 
establishing  the mission  requirements for  the 
new  agency.  Only  then, after  a  critical 
technology  has failed this highly  classified 
penetrat ion  test or  a  scenario that 
recombines multiple technologies in  a  novel 
way  has been  identified,  research  and 
development could begin  to find a  minimum 
sufficient response that permits the 
technology  to operate as efficiently  as before 
but closes preventively  the security  hole. 
While this proactive approach  will  not 
identify  every  recombining  threat, it will add 
a  new  layer  of disruption and innovation  to 
the human  ecosystem  on  top of the ones that 
are already  in place, but  this time under  the 
direct control of the homeland security 
institutions.
Because there is no bigger  threat  to 
America’s interests than  the loss of 
competitiveness caused by  crippling  its 
critical sectors in  the name of pointless 
security  measures – something akin  to an 
autoimmune disease if we extend the 
metaphor  a  little bit  more – the concept of a 
“Minimum  Sufficient  Response”  is essential. 
In  fact, for  the effort  to be successful and 
sustainable, most of the tasks should be dual-
purpose,  enhancing (rather than  the 
opposite) the usability  of the concerned 
technology. This would also have a  protective 
effect  on American  civil liberties and human 
rights, by  limiting  the scope of the security 
procedures. If done properly, this new  actor 
in  the homeland security  environment would 
identify  unproductive and bloated security 
solutions where a  risk management  approach 
is absent  (i.e.  a  layer  of security  that  does 
nothing  to enhance the resilience of a 
technology), and could propose the necessary 
changes to improve the usability  of the 
system.
W h i l e i n c r e m e n t a l r e s e a r c h  a n d 
development is an  essential  part  of the 
“systemic mission,”  this new  organization 
should be isolated from  them.  If an  attack by 
the few  does occur,  the technological  solution 
needed to avoid such an  event in  the future 
should not  be  the responsibility  of this new 
institution. Once a real “red team”  has made 
explicit  the exploitable  vulnerability, fixing  it 
has become an  incremental  and not  a 
disruptive challenge.
Proving the effectiveness of this new 
institutional  approach  will be difficult  and 
will require “out  of the box”  managerial  and 
political skills. To demonstrate this,  I offer  to 
the reader  a  thought experiment: Imagine 
that  an  organization  like the one I am 
describing  existed in 1997.  In  1998,  the 
organization’s red teams identified the 
cockpit doors of commercial  airplanes as 
weak links in  the security  environment  of the 
transportation  sector  for  many  scenarios, 
none of which  looked like the 9/11  terrorist 
attacks.58  Then, multidisciplinary  research 
and development teams identified a 
Minimum  Sufficient Response technology 
solution: by  armoring  the cockpit  doors and 
making  it impossible for  the pilot  to open 
them  while airborne – even  if he or  she wants 
to (in  case the criminal actors try  to blackmail 
him  or her  by  holding  hostage a  passenger  or 
a  flight attendant) – no asymmetrical actor 
would be able to gain control of the airliner, 
closing the security hole. 
If such  a  process would have taken  place, 
we would never  know  that something  as 
costly  as 9/11  was deterred, but  we would 
have taken  advantage of a  low  investment-
high  reward opportunity  to “upgrade” the 
United States security  ecosystem  in  a 
disruptive way,  leaving  mostly  unaffected the 
usability  of the technology.  I use the 9/11 
example because it is a  disruptive threat that 
has already  been  identified and mostly 
neutralized by  precisely  this kind of solution 
(the most  cost  effective measure of all  the 
preventive solutions identified by  the 9/11 
commission  report).59 It also shows how  hard 
it  would it be to measure the effectiveness of 
a  procedure that might  deter  a  catastrophic 
NIETO-GOMEZ, POWER OF THE FEW  16
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 18 (DECEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
event  if that  event  never  takes place because 
of our actions.       
Finally,  because what I am  proposing  here 
is a  DARPA  inspired model  for  the problem 
o f a d a p t i n g t h e h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
organizational  framework to respond to the 
power  of “the few,”  it  is necessary  to explain 
why  I do not consider  the existing  HSARPA  a 
sufficient solution.  First,  HSARPA lacks the 
proper  funding needed to have the  same 
positive effect that DARPA  has had for 
research  and development. 60  Second, 
HSARPA  is devoting  most  of those resources 
to research incremental  solutions to 
incremental problems.  The HSARPA mission 
specifically  states that it  was created to 
“enhance departmental operations.”61 
Because of this,  HSARPA  is not capable of 
addressing the “future shock mission.”  One 
employee of the science and technology 
directorate at DHS described HSARPA to me 
as an  agency  “suffocating”  inside of the 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y 
bureaucratic structure. For  an organization to 
be successful at confronting disruptive 
technologies,  strong evidence suggests that 
an  independent small organization is needed 
to escape the gravitational field of the 
incremental mission  of the bigger  institution 
and its organizational  culture.62  Currently, 
most if not all  of the HSARPA  projects are 
sustaining research  and development 
programs pivoting  around the operational 
missions of the Department  of Homeland 
Security. 
CONCLUSION
The expressed objective of this article was to 
define the rapid pace of technology’s 
evolution  and its recombining nature as two 
primal  forces that shape the homeland 
security  environment  in  a way  that has 
lowered the barriers to entry  for  disruption 
by  small groups of actors that  I called here 
“ t h e f e w . ”  B e c a u s e o f t h i s r e c e n t 
phenomenon, high  tech  societies require a 
security  strategy  to react  to the threats that 
arise from  this amoral phenomenon, and to 
preserve innovation  opportunities and 
freedom  of usability  for  new  technologies.  In 
the United States,  this mission stands on  the 
shoulders of the homeland security 
institutional framework,  which  is a 
consequence of a  catastrophic  “power  of the 
few” attack. 
 It  was also my  intention to demonstrate 
how  the dual nature of innovat ion 
(incremental  and disruptive) creates very 
dif ferent  chal lenges to the security 
environment.  While  homeland security 
institutions seem  to be dealing effectively 
with  the incremental  threats,  the current 
model  offers no real response to the 
disruptive ones.  This has a  clear  and 
dangerous negative effect  on  the American 
strategic  process,  penalizing  disruptive 
solutions to disruptive threats, and 
privileging an  incremental approach to 
security  planning. Because both are needed,  a 
new  institutional  framework  should be 
instituted to take advantage of the proven 
s u p e r i o r i t y  o f a d h o c r a t i c  a d a p t i v e 
organizations to deal with  unpredictable, 
chaotic  environments.  By  adding a  new  layer 
of positive disruption  to the environment, 
positive and unpredictable  innovation  would 
provide the best possible antidote to negative 
innovation  and the illicit  appropriation of 
technology. 
America  has been  built  on  the belief that 
the future will be better  than  the past  and 
that  the best  way  to harness progress is to 
allow  people to experiment  and think freely. 
Protecting  the homeland must  become a 
synonym  for  protecting those foundational 
values, by  making sure that positive 
technological recombination  is available for 
all,  and people can  embrace and not be afraid 
of this permanently  disrupted human 
environment.
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